



BT 220 .O88 1896 v.2
Ottley, Robert L.
The doctrine of the
incarnation

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THE DOCTRINE
OF
THE INCARNATION

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OF
THE INCARNATION

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VOL. II
TO THE PRESENT DAY

LONDON
METHUEN & CO.
NEW YORK: MACMILLAN & CO.
1896

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THE INCARNATION

§ I. THE POST-NICENE PERIOD, 325-381

THE period intervening between the Council of Nicæa and that of Constantinople was one of doctrinal reaction, and consequent confusion. The minute study of historical details is unnecessary for our present purpose. Our task will be the more simple one of reviewing in general outline the different currents of thought and opinion which were set in motion by the momentous decision of Nicæa.

That decision, it may at once be stated, had been arrived at with a rapidity which took a large portion of the Church by surprise. The fact is that the celebrated watchword of catholic belief, the *Homoousion*, had been very reluctantly accepted by many members of the Council, to whom the use of an unscriptural term appeared to be at best an unwelcome necessity. The term not merely excited the hostility of declared Arians, who at this time formed a comparatively insignificant group, but also offended the conservative instincts of theologians trained in the school of Origen, such as Eusebius of Cæsarea. These men still clung to the subordinatianist teaching of their master, and were deeply concerned for the interests of his theological system. The defenders of the Nicene formula thus

found various reactionary forces ranged against them: the conservative theologians who deprecated any employment of non-scriptural terms; prelates of strong personal ambition like Eusebius of Nicomedia; declared Arians; besides the great body of indifferentist or unlearned bishops, who had been induced to accept the *Homoousion*, but still dreaded the spectre of Sabellianism. To these must be added the Meletian schismatics of Egypt, with whom the reactionary party eagerly made common cause, and the multitude of heathens and Jews who instinctively favoured the Arian, *i.e.* the semi-pagan conception of God.¹ Finally, the Emperor Constantine himself after a short interval threw the weight of his influence into the anti-Nicene scale, perhaps suspecting that the symbol adopted by the Council did not represent the general sense of Eastern theologians, and being anxious accordingly to interpret the *Homoousion* in such a way as covertly to reintroduce, or at least make room for, the vague ideas of Christ's person which the symbol had displaced. That a liberal interpretation of the Nicene formula was admissible is made clear by the letter to the Church of Cæsarea in which Eusebius defends his subscription. He states that he had accepted the *Homoousion* in a qualified sense as declaring merely the truth that the Son was derived from the Father (ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι τὸν υἱόν). The term, he says, implies that the Son of God "bears no resemblance to the creatures which have been made, but is in every way assimilated to the Father alone who begat Him,² and is not of any other subsistence or substance, but from the Father." Finally, he explains the rejection of the Arian tenet πρὸ τοῦ γεννηθῆναι οὐκ ἦν as intended merely to

¹ Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* ii. p. 230.

² *Ep. Euseb. ap. Ath. de decr. Nic.* μόνῳ δὲ τῷ πατρὶ τῷ γεγεννηκότι κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀφωμοιωσθαι.

assert the doctrine of the Son's pre-existence before the Incarnation.

Thus the real controversy as to the Deity of the Son can only be said to have begun with the Nicene Council. For nearly sixty years the wearisome strife was prolonged; a strife ennobled indeed by instances of steadfast faith and endurance, but abounding also in miserable lapses and scandals, and specially disgraced by the relentless use of persecution. One figure alone can be said to stand out in heroic proportions,—that of the great Athanasius, who on succeeding to the episcopal throne of Alexandria (326) rose at once to the position of leadership, with the significant result that the anti-Nicene movement became during a considerable period mainly a personal crusade against Athanasius.

The actual struggle seems to fall naturally into three main divisions or stages:—(1) the period from 325 to the Council of Sardica, 343; (2) from 344 to the death of Constantius, 361; (3) from 361 to the Council of Constantinople, 381.

I. The first stage of the conflict may be described briefly as a period of Eusebian reaction and ascendancy. By dexterous use of their influence at Constantine's court, the Arianising party succeeded in accomplishing to a large extent the objects they had in view, which were mainly two: the removal of the leading catholic prelates, especially their most formidable and powerful opponent, Athanasius, and the withdrawal of the *Homoousion*.¹ Under the astute guidance of the unscrupulous Eusebius of Nicomedia they managed, partly by violence, but mainly by intrigue, to secure for themselves the leading

¹ Ath. *de Synod.* xxxii. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν συνόδων, καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν γραφομένων δέικνυσι τοὺς ἐν αὐταῖς συνελθόντας μαχομένους μὲν πρὸς τὴν ἐν Νικαίᾳ σύνοδον, ἀσθενούντας δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

sees of the East ; and the deposition of Eustathius, bishop of Antioch, in 331, was followed after a prolonged struggle by the condemnation of Athanasius at the Council of Tyre (335), and his banishment to Trêves (336). In the same year (336) Arius suddenly died on the very eve of his enforced readmission to communion, and a few months later (May 337) Constantine himself passed from the scene, with the result that Eusebius of Nicomedia became the acknowledged leader of the anti-Nicene party. His promotion to the see of Constantinople (339), and that of Acacius to Cæsarea (340), were events which displayed the bias of the new emperor, Constantius.

We thus find two parties confronting each other during this first period. (1) The Catholics, or Nicenes, under the leadership of Athanasius, were intent on guarding the symbol of the Council. The main stronghold of the catholic cause was in the West, one effect of Athanasius' banishment having been the formation of close ties between himself and some of the Western bishops, notably Julius of Rome. Indeed, Rome became from this time forward the stronghold of orthodoxy—a point which proved to be of special importance when the attacks on Athanasius were renewed (338–340). (2) The “Eusebians,” or “Acacians,” while professing to condemn the developed tenets of Arius, clung tenaciously to the subordinatianist theology which they had inherited from Origen, and aimed at the total exclusion from the creed of non-scriptural terms. The party included men of different types, some of them more in earnest than others, but those who came to the front were mere political intriguers, contending for religion without possessing it,—men like Eusebius himself, Acacius “the chameleon,” George of Laodicea, Leontius of Antioch, and at a later time Eudoxius, and the Western bishops

Valens and Ursacius. The great number and variety of the creeds which they put forth, between 340 and 361, testifies to their consciousness of the fact that they must confront the catholic *Homoousion* with something more substantial than mere negations, while they must satisfy the orthodoxy of the West by a decided condemnation of Arianism. This is the dogmatic importance of the creeds of Antioch and Sirmium, of which Athanasius gives an account in his work *de Synodis*. Before examining these, however, it is necessary to return to the Nicene party in order to describe briefly some circumstances which added impetus to the reactionary movement.

We have noticed that one consideration which caused the *Homoousion* to be accepted with great reluctance was the fact that it had been condemned at Antioch (269), as a phrase capable of Sabellian connotation. The fear of Sabellianism was very prevalent in the East, and unfortunately it was not long before the Eusebians could point triumphantly to the appearance of the very doctrinal tendencies which they had (to some extent, no doubt, sincerely) deprecated.

Marcellus, bishop of Ancyra, was a friend of Athanasius, and a zealous supporter of the Nicene symbol. In controversy, however, with the Arian Asterius, he unguardedly pressed the doctrine of the *Homoousion* in a Sabellian direction. His aim probably was to be true to the monotheistic language of Scripture, and to expose the tendency to polytheism which he, like Athanasius, discerned in the Arian belief. Marcellus was led "in the way of argument," we are told, to describe the Logos as an impersonal attribute of the Godhead, originally quiescent or potential, but in due time forthcoming and operative as ἐνέργεια δραστική. He held that for the purposes of creation, redemption, and sanctification, the

Divine Monad, without any loss of its essential unity, "expanded itself" into a triad (*πλατύνεται εἰς τριάδα*); but that ultimately, when the Logos and the Spirit should have fulfilled their respective functions, it would again "contract itself" (*συστέλλεται τριάς*). Marcellus also rejected the catholic doctrine of the Divine generation; Scripture, he maintained, nowhere mentions any "generation" of the Logos. He would accordingly confine the expressions, *Son*, *Image*, *Firstborn*, to the *incarnate* Christ, thus practically ignoring or denying the pre-existent personality of the Word, who, he held, was manifested in personal distinctness from the Father only at the Incarnation. In the historic Christ the Logos became personal, became the "Son of God."¹ In fact, according to Marcellus, the Incarnation was only a temporary economy; the Logos, having completed His redemptive work, laid aside the manhood which He had assumed, surrendered the kingdom to the Father, and was again merged in the Deity, becoming what He was before the Incarnation.² Marcellus indeed appears to have displayed the same Pantheistic tendency which had marked the system of Sabellius. He attempts, but fails in the attempt, to co-ordinate the idea of a coeternal Logos with that of filiation; and his solution of the problem involved abandonment of that very mystery of the eternal Sonship, the discernment and formulation of which had been the result of the doctrinal struggles of the third century.³

¹ Ath. *Orat. c. Arian.* iv. 22, τὸν Λόγον ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν εἶναι Λόγον ἀπλῶς. ὅτε δὲ ἐνηνθρώπησε, τότε ὠνομάσθαι υἱόν.

² Basil, *Ep.* lxi. 2 (writing to Athanasius), mentions this as the gist of M.'s heresy, ὅς Λόγον μὲν εἰρήσθαι τὸν μονογενῆ διδωσι, κατὰ χρεῖαν καὶ ἐπὶ καιροῦ προσελθόντα, πάλιν δὲ εἰς τὸν ὅθεν ἐξῆλθεν ἐπαναστρέψαντα οὔτε πρὸ τῆς ἐξόδου εἶναι οὔτε μετὰ τὴν ἐπάνοδον ὑφεστάναι. What became of the actual human body of Christ Marcellus does not appear to explain.

³ On Marcellus, see Ath. *Apol. c. Arian.* xxxii., xlvii.; *Orat. c. Arian.*

Photinus, bishop of Sirmium, the pupil of Marcellus, developed his master's teaching in an Ebionitic direction. In his view, Christ was a mere man supernaturally born of a virgin, and exalted to Divine dignity. The Logos indwelling Christ was an impersonal attribute of God, whom Photinus described as *Λογοπάτωρ*, i.e. both Father and Logos. This type of error approximated to the views of Paul the Samosatene, while the system of Marcellus was akin to Sabellianism.¹ It is obvious what a heavy discouragement the lapse of Marcellus and Photinus must have been to the catholic cause. The Eusebians were not slow to use their advantage, and in more than one of the Antiochene and Sirmian creeds they expressly condemned the errors of both teachers. Athanasius seems to have dealt very tenderly with Marcellus, and was for a long while inclined to defend him; at Rome his somewhat evasive confession of faith was apparently accepted as orthodox by Julius in a Synod held in 341;² but Athanasius eventually felt himself bound to abandon the defence of one whose teaching had been so dangerously developed by Photinus.³

Turning now to the various creeds put forth by the Eusebians, the dates of which range over the period between 341 (Council of the "Dedication" at Antioch) and 359, when the "dated" creed (third Sirmian) was forced upon the Western bishops assembled at Ariminum, we may notice some features which indicate the general position of the opponents of the Nicene symbol.

iv.; Epiph. *Hær.* lxxii. Also Harnack, *Dogm.* ii. p. 235 note; Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. 273-283; Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*, pp. 75-89; Zahn, *Marcellus von Ancyra*, cited by Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Stud. der Dogmengeschichte*, § 33.

¹ Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. note 53. Cp. Epiph. *Hær.* lxxi.

² See the letter of Julius in Ath. *Apol.* c. *Arian.* c. xxxii.

³ Marcellus was deposed by a (Eusebian) Synod at Constantinople in 336; Photinus at Sirmium in 351.

(a) The general type of Christology exhibited by these documents is Origenistic. They contain strong assertions of the favourite Arian thesis that there can be only one "unoriginate" (ἐν τὸ ἀγέννητον), and that consequently the Son is subordinate as being γέννητος, "having as His origin (ἀρχήν) the Father who generated Him, for *the Head of Christ is God*."¹ The denial that the Son was begotten by an act of the Father's will (θελήσει or βουλήσει) is condemned: "those who irreverently say that the Son was generated not by choice or will, thus encompassing God with a necessity which excludes choice and purpose, so that He begat the Son unwillingly, we account as most impious and alien to the Church."² But in general there is an evident anxiety on the part of the framers of the creeds to approach as closely as possible to the Athanasian standpoint: a marked deference to the statements of Scripture, and a characteristic tendency to heap up terms expressive of the Son's dignity by way of compensation for the omission of the *Homousion*. Thus the second Antiochene symbol styles the Son, θεὸν ἐκ θεοῦ, ὅλον ἐξ ὅλου, μόνον ἐκ μόνου, τέλειον ἐκ τελείου, βασιλέα ἐκ βασιλέως, κύριον ἀπὸ κυρίου, λόγον ζῶντα, σοφίαν ζῶσαν, φῶς ἀληθινὸν, ὄδον, ἀλήθειαν, ἀνάστασιν, ποιμένα, θύραν, ἄτρεπτόν τε καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον τῆς θεότητος, οὐσίας τε καὶ βουλῆς καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δοξῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπαράλλακτον εἰκόνα, τὸν πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως, κ.τ.λ.³ Again, in the third creed of Antioch,⁴ the Son is declared to be "perfect God of perfect God, begotten of the Father before the worlds." But throughout the symbols there

¹ The "Macrostich" in Ath. *de Synod.* xxvi. 3; so the "First Sirmian" [351], xviii. οὐ γὰρ συντάσσομεν υἱὸν τῷ πατρὶ, ἀλλ' ὑποτεταγμένον τῷ πατρί.

² "Macrostich," *ubi sup.* 8.

³ Ath. *de Synod.* xxiii.

⁴ *Ibid.* xxiv.

is a steady avoidance of the one crucial test of orthodox catholic belief.

(b) It is to be further observed that in some of these creeds there is an express condemnation of Arian statements, intended doubtless to conciliate the Catholics; but a comparison of the anathemas of the "Macrostich" for example, with those affixed to the creed of Nicæa, illustrates the tendency of the Eusebians to shelter themselves behind evasive phraseology. In the "Macrostich," it is declared "unsafe" to assert that the Son is ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, or ἐξ ἐτέρας τινος ὑποστάσεως παρὰ τὸν πατέρα, or that "there was a time when He was not"; but the only reason alleged is that these phrases are *not found in Scripture*,—an assertion which leaves open the question of their truth or falsity. It is significant also that the epithet κτιστόν which Arius applied to the Son, and which was anathematised by the Nicene Fathers, is omitted from the list of expressions condemned by the "Macrostich," nor is there any repudiation of the Arian assertion οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γεννηθῆναι.¹

(c) Again, several of the creeds contain a very decided condemnation of the teaching of Marcellus, which is not improbably aimed at Athanasius. Thus it is declared that Christ "abides as King and God for evermore"; that "His kingdom continues indissoluble to endless ages";² while in the "Macrostich" the disciples of Marcellus and "Scotinus" (Photinus) are expressly anathematised for rejecting Christ's pre-existence, deity, and unending kingdom, "upon pretence of supporting the *Monarchia*."³ It is clear that while the Nicene symbol was avoided as unscriptural, and Sabellian in tendency, the aberration of Marcellus and his adherents was welcomed by the Eusebians as a kind of object-

¹ But see the close of the second Antiochene symbol: *de Synod.* xxiii.

² *de Synod.* xxii., xxv., xxvi.

³ *Ibid.* xxvi. 6.

lesson, effectively illustrating the consequences of the Athanasian position.¹

Enough has been said to give a fair idea of the attitude assumed by the Eusebians. The mere number and variety of the symbols produced by them sufficiently proves the weak and undecided character of their belief, and its inability to offer serious resistance to the pressure of hostile dialectic. Yet the position of this party seemed to be justifiable so long as the Nicenes could plausibly be represented as inclining to Sabellianism. In the next stage of the struggle the anti-Nicene coalition was to some extent dissolved; the more religious-minded members of the party, after holding for a long while to the Origenist Christology, came to the point of declaring at the Synod of Ancyra (358) that the Son was not a creature, and that He was begotten of the Father's substance (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας). When once they were convinced that the Nicene symbol was not intended to shelter Sabellianism, they gradually drew nearer to the Catholics, and finally coalesced with them. The doctrine of such men as Basil of Ancyra, or Cyril of Jerusalem, was practically, if not verbally, that of Nicæa.

The importance of the proceedings at the Council of Sardica (343-344) is rather historical than dogmatic. The withdrawal of the Eusebians to Philippopolis served to exhibit very clearly the cleavage of opinion between East and West. The seceding party, besides deposing various Western prelates and reaffirming the former sentences against Athanasius, finally adopted a creed which was practically identical with the fourth Antiochene symbol.² The Westerns, under Hosius, contented them-

¹ See a list of the most important creeds in Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 91 [vol. i. p. 358].

² See Hilar. *de Synod.* xxxiv.; cp. Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* ii. 239.

selves with reaffirming the symbol of Nicæa,¹ and went so far as to acquit Marcellus of the charges brought against him by the Eusebians.

II. After 344 there was a rapid development of the situation, and it was not long before the adherents of the Nicene symbol found that they had to reckon with three divergent types of belief.

1. The Eusebians, after prolonged efforts to find a satisfactory formula, eventually adopted as their watch-word the phrase ὅμοιον κατὰ πάντα.² Their aim was to exclude any non-scriptural phrase, and accordingly they were only consistent in dropping any reference to the Divine substance (οὐσία). The vagueness of the phrase ὅμοιον perfectly suited the purposes of the irreligious and indifferent members of the party. The expression seems to appear publicly for the first time in the so-called "dated" creed, or third Sirmian (359), in which the Son is confessed to be ὅμοιος τῷ γεννήσαντι αὐτὸν πατρὶ κατὰ τὰς γραφάς.³ An explanation is appended as follows:—"Whereas the term 'substance' (οὐσία) has been adopted by the Fathers in simplicity, and gives offence as unintelligible to the people, and not contained in the Scriptures, it has seemed good that it be removed, and that it be never in any case applied to God again, because the Divine Scriptures nowhere mention the οὐσία of Father and Son. But we say that the Son is like the Father in all things (ὅμοιον τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ πάντα), as all the Holy Scriptures declare and teach."

¹ Ath. tom. ad Antioch. 5.

² In the second Sirmian creed ("the blasphemy": see Ath. de Synod. xxviii.), the Arian leaders, Valens, Ursacius, and others, make a new departure. They represent the *mystery* of the Divine generation as an excuse for ignoring the *fact*. The use of οὐσία is prohibited, on the ground that the Father alone knows how He begat the Son. This, as Gwatkin remarks, was a new policy (*Studies of Arianism*, p. 157).

³ See Athan. de Synod. viii. ; cp. xxx.

This document was probably drafted by the semi-Arian prelate, Mark of Arethusa,¹ and is evidently the result of a compromise, the more strict symbol of the semi-Arians (ὁμοιούσιον) being omitted. Virtually it expresses the views of the Acacian or neo-Eusebian party, and the ὅμοιον is the *positive* symbol which at the close of this period, by aid of intrigue and persecution, ultimately triumphed. For it was a recension of this "dated" creed that was eventually forced on the Western bishops at Ariminum (359), a document which indeed was of an even lower type than the original, inasmuch as the bare phrase ὅμοιον was craftily substituted for ὅμοιον κατὰ πάντα, while the use not only of οὐσία but also of ὑπόστασις in relation to the Divine Persons was proscribed.² Not only was the West compelled to accept this document; it was also adopted a few months later by an Acacian Council at Constantinople (360). Thus in 360 "the whole world groaned and marvelled to find itself Arian."³

The real objection to the phrase ὅμοιον is not its incorrectness, but its obviously evasive character. By semi-Arians like Basil of Ancyra, it could be employed in a virtually catholic sense, as including the idea of likeness "in will, in subsistence, in existence, in being," likeness such as a son bears to a father.⁴ So Cyril of Jerusalem speaks freely of the Son as ὅμοιος κατὰ πάντα, ἐν πᾶσιν ὅμοιος, and seems to regard this confession as

¹ A clear account of the circumstances is given by Dr. Bright, *Historical Writings of S. Athanasius*, Introd. p. lxxxi. ff.

² See the creed in *Ath. de Synod.* xxx., which should be compared with the "dated" creed in c. viii.

³ *Jerom. adv. Lucif.* vii. The most prominent Eusebian of this period was the unscrupulous Valens, bishop of Mursa in Pannonia.

⁴ See Basil's declaration, ap. *Epiph. Hær.* lxxiii. 22, κατὰ πάντα δε οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὑπαρξιν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.

the "royal road" of orthodox belief.¹ Nor does even Athanasius hesitate to repeatedly employ the expression.² But as used by Arianising theologians the ὁμοιον was ambiguous: it might connote mere likeness in will, or character, or operation, and indeed, as we shall presently see, it was liable to be employed as the logical premiss from which was deduced the blasphemous formula ἀνόμοιον.

2. This period (344-361) also witnesses the rise of the so-called "semi-Arian," or as it might be more correctly called, the "semi-Nicene" school, consisting of those who in perfect sincerity and on religious and doctrinal grounds, objected to the *Homoousion* as Sabellian in tendency, and preferred to adhere to the Cæsarean creed presented at the Council by Eusebius. There were earnest and even devoted men among them, such as Mark of Arethusa, Cyril of Jerusalem, and the learned and blameless Basil of Ancyra. It should be added that Constantius himself—wavering, restless, despotic, and passionate as he was—more decidedly inclined to this party than to their *Homœan* or Acacian rivals.³ These theologians were deeply imbued with the subordinatianist teaching of the pre-Nicene period, but they were desirous to side with Athanasius, and were more and more alarmed and repelled by the growing secularity and profanity of the Acacian party. Nor did they share in the strong aversion to non-scriptural phraseology which was supposed to be the chief objection to the symbol of Nicæa.

In 358 the views of this middle party took shape at the Synod of Ancyra held under the presidency of Basil.⁴

¹ See *Catech.* iv. 7; xi. 4; xi. 17.

² See passages in Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, vol. ii. pp. 432 f.

³ Newman, *Arians*, p. 297.

⁴ See Epiph. *Hær.* lxxiii. 2-11. Cp. Loofs, *op. cit.* § 34.

The synodal letter of this Council shows that pure Arianism at anyrate was not the creed of the East, for it definitely repudiates the strictly Arian tenets, *e.g.* the *ἀνόμοιον* and the creatureliness of the Logos. It insists that in essence the Son is like the Father (*ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν*),¹ but at the same time the *Homoousion* is condemned.²

The proceedings of this Council are interesting for more than one reason. It was a clear gain that there should be some decisive protest against positive Arianism;³ but the distinctive features of the Ancyrene statement are—(1) its insistence on our Lord's *Sonship* as implying *ὁμοιότης*. Our Lord bids us be baptized in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, "in order that . . . hearing the title *Son* we may conceive of the Son as *like* the Father whose Son He is." The revelation of the Divine Fatherhood is in fact a clue to the theological problem. "In the phrase *ἀγέννητος*," says Basil, "there is no indication of the *Father's* power." . . . "Even if we mention the name Father, we find suggested in the very title the notion of the Son. For a father is so called as being the father of a son."⁴ (2) The scriptural defence of the *ὁμοιούσιον*. (3) The repudiation of the *ὁμοούσιον* as virtually equivalent to *ταύτοούσιον*, used in a Sabellian sense.⁵ Evidently the Synod was anxious to mediate between the Sabellian and Arian views of Christ's person. The texts quoted in support of the *ὁμοιούσιον* were such as S. John v. 19 (*ὁμοιῶς ποιεῖ*) and 26, Rom. viii. 3, Phil. ii. 7, and

¹ Epiph. *Hær.* lxxiii. 5.

² *Ibid.* 11.

³ The Synod condemned the Arian manifesto of Sirmium ("second Sirmian," called the "blasphemy"). See Ath. *de Synod.* xxviii.

⁴ Epiph. lxxiii. §§ 3, 14, 19. Cp. very similar language in Basil of Cæsarea, *Ep.* xxxviii. 4; Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxx. 20.

⁵ Other points are noticed in a long note of Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* ii. p. 249.

special stress was laid on the expression *Image of God* as implying likeness, but not identity of substance. In fact, with the declaration of *likeness* the semi-Arians were satisfied. Athanasius speaks of them with uniform respect and consideration. "Those," he says, "who accept everything else that was settled at Nicæa, and dispute only about the *Homoousion*, are not to be regarded as enemies; nor do we attack them as Arians, or as opponents of the Fathers; but we discuss the matter with them as brethren with brethren, who have the same meaning as ourselves, and differ only about the word. For when they acknowledge that the Son is ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἐτέρας ὑποστάσεως, and that He is not a creature or a product, but genuine and natural offspring (γνήσιον καὶ φύσει γέννημα), and that He is eternally with the Father as being His Word and Wisdom, they are not far from accepting even the *Homoousion*."¹ It would seem that the influence of *Hilary* did much towards gradually drawing over the semi-Arians to the catholic view. His treatise *de Synodis*, which was written apparently in 358, was designed to bring about an understanding between the Gallican Church and the semi-Arians. Hilary frankly recognises the difficulties which hindered the latter from accepting the *Homoousion*, but exhorts them earnestly no longer to repudiate a formula which alone could secure the doctrine which he and they prized—the true Sonship of our Lord. "*Homoüsion* intelligo ex Deo Deum, non dissimilis essentiae, non divisum sed natum, et ex innascibilis Dei substantia congenitam in Filio, secundum similitudinem, unigenitam nativitatem. Quid fidem meam in *homoüsion* damnas, quam per *homoeüsii* professionem non potes non probare?" Finally, he adds, "Date veniam, fratres, quam frequenter poposci.

¹ *de Synod.* xli.

Ariani non estis; cur negando *Homoiusion* censemini Ariani?"¹

3. Meanwhile the doctrine of strict or logical Arianism was developed in the hands of Aëtius and Eunomius in a direction which Arius himself seems to have suggested.² Of these two leaders little needs to be said. Aëtius appears to have been in succession a vine-dresser, a goldsmith, and a medical practitioner. Both he and his pupil Eunomius had practised disputation, and both displayed the familiar Arian characteristics. But with some faculty of disputation, and skill in Aristotelian methods of dialectic, they combined a disdain of dissimulation which was comparatively creditable, and which soon brought upon them the resentment of Constantius. After 360 the *Anomæan* Arians ceased to be formidable; indeed it is evident that the formulation of their tenets produced a reaction, as is proved by their condemnation at Ancyra. The general line of their reasoning was as follows. Starting from the conception of God as *ὁ ἀγέννητος*, they argued that between the *ἀγέννητος* and *γέννητος* there could be no *essential* resemblance (*κατ' οὐσίαν*), but at most a *moral* resemblance.³ As the Unbegotten, God is an absolutely simple being; an act of generation would involve a contradiction of His essence

¹ Hilar. *de Synod. seu de fide Orientalium*, lxxxviii. (written probably at the end of 358). By "congenitam in Filio . . . nativitatem," H. seems to mean, "a simultaneous, unique generation involving perfect likeness." This is an assertion apparently of the fact that the Son is *coeval* with the Father, *only-begotten*, and, as a consequence, the *exact image* of the Father's substance.

² In the *Thalia*, ap. Ath. *Orat. c. Arian.* i. 6, ὁ λόγος ἀλλότριος μὲν καὶ ἀνόμοιος κατὰ πάντα τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας καὶ ιδιότητός ἐστιν, κ.τ.λ.

³ Eunom. *Expos. fid.* 2, ὅμοιον τῷ γεννήσαντι μόνον κατ' ἐξαιρετον ὁμοιότητα . . . οὐδὲ ὡς ἀγέννητον ἀγεννήτω. Cp. *Apol.* xiv., xxviii., ap. Fabricius, *Bibl. Græca*, vol. viii. c. 23. Epiph. *Hær.* lxxvi. gives the *συνταγματίον* of Aëtius. Cp. Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxix. 10, οὐ ταῦτόν, φησί, τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ τὸ γέννητον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ ὁ υἱὸς τῷ πατρὶ ταῦτόν.

by introducing duality into the Godhead. The Unbegotten cannot possibly resemble in essence that which is begotten. The formulæ arrived at by this kind of reasoning were *ἐτερότης κατ' οὐσίαν, ἀνόμοιος καὶ κατὰ πάντα καὶ κατ' οὐσίαν*, etc. The Acacians did not venture openly to favour the *Anomæans*, and actually anathematised them at Seleucia in 359,¹ but as Newman points out, in its practical effect the *ὅμοιον* was really equivalent to the *ἀνόμοιον*, "mere similarity always implying difference."²

It is not necessary to enter at length into the historical relations between the different parties whose divergent beliefs we have been reviewing. It is enough to point out that the exclusion of other formulæ seemed to pave the way for the victory of the *ὅμοιον*.

The logical Arians fearlessly concluded that Christ was not God; the semi-Arians, who differed from the Arians not only in their more religious tone of mind, but also in their sense of the mystery of the Divine Being and relationships, could not satisfactorily clear themselves of the charge of ditheism;³ the Emperor and the court party (Acacians) soon perceived that if peace was to be restored, it could only be by dropping the *Homoousion* and carrying a neutral formula, such as *ὅμοιον κατὰ πάντα ὡς αἱ γραφαὶ λέγουσιν*. It was a deadlock, and a colourless and indefinite symbol seemed to be the only mode of escape. Consequently the "third Sirmian" creed was drawn up as a provisional formula (May 359), but that which was eventually carried at the divided Council of Ariminum and Seleucia contained, as we have

¹ *Ath. de Synod.* xxix.

² *Arians*, p. 306.

³ The exposition of faith at Ancyra says of S. Paul's preaching at Corinth, τῷ ἀσυλλογίστῳ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐμώρανε τὴν σοφίαν τῶν συλλογίζεσθαι δυναμένων (*Epiph.* lxxiii. 6). See Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, 2. 284; Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* ii. 244.

noticed, a bare assertion of the ὅμοιον, Valens audaciously omitting the qualifying words κατὰ πάντα. This imperial creed, as it may fairly be called, was forced upon the Western bishops in exchange for the condemnation of pure Arianism.¹

Thus the work of Nicæa was undone. In 360 in a Council held at Constantinople the Acacians completed their triumph. Probably in deference to the suspicions of Constantius, Aëtius was banished, while some leading semi-Arians, Basil, Macedonius, Cyril, and others, were deposed and exiled as troublers of the Church's peace. Hilary, after making a desperate effort to reopen the discussion of the faith before the Emperor and Council,² shared the same fate. The prospects of the Church at the time of Constantius' death were indeed as gloomy as could well be conceived,—the Latins committed to an Arian creed, the Roman bishop Liberius a renegade, Hosius dead, Athanasius a wanderer in the deserts, Arian prelates in most of the sees of Eastern Christendom, perplexity and dismay in the hearts of the faithful laity who still adhered to the Nicene faith.³

III. The years 361–381 witnessed the doctrinal break-up of Arianism, and the decline and close of its ascendancy. The return of Athanasius to Alexandria took place on Julian's accession; in the following summer (362) a Synod was held at Alexandria to discuss several points of pressing importance, especially the treatment of bishops who had arianised. As to these it was decided that those who had communicated with

¹ See Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* ii. 246, 247. Cp. Ath. *de Synod.* viii. Ath. points out in *de Synod.* iii. and iv. that the creed is dated, and its novelty confessed by the very fact.

² In his *ad Const. Aug.* lib. ii.

³ See Newman's *Arians*, App. Note V.

Arians compulsorily, through surprise or weakness, should continue to hold their sees on signing the *Homoousion*. All, in fact, were to be welcomed into Christian fellowship who would *now* accept the Nicene formula and condemn Arianism.

The other main question raised at the Council was one of phraseology. Confusion had arisen from the fact that the Westerns used *hypostasis* as synonymous with *substantia* (οὐσία), and accordingly spoke of *una hypostasis*, while the usual Eastern phrases were *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις* and *μία οὐσία*. The difficulty was specially acute in relation to the schism at Antioch, where the Meletians adhered to the phrase *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*, while the schismatic party of Paulinus (Nicoenes) preferred *τρία πρόσωπα*. The Council of Alexandria incidentally endeavoured to heal the trouble at Antioch, but its efforts were frustrated by the self-willed action of Lucifer, bishop of Cagliari. Its main concern, however, was to regulate and adjust the theological terminology which had occasioned confusion. After mutual explanations had been offered, it was decided that both phrases (*una hypostasis* and *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*) were to be deprecated. Neither οὐσία nor ὑπόστασις, it was maintained, were strictly applicable to the Godhead, οὐσία being nowhere used in the Scriptures with any reference to the Divine Being, and ὑπόστασις being employed by the apostle only "through a dogmatic necessity" (τῇ τῶν δογμάτων ἀνάγκῃ). The use of these terms, therefore, though acknowledged to be allowable in any other connection (καθ' ἕτερον λόγον) was practically discouraged, and the Nicene creed was unanimously adopted as a standard not only of belief, but of phraseology.¹ Besides declaring the divinity of the Holy Spirit against Mace-

¹ See Ath. tom. ad Antioch. 5, 6; Socr. H.E. iii. 7. Cp. Newman, *Arians*, c. v. § 1.

donius, the Council also asserted the verity of our Lord's reasonable human soul. In the following year (363) a synod held at Antioch, under the presidency of Meletius, accepted the *Homoousion* in the somewhat evasive sense, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱὸς ἐγεννήθη καὶ ὅτι ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν τῷ πατρί.¹ The explanation is significant; while it covered the ambiguous confession of men like Acacius, it served also to mark the amalgamation of religious-minded semi-Arians with the Nicenes.

During the interval between this Council and the synod of Constantinople (381) several prominent figures passed from the scene. The death of Liberius (366) was followed by that of Hilary (368). Athanasius himself, after once again suffering exile during the persecution of Valens, passed away in 373; and Basil of Cæsarea in 379. The accession of Theodosius in 379 restored the hopes of the orthodox. Eight years after the death of Athanasius the second ecumenical Council was summoned to meet at Constantinople. No Western bishops were present, but 150 Eastern prelates attended. The first president, Meletius of Antioch, died during the session of the Council, and was succeeded by Gregory, and he, on his resignation, by Nectarius. Among those present at the sittings were Gregory of Nyssa and Cyril of Jerusalem. According to the prevailing view, the result of the Council was the adoption of the Nicene creed, with certain additions,—a clause directed against the tenets of Marcellus, and an expansion of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, in view of the Macedonian development of Arianism. But historical investigation points to a different origin of the formula supposed to have been adopted at Constantinople. There is good reason for doubting whether the so-called Niceno-Constantino-

¹ Soer. *H.E.* iii. 25.

politan creed was the one really subscribed by the Council. It seems probable that the Synod of 381 put forth no new symbol, but contented itself with acknowledging the Nicene creed.¹ The creed which we usually call "Nicene" (Niceno-Constantinopolitan) was probably a recension of an older creed, possibly the traditional baptismal creed of Jerusalem,² enlarged by Cyril soon after his transition from semi-Arianism to the *Homoousion* (about 362). It was only at a later time, when the Council of 381 was generally recognised as ecumenical, that the creed was ascribed to it. "It was to all appearance reserved for a later time than the age of Chalcedon to confuse the 'creed of the 150' with the enlarged Nicene creed, and thus to complete the fictitious history which was begun when the 150 Fathers of Constantinople were first reputed to be the authors of the creed, of which we may well believe that they had expressed approval."³ Thus, in fact, it would seem that the Nicene symbol "in its turn gave place to a creed of yet more venerable ancestry, the worthiest of those that were called forth after a longer experience by the wants of a more auspicious time." There is nothing to show why the creed in its present form was attributed to the Council of 381. It should be observed in regard to this symbol that (1) as compared with the Nicene creed, it omits the explanatory clause, *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός*, and the anathemas; (2) as compared with later definitions, there is no assertion of the consubstantiality (*Homoousion*) of the Holy Spirit.⁴

¹ So Sozom. *H.E.* vii. 9. See the arguments of Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* ii. 265 note, and Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengesch.* i. 192 note. Cp. Hort, *Two dissertations* (1876); Loofs, *Dogmengesch.* § 34, 4 note.

² See Cyril, *Catech.* v. 12.

³ Hort, *Two dissertations*, p. 115.

⁴ The attempt to reconcile the Macedonians, of whom thirty-six attended the Council, completely failed. See Socr. *H.E.* v. 8.

§ II. THE THEOLOGY OF ATHANASIUS

Athanasius was born about 296. He was brought up at Alexandria and trained in the catechetical school. In 325 he took a prominent part in the Council of Nicæa; succeeded Alexander as bishop in 326; and died in 373. The most elaborate dogmatic work of his later years is his series of *Orations against the Arians*. His historical writings, especially the treatises *On the decrees of the Nicene Synod*, and on the *Synods of Ariminum and Seleucia*, are important as a chief source of information respecting the course of the Arian controversy between 325 and 361. But already at an early age (about the year 318) he wrote a work consisting of two essays, *Against the Heathen* and *On the Incarnation of the Word*—both of them remarkable for their philosophic mode of treatment and their strong grasp of the central fact of Christianity. The work *contra Gentes* (λόγος κατὰ Ἑλλήνων) is a polemic against heathenism, the main purpose of which is to assert the distinct personality and transcendence of God; from this monotheistic position Athanasius argues to the existence of a Divine Word or Son. The *de Incarnatione* (περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως τοῦ Λόγου) takes as its starting-point the intimate relation that exists between the universe and the Logos, regarded as its creator, and as the essential revealer of God.

Before giving any detailed account of this treatise we may briefly describe the subsequent literary history of the author. To the years between 350–355 belong Athanasius' *Apology against the Arians*; his letter to a friend *On the decrees of the Nicene Synod*, defending the use of the non-scriptural term *Homoousion*; his *de sententia Dionysii*—designed to refute the pretension of Arius and his followers that the doctrine of Dionysius of

Alexandria accorded with their own. The *Orations* were written apparently during the third exile, when Athanasius was in hiding in the Nitrian desert. The *Letter to Epictetus* belongs to 371, and is significant as marking the point of transition from controversies on the Trinity to those which concerned the Incarnation. In this letter Athanasius states the faith against positions which, in germ at least, are those of Apollinaris and of Nestorius respectively—viz. the assertion that Christ's body was not truly human but formed out of the essence of the Godhead, and the view that the Virgin-born and crucified Jesus was a human individual distinct from the Word or Son.¹ Athanasius sees in these ideas a retrogression to Docetism, and insists on the necessity of a *real* assumption by God of the human nature which needed redemption.

We may now return to the two earliest treatises—the *contra Gentes* and the *de Incarnatione*—in order to form some idea of the point of view from which Athanasius regards the Incarnation. It may be said at once that he is the first Greek Father who seems explicitly to raise and to answer the question *Cur Deus homo?* His starting-point is the existence and Deity of the Logos. The existence of the Word was acknowledged by the highest philosophy of the day; His Divine subsistence was an element in the immemorial tradition of the Church. Athanasius aims at exhibiting the continuous operation of the Logos in creation, in the preservation of the universe, and in the restoration or salvation of mankind.

In the *contra Gentes* Athanasius paves the way for his doctrine of the Incarnation by insisting on two com-

¹ See *ad Epict.* vii. (against docetic tendencies), and xi. (against Nestorian tendencies). Cp. chap. ii. and Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. p. 354 f. Bright, *S. Ath., Orations against the Arians*, introd. p. xevii.

plementary truths—(1) the transcendence and self-sufficiency of God as the immaterial and invisible cause of all that exists; ¹ (2) His immanence as the principle of order, harmony, and rationality that pervades the universe.² The principle whereby God is present in the universe can be no other than the Logos, not the mere “sporadic” Logos of the Stoics, but the very Word (*αὐτολόγος*) of God Himself, living and operative, “a person distinct from the creation . . . who ordered the universe and enlightens it by His providence,” *ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἀγαθὸς λόγος ὑπάρχων*.³ At this point Athanasius gives to his description of the Godhead that *ethical* turn which colours his whole theory of the Incarnation, and is specially characteristic of the catholic conception of God which he represents. The goodness of God—that is his keynote. “The God of the universe is by nature good and glorious (*ὑπέρκαλος*); whence also He is kind to man. For a good being is incapable of envy; He grudges to none his existence; nay, He wills the existence of all that He may be able to show His loving-kindness to man.”⁴

At this point the transition is made to the consideration of the Incarnation. God is the fountain of good; He accordingly imparts to His rational creatures the light of the Logos,—makes them *λογικοί*, and possessors, as it were, of “shadows of the Logos.”⁵ He protects them beforehand from failure to attain their true end by the gift of a law, and of grace to fulfil it. Why then was the Incarnation necessary?

1. First, answers Athanasius, because sin appeared, and by depriving man of the Logos, deprived him of the principle of *life*. Sin thwarted the purpose of God, and

¹ *c. Gent.* xxviii., xxix.

² *Ibid.* xxxvi.—xl.

³ *Ibid.* xl.; cp. xlii.

⁴ *Ibid.* xli. The thought is Plato's: see *Tim.* 29 E. Cp. *de Incarn.* iii.

⁵ *de Incarn.* iii.

defaced His image in man; but its main consequence was death. Man who by continued subjection to, and union with, the Logos might have been immortal, became by sin subject to the law of natural corruption (*φθορά*). The ethical view of the Incarnation is at once suggested. "It was our state that was the cause of the great descent; our transgression that evoked the loving-kindness (*φιλανθρωπίαν*) of the Logos."¹ What was God to do? To have acquiesced in the ruin of His handiwork would have been weakness, or want of love; it would have been unworthy of His goodness.² Thus Athanasius boldly insists that the necessity of redemption lies in the perfection of the Divine character. "But," it might be asked, "if God is good, why was not repentance on man's part sufficient?" Athanasius replies that repentance might have been a sufficient remedy for sin viewed merely as an act of the will; but repentance was powerless to undo the physical effects which sin had wrought. Men were overwhelmed in their natural corruption, and besides there was a just claim of the Creator to be satisfied (vii.). Nothing would suffice in such a crisis but the very presence of the creative Logos Himself. He who had been the creator must needs be the author of a new creation; He alone could share the thoughts, and sympathise with the purpose of the Father, could recognise the unseemliness of the ruin, the pitifulness of the misery in which man was involved (vii., viii.). So He assumed a body akin to ours, a body capable of death, capable also of being an instrument of restoration. This sacred body He constituted His organ,³ and by His entire appropriation of our nature became our perfect representative before God (ix.). This surely was a work

¹ *de Incarn.* iv.

² *Ibid.* vi. s. *fin.*

³ *Ibid.* viii. ἐν τῇ παρθένῳ κατασκενάζει ἐαυτῷ ναὸν τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἰδιοποιεῖται τοῦτο ὡς περ ὄργανον, κ.τ.λ.

"peculiarly suited to God's goodness"; it was a worthy exhibition of love seeking the recovery of the lost. So at least does the New Testament describe it (2 Cor. v. 14; Heb. ii. 9, etc.).¹

2. Athanasius proceeds (xi.-xvi.) to give a second reason for the Incarnation. It was necessary not only for man's restoration, but for the revelation of God. Man was made for the knowledge of God, and to this end was endowed with a share of the Logos, but by sin he lost the principle of Divine reason, and in spite of God's witness to Himself in creation and in the law, he gradually sank to lower depths of degradation (xi., xii.). It was thus necessary that the Logos Himself should assume a body, that man might be again renewed after His image. If the effaced image was to be restored it must be renewed by the Son of God Himself, as being the very image of the Father; if the lost knowledge of God was to be recovered, the Word of God must come down to man's level and present Himself by means of a human body in the sphere of sense (*ἐν γενέσει καὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς*) in order that through Him man might recognise the Father (xiii.-xv.). And this the Word actually accomplished in the Incarnation. "For men's minds having finally fallen to things of sense, the Word disguised Himself by appearing in a body, that He might as Man transfer men to Himself and centre their senses on Himself, and . . . persuade them by the works which He wrought that He is not Man only, but also God" (xvi.).

So far Athanasius has stated the two main functions of the incarnate Logos. (1) As the *Life* He destroys the principle of corruption which held man captive; He restores to man what he had lost by sin, the boon of immortality (*ἀφθαρσία*). (2) As the *Word* of God He

¹ *de Incarn.* x.

restores the true knowledge of the Father ¹—this point being expanded in chaps. xvii.—xix., with special reference to the death of Christ.

In the following chapters (xx.—xxxii.) the Divine method of salvation is dealt with in detail, in order to exhibit more distinctly the real consequences of Christ's death and resurrection. The central thought of this section is that the Logos is in two respects the Head and Representative of our race; first, in paying the debt due for sin, on behalf of all; second, in imparting to the human race the fruits of His victory over death,—life and incorruption (*ἀφθαρσία*). Christ assumes the body of man in order to pay the debt which all owed (*τὸ ὀφειλόμενον παρὰ πάντων*). For "since it was necessary that the debt owing from all should be paid again . . . to this end, after giving the proofs of His Godhead from His works, He next offered up His sacrifice also on behalf of all, yielding His temple to death in the stead of all, in order, first, to make men quit and free of their old trespass,² and, secondly, to show Himself more powerful even than death, displaying His own body incorruptible as firstfruits of all" (xx.). Two results in fact followed from the death, and were attested by the resurrection: (1) "the death of all was accomplished (*ἐπληροῦτο*) in the Lord's body"; (2) "death and corruption were wholly done away by reason of the Word that was united with it" (xx.).

This chapter summarises Athanasius' teaching as to the purpose of the Incarnation; the thought of redemption is the keynote of his theology. His central idea is

¹ Harnack remarks (*Dogmengesch.* ii. 159) that this is a reproduction of the favourite thought of the apologists, but while they insisted chiefly on the *teaching* of Christ, Athanasius regards the *person* of Christ as the real revelation of the Godhead. What nature was powerless to teach man, he learned from the actual life and activity of the incarnate Word.

² See also chaps. vii., ix., x., where the same thought is developed.

that by the Incarnation the Divine Being Himself entered into the world of humanity, in order to fulfil its obligations, and to lift it into the life of fellowship with God—in a word, to “deify” human nature.¹ It is in this respect that Athanasius seems to advance beyond some of the ante-Nicene apologists. They regarded the Logos philosophically as the creative and life-giving principle of the universe. Athanasius looks upon the Logos as essentially the Redeemer and Saviour; the philosophical standpoint gives way to the religious and ethical interest.² Athanasius in fact anticipates the Thomist view that the Incarnation was needed only for man’s restoration, and was a supreme manifestation of Divine pity and love. “His becoming man,” he says in another work, “would never have taken place, had not man’s need been present as the cause.”³ And here he is true to the traditions of the Greek school of apologists, especially Justin and the writer to *Diognetus*, although his estimate of *revelation* as the means of redemption appears qualified and subdued when compared with theirs.

¹ Chap. liv. αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐνηνθρώπησεν ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν. This is on the whole the most characteristic idea of Athanasius. Cp. esp. *Orat. c. Arian.* i. 33, 39. αὐτὸς υἱοποίησεν ἡμᾶς τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ ἐθεοποίησε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, γενόμενος αὐτὸς ἀνθρώπος. Ὅυκ ἄρα ἀνθρώπος ὢν, ὕστερον γέγονε θεός· ἀλλὰ θεὸς ὢν, ὕστερον γέγονεν ἀνθρώπος, ἵνα μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς θεοποιήσῃ. Θεοποίησις is for Athanasius a heightening of human life, a renewal of man after the Divine likeness, not a pantheistic absorption of the human in the divine. (See Harnack, *l.c.* ii. p. 162 note; cp. Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, ii. p. 88, s.v. “Deification.”)

² Observe in this connection the importance of the doctrine of creation in chaps. i.–iii., in which the act of creation is ascribed not to the Logos but directly to God. To the elder apologists, as to Philo, the characteristic work of the Logos was that of creation—an idea which tended towards dualism, by over-insistence on the thought of mediation between God and the creature. Characteristic of Athanasius is the idea expressed in *Orat. c. Arian.* iii. 6, τὸ γὰρ ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὁ υἱός, ἐν ᾧ ἡ κτίσις πρὸς τὸν θεὸν καταλλάσσεται. [Harnack, ii. 206 note.]

³ *Orat. c. Arian.* ii, 56.

The second section of the *de Incarnatione* is in large measure apologetic; the third section (xxxiii.—lv.), even polemical. The main interest of both parts, however, is that, apart from details, they answer some great *à priori* objections to the actual fact of the Incarnation, and the mode of its occurrence. ✓ Thus (1) Athanasius deals with the somewhat modern difficulty that the Incarnation is incompatible with the idea of the Divine infinity (xli., xlii.; cp. xvi., xvii.). His reply is that though the Logos dwelt in the body, He was not pent up in it. He did not cease to be in the entire creation, as the source of its life, and movement, and order. There is nothing absurd in the idea that the Word should manifest Himself, as in the whole universe, so specially in a part. "For humanity too is a part of a whole" (xlii.). And this is justified by analogy: for the human mind "though pervading man throughout, is interpreted by a particular part of the body, the tongue." Similarly the Word, though pervading the universe, may well use the human body as an instrument. ✓ (2) Again, it is asked, "Why did the Word not manifest Himself through some nobler part of the creation than man?" as if it were unworthy of Him to dwell in a mere human body. Athanasius answers that the Word came "not to make a display, but to heal and instruct the suffering." It was man alone that had gone astray; "neither sun nor moon nor heaven nor the stars nor water nor air had swerved from their order; but knowing their artificer and sovereign, the Word, they remain ever as they were" (xliii.). The Word became man in order to aid him, thus condescending to his weakness, and coming as it were to the rescue of the storm-tossed universe, by taking His seat at the helm and correcting its calamities.¹ Here again it is noticeable that Athanasius finds the true answer to a specula-

¹ Ath. refers to a passage of Plato, *Polit.* 273 D.

tive difficulty in the character of God. (3) Again, "Why did not God aid man by mere *fiat* (νεύματι μόνῳ)? Why was the Word compelled to assume a body—He who had called the creatures into being?" Athanasius replies that the question now was not of creating a world—calling it out of non-existence, but of restoring that which was already existent. "It was not things non-existent that needed salvation, so that a bare *fiat* should suffice, but man, already existent, was going to corruption and ruin" (xliv.). Further, the corruption had made its seat *within* the body, "death was engendered within," and it was necessary that life also should be, as it were, "wedded" (συμπλακῆναι) to the body, if the inherent corruption was to be vanquished and expelled. For the life of the Logos is, as it were, the asbestos robe protecting the body from the ravages of death; it was with good reason, therefore, that the Saviour clad Himself with a body, in order that man's mortality might be *swallowed up of life*.¹

The whole book concludes (xlv. ff.) with a valuable summary of the facts of Christian experience as attesting the present and victorious energy of the risen Christ; the decay of paganism and its accompanying evils, the expulsion of demons, the spiritual triumphs of the faith in nations, in society, in the individual character (lii.).² "In a word," says Athanasius, "the achievements of the Saviour, resulting from His becoming man, are of such kind and number, that if one should wish to enumerate them, he may be compared to men who gaze at the expanse of the sea and wish to count its waves."

So far we have been concerned with Athanasius' theory

¹ The question raised by Athanasius is discussed more fully elsewhere (p. 326); cp. Greg. Nyss. *Orat. cat. mag.* xvii.

² Especially noteworthy is the martyrs' contempt of death (lii.). Cp. the great passage in chap. xlii.; and Cyprian, *ad Donat*.

of redemption.¹ Dorner makes one criticism which may be repeated here, namely, that though the arguments of Athanasius imply the completeness of Christ's human nature, he yet makes express mention only of the body, without any reference to the human soul of Christ. He regards our Lord rather as the Logos veiled in human flesh, than as the man passing through the different stages of human probation and development. In this respect he seems to fall short of his own conception of the Incarnation—that it was no mere theophany, but an actual participation in the lot and sufferings of man.² It is, in fact, characteristic of Athanasius that he habitually looks upon the Logos as the sole motive, "hegemonic," personal principle in the God-man. To him Christ is the indivisible God-man, the Divine Saviour and Enlightener, essentially one with the God whom He manifests. Here is a point of contrast between Athanasius and the Antiochene school (Arius and afterwards Nestorius). To the latter, salvation seemed to consist not so much in essential fellowship with Deity, as in the knowledge of God coming to the aid of human freedom; and Christ was accordingly regarded less as the Logos incarnate than as the perfect, inspired man, communicating a revelation of Divine truth to men. The interest of Athanasius, in a word, was ethical and religious; that of his opponents in the Arian struggle was mainly intellectual.³

From Athanasius' doctrine of the Incarnation we pass to his anti-Arian polemic and his conception of the Trinity.

¹ Substantially the same soteriology is found in *Orat. c. Arian.* i. 40-43, ii. 67-70.

² Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. p. 259. But Harnack (*Dogmengesch.* ii. 213 note) points out that in *Orat.* iii. 30, *σάρξ* is expressly explained as meaning "human nature" in its totality. The verity of Christ's human soul was asserted by the Council of Alexandria (362), the doctrine being further developed by Hilary.

³ Harnack, ii. 161 f.

His method of dealing with Arianism consists in a clear development of its consequences. Thus, for example—(1), if Arius be right, the doctrine of an *eternal* Trinity is false: there was a time when the Godhead was, as it were, incomplete (ἐλλειπής), and the sacred Triad only attains completeness by the inclusion within itself of a created being—once non-existent, now deified and worshipped. An alien substance (ξένη καὶ ἀλλοτρία φύσις) is introduced into the sphere of Deity; a pagan addition is made to the fulness of the Godhead.¹ (2) Again, the Fatherhood of God cannot have been an eternal fact. There was a time when He as yet did not possess His Logos and Radiance (ἦν πότε ἄλογος, καὶ, φῶς ὢν, ἀφεγγής ἦν).² (3) Further, the worship of an Arian Christ is in principle merely polytheistic. It is the worship of two Gods, one increate, the other created.³ On the other hand, if Arius be right the worship of the Church is heathenish. (4) Finally, if the Logos be merely a creature, and therefore alterable in character (τρεπτός), he can neither reveal the Father nor unite man to God.⁴ It is this last consideration on which Athanasius lays the greatest stress. His strong soteriological interest prompts him to grasp, and forcibly point out, the real issue at stake, namely, the question whether the Son be a creature or not. "Divine Sonship and creatureliness," he says in effect, "are ideas incompatible with each other."⁵ The essential meaning of "Son" in relation to Deity must imply consubstantiality of essence. The Arian insistence on *posteriority* to the Father assumed a condition, namely, *time*, which could not exist in the case of God. If Christ, in fact, be literally a Son,

¹ *Orat. c. Arian.* i. 17, 18.

² *Ibid.* 24, 25.

³ *Orat.* iii. 16. This is a favourite anti-Arian thesis. Cp., e.g., Bas. Cæs. *Ep.* cexliii. 4, πολυθεία κεκράτηκε· μέγας θεὸς παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ μικρός.

⁴ See *Orat.* i. 35, and ii. 67, 70.

⁵ Cp. *Orat.* ii. 2, 20, 73.

He must be what the Father is. No creature could mediate between God and man; could unite the creature to the Creator; could bestow the grace of adoption—adoptive sonship implying a real, essential sonship.¹

Athanasius' general method of explaining expressions which implied the creatureliness of the Son, and which accordingly were pressed by the Arians, was to refer them to His manhood. As man, Christ is "exalted" for us; as man He "receives"; as man He is "anointed"; as man He was "created the beginning of the ways of God";² as man He is called "firstborn of creation."³ In short, all such expressions as *ποιεῖν*, *γένεσθαι*, *κτίζειν*, *κ.τ.λ.*, are to be referred to "the ministry and the economy" of the Word.⁴ In the *third Oration* various New Testament statements are examined, especially such as imply human limitations in the incarnate Word.⁵ These (such is Athanasius' usual line of interpretation) are to be looked at ethically as instances of condescension to man's weakness and ignorance,⁶ not as implying any failure of power or knowledge in the Word.

In Athanasius' positive doctrine of the Trinity the following points are important:—

(1) We notice his tenacious hold on the doctrine of the *monarchia*. His starting-point is the statement *μία*

¹ *Orat.* ii. 24, 34, 35, 66–69. Cp. Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, ii. 35.

² *Orat.* i. 41 (Phil. ii. 9), 46 (Ps. xlv. 7 f.), 53 ff. (Prov. viii. 22; Heb. i. 4 and iii. 1). The discussion of Prov. viii. 22 LXX. *κύριος ἐκτίσεν με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ*, takes up a large part of *Orat.* ii., see esp. ii. 50.

³ Col. i. 15; see *Orat.* ii. 62.

⁴ *Orat.* i. 62.

⁵ See esp. iii. 27 for a list of Arian "stock" passages.

⁶ iii. 37 ff. deals with the subject of Christ's supposed ignorance (S. Mk. xiii. 32). On this point (see below, p. 299) Ath. speaks uncertainly. In iii. 43 he simply says, *ὡς μὲν λόγος γινώσκει, ὡς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἀγνοεῖ*; *ἀνθρώπου γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ ἀγνοεῖν*. But see other suggestions in 48. In iii. 53 Ath. allows the idea of *προκοπή* in Christ.

ἀρχὴ θεότητος.¹ Yet within this unity there are ὑποστάσεις, "Persons" really subsistent (οὐσιώδεις),² not divided, or of different nature, but inter-related and inter-dependent, the Son being related to the Father as stream to fountain or radiance to light. Athanasius, indeed, approaches the Sabellian position when he says that S. Jo. x. 30, *I and the Father are one*, demonstrates the identity (ταυτότητα) of the Godhead, while S. Jo. xiv. 10, *I am in the Father and the Father in Me*, proves the unity of the substance (ἐνότητα τῆς οὐσίας). But this passage (*Orat.* iii. 3) is followed by one expressly repudiating the Sabellian view.³

(2) The Son is ἐτεροούσιος τῶν γεννητῶν, and ὁμοούσιος καὶ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς. He shares the unchangeableness (τὸ ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοιώτον) of the Divine substance. It is noticeable that in the *Orations* Athanasius avoids the term ὁμοούσιον. He was concerned with facts rather than with names, and he adheres closely to Scripture both in argument and statement. He frequently uses the phrases ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν, ὁμοίας οὐσίας (e.g. *Orat.* i. 20, 21, ii. 42), perhaps with a view of conciliating the semi-Arians; and even adopts the term ὅμοιος (*Orat.* i. 9, ii. 17); or ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκὼν (i. 26); even ὅμοιος κατὰ πάντα (ii. 18, 22). The fact is that he is penetrated by the Platonistic idea of the immeasurable gulf that separates the Creator from the creature; if the Son be ranged on the side of the Father, He is thereby set over against the creature (ii. 20).

¹ See esp. *Orat.* iv. 1; cp. iii. 15, and ii. 10.

² Ath. has no word for "persons." He uses δύο or τρία, as the case requires. See the important passage *Orat.* iv. 1.

³ Cp. *Expos. fid.* i., where he rejects the notion of a νιοπάτωρ. The Son is ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς, ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας γέννημα. The Son has one and the self-same substance with the Father. Cp. *Orat.* i. 22, ἔχων ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν ταυτότητα, and *Orat.* iii. 36, ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ θεότης τοῦ πατρὸς θεότης ἐστίν.

(3) As to the Divine *γέννησις*, human analogies are expressly excluded (i. 14). The Divine generation—here we have an Origenistic thought—is an eternal and necessary process in the Godhead: *ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς αἰεὶ καὶ τῇ φύσει, οὕτως αἰεὶ γεννητικὸς τῇ φύσει ὁ πατήρ* (*Orat.* iii. 66; cp. iv. 4). But the process is not “necessary” in any mechanical sense. The term *βουλήσει* is, indeed, disallowed (iii. 63), but only because “the Logos is Himself the living Will (*ζῶσα βουλή*) of the Father, by which all things were made.” The “nature” of God transcends the categories proper to human nature: (iii. 62, *ὅσῳ οὖν τοῦ κτίσματος ὁ υἱὸς ὑπέρεκειται, τοσούτῳ καὶ τῆς βουλήσεως τὸ κατὰ φύσιν.* 63, *ὁ μὴ ἐκ βουλήσεως ὑπάρχων θεὸς οὐ βουλήσει, ἀλλὰ φύσει τὸν ἴδιον ἔχει λόγον*).¹ While, however, Athanasius passes beyond the ante-Nicene subordinatianism, the element of *ὑποταγή* involved in the Son’s *derivation* from the Father is recognised in *Orat.* i. 58, where S. John xiv. 28 is explained: the Father is “greater” than the Son, not in dignity nor in priority of time, but only *διὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς γέννησιν*. In general, Athanasius employs the somewhat concrete language of his predecessors when it suits his purpose; thus he speaks of the Son as *φύσει γέννημα* (iii. 67).² But his aim seems to be to insist on the actual objective subsistence of the Logos, who is a living person; not like a human word, unsubstantial (*ἀννπόστατος*), but *λόγος ζῶν* and *ἐνούσιος σοφία*.³

¹ See the whole discussion iii. 62–66. In 66 we have a new mode of statement. The Son is not *ἀθέλητος τῷ πατρί*, but *θελόμενός ἐστιν παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς*. He is derived from the Father “with the Father’s pleasure.”

² So *Orat.* ii. 24, and *Expos. fid.* 3, *γέννημα κατὰ φύσιν τέλειον*.

³ *de Synod.* xli. Cp. Greg. Nyss. *Orat. cat. mag.* i. The *expos. fid.* i. gives a clear summary of Ath.’s doctrine as follows: We believe in God the Father, *καὶ εἰς ἓνα μονογενῆ λόγον, σοφίαν, υἱὸν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀνάρχως καὶ αἰδιῶς γεγεννημένον, λόγον δὲ οὐ προφορικόν, οὐκ ἐνδιάθετον, οὐκ ἀπόρροϊαν τοῦ τελείου, οὐ τμήσιν τῆς ἀπαθούς φύσεως, οὔτε προβολήν, ἀλλ’ υἱὸν αὐτοτελῆ, ζῶντά τε καὶ ἐνεργούντα, τὴν ἀληθινὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ πατρὸς, ἰσότημον καὶ ἰσόδοξον*

(4) There are various important statements touching the person and work of the incarnate Christ, especially in the *Orations*. In brief, Athanasius teaches that the Logos *became man*,—did not merely visit *a man* (*Orat.* iii. 30, *ἄνθρωπος γέγονε, καὶ οὐκ εἰς ἄνθρωπον ἦλθεν*). In His person two natures were united without confusion; He was not turned into flesh (*ad Epict.* viii.), but appeared in flesh, and made His flesh the instrument of His wonder-working power. In virtue of the unity of His person, all the acts and sufferings of the manhood are to be attributed to the Logos. One Divine person acts both *θεϊκῶς καὶ ἀνθρωπίνως* (*Orat.* iii. 35). Even the manhood is an object of worship, because it belongs inalienably to the uncreated Logos (*c. Apoll.* i. 6). In the Incarnation there was a real union of our manhood with Deity, whereby sin was destroyed, and humanity set free from its corruption, and made immortal. His death was the death of all—a ransom (*λύτρον*) for us (*Orat.* i. 45). His victorious life also is ours, in virtue of our incorporation into Him (*Orat.* ii. 61, *ἡμεῖς ὡς σύσσωμοι τυγχάνοντες κατ' ἐκεῖνο σωζόμεθα*). Christ is in virtue of His Incarnation the source to man of Divine knowledge, the pattern of holiness, the bestower of forgiveness and of the Holy Spirit (*Orat.* i. 12, 16, 51; ii. 65; iii. 23–25). In all this line of thought Athanasius closely adheres to what has been called the “Johannine” type of theology,—that which appears in Ignatius, the writer to *Diognetus*, and Irenæus.¹ The Logos has really entered into abiding

(S. Jo. v. 23) . . . θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ (1 S. Jo. v. 20) . . . παντοκράτορα ἐκ παντοκράτορος· πάντων γὰρ ὢν ἀρχει ὁ πατήρ καὶ κρατεῖ, ἀρχει καὶ κρατεῖ καὶ ὁ υἱός· ὅλος ἐξ ὅλου, ὅμοιος τῷ πατρὶ ὢν, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Κύριος (S. Jo. xiv. 9) . . . ἐγεννήθη δὲ ἀνεκφράστως καὶ ἀπερινοήτως, κ.τ.λ. Obs. to Ath. the words *θεότης, οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, ἰδιότης τῆς οὐσίας*, κ.τ.λ., are, in relation to the Godhead, practically synonymous. Cp. esp. *tom. ad Antioch.* vi.

¹ The work ascribed to Athanasius *c. Apoll.* i. 8, illustrates the “pneumatic” tendency of A.’s Christology.

communion with men; He is very God, and therefore, through our union with Him, effectually restores our nature and lifts it into the state of salvation, by uniting it to God, or, to use Athanasius' own word, by "deifying" it (*Orat.* ii. 66, 67, 69, 70; cp. iii. 34; *ad Epict.* vii.).¹

It only remains briefly to notice some general characteristics of the theology and mental habit of this great teacher.

Perhaps the most impressive feature of his writings is the ethical conception of God which marks them. Arius spoke of τὸ ἀγέννητον as if it was an adequate synonym for θεότης. Athanasius insists that the phrase is not scriptural. We are rather taught to pray to "Our Father." Nor ought we simply to ask what God might conceivably have done; for He is not bare power.² Nor is He subject in any mechanical sense to necessity.³ He is essentially loving and good, merciful, and full of care for men.⁴ The difference between Athanasius and the Arians lay in this profoundly different conception of God. They, from the metaphysical standpoint denied the possibility of a Divine Sonship; but to Athanasius "omnipotence is not the synonym of God conceived as Godhead. The terms in which He is construed are ethical, and the ethical Deity can never live out of relations or secluded from those who need Him."⁵ The Arian struggle did indeed constitute a very critical stage

¹ See generally Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* ii. 203-214. Harnack has much severe criticism of Athanasius' doctrine of the Trinity—its "absurdities," "contradictions," etc.—which could not be profitably discussed in this place. See *Dogmengesch.* ii. 218-221.

² *Orat.* ii. 68, σκοπεῖν δὲ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις λυσιτελοῦν καὶ μὴ ἐν πᾶσι τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λογίζεσθαι.

³ *Orat.* iii. 62, ἀτοπὸν ἐστὶ λέγειν ἐπὶ θεοῦ ἀνάγκην.

⁴ *Orat.* i. 63; ii. 65, 77; cp. iii. 8, ἀγαθὸς ὢν καὶ κηδόμενος τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

⁵ Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theol.* p. 421. See a magnificent passage in Greg. Nyss. *Orat. cat. mag.* xx.

in the development of the Christian doctrine of God, and it is difficult to exaggerate the influence and importance of Athanasius' conception of God,—a conception which, as we have noticed, was a heritage from the earliest Greek school of apologists.

It is noticeable too that Athanasius starts from Church tradition as a basis: facts, he says, are more important than statements; *οὐσίαι* are prior to *λέξεις*.¹ He complains that Arians fail to understand the terms *ἐν* and *ὁμοιον* in the sense proclaimed by the Church.² He refers to the regular catechetical instruction of the Church as the main element in the formation of Christian faith; ³ to the "apostolic tradition"; to the ecclesiastical rule (*κανὼν*) or definition (*σκοπός*) which is, as it were, "an anchor of the faith."⁴ He maintains that at Nicæa the assembled prelates did but "publish the sound and ecclesiastical faith." "For what the Fathers have of old delivered—that is truly doctrine; and this certainly is the token of [true] teachers, to confess the same thing with one another, and to vary neither among themselves, nor from the Fathers."

Finally, Athanasius did much to check the tendency of his contemporaries towards theological development in a wrong and unprofitable direction. The teaching of Origen, as developed by his pupils, was leading to a "secularisation" of the faith at least in the sense that Christian truth was gradually being transformed into a philosophic system of cosmology. In the East this movement was already strongly marked. Probably the result of Athanasius' work was to arrest this tendency: by recalling the consciousness of the Church to^v the central fact that in the incarnate Son God Himself had *visited and redeemed*

¹ *Orat.* ii. 3.

² *Orat.* iii. 10.

³ *Orat.* ii. 34; cp. *ad Epict.* iii.

⁴ *Orat.* iii. 28, 35, 58; cp. *de decret. Nic.* iii., iv.

His people. To the great realities of sin, judgment, death, redemption, and salvation was again assigned their rightful prominence. Athanasius was in fact more or less in conscious antagonism to the "higher thought" and speculation of the Church. His wanderings in exile among the hermits and monks of the desert enabled him perhaps to measure the importance of those unseen forces which keep faith alive and vigorous: the mortified lives, vigils, and prayers of the faithful; the secret work of the Holy Spirit leading men to the knowledge and love of God.

§ III. FINAL FORMULATION OF THE NICENE THEOLOGY

The final formulation of the Nicene theology was the work of the celebrated theologians of Cappadocia, Basil of Cæsarea (abp. 370, d. 379), his brother Gregory of Nyssa (bp. 370, d. 394),¹ and Gregory of Nazianzum (b. 329, d. 389 or 390). This important work was proceeding, speaking broadly, between the years 370 and 394, and its result was the provisional settlement of the terminology of the doctrine of the Trinity, on the basis of the Nicene symbol (ὁμοούσιον). The Cappadocians brought to this task a wide and accurate knowledge of current Greek philosophy; they not only inherited the theology of Origen, but had also close connections with the highest thought and culture of contemporary paganism, Basil and Gregory of Nazianzum having studied in youth

¹ Greg. Nyssen's *Oratio catechetica magna* contains a profound and acute treatment of the Incarnation, dealing not only with the personality of the Logos and Spirit (i.-iii.), but also with wider aspects of the Incarnation in its relation to the problem of evil (v.-vii.), and to the character of God. Especially valuable is his chapter (ix.) on the moral glory of the *κένωσις* (cp. xxiv.), and his discussion of some speculative difficulties as to the method of the atonement, etc. Like Athanasius, Gregory takes as his foundation the goodness of God (xix., xx.). Cp. *Antirr.* xlii. *λείπεται ὅπερ ἂν τῷ σκοπῷ τῆς φιλανθρωπίας συμβάλῃ, τοῦτο εὐλογώτερον περὶ τὸν θεὸν αἰεσθαι.* See also Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* ii. 162 ff.

at Athens with Julian, afterwards emperor, for their fellow-student.

The Cappadocians take as their starting-point the *Homoousion*. Basil indeed acknowledges that he had felt a difficulty in the use of the term. He would have preferred some such phrase as ἀπαρλλάκτως ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν,¹ but he was induced to accept the *Homoousion*, possibly through the influence of Apollinaris, who seems to have suggested that ὁμοούσιος might imply both ταυτότης and ἐτερότης οὐσίας. Accordingly Basil elsewhere declares that both ὅμοιον and ἀνόμοιον, as words implying mere quality, are inapplicable to the Godhead. He accepts the ὁμοούσιον as "an heir of the Fathers of Nicea": the term implies the identity of the Divine substance (ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως), for the "unity" of the Godhead is not proclaimed in Scripture in such wise as to exclude the idea of Sonship, but in opposition to the notions of polytheistic paganism.² Together, however, with the *Homoousion* the Cappadocians accept the current phrase τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις,—a phrase which may be said to be distinctive of the neo-Nicene school,—and their task is to co-ordinate it with the older Nicene insistence on the *Homoousion*. In doing this they adhere to the Christology of Origen,—holding firmly to the *separate hypostasis* of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

The results of their work are perhaps embraced in the following summary.

(1) The terms οὐσία and ὑπόστασις are now sharply distinguished. οὐσία receives a sense midway between that of abstract "substance" and the concrete "individual

¹ See *Ep.* ix. 3.

² Bas. *Epp.* viii. 3, lii. 1. For passages insisting on the "Monarchia," see also Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxix. 2. Here μοναρχία is explained οὐχ ἥν ἐν περιγράφει πρόσωπον, ἀλλ' ἥν φύσεως ὁμοτιμία συνίστησι, καὶ γνώμης σύμπνοια, καὶ ταυτότης κινήσεως, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐν τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ σύννευσις. Cp. *Orat.* xxxi. 14.

being," inclining to the former. *ὑπόστασις* receives a sense midway between "person" and "attribute," inclining to the former. *πρόσωπον* is avoided, though not actually repudiated, as admitting of a Sabellian connotation. The phrase finally adopted is *μία οὐσία* (or *θεότης*) *ἐν τρισὶν ὑποστάσεσιν*. A typical passage is the following from Basil's *Epistles*: *οὐσία δὲ καὶ ὑπόστασις ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν ἣν ἔχει τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον οἶον ὡς ἔχει τὸ ζῶον πρὸς τὸν δεῖνα ἄνθρωπον. Διὰ τοῦτο οὐσίαν μὲν μίαν ἐπὶ τῆς θεότητος ὁμολογοῦμεν ὥστε τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον μὴ διαφόρως ἀποδιδόναι, ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἰδιάζουσιν, ἵν' ἀσύγχυτος ἡμῖν καὶ τετρανωμένη ἡ περὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἔννοια ἐνυπάρχη.*¹ In order to guard the unity of the Divine essence Gregory of Nyssa speaks of three "modes of subsistence" (*τρόποι ὑπάρξεως*); and it is held to be allowable to speak of each blessed Person as subsisting *ἐν ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει*.²

(2) The distinctions of the three Persons are secured by distinguishing between what was common to all (*κοινόν*), and what was peculiar to each (*ἴδιον*, *τὸ τῶν προσώπων ἰδιάζον* [Bas. *Ep.* cxxxvi. 6], *ιδιότης*, *ιδίωμα*, *ιδιότητες γνωριστικά* [*Ep.* xxxviii. 5] or *χαρακτηρίζουσαι*). Thus "common to all the Three is the being increate (*τὸ μὴ γεγονέναι καὶ ἡ θεότης*); to the Son and Spirit, derivation from the Father; peculiar to the Father is *ἡ ἀγεννησία*; to the Son, *ἡ γέννησις*; to the Spirit, *ἡ ἐκπεμφσις* or *ἐκπόρευσις*."³

(3) The ante-Nicene idea of the ministerial subordination of the Son is almost wholly set aside.⁴ To each Person

¹ *Ep.* cxxxxvi. 6. Cp. xxxviii. 5 and cxxv. 1. Greg. Nyss. *Orat. cat. mag.* i., calls this a "technical distinction." Obs. *φύσις* is admitted as equivalent to *οὐσία*. See Bas. *Ep.* cex. 4; Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxiii. 11, xxxiii. 16.

² Bas. *Ep.* cxxv. 1.

³ Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxv. 16, xli. 9.

⁴ Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxx. 5, does indeed explain "the subordination" as Christ's fulfilment of His Father's will, but lays no stress on the statement.

is assigned the exercise of Divine attributes, the possession of the common substance of Deity. There is further an inseparable "identity of operation" (ἐνεργείας ταυτότης) on the part of the Divine Three which implies equality in glory, rank, and majesty (ὁμοτιμία). Thus Basil declares "the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost alike sanctify, quicken, enlighten, comfort, and effect all else of the same kind. . . . So likewise all other operations are equally wrought in the saints by the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost."¹ The only subordination of the Son acknowledged by the Cappadocian Fathers is that which depends on the derivation of the Son's essence, and this truth is carefully guarded. "The Son," says Nazianzen, "is a Son and therefore not unoriginate (οὐκ ἀναρχος), for He is *of the Father*. But if there be a thought of a beginning in time (ἀπὸ χρόνου ἀρχή) He also is ἀναρχος. For the creator of time cannot be subject to time."² Again, "the Son and Spirit are not unoriginate as to *cause*, but unoriginate in respect of *time*."³ The Son in fact derives His being from the Father, but the entire essence of Deity is in each Person, though each possesses it in a different mode. From this point of view the Father is αἴτιος, the Son and Spirit are αἰτιατά; but there is no difference or inequality between the Divine Three; rather there is "a continuous and inseparable communion."⁴ This doctrine of the inseparable operation of the three Persons is specially characteristic of Gregory Nyssen. He seems to be a Platonic realist, believing in the unity of God as he believes in

¹ *Ep.* clxxxix. 7. So 8, "The identity of their operations suggests the unity of the substance." Cp. Greg. Nyss. *Quod non sint tres Dii* [Migne], *P.G.* 45, p. 125 c; *de comm. not.* 180 c.

² *Orat.* xxxix. 12; cp. *Orat.* xx. 7.

³ *Orat.* xxix. 3.

⁴ Bas. *Ep.* xxxviii. 4, συνεχὴς τις καὶ ἀδιάσπαστος κοινωνία. For αἴτιος and αἰτιατά, see Greg. Nyss. *de comm. not.* [Migne], 180 c. Cp. Loofs, § 34, 5.

the unity of man.¹ "The idea of God, or of the Deity, is one, indivisible; there exists but one simple Divine essence; the plurality within the Godhead does not affect this essence itself, but merely the hypostases, each of which contains the entire essence. It is incorrect, therefore, to speak as though the Divine essence were itself a plurality." Strictly and scientifically speaking, we cannot conceive of one Person apart from the two others. The very mention of the "Son" implies the existence of the Father and of the Spirit, but we must not attribute that to the one essence which is predicable solely of the separate *hypostasis*. In the Holy Trinity all Divine activity proceeds forth from the Father, advances onward through the Son, and reaches its perfection in the Holy Spirit. Neither in time, place, will, nor work are the Persons separated.²

It is evident that these writers felt a real difficulty in repelling the charge that they taught tritheism. Gregory seems to meet the objection when he suggests that idea of interpenetration, or mutual permeation of the Divine Three (*περιχώρησις*), which was distinctly formulated by later theologians. Basil deprecates the connection with Deity of strictly numerical ideas.³ Gregory Nazianzen even apologises for the distinction of three *Persons* in the Deity. "This," he declares, "is the peculiar nature of things simple—not to be like some one thing, and unlike another; . . . the property [of a simple thing] is to be rather something self-identical than a thing that resembles another" (*ταὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀφομοίωμα*).⁴ The three Persons, he elsewhere says, are

¹ See *Quod non sint* [Migne], pp. 117–119; *de comm. not.* 180 D ff. Cp. Dorner, *div. i. vol. ii.* pp. 315 ff.

² See *Quod non sint*, p. 125 c.

³ *Epp.* ccxiv., xxxviii.

⁴ Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxx. 20. Cp. xxxix. 11. It would seem that Greg. Naz. popularised the new phraseology.

three in respect of their peculiar properties (*ιδιότητες*); they may be called *ὑποστάσεις* or *πρόσωπα* indifferently, —there is no need to dispute about words; but they are one in respect of essence or Deity. “The distinctions between *Him of whom*, *Him through whom*, and *Him in whom*, do not divide the substance, but are modes of characterising the distinctive characteristics (*ιδιότηας*) of one unconfused substance.”¹ To deny, says Basil, the unity of essence is to fall into polytheism; to disallow the separate individuality of the hypostases,² is to subside into Judaism.

Thus the theology of the *Homoousion* is developed by the Cappadocians under Origenistic influences. The intermediate stage between their work and that of Athanasius may be traced in the careful dogmatic statement of Basil of Ancyra and others preserved by Epiphanius (*Hær.* lxxiii. 12–22),³ which makes an effort to fix more exactly the sense of the terms *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, in relation to the Son. The word *ὑπόστασις* is defended (chap. 16) as having been used by the Easterns, *ἵνα τὰς ιδιότητας τῶν προσώπων ὑφεστώσας καὶ ὑπαρχούσας γνωρίσωσιν*. Basil here makes an advance on Athanasius, and the Cappadocians develop the hint of Basil. The great interest of their work lies in the fact that from the standpoint of the current Platonistic philosophy of the day, they laboured to find a really scientific expression for the Nicene doctrine. Their success represents the victory of Platonism over a dry and formal Aristotelianism; the alliance, at least for a time, of the highest learning of the time with the catholic faith. Athanasius survived long enough to witness the triumph of the cause to which he had devoted his life; and the

¹ Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxxix. 12.

² τὸ ἰδίᾳζον τῶν ὑποστάσεων. *Ep.* cx. 5.

³ See a long note in Harnack, *l.c.* ii. 249. Cp. Loofs, § 34, 1.

Cappadocians always acknowledged him as the representative *par excellence* of catholic orthodoxy.¹ They themselves certainly deserve the praise which has been justly given them for the sobriety and moderation with which they accomplished their difficult work. They never lose sight of the fact that they are face to face with mystery;² nevertheless they energetically assert that a real knowledge of God is possible. "The spirit of modesty just alluded to prevented them from treating as settled that which was still unsettled, impelled them to continue their investigations into the true idea of *hypostasis*, and to give free play to all attempts to further a solution, provided only that the interests of Christology were kept in sight, and that neither mixture nor separation, neither Sabellianism nor Arianism (or tritheism) were favoured and aided."³

¹ Cp. Harnack, *l.c.* ii. 256, 267. See esp. Bas. *Ep.* lxvi., written about two years before Athanasius' death.

² See, e.g., Greg. Nyss. *Orat. cat. mag.* iii.; Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxix. 8.

³ Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. p. 331. I ought not to close these sections without referring the student to the admirable and exhaustive account of Athanasius, his theology, life, and times, contained in Mr. Robertson's prolegomena to *Athanasius* [Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers, ser. 2]. In regard to the neo-Nicene terminology, see the prolegomena to *Gregory of Nyssa* in the same series.

PART VI

THE PROBLEM OF THE INCARNATION

§ I. Apollinarianism.

The Christological problem.

1. The error of Apollinaris: its exact nature and motive.
2. The catholic position.
3. General result of the controversy: the doctrine of Christ's human soul.
Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine.

§ II. Nestorianism.

1. Theodore of Mopsuestia.
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Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon.
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§ I. APOLLINARIANISM

The century which closed with the Council of Constantinople (381) had been entirely absorbed, not in Christological, but in Trinitarian controversy. But "Christology was the perennial motive of the Trinitarian efforts."¹ The formulation of the Christian idea of God must necessarily precede the construction of theory as to Christ's person, and the work of the Nicene Fathers practically amounted to a restatement of the Christian doctrine of God. The doctrine of the Divine unity and transcendence had been supplemented by clearer statements not only of the immanence of the Logos, which was a kind of prophecy of the Incarnation, but also of the relationships subsisting within the Godhead.

At the point we have now reached, the problems which emerge are more strictly Christological. Not of course that the doctrine of Christ's person had been ignored during the Nicene struggle. The great writers who defended the tradition of the Church were deeply conscious at least of the reality of redemption. They had an intuition of Christ's person, practically identical with that which Irenæus and Tertullian had so richly developed. The catholic conception of redemption implied nothing less than an assumption by the Divine Logos of human nature in its entirety. To Athanasius, for instance, who may be regarded as representing the Alexandrine view of our Lord's person and work, Jesus Christ is the representative Man in whom human nature was enabled to do and to bear what was entirely above its native strength; in whom, as the first-fruits of our race, all men died unto sin, and were exalted into the life of Divine fellowship.² As Athanasius often insists,

¹ Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. p. 332.

² See esp. the *de Incarn.* and *Orat.* i. 41-43, 46, 47; ii. 61, 67, 68; iii. 33,

the Logos made His own *all* that is human; Marcellus taught that in Christ there was a special operation of the Logos, but catholic writers could be content with nothing short of an entire assumption of humanity by the Logos. Hitherto, however, the full significance of this position had hardly been acknowledged. Athanasius, for instance, had insisted much upon the assumption by the Word of human *flesh*, as the temple or organ of Deity; and had gone so far as to explain that the word *σάρξ* in S. John i. 14 implied the perfection of human nature,¹ a true human soul as well as body. The doctrine of the verity of Christ's human soul was in fact asserted by the Council of Alexandria, but the bearing of this verity on the unity of Christ's person had as yet hardly been faced. The importance of the doctrine of the human soul of Christ seems to have occurred to Eustathius of Antioch, who composed a work *on the Soul*,² but Athanasius, while maintaining against the Arians the completeness of Christ's human nature, and His consequent possession of a human soul, yet shrank from giving prominence to the logical consequence that Christ, in His human nature, was possessed of real freedom of choice, and really underwent moral probation and development.

The problem as to the unity of Christ's person—the question how the Divine Logos could have assumed human nature in its completeness—was forced upon the Church by the attempted solution of APOLLINARIS or Apollinarius, bishop of Laodicea, a man of cultured and philosophic mind, a gifted exponent of Scripture, and a devoted adherent of Athanasius and the Nicene theology. He conceived that the problem might be solved by

34; iv. 33, etc. Cp. similar statements in Greg. Nyss. *Orat. cat. mag.* xvi., xxxii., xxxvi., etc. Hilary, passages in Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. notes 81, 82.

¹ Thus in *Orat c. Arian.* iii. *σάρξ* is explained to mean *άνθρωπος*.

² See Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. note 60.

simple denial of the existence of a reasonable soul (*νοῦς*) in Christ's human nature. For it is noticeable that Apollinaris intended to represent Christ's human nature as impersonal—a doctrine which the Church ultimately accepted. He believed himself to be expressing the mind of Christendom, his aim being on the basis of Nicene doctrine to construct a scientific Christology.

1. What, then, was the error of Apollinaris? It originated no doubt partly in his fear of Arianism, partly in his anxiety to vindicate the unity of Christ's person, but partly also in a false psychology. He regarded the *νοῦς* in man as the seat of sinful instincts, and he was supremely anxious to guard the immutability (*τὸ ἄτρεπτον*) of Christ's human will. "For where," he said, "there is perfect (or complete) manhood there is sin."¹ "Mankind is saved not by the assumption of a reasonable soul, and an entire manhood, but by the assumption of flesh, whose natural property it is to be under guidance (*ἡγεμονεύεσθαι*); and the flesh needed an immutable soul (*νοῦς*), not succumbing to it (the flesh) through weakness of knowledge, but conforming it without violence to itself."

(a) Accordingly Apollinaris accepts the Arian account of Christ's person, namely, that the Logos united to Himself a body of flesh without reasonable soul, in order to turn the doctrine against its advocates, who gave special prominence to the creaturely "mutability" or freedom of choice (*τὸ τρεπτόν*) of the Logos. He felt it necessary to exclude every element of free choice from Christ's humanity. In effect he says to the Arians, "Christ is, as you say, the Logos appearing in human flesh and fulfilling the part of the soul; but He is *not*, as you maintain, a mere creature. He is Divine, and therefore

¹ "Ath." c. *Apoll.* i. 2. Greg. Nyss. *Antirr.* c. *Apoll.* xl. (a very important passage).

immutable and infallible.”¹ The Logos, in short, was a prevailing principle of holiness, supplying the place of that *νοῦς* which in Adam had fallen under the dominion of the flesh. Thus the possibility of moral evil seemed to be effectually excluded from Christ’s human nature.

(b) Apollinaris was anxious also to guard the unity of Christ’s person. He feared that the admission of two perfect natures (*δύο τέλεια*) would involve a dual personality. He, like Nestorius, was unable to conceive of a human “nature” apart from personality. He fell back accordingly upon the notion of a new nature, that of “God made flesh” (*θεὸς σαρκωθείς*). “The true God,” he said, “is He who being separate from flesh (*ἄσαρκος*) was manifested in flesh, perfect with the true and divine perfection; not two persons nor two natures; not the Divine Logos one person, and the man Jesus another person.”² Thus the fear of what ultimately was the error of Nestorius induced Apollinaris to fall back on a kind of monophysitism: the idea that there was in the incarnate Christ *μία φύσις σύνθετος, σύγκρατος, σαρκική καὶ θεϊκή*.³ Only so did he hope to secure a true unity of volition and thought; the ruling principle (*τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*) in Christ would be the Logos, and the notion of two thinking or willing principles in the same subject would be excluded.

We should notice the motive which dictated this view. Apollinaris saw that for the accomplishment of Christ’s redemptive work it was vitally necessary that His person should be one and the same; His acts and sufferings, in order to have saving merit and efficacy,

¹ Cp. Petav. *de Incarn.* i. 5. 4. Dörner, *div.* i. vol. ii. p. 365.

² See the treatise of Apoll. *κατὰ μέγος πλῆρις* (ascribed to Greg. Thaumaturgus and included in his works).

³ See the passages quoted by Justinian, *c. Monoph.* in Mai, *Scrip. vet. nova collectio*, vol. vii. pp. 301 ff.

must be those of a Divine personality. It was this thought that he probably intended to express in the phrase *ἄνθρωπος κυριακός*, which catholic writers disallowed.¹ He wished to advance beyond the idea of mere *possession* or *assumption* of manhood by the Logos to that of the Logos actually *being made man*, and to regard the humanity of Christ in relation to His person as an integral, constitutive element, not a mere external addition.²

(c) Again, Apollinaris held a view, apparently due to his partiality for Plato, that the rational soul (*νοῦς*) of man, as being free, yet limited in knowledge, must necessarily be the seat of sinful instincts. "Our rational soul," he said, "is under condemnation."³ If Christ assumed the totality of human attributes, He undoubtedly had human reasoning powers (*λογισμοί*); and it is impossible for these to be free from inherent sin."⁴ This view involved the quasi-Manichæan idea that human nature is *essentially* and by its very constitution sinful, the most distinctive element in it (*τὸ κυριώτατον*) being *νοῦς*, which according to Apollinaris is the necessary seat of sin. Accordingly, when Apollinaris denies the presence in Christ of a human *νοῦς*, he does undoubtedly imply that the principle of free will is an evil which mars the perfection of human nature, and from which our manhood needs liberation, inasmuch as it naturally tends to evil.

(d) The sketch of Apollinaris' theology would be incomplete without some allusion to an idea of special

¹ See Greg. Naz. *Ep.* i. *ad Cledon.* § 3. Aug. retracts his allowance of the phrase *homo dominicus* in *Retract.* i. 19, § 8. [Goldhorn on Greg. *ad loc.*]

² Dorner, *div. i.* vol. ii. p. 378.

³ Greg. Naz. *Ep.* i. *ad Cled.* 10.

⁴ "Ath." c. *Apoll.* ii. 6; cp. *ibid.* i. 2. Ὅπου γὰρ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος ἔκει καὶ ἁμαρτία. See also i. 15. Cp. Dorner, *div. i.* vol. ii. p. 395 ff. on the Manichæan and Docetic tendency of Apollinaris.

interest, and even grandeur, which underlay his teaching; the idea, namely, of an essential connection between the Divine and human natures, which first reached its embodiment and fulfilment in the Incarnation. A union between God and man seemed to be "demanded by the essence or conception of both natures." In this union Apollinaris conceived that both natures—human and Divine—for the first time reached a predestined goal: humanity, because it remained in a sense imperfect, without the Incarnation; deity, because the Divine love must needs remain unsatisfied till God had actually become man.

According to Apollinaris, the Logos is not only the image of God but the archetype of manhood. He was eternally predestined to become man, and bore within Himself, so to speak, the "potency" of Incarnation. In this sense Apollinaris spoke of Christ's human nature as pre-existent. Christ was the pre-existent heavenly man, as being destined for the Incarnation.¹ So Apollinaris understood the expression of S. Jo. iii. 13, *The Son of man which is in heaven*, and the statement of S. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 47), *The second man is from heaven*. The Logos, who supplied the place of the human soul in Christ, was in no sense foreign to the essence of humanity; rather He was "the truth of human nature"—that without which it could not attain the goal of its development. Accordingly, from this point of view, human nature (σάρξ in the wider sense of the term, *i.e.*, ἄνθρωπος) was in a sense coeternal with the Logos, not

¹ Greg. Nyss. *Antirr.* xiii. Apoll. said προὑπάρχει ὁ ἄνθρωπος Χριστός. His contemporaries misunderstood him to mean that the actual *flesh* of Christ pre-existed. It would seem that his teaching was actually perverted in this direction. Thus Greg. Naz., *Ep.* i. *ad Cled.* 6, thinks it necessary to deny the descent of the σάρξ from heaven. See also Greg. Nyss. *l.c.* "Ath." c. *Apoll.* i. 2, 4, 7, 9, 10. Cp. Dörner, *div. i.* vol. i. pp. 371-374. Harnack, ii. 313.

something adventitious but something essentially "consubstantial and connatural";¹ man's nature pre-existed in God. The human birth of the Son of God was indeed an act of self-humiliation (κένωσις), but only in the sense that to be the archetypal man is a higher state of existence than to be actually man and to pass through the stages of a human history. This line of thought had no doubt points of contact with catholic teaching. The work of the Logos in relation to fallen humanity was doubtless that of exhibiting its true archetype and pattern according to the Divine intention. In this sense Christ was "the new" or "heavenly man," the "perfect image" after which our manhood was capable of being re-created";² the "second Adam" in whom our fallen nature was restored to its archetypal sinlessness. But to catholic writers there appeared to be a pantheistic confusion in the suggestion that the flesh was "consubstantial and coeternal with the Word."³ The books *against Apollinaris*, ascribed with doubtful propriety to Athanasius, clearly insist upon the distinctness of the two natures in Christ, as well as on the completeness of the manhood. Christ assumed a human soul as a true element of human nature in its integrity "in order that one might become both, perfect in all points";⁴ and the two, though conjoined inseparably in an actual vital union (ένωσις φυσική, c. *Apoll.* i. 10) yet remain distinct and unconfused. To allow a possible

¹ *Apoll. ap. Greg. Nyss. Antirr.* xvii. οὐχὶ ἐπίκτητος ἐπὶ τῇ εὐεργεσίᾳ γίνεταί ἡ σὰρξ τῇ θεότητι, ἀλλὰ συνουσιωμένη καὶ σύμφυτος. Cp. *Greg. Naz. ad Nect.* iii.

² "Ath." c. *Apoll.* i. 5, 7, ii. 10.

³ *Ibid.* ii. 12, εἰ δὲ ὁμοούσιος τοῦ λόγου ἡ σὰρξ καὶ συναΐδιος, ἐκ τούτου ἐρεῖτε καὶ τὰ πάντα κτίσματα συναΐδια τῷ τὰ πάντα κτίσαντι θεῷ. The form of error which Ath. combats seems to be a *distortion* of Apoll.'s teaching, but it is a true development of his *tendency* to ignore the distinction between manhood and Godhead. Cp. *Gore, Bampton Lectures*, p. 93.

⁴ *Ibid.* ii. 7. See esp. 16.

commingling of the two natures in Christ leads to pantheism, just as a mutilation of the manhood implies docetism.

2. The catholic position.

(i.) The main motive of resistance to Apollinarianism was a right jealousy to maintain the reality and completeness of man's redemption in Christ. If He did not assume human nature in its integrity, including its most distinctive element (τὸ κυριώτατον)—the element most worthy of redemption, and therefore specially needing salvation—Christ could not be either our perfect *example* nor our *redeemer*. Catholic writers complained that the Apollinarian Christ was not really human (οὐχ ὁμοούσιος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ κατὰ τὸ κυριώτατον);¹ He had not assumed the substance which actually needed restoration. Only that which was really united to God could be regarded as "saved." As Gregory Nazianzen expressed it, τὸ ἀπρόσληπτον ἀθεράπευτον. The *whole man* must be restored.²

(ii.) Church teachers further pointed out a docetic element in Apollinaris' teaching. There could be no possibility of a real human probation, or real advance in Christ's manhood, if there were no real human will to be surrendered,—if, as Apollinaris maintained, "the Godhead without constraint swayed the manhood."³ The Church teachers indeed agree with Apollinaris in assigning to the Godhead in Christ absolute predominance; above the human nature stands the "hegemonic Divine." One

¹ Greg. Nyss. *Antirr.* xxiii.; cp. Greg. Naz. *Ep.* i. *ad Cled.* vii.

² "Quod si utique imperfectus homo susceptus est, imperfectum Dei munus est, imperfecta nostra salus, quia non est *totus homo* salvatus." (Def. of the Roman Council under Damasus, in Dörner, *div.* i. vol. ii. note 83). Cp. the very similar passage, Tert. *de Resurr.* xxxiv. See also Petav. *de Incarn.* v. 11, §§ 10, 11; Loofs, *Dogmengesch.* § 35, 3.

³ Greg. Nyss. *Antirr.* xli. ἀβιάσως, φησιν, ἡ θεότης τὴν σάρκα προσάγεται. See "Ath." c. *Apoll.* i. 2, ii. 4, and Ath. *ad Epict.* vii.

writer even uses language which at first sight appears monothelitic,¹ but he seems to mean no more than that the human will was ever completely subject to the Divine. While, however, the catholic writers were content with attributing a true human will to our Lord, without insisting prominently on its independent freedom of choice, Apollinaris exaggerated the supposed necessary antinomy between human will and Divine, and preferred to evade the difficulty by denying the very existence of any human soul in Christ. Perhaps the best statement of the position at which catholic Fathers of this period arrived is that of Gregory Nazianzen in his *first Ep. to Cledonius*, c. ix. Gregory claims for the manhood of Christ that though perfect of its kind, it is *relatively* imperfect; just as a hill is inferior to a mountain, or a mustard seed to a bean, so in the same way the human *νοῦς*, though relatively perfect and endowed with a capacity of control (*ἡγεμονικόν*), is yet not *absolutely* perfect, for it serves God and is subject to Him, not sharing the Divine right of control or the Divine majesty.² Thus if subjection to God be part of the truth, or absolute idea, of human nature, it is not incongruous to suppose that the unity of Christ's person is compatible with the due exercise of a human will. It is obvious that this merely "quantitative" idea of the distinction between Godhead and manhood—the conception of the Divine as a whole, and the human as a part—is not satisfactory; it only illustrates the fact that theological thought was as yet unable to free itself from physical categories, and that the mystery under discussion

¹ "Ath." c. *Apoll.* ii. 10, ἡ γὰρ θέλησις θεότητος μόνης. Cp. Bright, *Athanasius' Orations against the Arians*, introd. xeviii.

² τέλειον οὖν ἡμέτερος νοῦς καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὐχ ἀπλῶς τέλειον, θεοῦ δὲ δοῦλον καὶ ὑποχείριον, ἀλλ' οὐ συνηγεμονικὸν οὐδὲ ὁμότιμον. Cp. Dorner, *div. i. vol. ii. pp. 425, 426.*

was unripe for settlement. The suggestion of Gregory, if pressed, would lead logically to the view which afterwards largely prevailed, that the manhood in Christ was a mere accident, or "moment," of the Deity.

In fact the problem which Apollinaris raised was that which Nestorianism revived—the problem of the unity of Christ's person. Apollinaris held that two complete natures must imply a dual personality.¹ Catholic instinct hesitated where Nestorius afterwards boldly drew the conclusion. Gregory Nazianzen makes strong assertions as to the unity of the person of Christ,² defending the application of the term *θεοτόκος* to the blessed Virgin, and saying, what other Fathers repeat after him, *ἄλλο μὲν καὶ ἄλλο τὰ ἐξ ὧν ὁ σωτήρ, οὐκ ἄλλος δὲ καὶ ἄλλος*. But the mode of conjunction of the two natures is not accurately conceived or stated. Gregory is content to express the union as *σύγκρασις*. Similarly Gregory Nyssen teaches a *transmutation* of the human into the Divine. His language has indeed a strong Eutychian cast; he even denies that the manhood retained its distinctive properties; in the resurrection state it is swallowed up "like a drop of vinegar in a limitless ocean."³ By the aid of the same illustration he meets the Apollinarian objection that if Christ be perfect man "the triad is expanded into a tetrad."⁴

Thus the problem raised by Apollinaris remained un-

¹ Greg. Nyss. *Antirr.* xliii. *ἐὶ ἀνθρώπῳ τελείῳ συνήφθη θεὸς τέλειος, δύο ἂν ἦσαν*. Cp. Greg. Naz. *Ep.* i. *ad Cled.* 8. Apoll. called the Catholics *ἀνθρωπολάτραι*, *ibid.* 10.

² *Ep.* i. *ad Cled.* 4; *Ep.* ii. 1. ³ *c. Eunom.* v. p. 708 c. [Migne *P. G.* 45].

⁴ *Antirr.* xlii. (a very important passage). Petavius attempts to explain this language (*de Incarn.* x. 1, §§ 6–10). Gregory seems to mean that we finally realise the oneness of Christ's person when we see the sinless infirmities of His manhood—sorrow, pain, hunger, etc., swallowed up in the glory of the risen Christ. His general teaching appears to exclude the idea that he took a docetic view of Christ's humanity.

answered until at a later period catholic theology denied in express terms the existence of two "ruling principles" (ἡγεμονικά) in Christ. The Church finally accepted the view that there was but one ἡγεμονικόν in Christ, namely, the Divine Logos (ὁ θεώσας τὸν νοῦν θεός).¹ At present the catholic writers had only begun to face the problem,—how to harmonise the duality of natures with the unity of person. The mode of solution was not yet apparent, and accordingly the Fathers, after giving tentative explanations, were content simply to cling to the verity of Christ's perfect manhood, adhering to it as a matter of tradition which Tertullian in the third century had helped to formulate in such phrases as *utraque substantia in una persona; duæ substantiæ in Christo Jesu, divina et humana; duplex status non confusus sed conjunctus*; etc.²

3. The general result of the controversy with Apollinaris and his adherents³ was a certain development of the doctrine of the human soul in Christ. In 362 the Synod of Alexandria asserted the existence of a human soul in Christ,⁴ and the subject engaged the attention especially of the Cappadocians and Hilary. Gregory Nazianzen revives the idea of Origen that the

¹ Maximus *ap. Petav. de Incarn.* v. 12, § 6. Petav. well says, "Siquidem vel adoptivi filii sunt ii qui Spiritu Dei aguntur—quanto propius excellentiusque naturam ac mentem propriam Deus ipse moderabatur, impulsuque suo quam vellet in partem flectebat? In quod intuens Apostolus dixit *Caput Christi Deum* (1 Cor. xi. 3) quæ vox 'capitis' τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ respondet, et idipsum 'juris,' 'auctoritatis,' ac 'potestatis' vocabulis continetur."

² Cp. *adv. Prax.* xxvii. Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* ii. 304 f.

³ In 362 the Council of Alexandria rejected A.'s error without naming the author; it was also condemned in different Synods held by Damasus of Rome, between 374–377. Apollinaris seceded from the Church in 375, and died in 390. The polemic against him was carried on by the Cappadocians mainly during 370–380. Basil in *Ep.* cclxiii. 4 (written 377?) speaks sadly of Apollinaris' later aberrations.

⁴ Cp. Soer. *H. E.* iii. 7.

soul (νοῦς) was the medium through which the Godhead united itself with the human nature. The Logos is spoken of as διὰ μέσου νοὸς ὁμιλήσας σαρκί.¹ This view became current in both East and West; it is repeated almost in the words of Gregory by John of Damascus, and various Latin Fathers speak of Christ assuming flesh *mediante anima*.² The view of Hilary, however (d. 368), is worthy of notice, because he seems to have insisted, independently of the controversy with Apollinaris, on the reality of our Lord's human soul, thus vindicating with Athanasius and the Cappadocian school the completeness of the two natures, after the manner of Tertullian, while at the same time he anxiously endeavoured to maintain the personal unity of Christ. Hilary was in fact led by his high estimate of the nobility of the human soul to a peculiar view. He held that the soul of man is from God: the body is merely *ex aliena substantia*. The soul must necessarily suffer defilement in entering the body; therefore as the soul of Christ was specially created by the Logos, so He fashioned or constituted for it a body as its appropriate temple. The body of Christ was of heavenly origin, for it was framed by Himself: *Ipsa corporis sui origo est*.³ His

¹ *Orat.* xxxv. Cp. *Ep.* i. *ad Cled.* 10.

² Joh. Damasc. *de orth. fid.* iii. 6, ἡνῶται τοίνυν σαρκί διὰ μέσου νοῦ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, μεσιτεύοντος θεοῦ καθαρότητι καὶ σαρκὸς παχύτητι· ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν γὰρ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σαρκὸς ὁ νοῦς· νοὺς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ καθαρώτατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦ θεός. 18, νοὺς γὰρ ἐν μεταίχμιῳ ἐστὶ θεοῦ καὶ σαρκός, τῆς μὲν ὡς σύννοικος, τοῦ θεοῦ δὲ ὡς εἰκῶν. Cp. Aug. *de agone Chr.* "Invisibilis et incommutabilis veritas per spiritum animam, et per animam corpus suscipiens," etc. So *Epist.* cxl. 12; Greg. Mag. *Moral.* xviii. 20. "Dominus autem per Divinitatem lumen est: qui mediante anima in eius [Mariæ] utero fieri dignatus est per humanitatem corpus." Rufin. *in Symb.* xiii., "Filius Dei nascitur ex Virgine, non principaliter soli carni sociatus sed anima inter carnem Deumque media generatus." See other references in Petav. *de Incarn.* iv. 13. Cp. Aquin. *Summa*, p. iii. q. 6. art. 1.

³ *de Trin.* x. 18. ff. "Caro illa . . . de cælis est, et homo ille de

body was in this sense heavenly (*cæleste corpus*). But Hilary is careful to point out that though the Son of God fashioned for Himself a body He took the actual substance or material of it from Mary. In this sense He took to Himself an alien substance, a "new creature" (*nova natura*).¹ But it was His own Divine act whereby He first united Himself with a soul of His own creation, and then by this soul animated the earthly material derived from Mary and made it a body: *ut per se sibi assumpsit ex virgine corpus, ita ex se sibi animam assumpsit*.

It remains only to notice at this point that Hilary approaches the problem of the unity of Christ's person from a purely ethical standpoint. He conceives the incarnate life as a continuous state of Divine *self-evacuation*. *In forma servi veniens evacuavit se a Dei forma*.² But *evacuatio formæ non est abolitio naturæ; quia qui se evacuat non caret sese, et qui accipit, manet*. The person is ever one and the same: *quia unus atque idem Christus sit, et demutans habitum et assumens*. The Son of God having laid aside His glory, voluntarily persisted in the state of humiliation, remaining as it were hidden (*intra se latens*) without actually laying aside His higher nature: He retained and even exercised, but concealed, the *potestas generis sui*.³

It seems an inconsistency in Hilary that he should ascribe, as he appears to do, impassibility to our Lord's human body, and even to His soul. He does, in fact,

Deo est." Cp. Greg. Nyss. *Antirrh.* liv. See generally Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. pp. 402 ff. and note 74.

¹ *de Trin.* ix. 54. Dorner, div. i. vol. ii. p. 405.

² *in Ps.* lxxviii. 25. Cp. *de Trin.* ix. 14, xi. 48.

³ *de Trin.* ix. 51. "Neque enim defecerat natura, ne esset: sed in se humilitatem terrenæ nativitatis manens sibi Dei natura susceperat, generis sui potestatem in habitu assumptæ humilitatis exercens." So xi. 48.

ascribe to the body a certain *indolentia: virtus corporis sine sensu pœnæ vim pœnæ in se deservientis excepit*.¹ Hilary goes on to explain that the body was exempt from suffering, just as it showed itself to be exempt from ordinary laws when Christ walked on the water, or passed through closed doors. "He had a body wherewith to suffer, and He suffered; but He had not a nature capable of feeling pain (*dolendum*).” To later theologians this kind of language naturally appeared docetic, but it is perhaps to be qualified by consideration of Hilary’s favourite thesis, namely, that all Christ’s acts and sufferings were the result of a free self-determination of His will. He could only suffer, so far as it was His will to suffer. This is in effect what Augustine means when he says *Turbatus est Christus, quia voluit; esurivit Jesus, verum est, sed quia voluit; . . . mortuus est Jesus, verum est, sed quia voluit; in illius potestate erat, sic vel sic affici vel non affici*.² In other words, what in our case is the result of a necessity of nature, was in the case of Christ the result of free acceptance.³ “We declare,” says Hilary, “that the Son of God *non ex naturæ necessitate potius, quam ex sacramento humanæ salutis passioni fuisse subditum, et voluisse se magis passioni subjici, quam coactum. . . . Passus ergo est Deus, quia se subjecit voluntarius passioni*.”⁴

How then did Hilary conceive the unity of our Lord’s person? He seems to solve one mystery by another; to represent the Son of God as subsisting simultaneously in two states or spheres: the state of glory or majesty in

¹ *de Trin.* x. 23. Cp. 24, “Sed ad demonstrandam corporis veritatem, corporis consuetudo suscepta est.” 47, “Fallitur ergo humanæ æstimationis opinio putans hunc *dolere* quod *patitur*.”

² Aug. *in Joann. tract.* xlix. 18. The above is perhaps the only defence that can be offered for Hilary’s language, which he may have retracted.

³ Dorner, *div. i. vol. ii. p.* 414.

⁴ *in Ps.* liii. 12. See other passages in Dorner, *div. i. vol. ii. note* 78, esp. *de Synod.* xlix., where Hil. distinguishes between *passibilitas* and *passio*.

which He was before the Incarnation; and the state of advance, progress, or return, in which He willed to subsist for the sake of man. This dual state of existence is described by Hilary as follows: *Deo itaque proprium fuit esse aliud quam manebat, nec tamen non esse quod manserat; nasci in homine Deum, nec tamen Deum esse desinere; contrahere se usque ad conceptum et cunas et infantiam, nec tamen Dei potestate decedere. Hoc non sibi sed nobis est sacramentum. Neque assumptio nostra Deo profectus est: sed contumelice suæ voluntas nostra provectio est, dum nec amittit ille quod Deus est, et homini acquirit ut Deus sit.*¹ Clearly his thought in this passage is that of a single personality occupying simultaneously two distinct spheres of consciousness. He is following the line of thought which perhaps is the only one that in some measure "appeases" our sense of mystery in regard to this subject.²

Other Western writers do not contribute to the solution of the problem which Apollinaris had raised. They content themselves with reproducing the distinctions formulated by Tertullian: thus Ambrose uses the ordinary language of the West as to the two natures (*gemina substantia*), e.g., *utrumque unus et unus in utroque*, etc., but does not seem to feel the pressure of the difficulty with which Hilary tries to grapple.³ Augustine also uses the phrase *una persona geminæ substantiæ*; and speaks of the union as a "mixture": *Verbo Dei ad unitatem personæ copulatus et quodam modo commixtus est homo.*⁴ Perhaps the following is a typical passage: *Quia omnipotens erat, fieri potuit manens quod erat. . . . Proinde quod verbum*

¹ *de Trin.* ix. 4.

² Cp. below, p. 291.

³ See passages from Ambrose in Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, § 23, p. 210.

⁴ *de Trin.* iv. 30. See also an important passage, *Epist.* cxxxvii., esp. § 11.

*caro factum est, non verbum in carnem pereundo cessit, sed caro ad verbum ne ipsa periret accessit, ut quemadmodum homo est anima et caro, sic esset Christus Deus et homo. Idem Deus qui homo, et qui Deus idem homo: non confusione naturæ sed unitate personæ. . . . Ac per hoc qui erat Dei Filius factus est hominis filius, assumptione inferioris, non conversione potioris, accipiendo quod non erat, non amittendo quod erat.*¹ Augustine in fact adheres simply to the received theology, and finds relief for his intellect in the thought of the Divine omnipotence. The fact is his interest in Christology is rather religious than purely intellectual; he delights to dwell on the significance of Christ's human example, and the humility by which He healed and subdued human pride.² The subject of the human soul in Christ is not fully developed by Augustine;³ but he approves the suggestion that the Son of God created a soul for Himself, without however definitely stating his own view; and he regards the Godhead as τὸ ἡγεμονικόν in Christ: *Deus non quomodo alios sanctos regebat illum hominem sed gerebat.*⁴

On a general review of the Apollinarian controversy the most important points seem to be these—

(1) Church teachers had successfully vindicated the reality and completeness of Christ's human nature. They had insisted on the evidence of the Gospels, but still more emphatically perhaps on the *a priori* consideration that the true redemption of man's nature must necessarily involve the assumption of manhood in its entirety—body, soul, and spirit, with their several faculties of action, thought, and will.

¹ *Serm.* clxxxvi. 1, 2.

² See *Enchir.* 108, and the beautiful passage *Confess.* vii. 18.

³ See *Epist.* cxl. 12 for an anti-Apollinarian passage; cp. *de agone Chr.* xx., xxiii.

⁴ *de Trin.* xiii. 23.

(2) They had also maintained, as a matter of Church tradition and of Christian intuition, the essential unity of Christ's person: but so far they had not succeeded in explaining the conditions under which such unity was conceivable. The general tendency of the catholic writers is to allow to Christ's human nature a relative independence, but at the same time to subordinate the humanity entirely to the Godhead as its true ruling principle (*ἡγεμονικόν*). It was inevitable that attention should henceforth be devoted to the mode, condition, and effect of the union between God and man in Christ. This tendency of thought probably received an impetus from the anthropological controversies of the fifth century in the West. There Christian thought busied itself with the significance of our Lord's human example, the reality of grace, and the nature of the work of redemption,¹ the doctrine of God and of Christ's person being studied chiefly in the light of man's redemption. On the other hand, in the East the intellectual problem still confronted the Church, though, as we have seen, her teachers were to some extent guided in their opposition to Arius and Apollinaris by the idea of redemption, and what it involved. The two factors in Christ's person—the Divine nature and the human—had been asserted. Christ was truly God (*ἀληθῶς θεός*); the redeemer of humanity could not be less than Divine. On the other hand, He was perfectly human (*τελέως ἄνθρωπος*); fallen man needed an entire and comprehensive restoration of his nature. Christ then was Divine and human. How was the union of the two natures in His person to be conceived, and what did it imply? The controversies of the first half of the fifth century are concerned with the solution of this problem.

¹ Aug. *Epist.* cxl., *de gratia novi testamenti*, is an illustration of the way in which the doctrine of grace is linked to that of the Incarnation.

§ II. NESTORIANISM

1. Nestorianism had its root in the theology of Antioch, especially in that of its representative teacher, *Theodore of Mopsuestia* (350–428). The school of Antioch was chiefly interested in anthropology;¹ its system of scriptural exegesis was literalistic; its logical method was Aristotelian.

The error of Apollinaris had led to the vindication of the real distinctness of two complete natures in the incarnate Christ: it is this *distinctness* which is exaggerated by the Antiochene school. The Christology of Theodore starts from the conception of Christ's complete manhood; the perfection of His human experience. Christ actually struggled with human passions, and passed through a veritable conflict with temptation, in which He was continually victorious. So, remaining sinless under probation, He passed into the state of immutable virtue. The power to keep Himself free from sin He owed (1) to His sinless birth; (2) to the union of His manhood with the Divine Logos. In fact, while His birth and baptism imparted to Him a unique unction of the Spirit, the perpetual co-operation of the indwelling Logos made it morally impossible for Him to fall. But the union with the Logos was only bestowed on the manhood of Jesus by anticipation as the reward of His *foreseen* sinless virtue; it was finally consummated in the state of glory, to which the manhood was elevated.

¹ For Theodore's view of man as a microcosm, see Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. pp. 31 ff. Christ came to be what Adam had failed to be,—the real image of God. His humanity was therefore real and complete; He must needs be perfected through a real human experience. Theodore reproduces the general tendency of Diodore of Tarsus [d. circ. 394], some fragments of whose writings are found in Marius Mercator and others. Cp. Loofs, *Dogmengeschichte*, §§ 36, 37.

Theodore conceived three modes of union to be possible between the Logos and the manhood¹—

(1) An *essential* indwelling (ἐνοίκησις κατ' οὐσίαν); but such a self-limitation of God seemed to him incompatible with the conditions of the Divine nature.

(2) An *effectual* indwelling (κατ' ἐνέργειαν); but as God is everywhere present in operation and energy, this mode of indwelling would be no special privilege of Christ.

(3) Accordingly he fell back on the idea of a *moral* indwelling (κατ' εὐδοκίαν)—that special indwelling which God vouchsafes to those whom He regards with complacency, and who display a moral affinity with His own character and will. Such an indwelling demands moral conditions in the subject of it; it depends on his habit or state of mind and will (σχέσις τῆς γνώμης). Of this type was the Divine indwelling in Christ, according to Theodore's view (cp. S. Luke iii. 22); it was in fact the same in kind, but higher in degree than the indwelling of God in His saints; for in Christ God dwelt ὡς ἐν νύμφῃ. God assumed and adopted the man Jesus, and fitted him to partake of all the honour which the Logos (who is φύσει υἱός) enjoys. The man Christ shared the glory of Divine sonship, being *adopted* at His baptism, and gradually exalted so as to become the "firstborn" of creation, the head of the human race, the recipient of the homage of the universe.

In effect this view substitutes for the Incarnation the indwelling of a man by the Logos. The Logos assumed the man Jesus from the moment of His conception, and brought Him through trial and probation to perfection.

¹ The idea of an essential union (ἐνωσις φυσική, or καθ' ὑπόστασιν. See "Ath." c. *Apoll.* i. 10, 12) was supposed by the Antiochenes to be discredited by its practical consequences as displayed in Apollinarianism.

Theodore seems to shrink from the conclusion to which this view tends—a dual personality in Christ. He insists on the fact that the conjunction (*συνάφεια*) between the Logos and the man is so close and indissoluble, that they may be spoken of as one person, just as man and wife are “one flesh.”¹ Theodore maintained that he did not teach a dual sonship: “We speak not of two sons or two lords; since the Divine Logos is essentially one God, to whom he [the man Christ] is united and partakes of His deity, so sharing the title and dignity of Son.”

2. The Christology of the Antiochene school appears in its logical and developed form in Nestorius. We must remember that it represents a reaction from the tendency either to mutilate Christ’s human nature (Apollinarianism), or to minimise the actual experience of humiliation recorded in the Gospels. In any case Nestorius is the exponent of the reactionary view; he popularises the ideas of Theodore, and brings the Antiochene tendency to a point.

NESTORIUS succeeded to the see of Constantinople in 428. In that year one of his presbyters, Anastasius, preached a sermon impugning the use of the term *Theotokos* as applied to the blessed Virgin; and he was supported by Nestorius in a series of discourses.² The word, which seems to have been quite familiar for at least half a century previously,³ had already been dis-

¹ See various passages collected by Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogm.* § 23, p. 202; also Theodore’s confession of faith, in Gieseler, *Eccl. Hist.* i. p. 392 [Eng. tr.]; cp. a valuable note in Bright, *S. Leo on the Incarnation*, note 34.

² The sermons of Nestorius were translated by Marius Mercator; see his works, Migne *P.L.* 48, pp. 757 ff.

³ See Petav. *de Incarn.* v. 15, §§ 6-9. The more usual expression was that “God was born” of the B. V. M. The word had been used by Church writers from Origen downwards. See Pearson on *The Creed*, art. 3, note 36; Bright, *S. Leo*, note 3.

puted by Theodore. Following his lead, Nestorius denied that Mary was "Mother of God." He objected to the phrase mainly on the ground that it was non-scriptural. "I have learned," he said, "from Scripture that God came forth (προελθεῖν) from the Virgin; but never that He was born (γεννηθῆναι) of her." The Virgin might, he allowed, be called *χριστοτόκος*, but not *θεοτόκος*. She brought forth a man, who was accompanied by the Logos (συμπαρελθόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ Λόγου).

Although Nestorius would not draw the inevitable inference from his own statements, Cyril holds him responsible for the logical result of his position. The rejection of the term *Theotokos* seemed inevitably to involve two consequences—

(1) If Mary be not *Theotokos*, i.e. the mother of one person, and that person divine, the assumption of a single human being into fellowship with the Logos is substituted for the Incarnation of God. For Nestorius denied that the two natures in Christ formed a personal unity (ἔνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν). There was at most a union of relation (ἔνωσις σχετική) between the Logos and a man, parallel to that between husband and wife, or friend and friend. Nestorius would allow only a "conjunction" (συνάφεια) of two persons; a union by "indwelling" (κατ' ἐνοίκησιν); an "appropriation," or "possession" (οἰκείωσις, σχέσις) of a human person by the person of the Word.

Thus Mary's son was the "organ" or "vesture" employed by the Word; the "temple" in which He dwelt. The man Christ was not God (θεός), but God-bearer (θεοφόρος), or "possessor of the Godhead" (κτῆτωρ τῆς θεότητος). "I worship," said Nestorius, "him that is borne (τὸν φορούμενον) for the sake of Him who bears (διὰ τὸν φοροῦντα); him that is visible for the sake of

Him who is hidden.”¹ Christ is to be worshipped because God is in Him, not because He is God.

(2) If Mary is not *Theotokos*, Christ's relation to humanity is changed. He is no longer the effectual redeemer of humanity. The Divine work is at best the adoption or elevation of a man in whom the Logos dwells, choosing him *κατὰ πρόγνωσιν*, i.e. as foreknowing what manner of man he would prove to be. To this individual man the Logos unites Himself, not personally (*καθ' ὑπόστασιν*), but morally, in virtue of his merit (*κατ' ἀξίαν*). *Humanity as a whole* is not advanced in the exaltation of Christ; but *one individual* is so advanced, and is allowed to share in the worship due to the Logos (*καθ' ὁμοτιμίαν*, or *κατ' αὐθεντίαν*).²

The view of Nestorius has its merit as well as its fatal defect. The really strong point of Nestorianism is its grasp of the necessity of attributing its due significance to the portrait of the God-man in the Gospels. The example of Christ must have real meaning for His fellow-men; His moral development must have been an actual historical process, not a mere illusion; it must have been real, not docetic. As Dorner points out, the Antiochene theologians,³ and especially Theodore, were anxious to pursue the path which the Church had

¹ Petav. *de Incarn.* i. 9. In iii. 3 Petav. gives other Nestorian phraseology, e.g., *σχετική συνάφεια, προσκύνησις κατ' ἀναφοράν, προσωπική ἔνωσις, κ.τ.λ.*

² Cp. Cyril, *ep. ad Nest.* ii. anath. 3, etc. [Boeth.] *de pers. et duab. nat.* c. 4, “Quæ est igitur facta hominis Deique coniunctio? Num ita quasi cum duo corpora sibimet apponuntur ut tantum locis juncta sint et nihil in alterum ex alterius qualitate perveniat? quem conjunctionis modum Graeci *κατὰ παράθεσιν* vocant. . . . Jam vero sequitur ut personis manentibus nullo modo a Divinitate humanitas credatur assumpta; omnino enim disjuncta sunt quæ æque personis naturisque separantur. . . . Non est igitur salvatum humanum genus,” etc.

³ Already (during the Arian conflict) Eustathius of Antioch had pointed out the reality of Christ's human soul.

followed in rejecting Apollinarianism; to vindicate the completeness of Christ's human nature, and the moral freedom of His human will. But Nestorius endeavoured to explain the mystery of Christ's person logically rather than ethically. He had a clear idea of that which, speaking metaphysically, *seems* to contradict the essence of Deity. "I cannot," he said, "adore a God of three months old; a God who is dead and buried." But he failed to apprehend the ethical idea of Divine power which is guided by love and a purpose of grace,—love condescending to lay aside its glory, and to accept creaturely limitations. He spoke as if the word *Theotokos* implied the birth of *Deity*,¹ not the birth of a *Divine Person*. "God could not be born, *quâ* God: therefore Mary was not *Theotokos*." The Antiochene doctrine, as exhibited in the theology of Nestorius, had its roots in the past. It is distinguished from the error of Paul the Samosatene only by its more clear affirmation of the personality of the indwelling Logos. It practically represents Christ as no more than an inspired man (*ἄνθρωπος ἐνθεός*). While the manhood of Christ is set in the forefront, the Godhead is in effect reduced to the level of an inspiring and sustaining power, the catholic idea of an all-powerful Divine Redeemer being altogether obscured or withdrawn from view. Christ's humanity is exhibited as a pattern, inviting men to imitation; but is no longer the divinely endowed medium of grace, power, and life. And at this point we may notice the affinity between Nestorian and Pelagian error. Cassian in describing a certain humanitarian heresy akin to that of Nestorius which arose in Gaul early in the fifth century, points out its connection with Pelagianism. He traces

¹ This confusion between *God* and *Godhead* runs throughout the sermons of Nestorius; see esp. Serm. vii., *non occidit Pilatus Deitatem*. Cp. Bright, *Ch. Hist.* 313-451, p. 316.

a tie of affinity between the doctrine that Christ was a sinless man promoted for His merits to the dignity of being assumed by God, and the Pelagian view that all men could, without the aid of God, become simply by their own efforts what Christ became. The Nestorian Christ came not to effect an unnecessary redemption, but simply to inspire men to self-dependent efforts by setting before them a good example.¹ In point of fact there are said to have been historical connections between the followers of Nestorius and those of Pelagius, and the affinity is illustrated by the case of the monk Leporius, who, for a while, combined both forms of error, but finally recanted.² In modern times the same combination of tendencies is seen in Deism: taking an optimistic view of man's condition and capacities, Deism sees no need of redemption, or atonement for sin. The solitary merit of the Antiochene Christology is its tenacious hold of the figure of the historical Christ at a time when there was some tendency in the Church to represent the humiliation of Christ as "economic," and to assign an excessive predominance to the Divine aspect of His person. There is justice in the observation that "the Church owes it to the theologians of Antioch that its Christology did not become the development of a mere *idea* of Christ, submerging altogether the actual historical Christ."³

Before passing to the theology of Cyril, let us briefly explain the disputed term.

Its meaning is that *Mary did truly bear the person who*

¹ See Cassian, *de Incarn. Chr.* i. cc. 2, 3, ap. Petav. *de Incarn.* i. 12. Petav. quotes the epigram of Prosper:—

"Nestoriana lues successi Pelagianæ,
Quæ tamen est utero prægenerata meo.
Infelix miseræ genetrix, et filia natæ,
Prodivi ex ipso germine quod peperit," etc.

² Aug. *Epist.* ccxix.; Cassian, *de Incarn.* i. 4, 5.

³ Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* ii. 327.

is very God.¹ She is Mother of God, *secundum humanitatem* "as touching His manhood." Out of her substance the Word fashioned for Himself a dwelling-place, and the flesh so assumed became the very body of the Word (ἡ σὰρξ ἰδία τοῦ Λόγου). When Nestorius insisted that "Mary did not bear God," he meant to teach what no catholic disputed, namely, that the Godhead cannot in itself be subject to human accidents like birth and death. But catholic theology spoke, as we have seen, of a twofold "generation" of the Word: He was begotten of God before the worlds; He was born in time of the Virgin His mother. Novatian, meeting a similar objection, well says: *Quis non intelligat quod impassibilis sit divinitas, passibilis vero humana fragilitas? Quis non cognoscat non illud in Christo mortuum esse quod Deus est, sed illud in illo mortuum est quod homo est? . . . Mors in Christo adversus solam materiam corporis potuit valere. Adversum divinitatem Sermonis non potuit se exercere.*²

3. What then was the Church's answer to Nestorianism? In refuting Apollinaris, theology had already anticipated the answer. Following the lead of Athanasius, the Cappadocians had insisted on the concrete unity of the God-man,—a unity resulting, as they were inclined to teach, from a kind of combination of the two natures, which excluded the idea of a dual sonship. Thus Gregory Nazianzen says: "Both that which assumed, and that which was assumed, was God; two natures combining into unity (εἰς ἓν συνδραμοῦσαι), not two sons; whereof the one deified, the other was deified. O

¹ As a Greek writer (quoted by Petav. v. 17) says, ἡ τοῦ προσλήμματος ὑπόστασις θεία ἦν, καὶ τὸ πρόσλημμα δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐνώσεως ἐθεώθη. Cp. Hooker, *Ecc. Pol.* v. 52, § 2, for an admirable statement. See also a valuable note of Bright, *S. Leo*, note 3.

² *de Trin.* xxv. See also an explanation by Vinc. Lirin. *Common.* xv.

strange commixture! O wondrous mingling!"¹ Yet the distinction of the two natures was carefully guarded, in spite of the fact that the higher so entirely dominated, and almost absorbed, the lower. The Cappadocian Fathers were anxious to be true to each aspect of the historical portrait of Christ. It was the overpowering certainty of an actual historic redemption that inclined them to represent the unity of the natures as a process by which the manhood was blended with the Godhead. "In relation to the Antiochenes they defended a religious position; in opposition to Apollinaris, a historic position."²

Perhaps the most explicit statement, before the controversy with Nestorius began, is the following by Gregory Nazianzen: "We do not," he says, "separate the manhood from the Godhead, but we teach one and the same [Christ]. . . . If anyone supposes that Mary is not mother of God (*θεοτόκον*), he is parted from the Deity; . . . if anyone introduces the idea of *two* sons, the one proceeding from God and the Father, the second coming from the human mother, and not one and the same [Son]—may he fall from the adoption promised to them that rightly believe! For the natures are two—Godhead and manhood; . . . but there are not two sons, nor two Gods."³ The Athanasian view, as it may be called, takes final shape in the theology of the celebrated CYRIL, archbishop of Alexandria (412–444), a learned but passionate and ambitious prelate, who entered the field of controversy against his rival at Constantinople, "moved by interests both personal and doctrinal." There can be little doubt, however, that the uppermost

¹ *Orat.* xxxvii. 2, xxxviii. 13. Cp. Greg. Nyssen's theory of *μεταβολή*.

² Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogm.* i. p. 205.

³ *Ep.* i. *ad Cled.* §§ 3, 4. (Cp. a similar, and nearly contemp. Latin statement in Ambr. *de Incarn. Dom. sacr.* vi. § 47.)

feeling in his mind was one of alarm and resentment at the religious bearings of the Nestorian view. The contest began with a correspondence between the two prelates, followed by an appeal by both to Celestine of Rome. After some hesitation, Celestine sided with Cyril—Rome thus adhering to her traditional policy of maintaining the alliance with Alexandria. Nestorius was condemned at Rome, and virtually deposed; shortly afterwards (in 430) Cyril held a synod at Alexandria, which declared Nestorius a heretic; and at the same time he published twelve anathemas, which were appended to the third letter addressed to Nestorius.

Nestorius thus finding himself at issue with Rome and Alexandria, published twelve counter-anathemas.¹ It is important to remember that he was largely supported in the East, notably by John of Antioch, to whom Nestorius had given satisfactory explanations as to the use of the expression *Theotokos*, and later by Theodoret,² bishop of Cyrus, whose sympathies were Antiochene, and who actually wrote a refutation of Cyril's anathemas. Meanwhile the Emperor had been pressed to call a general Council, which was accordingly summoned for 431 at Ephesus. The circumstances of the Council do not concern us here; it is enough to say that the proceedings were marked by more than ordinary violence, and conducted in a wholly indefensible manner and spirit. Celestine was represented by three legates. After a delay of sixteen days, Cyril and Memnon of Ephesus opened the sessions without waiting longer for John of Antioch and his adherents. About 159 bishops took

¹ See them in the Latin trans. of Marius Mercator [Migne, *P.L.* 48, pp. 909 ff.].

² Born at Antioch, *circ.* 390; bp. of Cyrus, *circ.* 420; died *circ.* 457. As to his character, etc., see Robertson, *Ch. Hist.* ii. 185-6. Cp. Gieseler, *Eccl. Hist.* i. 399 note.

part in these first proceedings, which were carried through with needless haste, and ended in the condemnation and deposition of Nestorius, as a "new Judas" (June 22, 431). A few days later (June 27) John of Antioch arrived, and was highly indignant at the course things had taken; he at once held a council of his supporters, about forty-three in number, at which Cyril and Memnon were condemned and excommunicated, but no mention was made of Nestorius. The Emperor was persuaded to confirm the sentence of both the rival synods. The secret influence, however, exercised by Cyril at Constantinople was not without effect; and the Emperor was finally prevailed on to reinstate Cyril and Memnon; Nestorius' deposition was confirmed, and he retired to a monastery. Thus the Council was brought to an end. Two points are specially worthy of remark—(1) It is a question whether Nestorius really held the opinions ascribed to him by Cyril. The historian Socrates—no unprejudiced witness—imputes nothing more to him than a needless repugnance to orthodox language, arising from ignorance.¹ As a matter of fact, Nestorius allowed the use of *Theotokos* under restrictions: the Virgin might be called "mother of God," because of

¹ *H.E.* vii. 32: "When I came to read the books put forth by Nestorius, I found that the man was ignorant—and I will speak my mind frankly. I was not actuated by hatred to him when I described his shortcomings; nor do I mean to make light of his good points, in order to please certain persons. To me it appears that Nestorius did not follow the lead of Paul the Samosatene, or Photinus; nor did he assert at all that Christ was a mere man; but he shrinks only from the phrase [*Theotokos*] as if it were a spectre; and this is the result of his vast ignorance. For though gifted with natural eloquence, and therefore accounted learned, yet in fact he was ill-trained, and he disdained to study the works of ancient interpreters. Puffed up with pride at his own faculty of speech, he did not spend sufficient pains on the study of ancient documents." Socrates goes on to say that Nestorius did not know the old reading of 1 Jo. iv. 3, *πάν πνεῦμα δὲ λέγει τὸν Ἰησοῦν, κ.τ.λ.*, which was believed to have been expunged by designing heretics. See Westcott, *ad loc.* add. note.

Him who was *united* to that which was born of her.¹ "The controversy more than once appeared to be in such a position that it might have been ended by a word of explanation; but an unwillingness on both sides to concede, and personal animosities, unhappily prolonged it."

(2) We notice also the great hostility excited in the East by Cyril's anathemas. It was some time before peace was restored, even after the conclusion of the Council. Some, like the devout and learned Theodoret, laboured steadily for peace, which could only be arrived at on some other basis than that of Cyril's anathemas. In 432-3 an understanding was arrived at: John of Antioch being induced to assent to the condemnation of Nestorius, and Cyril subscribing a formula, probably compiled by Theodoret, without being compelled to retract his former utterances. Many Egyptian prelates, however, remained dissatisfied with the formula, for its explicit acknowledgment of the two natures. On the whole, each party had secured an important point: the Antiochenes were satisfied with the rejection of Apollinarianism and the recognition of two natures; Cyril was content with the affirmation of the unity of the person in Christ, and the *ἔνωσις δύο φύσεων*.²

Nestorius, after wandering in exile, died about 440. With his death Nestorianism passed beyond the limits of the empire; its last stronghold was the school at Edessa, which was suppressed by the Emperor Zeno in 489. Its home henceforth was in Persia, where the Nestorian

¹ See Nest. *Serm.* iv., v. and *Ep. ad. Celest.* (ap. Migne, *P.L.* 48, p. 842f.).

² See the formula in Gieseler, *Eccl. Hist.* vol. i. p. 401 note; or Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogm.* § 24, p. 216. The most important sentences are: ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν . . . ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιον ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα. δύο γὰρ φύσεων ἔνωσις γέγονε: διδὲ ἓνα χριστὸν, ἓνα υἱόν, ἓνα κύριον ὁμολογοῦμεν κατὰ ταύτην τὴν τῆς ἀσυχύτου ἐνώσεως ἔννοιαν ὁμολογοῦμεν τὴν ἁγίαν πάρθενον θεοτόκον, κ.τ.λ.

or "Chaldæan" Church established itself, and entered on a career of great missionary activity in India, Arabia, and even China and Tartary. For a long period Ctesiphon, and later Bagdad, was the seat of the Nestorian patriarchs; in the thirteenth century there are said to have been as many as twenty-five metropolitan sees in the Nestorian Church. After the destructive inroads of Tamerlane, the Church shrank to a remnant, which still maintains a precarious existence in the valleys of Kurdistan. In the year 1830 there were said to exist at least 150,000 Nestorian Christians; but their numbers have now probably been greatly reduced.¹

4. We now come to the Christology of Cyril, of which it may be said at once that it is in line with the theology of Athanasius as developed by the later Nicenes. The theology of Alexandria starts in fact from the point of view opposite to that of the Antiochenes. It starts from the person of the Logos: the God-man forming a concrete unity, within which, by a process of abstraction, two distinct natures can be discerned. Christ is regarded as *ἐν ἐκ δύο τῶν ἐναντίων*; a single Divine person submitting to conditions non-natural to His Deity: *ὁ ὦν γίγνεται, καὶ ὁ ἄκτιστος κτίζεται, καὶ ὁ ἀχώρητος χωρεῖται*, says Nazianzen.² Conversely the Manhood was glorified, and even transformed by its union with the Logos: "It no longer remained within its own properties and limits; but by the right hand of God it was coexalted, and became instead of a thing subject, Christ the king; instead of a thing lowly, most high; instead of man, God (*ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου θεός*)."³ This last passage is an extreme statement of the "Alexandrine"

¹ Hefele, *Concilien*. ii. 270. As to later times, see the Reports, Transactions, etc., of the Abp. of Canterbury's Mission to the Assyrian Christians.

² Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxxviii. 13.

³ Greg. Nyss. *c. Eunom.* v. [Migne], p. 697.

point of view, and it is obvious that the tendency of it is towards a minimising view of Christ's humanity. At anyrate it is this type of theology which attains a definite form in Cyril.

Cyril then starts from the one person of the Logos, as posited by the actual fact of Redemption. The Logos has assumed our manhood in its entirety in order to redeem it. The formula characteristic of Cyril is accordingly *μία φύσις τοῦ Λόγου σαρκακωμένη*,—a phrase which will be examined more particularly below. The Logos appropriates the substance of manhood, the body of flesh and the reasonable soul, as an actual part of that universe which He comes to redeem; He incorporates the manhood with His own person, blending the properties of either nature, and gathering them into a single personal unity.¹ The manhood accordingly ceases to have any independent existence; it remains, as it were, a receptive and passive instrument, scarcely more than an attribute, of the Divine Being. The eternal person of the Word assumes every element of the humanity—"appropriates" the entire nature, giving infinite merit and worth to all its acts and sufferings by making them His own: *αὐτοῦ γὰρ εἶναί φαμεν κατ' οἰκείωσιν οἰκονομικὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, καὶ μετὰ τῆς σαρκὸς τὰ αὐτῆς*.² This does not imply any change in the unalterable nature (*φύσις*) of the Logos, nor any confusion or commixture.³ The Godhead continues in its glory and power what it was: "Though He took our nature and economically put on the form of a servant, yet He remained in His own natural Godhead and Lordship. For He has not ceased to be God, even though He was made flesh. . . . And

¹ *de Inc. Unig.* Migne, *P.G.* 75, 1244 B, *εἰς ἓν ἄμφω συλλέγων, καὶ ὥσπερ ἀλλήλοις ἀνακίρνας τὰ τῶν φύσεων ιδιώματα.* Cp. 1249 D.

² *Quod unus sit Christus*, Migne, *P.G.* 75, 1332 D.

³ *ad regin.* etc., ii. Migne, *P.G.* 76, 1364 A; *Quod unus*, 1292 D.

since He willingly condescended to the limitations of humanity. . . . He perforce submitted also to human birth; not that His Divine nature then took its origin, but He ever was and is, naturally and in truth, the Word proceeding from God the Father." But "He is said to have been born as touching the flesh, because He appropriated to Himself the birth of His own flesh."¹

Two points demand special attention.

1. What is Cyril's conception of the "unity" of the Divine person? On this point he is not consistent. Sometimes he approaches the subject from the point of view of his own formula, *μία φύσις*. Under this aspect the "person" of the Logos is the one unchangeable Divine Being, who remains even after the Incarnation what He was before it. The manhood is thus reduced to an impersonal accident or element in the Logos, who remains what He ever was, except in being *σαρκωθείς*:² He is no longer *Λόγος ἄσαρκος*. Sometimes, on the other hand, Cyril speaks of the person of Christ as if it were a *resultant* unity. He frequently uses such phrases as *ἡ εἰς ἐνότητα συνδρομή*, or *ἐκ δύο φύσεων εἰς Χριστός*; and he frequently adduces the accepted human analogy in illustration of the personal unity of the incarnate Christ: just as man is compounded of two dissimilar substances, soul and body, yet in the result is one personal being; so, from two natures united without being confused (*ἐκ δύο πραγμάτων*), results the person of Christ.³ Cyril maintains, as we have seen, that his doctrine of "one nature" does not imply any confusion or mixture of the two natures. But, in his view, if the

¹ *ad regin.* i. 1205 B, C.

² Cp. *ep.* xlv. (*ad Succens.* ii.), Migne, *P.G.* 77, 241 A.

³ *de Inc. Unig.* 1224 B; *ep.* 1208 D, "The mediator consisted of (*συγκείσθαι ἐκ*) our manhood, perfect according to the law of its own nature, and the Logos." See the whole passage; cp. *ep.* xlv. p. 233 A (very explicit).

two natures are separated, as Nestorianism separates them, no true incarnation has taken place. The distinction of the two natures is, in fact, relatively unimportant; the material point (in view of redemption) is that human nature has been really incorporated with the substance (or φύσις) of the Word, and has become, so to speak, included, by the act of incarnation, in the one person of Christ.¹ It is clear that Cyril's view of the unity of Christ's person is not strictly consistent, but the *point* of his anti-Nestorian teaching, though it varies in form, is identical throughout—*Christ one person, and that person Divine*.

2. What, then, is the relation of the two natures?

Both, Cyril replies, remain in their integrity, without confusion of attributes.² But though in the abstract, and for the purposes of thought or argument, the two natures in Christ can be distinguished,³ the distinction is merely conceptual. *In concreto* there is but one personal subject, μία φύσις σεσαρκωμένη. In virtue of the union, the Divine nature makes itself (so to speak) bearable (οἰστόν) to the inferior nature,—a point which Cyril illustrates by reference to the bush burning but not consumed;⁴ and the properties of the higher nature pass over to the lower,⁵ just as the ιδιώματα of the lower are appropriated by the higher. In virtue of the

¹ He speaks of "God in the person of Christ" (ἐν τῷ προσώπῳ χριστοῦ), *de Inc. Unig.* 1233 c. Cp. Dorner, *div. ii. vol. i. pp. 56 f.* Harnack, *Dogm. ii. 332*.

² There is no absorption of the manhood into the Divine nature. See *Quod unus*, 1292 d.

³ *ep. ad Eulog.* xlv. 225 B, ὁ μὲν λόγος καὶ ἡ θεωρία οἶδε τὴν διαφορὰν. Cp. *de Inc. Unig.* 1221 B, θεωρεῖ μὲν τινα φύσεων διαφορὰν ὁ νοῦς· ταῦτόν γάρ οὐτι που θεότης τε καὶ ἀνθρωπότης· εἰσδέξεται δὲ ὅμῳ ταῖς περὶ τούτων ἐννοαῖς καὶ τὴν ἀμφοῖν εἰς ἐνότητα συνδρομήν.

⁴ *Quod unus*, 1293 A.

⁵ *de Inc. Unig.* 1249 A. The Logos was wont τὰ τῆς ιδίας φύσεως κοινοποιεῖν τῷ ἰδίῳ σώματι.

communicatio idiomatum, the Logos can be said to suffer, hunger, thirst, learn, pray; while, on the other hand, the manhood can be adored, and the body called "divine" (θεῖον σῶμα).¹ Mary also can be rightly styled *Theotokos*. But this interchange of properties finds its practical limit in the Divine properties of the Logos, who remains ἀτρεπτος, ἀπαθής, ἔξω τοῦ παθεῖν καθὸ νοεῖται θεός.² It is just at this point that Cyril involves himself in contradictions, by insisting too rigidly on the metaphysical, as against the ethical, conception of the Divine nature. "How," he asks, "can the same person at once suffer and not suffer? Only by suffering in His own flesh, and not in the nature of Godhead. Indeed, wholly ineffable is the account of these things, and no mind can attain to ideas so subtle and exalted; yet, following reasonings which tend to right belief, and viewing the plan of what is fit, we neither alienate Him from being said to suffer, . . . nor do we affirm that the things pertaining to the flesh have been wrought upon His Divine and supreme nature; but He may be conceived as suffering in His own flesh, albeit not suffering in His Godhead after some such mode as this. . . . As iron in contact with the onset of fire gives it admission and travails with the flame, and if it chance to be struck by aught, the iron bears the brunt, while the nature of the fire remains uninjured; even so may you form an idea in regard of the Son being said to suffer in the flesh, and not in His Godhead."³ Here, in spite of his admissions elsewhere, Cyril simply falls back on an emphatic declaration that neither nature in any wise parted with its own properties. That which was proper to each was possible

¹ *de Inc. Unig.* 1228 A, and *passim*. Cp. *adv. Nest.* ii. Migne, *P.G.* 76, p. 96 A.

² *Quod unus*, 1337 D. Cp. 1362 B, C (concluding summary, very explicit).

³ *Quod unus*, 1357 C, D.

for each: consequently Christ ἀπαθῶς ἔπαθεν. The Deity remained impassible, though the human nature suffered; the same person was at once exempt from human infirmity and subject to it. "Cyril apologises for this metaphor," Dr. Bruce very fairly observes. "Well he might; for the metaphor fails to do justice either to the nature of God, or to the nature of suffering. Of course the Divine nature cannot suffer as the body suffers; but there is a moral suffering of which God is capable because He is love."¹

And this brings us to another inconsistency in Cyril's Christology.

The humanity, as he repeatedly insists, is perfect. In assuming it, the Son of God really submitted to the limitations of creaturely existence. In the physical sphere, says Cyril, "He economically suffered the limitations of manhood to prevail over Him."² He submitted to ordinary laws of human development and growth. But it is noticeable that in the intellectual sphere Cyril admits only the semblance of limitation. *Real* ignorance, *real* growth in knowledge, appeared to him to be incompatible with the ἔνωσις of the two natures. It was impossible to conceive the Logos as possessed of knowledge of which the incarnate person was ignorant. The supposed "advance" in Christ's knowledge as man was only the graduated manifestation of a wisdom already complete and all-embracing; a manifestation which kept pace with the bodily growth. Thus Christ is described as "usefully pretending not to know the day of judgment"; or as speaking "economic-

¹ *Humiliation of Christ*, p. 58, note 6.

² ἡφίει δὴ οὖν οἰκονομικῶς τοῖς τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος μέτροις ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ κρατεῖν. *Quod unus*, 1332 B. By "economy" Cyril seems to mean self-subjection to limitations non-natural to Godhead, *e.g.* the law of growth.

ally" in professing ignorance.¹ While in stature there was *real* growth, in knowledge and wisdom there was only *apparent* growth. This inconsistency² seems to be due to the preconceptions with which Cyril approached the subject of the Incarnation. Both he and his Antiochene opponents assumed that, given an incarnation of God, a true human experience was impossible. The error of both is "over-confident dogmatism as to the conditions and possibilities of the Incarnation."³ Athanasius had made some tentative suggestions,⁴ but Cyril is bolder, and puts forward a theory which betrays him not only into inconsistency with himself, but into an unworthy conception of our Lord's character, as if He could actually feign an ignorance that was not real.⁵

It is sufficiently clear however that the point of Cyril's contention against Nestorius is this: that the Church teaches *a condescension of God, not the mere exaltation of a man*. Cyril's difficulties and contradictory statements result from his effort to explain the mystery of a real Divine condescension, without the aid of a

¹ The passages bearing on our Lord's knowledge as man are collected by Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, note A (pp. 366 ff.). See the same work, pp. 50-58, for a useful discussion.

² A much later writer, belonging to the mystic school of Latin scholasticism, Richard of S. Victor, raises the question naturally suggested by the Cyrilline view: "Placet tibi," he asks Hugo in the dialogue *de Emmanuele*, lib. ii. c. xviii., "ut dicatur in sapientia profecisse secundum falsitatem, et ætate quidem secundum veritatem? . . . Dic utrum tibi placeat unam eandemque dictionem in una et eadem positione, juxta historicum sensum ad diversas acceptiones accommodare."

³ Bruce, *op. cit.* p. 56.

⁴ Cp. p. 302.

⁵ Theodoret, *Reprehensio* xii. *capp. Cyril.* on anath. 4, says: "If He knows the day, and from a desire to hide it says He knows not, see to what a blasphemy the inference leads; ἡ γὰρ ἀλήθεια ψεύδεται." Cyril's answer is: "The ignorance was not that of the Logos; but of the form of the servant (μορφῇ δούλου), which only knew at that time so much as the indwelling Deity revealed." This is an unobjectionable statement as compared with Cyril's other expressions. On the whole subject, see below, pp. 298 f.

truly ethical conception of God. His central thought is that of the *power* of the Logos to appropriate human nature and reveal Himself under the limitations it imposes. "It was *not impossible* (ἀμήχανον) to the gracious God to make Himself endurable to the limitations of humanity."¹ He regards the Incarnation too exclusively as an act or movement towards man of Divine power,—a movement single and complete from the first; he does not contemplate it as a *continuous* effort of self-abasing love, which waits on human development, and tempers itself (to use Hilary's expression) to the capacities of the assumed manhood. The fact is that Cyril is dominated by physical ideas.² He regards the person of the Word as appropriating human nature by a single definite act or process (ἔνωσις φυσική). In his view the indissolubleness of the ἔνωσις depends on its being a Divine act of power, rather than a continuous ethical process in which the Divine and human alike took part, each according to its true law,—the Divine by free appropriation of the human; the human by free moral adherence and submission to the Divine. Thus Cyril failed to find a place in his view of Christ's person for the element of truth which Nestorius was anxious to maintain, namely, the ethical significance of Christ's manhood. Consequently "not an ethical, but primarily a physical Christology, was the result of his inquiries; for, according to his representations, the In-

¹ *Quod unus*, 1293 A.

² It is significant that Cyril usually employs neuter expressions (*e.g.*, δύο πράγματα, ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον) to denote the two natures (Dorner, *div. ii.* vol. i. p. 71). Theodoret, in reply to Cyril's third anathema, makes the objection that a φυσική ἔνωσις implies physical necessity, whereas the *kenosis* is an act of free moral condescension. ἡ γὰρ φύσις ἀναγκαστικόν τι ἐστὶ καὶ ἀβούλητον χρῆμα . . . εἰ τοίνυν φυσικὴ γέγονε . . . ἡ καθ' ἔνωσιν σύνοδος, ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τινὸς βιαζόμενος, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ φιλανθρωπία κεχηρμένος, ὁ θεὸς λόγος συνήφθη τῇ τοῦ δούλου μορφῇ, κ.τ.λ. (Bruce, *op. cit.* p. 52.)

carnation was, strictly speaking, accomplished (*i.e.* consummated) as soon as the Logos had appropriated the human, and made it an actual modification of Himself,—so soon as the human became physically insubstantiated with the Divine. From that time onwards, the human aspect pursued no longer even a relatively independent course, although the Logos, during His mundane existence, was mindful of, and regulated His self-representation according to, human laws.”¹ Both Cyril and Nestorius seem to have ethical interests at heart, but both are hampered in their treatment of the Incarnation by their metaphysical conception of Deity. The result is that while Cyril dwells too exclusively on the Incarnation as a *physical fact*, Nestorius exaggerates the reality of the *moral process or discipline* by which the manhood of the Logos was “made perfect.” The two views were really complementary. Cyril started from the Divine side, insisting on the unity of the person, and looking at the Divine fact in its completeness and entirety; the Antiochenes started from the human side, and looked at the Incarnation as a *status exinanitionis*,—a process tending towards consummation. Cyril’s thought is dominated by the theology of S. John; the Christology of the Antiochene school may be said to recall the teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews, reproducing it, however, in a distorted form.

It must be admitted that there is in Cyril a very strong vein of monophysitism, though perhaps it is less pronounced than in Gregory of Nyssa. Practically the Redeemer’s manhood ceases to have independent significance; it is transformed and “deified” to a point which makes it only nominally “consubstantial” with ours. In his language Cyril is obviously in some sense monophysite; for he insists that the Logos after the Incarnation ever

¹ Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 73.

remained what He had been before, *μία φύσις*, in spite of the fact that he strenuously denies the imperfection of the manhood or its confusion with the Godhead. But he is so dominated by the exclusive idea of the Incarnation as a Divine redemptive act, that his mode of expression is physical, and his illustrations even "bear a *chemical* character."¹ He regards as an act of simple power, what is after all a supreme display of *love*; and he underrates that element of moral co-operation on the part of man which is an essential condition of his redemption. There is, in fact, a docetic element in Cyril, in spite of his energetic protests against docetism.² But on the other hand he cannot be fairly accused of ignoring the historical Christ of the Gospels.³ Rather it is an unhistorical analysis of the person of Christ which offends both his historical and religious instincts.⁴ He looks on Christ not merely as the example or type of holy manhood, but as a Divine gift to man,—a Divine Being, *mighty to save*, who has actually entered into vital union with our race. In his general point of view Cyril is far more true than the Antiochenes to the religious consciousness of Christendom. Christian tradition is on his side.

The letters to *Nestorius*⁵ and to *John of Antioch*, which have ecumenical sanction, call for some brief notice.

1. The main point on which Cyril lays stress is the *unity and continuity* of the Redeemer's person. The Logos (*ὁ τοῦ Λόγου φύσις*) took to Himself a body of flesh

¹ Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 73.

² See, e.g., *de Inc. Unig.* 1196 c (where he uses the expression *παχέα καὶ ἐναργής οὐκονομία* of the Incarnation), and the page following.

³ See *de Inc. Unig.* 1215; *ad regin.* ii. 1384 ff.

⁴ Seeberg, *Lehrbuch*, i. 208. Cp. Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. pp. 60, 61.

⁵ *Ep.* ii. and *Ep.* iii. to Nestorius are published separately by P. E. Pusey; in Migne's ed. they are numbered 4 and 17 respectively. The letter to John of Antioch is no. 39 in Migne (*P.G.* 77). See Pusey's preface. *N.B.*—The references are to Pusey's edition of *The three epistles* [Oxford, 1884].

animated by a reasonable soul, uniting it hypostatically to Himself (*Ep.* p. 6). Here the personal union (ἡ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔνωσις, ἔνωσις ὑποστατική) is opposed to a union κατὰ θέλησιν μόνην ἢ εὐδοκίαν, which would imply the assumption merely of a person or individual man (πρόσληψις προσώπου μόνου).

2. *The general character of the Incarnation*: it was an act of loving condescension undertaken "for us and for our salvation" (*Err.* i. p. 6; ii. p. 18); it involved the "endurance" (ὑπομεῖναι) of a human birth (i. p. 6); a voluntary self-exinanition (καθεὶς ἑαυτὸν εἰς κένωσιν, ii. p. 18; ἐκούσιον κένωσιν, p. 28). Cyril so far views the Divine act ethically, as a free and voluntary movement of Divine pity towards man.

3. *The distinction of the two natures is preserved* (i. p. 6). There was no confusion of the manhood with the Godhead, but the Logos "appropriated" (οἰκειούμενος, i. p. 6; ii. p. 24), and made His own, all the ordinary accidents and attributes of a true humanity, without undergoing any change in His own Divine nature (μεμενηκὼς ὅπερ ἦν θεός . . . ἄτρεπτος γὰρ ἐστι καὶ ἀναλλοιώτος παντελῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἅει μένων, *Ep.* ii. p. 20); He remained ἀπαθὴς ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι σώματι (*Ep.* i. p. 8; cp. 7). While actually lying in the manger "He was filling the whole creation as God" (*Ep.* ii. p. 20). Both natures are perfect and entire, distinct and unconfused (*Ep.* iii. p. 48).

4. *The one person of Christ results from the conjunction of the two natures* (i. 6, ἀποτελεσασὼν [τῶν φύσεων] τὸν ἕνα Κύριον καὶ Χριστόν), Christ is ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἰς. The union (ἔνωσις) is no mere "conjunction" (συνάφεια) such as in virtue of worth or dignity a man might have with God (ii. p. 22); nor is it a mere "juxtaposition" (παράθεσις) of two persons; nor a mere relative or accidental "participation" (μέθεξις σχετική), like that of those who are morally united to God. Cyril specially rejects συνάφεια

(the Nestorian term) as "inadequate to express the nature of the union" (*ibid.*). The union is *καθ' ὑπόστασιν*, or, as Cyril elsewhere expresses it, *ἕνωσις φυσική* (ii. p. 36), *i.e.* real, and resulting in one indivisible person or *φύσις*.¹

5. *The communicatio idiomatum.* The unity of the person makes it possible to ascribe human accidents, *e.g.* birth, death, suffering, to the Logos (i. p. 6 f.), and Divine properties to the flesh (*ὅτι μὴ ἀλλότριον τοῦ Λόγου τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ*, i. p. 8; *σὰρξ ἰδία τοῦ Λόγου*, ii. p. 26). Catholic worship is not devotion paid to a man together with the Logos (i. p. 8), but is addressed to the one person who has made manhood His own. Thus, too, the blessed Virgin may be called *Theotokos* (i. p. 10), as being the mother of the sacred humanity which the Logos deigned to assume. Further, the one eternal person of the Son not only gives infinite worth and efficacy to the sufferings and actions of the assumed manhood, but also imparts to the very flesh itself a vitalising power. He who is the Life indeed (ii. p. 24) has made the flesh His own, and endued it with a sanctifying and quickening power. What we partake of in the Eucharist is not ordinary flesh, but the flesh assumed by Him who is the Life, our very God and Saviour (ii. p. 26).

6. *Positive teaching of the anathemas.*

(1) Christ is *θεὸς κατ' ἀλήθειαν*, and Mary is *θεοτόκος*.

(2) The Logos is united to the human nature *personally* (*καθ' ὑπόστασιν*).

(3) The union of the two natures excludes any duality of persons (*ὑποστάσεις*) united merely by a moral "con-

¹ On the phrase *φυσική ἕνωσις*, see Petav. *de Incarn.* iii. 4. In this connection the word implies (1) that the union is *real* (cp. *κατ' ἀλήθειαν* in anath. 1), as opposed to the simulated union of Nestorius—a union merely of grace and favour. (2) *personal*—the result being a single person: "unus aliquis existit, non aggregatione sola, neque consensione voluntatum." (3) The union is that of man's *φύσις*, not of a human *person*, to the *φύσις* of the Logos.

junction" (*συναφεία*) dependent on the power or choice of the Logos, or the worth of the person exalted. The union consists in "a concurrence into unity of nature" (*σύννοδος ἢ καθ' ἔνωσιν φυσικὴν*).

(4) The utterances of Christ in Scripture are not to be allotted some to the Godhead, some to the manhood, but all to the one person of the Word.

(5) Christ is not merely *θεοφόρος ἄνθρωπος*, *Deum ferens homo*, but verily God.

(6) The Word is not "God" or "Lord of Christ," but the self-same person is truly God and man.

(7) Christ is not merely a man in-wrought (*ἐνηργησθαι*) by the Logos, or invested with the glory of the only-begotten, as if he were another than He.

(8) The adoration of Christ is not the "co-worship" or "co-glorification" of a man; it is an undivided act of homage to Emmanuel.

(9) Christ does not use the Divine power as an endowment derived from another, but the Spirit is His own.

(10) The very Word of God Himself became our *High Priest* and the *Apostle of our confession*; nor had He need to offer sacrifice for Himself, but for us alone.

(11) The flesh of the Lord is life-giving, as being the own flesh of the Logos, who is mighty to quicken all things. It is not the flesh of one who is merely joined to the Logos in virtue of moral worth, or is merely the subject of Divine indwelling.¹

(12) The very Word of God suffered, was crucified, and tasted death, and was made the first-born from the dead, being Himself as God both Life and Giver of Life.²

¹ Cp. *Quod unus*, 1360 c, d.

² See the comments of Petav. *de Incarn.* vi. 17 on the anathemas of Nestorius and Cyril. On anath. 2 he explains *καθ' ὑπόστασιν* as meaning in this place a "real union," not a mere union of relation (*ἔνωσις σχετική*). *καθ' ὑπόστασιν* is equivalent to *vere et substantive*.

NOTE.—The phrase μία φύσις τοῦ Λόγου σαρκαωμένη.

Cyril's own statements may be illustrated by the following passage from the *Ep. i. ad Succensum* [Migne, *P.G.* 77, *Ep.* xlv.], quoted by Petavius (iv. 6):—

μετὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν οὐ διαιροῦμεν τὰς φύσεις ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, οὐδὲ εἰς δύο τέμνομεν υἱοὺς τὸν ἕνα καὶ ἀμέριστον, ἀλλ' ἕνα φαρὲν υἱὸν καὶ, ὡς οἱ πατέρες εἰρήκασιν, μίαν φύσιν τοῦ Λόγου σαρκαωμένην.¹

It is to be observed—(1) That the expression was ascribed to Athanasius (Jo. Damasc. *de orth. fid.* iii. 6). This, however, is expressly denied by Leontius, who declares that Cyril was the first orthodox writer who employed the phrase; it was frequently used, he says, by Apollinaris, and had brought upon Cyril himself the charge of being an Apollinarian. The question whether Athanasius really used the expression is one of some perplexity, as Petavius admits (iv. 6, §§ 5–8).² Athanasius does use the phrase οὐσία τοῦ Λόγου, a fact which Newman considers some corroboration of Cyril's ὡς οἱ πατέρες εἰρήκασιν.

(2) The expression is qualified by the use both of πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις: e.g. *Ep. ad Nest.* iii. ἐνὶ τοιγαροῦν προσώπῳ τὰς ἐν τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις πάσας ἀναθετέον φωνάς, ὑποστάσει μιᾷ τῇ τοῦ Λόγου σαρκαωμένη. *Cp. adv. Nest.* ii. p. 93 D.

It is also illustrated by the image frequently employed by Cyril, of the soul and body united in a single human personality. It is clear, too, from the context that the intention of the phrase is to exclude the Nestorian idea of a dual sonship.

(3) The explanations of the phrase are mainly two—

(a) Some hold that Cyril simply uses the word φύσις

¹ Migne, *P.G.* vol. lxxvii. p. 232 D.

² On the tendency to ascribe writings of Apollinaris to Athanasius, see Loofs, *Dogmengesch.* § 35, 5. Apoll. most probably used the full phrase of Cyril; *ibid.* § 35, 2.

as equivalent to *ὑπόστασις*. The passage *adv. Nest.* ii. p. 93 D has *μία ὑπόστασις ἡ τοῦ λόγου σαρκαρκομένη, ἡ φύσις τοῦ λόγου* would accordingly mean "the person of the Word." Thus Cyril himself, in defending his second anathema against Theodoret says, *ἡ τοῦ Λόγου φύσις ἡγουν ἡ ὑπόστασις ὃ ἐστὶν αὐτὸς ὁ Λόγος, κ.τ.λ.*¹

(b) Others maintain that Cyril's *φύσις* means "nature," and that he is not so much insisting on the singleness of *Christ's* person, as on the actual union of *Deity* with *manhood*: οὐ γὰρ εἶπε τοῦ χριστοῦ μίαν φύσιν σαρκαρκομένην, ἀλλὰ μίαν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σαρκαρκομένην, τὴν ἄλλην φύσιν δηλῶν (*Leont. ap. Petav. iv. 7, 4*). This seems to be favoured by Cyril's own words in his *second letter to Succensus* (*Ep. xlv. Migne, P.G. 77, p. 244 A*). In this letter Cyril lays great stress on the word *σαρκαρκομένη* as definitely intended to express the assumption of a complete manhood.

Combining these somewhat divergent statements, it would appear that by *ἡ φύσις τοῦ λόγου* Cyril meant "the Divine nature as it subsists in the person of the Logos."² The expression thus guards against the notion that any other person of the Blessed Trinity became incarnate; while *σαρκαρκομένη* is intended to express the duality of the natures. It was precisely this last word which Eutyches omitted.

What Cyril wished to maintain was—

(i.) The inseparable conjunction of the two natures. They are for ever *ἀδιαίρετοι ἐν τῇ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἐνώσει*. Cp. *Ep. ii. ad Succens.* [*Migne, Ep. xlv. p. 245*].

(ii.) The impersonality and dependence of the man-

¹ ap. Damasc. *de orth. fid.* iii. 11; Theod. *Repr.* xii. *capp.* [ed. Schulze, vol. v. p. 13].

² So Damasc. concludes (iii. 11) ὥστε τὸ εἰπεῖν φύσιν τοῦ Λόγου οὔτε τὴν ὑπόστασιν μόνην σημαίνει οὔτε τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ὑποστάσεων, ἀλλὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Λόγου ὑποστάσει ὀλικῶς θεωρουμένην.

hood, which the Word uses as His instrument,¹ absolutely dependent on Himself.

(iii.) The unity and continuity of the person in Christ.

The following passage from Dr. Newman's *Athanasian treatises* perhaps expresses Cyril's real meaning. When the Word became flesh, "all that He ever had continued to be His; what He took on Himself was only an addition. There was no change; in His Incarnation He did but put on a garment. That garment was not *He*, or, as Athanasius speaks, *αὐτός*, or, as the next century worded, 'His person.' That *αὐτός* was, as it had ever been, one and the same with His divinity, *οὐσία*, or *φύσις*; it was this *φύσις*, as one with His person, which took to Itself a manhood. He had no other person than He had had from the beginning; His manhood had no personality of its own; it was a second *φύσις*, but not a second person; it never existed till it was His; for its integrity and completeness it depended on Him, the Divine Word. It was one with Him; and *through*, and *in* Him, the Divine Word, it was one with the Divine nature; it was but indirectly united to it, for the medium of union was the person of the Word. And being thus without personality of its own, His human nature was relatively to Himself. . . . a *περὶ αὐτόν*, a *περιβολή*, a *συμβεβηκός*, a 'something else besides His substance,' an *ὄργανον*. Such was His human nature; it might be called an additional attribute."²

The real fault of Cyril's phrase *μία φύσις* is its vagueness. He follows Athanasius in expressing the absolute dependence of the manhood on the Logos by calling the Divine Logos alone *φύσις*.³ It is obvious how readily

¹ Cp. *adv. Nest.* ii. p. 96 A.

² Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, vol. ii. pp. 426 f. [ed. 2]. Cp. *Ath. Orat. c. Arian*, ii. 45, iii. 34, etc. Petav. *de Incarn.* iii. 4, §§ 15, 16.

³ So Ath. distinguishes between *φύσις* and *σάπξ*, *Orat.* iii. 34. "In

the monophysites might appeal to Cyril's authority in support of their view that *φύσις* was identical with *ὑπόστασις*. Cyril's theology is correct, but his terminology confused: "his fault was principally that of tenaciously clinging to the vagueness of expression and thought which prevailed at an earlier period, without its defectiveness being felt—treating [the earlier terminology] as though it were perfect and satisfactory; and setting himself in opposition to those who demanded that the unity should be more accurately defined, and the *rationale* of it more distinctly exhibited."¹ Cyril's formula, in fact, marks his failure to do justice to the Antiochene position as represented by men like Theodoret. The theologians of Antioch in their recoil from Apollinarianism had made the attempt to analyse the "primitive and immediate intuition" of the unity of Christ's person; to recognise and do justice to both the elements which entered into the problem. Cyril thought it enough to state the paradox (*e.g.* the Son of God *ἀπαθῶς ἔπαθεν*), and to lay stress on its incomprehensibility,² without contributing in any appreciable degree to the solution of the problem. In view, however, of the pantheistic tendencies of the time, the work of Chalcedon was not less essential than that of Ephesus to the preservation of Christian faith.

comparison of the Divine Person who had taken flesh, what He had taken was not so much a *nature*, though it was strictly a nature, as the substance of a manhood which was not substantive." *Ath. Treatises*, ii. p. 327.

¹ Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 57. Cp. pp. 109, 110.

² The religious consciousness of the Church was content merely with a strong and definite statement of the mystery, and no more: *σιωπῇ προσκυνεῖσθω τὸ ἄρρητον*. Harnack, ii. 331. Dorner refers to *Hom. pasch.* xvii. as an instance of Cyril's tendency to speak of the problem as an absolute mystery or miracle: *πέρα λόγου τὸ θαῦμα*, he says. [Migne, *P.G.* lxxvii. p. 781 A.]

§ III. EUTYCHIANISM

Many of Cyril's adherents were dissatisfied with the compromise which was effected in 433 between the Antiochenes and Cyril. The formula accepted had stated the doctrine of the *διαφορά τῶν φύσεων* in terms too decisive to be acceptable to many of the Egyptian bishops.¹ The monophysite tendency in a pronounced form reappeared after Cyril's death (444); its main representatives being Cyril's successor Dioscurus and the archimandrite Eutyches, head of a monastery in Constantinople.

1. There can be no doubt that *Dioscurus* at least was principally actuated by motives of policy; he not only represented the traditional hatred of Alexandria for "New Rome," but probably aimed at a kind of papal dominion over the East. *EUTYCHES* represented the Alexandrine theology at Constantinople. He was an aged monk of unbalanced convictions and strong anti-Nestorian zeal, who clung to the Cyrilline formula *μία φύσις μετὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν*. He seems to have renewed the charge of Nestorianism against those who, like his own bishop Flavian, adhered to the formula of union agreed upon in 433. Consequently in 448 he was accused of heresy by Eusebius of Dorylæum, before a synod held at Constantinople. After some display of reluctance he was induced to make the statement, *ὁμολογῶ ἐκ δύο φύσεων γεγενῆσθαι τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν πρὸ τῆς ἐνώσεως, μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἔνωσιν μίαν φύσιν ὁμολογῶ*. He illustrated his proposition by the simile used by Gregory of Nyssa,—that of a drop of vinegar absorbed in the ocean; further, he maintained that the body of the Redeemer was not "consubstantial" with ours.²

¹ Cyril in his letter to *Eulogius* (*Ep.* xliv., Migne, *P.G.* 77) shows his consciousness of this dissatisfaction, and offers explanations.

² See Flavian's letter to Leo, *Leo. Ep.* xxii. See also *Ep.* xxvi. It would seem that Eutyches was induced to withdraw the last proposition.

Condemned by the council, Eutyches appealed to Leo of Rome,¹ who ultimately, after some hesitation, on receipt of an authentic statement of the case from Flavian, and an urgent appeal for a decisive statement, addressed to him the celebrated *Tome* (*Ep.* xxviii.).

Meanwhile Dioscurus, aware of his opportunity, had induced Theodosius to summon a council at Ephesus (449); at which 135 prelates attended, and Leo himself was represented by three legates. The result of the synod was a foregone conclusion. After proceedings of incredible violence, Eutyches was declared orthodox by all but a small minority of those present, and was restored to the position of which he had been deprived; Flavian, Ibas of Edessa, Eusebius, Theodoret, and Domnus of Antioch were deposed. Flavian actually died as the result of the violence suffered by him, and Anatolius, an adherent of the Alexandrian primate, succeeded to the vacant see. No new dogmatic formula was issued by the council, but the "faith of the Fathers" of Nicæa and Ephesus was confirmed. The unscrupulous boldness and resolution of Dioscurus had triumphed, "the Church of the East lay at the feet of the Alexandrian patriarch, and he had achieved all with the Emperor's assent."²

Such was the disorderly "Latrocinium" of Ephesus.³ The situation, however, was rapidly changed by the death of Theodosius in 450. He was succeeded by Marcian and Pulcheria, who were resolved to summon a new council at Chalcedon, 451. Leo's one aim since the

¹ *Leo. Ep.* xxi. Eutyches appends a passage attributed to Julius of Rome, but afterwards shown to be by Apollinaris, denying the duality of natures in Christ.

² Harnack, ii. 362. Harnack denies that the Synod deserves the name "Robber-Synod"; it represents, he thinks, "the tradition of contemporary piety."

³ So Leo calls it, *Ep.* xcv. Cp. Loofs, *Dogm.* § 38, 1; and see Bright, *S. Leo*, note 139, for a fuller account of the circumstances.

Latrocinium had been to annul its proceedings, and secure the holding of a council in Italy.¹ But he was very unwilling that a council should be held in the East, and even went so far as to maintain that the necessity for a Synod had passed; that it would, in short, be "inopportune."² But the Emperor remained firm, and the council was accordingly held at Chalcedon in October 451. Possibly as many as 630 bishops attended, including proxies—the largest number ever yet assembled. Leo claimed precedence, and exercised his right through his four legates; he also took it for granted that his *Tome*, which obtained no hearing at Ephesus, would be regarded as decisive.³

The number of the council's sessions is variously reckoned, but was probably fifteen at least; the proceedings were very tumultuous; the assembled prelates repudiated Dioscurus as eagerly as they had followed his lead at Ephesus. He was deposed, and the *Tome* was accepted as expressing "the faith of the fathers and apostles." "Peter," cried the bishops, "has spoken by Leo." All except thirteen Egyptian prelates⁴ signed the *Tome*.

The general result of the Council was—

(1) The condemnation and banishment of Dioscurus.

(2) The acceptance of Leo's *Tome* and of Cyril's *Epistles to Nestorius* as a standard of orthodox belief.

(3) The drawing up of a new definition, in spite of the protests of the Roman legates.

2. It is important to form an exact idea of the error which the Church excluded by the *Definition* of the Council of Chalcedon. The error of Eutyches really sprang from the same root as that of Nestorius, *i.e.* inability to conceive of "nature" apart from "personality."

¹ See *Epp.* xliv., liv.

² *Ep.* lxxxiii. 2.

³ *Ep.* xciii. 1, 2.

⁴ These thirteen implored the Council not to insist on their subscription to the *Tome* before a new archbishop was appointed. See Bright, *Ch. Hist.* p. 407 f., and canon 30 of the Council, ap. Hefele, *Conciliengesch.* ii. 519.

Nestorius supposed that a dual nature must imply a dual personality; Eutyches, in repudiating the idea of a dual personality, clung to the idea of only a single nature. It has often been pointed out¹ that Eutyches in appealing to Cyril's formula, *μία φύσις τοῦ Λόγου σαρκαρκωμένη*, omitted the last word, on which Cyril himself had insisted as supplying a proper safeguard of the real humanity of Christ; he quite overlooked Cyril's clear teaching as to the *διαφορὰ τῶν φύσεων*, an expression actually adopted in the formulary of Chalcedon. What Eutyches in effect maintained was either an absorption of the human nature into the Divine, or a fusion (*σύγχυσις*) of the two natures; so at least his meaning was interpreted by Theodoret.² Accordingly his reluctant admission before the synod of Constantinople that Christ was *ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν* as touching His manhood, was practically valueless. What he denied was the reality and permanence of our Lord's humanity. Thus though it was unjust to charge Eutyches with reviving the Apollinarian or Valentinian view³ of Christ's humanity as if Deity had converted itself into flesh, yet it is true that in tendency Eutyches belongs to the docetic school of heresy,⁴ since he does practically deny the real assumption of our manhood by the Son of God. At the best, his idea must have been that the effect of the *ἔνωσις* was not merely an exaltation or glorification of our humanity, but an actual transmutation of it.⁵ The fact is that Eutyches had evidently no clear idea as to the constitution of Christ's person. "He did not pretend to comprehend the mystery of the Incarnation,

¹ e.g., Petav. *de Incarn.* i. 15, § 7.

² In his dialogue, *Eranistes*. See Bruce, *Humil. of Christ*, pp. 59, 60.

³ So Flavian, *Leon. Epp.* xxii.

⁴ Petav. *de Incarn.* i. 15, § 1.

⁵ Cp. Dorner, *div. ii. vol. i.* pp. 83, 84, and note 19 (p. 404), and Bruce, *Humil. of Christ*, pp. 60, 61.

but rather gloried in proclaiming its incomprehensibility." He was the victim of an exaggerated reverence. The Deity in Christ seemed so entirely to overshadow the human nature that the latter shrank into nothingness, or rather vanished altogether; and even if the humanity were acknowledged to exist in fact after its assumption by the Word, it could not be reverently thought of as consubstantial with ours.¹

3. Leo's famous letter to Flavian exhibits all the characteristics of an understanding practical, strong, and sagacious, but unversed in the subtle distinctions which occupied the Greek mind, and incapable of contributing more to the solution of the problem than a clear antithetic statement of its factors. It is virtually a reproduction of current Western theology in terms already adopted and fixed by Tertullian. It exhibits the uniform tone and tendency of the Roman Church; its tenacious hold upon the faith; its practical rather than speculative interest in theology. Leo "betrays his dogmatic *naïveté* in maintaining that the twelve clauses of the Apostles' Creed sufficed for the refutation of the Eutychian as of other heresies."²

In the same spirit he begins his letter to Flavian by referring to three clauses of the Roman creed as destructive of "the engines of almost all heretics," the clauses which state the *nativitas divina* and *nativitas temporalis* of the Son. This reference to the symbol of his own Church is consistent with the papal tone of Leo throughout the whole controversy. He speaks as if he were a supreme arbiter, referred to by the Emperor and the Church alike

¹ According to Eutyches, Christ's body was not *σῶμα ἀνθρώπου*, though it might be called *σῶμα ἀνθρώπινον*. The essence (*οὐσία*) of manhood ceased to exist in the Word made flesh.

² *Ep.* xxxi. 4, "Siquidem ipsa catholici symboli brevis et perfecta confessio, quæ duodecim apostolorum totidem est signata sententiis, tam instructa sit munitione cælesti ut omnes hæreticorum opiniones *solo ipsius* possint gladio detruncari." (Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogm.* i. p. 220.)

for a final decision on the point of faith. Flavian is to be instructed as to the orthodox view.¹ Leo anticipates that the decision of the Ephesine Council will merely be a supplementary endorsement of the *Tome*, *ut pleniore judicio omnis possit error aboleri*.²

The following points are characteristic in the teaching of the *Tome* :—

(a) The duality of the natures is asserted. Christ is both God and Man; both natures remain what they were, *salva proprietate* (*ιδιότης*) *utriusque naturæ* (c. 3). This thesis, it should be noticed, is expressed and developed in terms derived from Tertullian (*natura*, *substantia*, etc.), and other Western Fathers, *e.g.* Ambrose, Hilary, and Augustine.

(b) The two natures unite in one person, and each fulfils its proper functions in the incarnate life; the two act in reciprocal correlation, each according to its own proper law. *Agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium est; Verbo scilicet operante quod Verbi est, et carne exsequente quod carnis est. Unum horum coruscat miraculis, aliud succumbit injuriis*, etc. Leo seems to regard the personality as the *result*, or sum-total, of the union of two natures; the person is the centre of consciousness and action in a Being who is both God and man.³ From the unity of the person follows the *communicatio idiomatum* (c. 5).

(c) Leo's interest is mainly soteriological. The final cause of the Incarnation was man's redemption (c. 3); the restoration of fallen humanity demanded a mediator between God and man, at once Divine and human, *i.e.*

¹ Cp. *Ep.* xxvii. (to Flavian), "Rescribimus . . . ut fraternitatem tuam, quid de tota causa constitui debeat, *instruamus*."

² *Ep.* xxxiii. 2. Cp. Harnack, ii. p. 356.

³ Leo does not throw light on the problem of Christ's personality—to which nature it belongs, or whether it is distinct from both; nor does he explain how the unity of person is compatible with duality of nature.

passible and impassible, mortal and immortal. The motive was pity: the Redeemer's work was *inclinatio miserationis, non defectio potestatis*. Leo seems to minimise the *κένωσις*, insisting after the manner of Cyril that the Son of God, in taking human nature, *a paterna gloria non recessit* (c. 4). It may be urged, however, that other passages in his writings define his meaning more exactly: he simply means that the Divine Son did not cease to be very God.¹ The *forma servi* did not detract from the *forma Dei*; the condescension of God did not change or impair His nature. This ethical view of the Incarnation is an important element in Leo's Christology; but it may fairly be urged that it is somewhat unduly restricted.² The free course of infinite love is of course limited by other necessary perfections of Deity; but Leo, like Cyril, seems somewhat over-confident in determining *a priori* the conditions of the mystery.

(d) The special point of value in Leo's Christology is his insistence on the *permanence* of Christ's manhood. Our human nature, assumed by the Word, remains complete in its integrity,³ fulfilling its appropriate functions; in its exaltation, mankind as a whole is advanced to its true destiny. To deny the reality of the manhood is to fall under the condemnation of 1 John iv. 2 and 3 (reading *omnis spiritus qui solvit Jesum*), and implies a docetic denial of the reality of the sufferings "undertaken for the salvation of the world."

(e) We may observe also that Leo is imbued with the thought that the true faith is a *via media* between conflicting errors. He states with great clearness and precision the two sides of the antithesis involved in a fact like the Incarnation. But there is no attempt at a

¹ Cp. Bright, note 150.

² See Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 88; cp. Bruce, *Humil. of Christ*, pp. 64, 65.

³ "Caro naturam nostri generis non relinquit," c. 4.

solution of problems, nor any definite statement as to the relation between the two natures, or the conditions and consequences of their union in the one person of the Word. This omission is particularly noticeable in relation to the question of Christ's human knowledge, which had specially engaged Cyril's attention. In fact, the exact relation between the Godhead and the Manhood at different stages of the incarnate life, and the reciprocal influence of each on the other, was not a subject which concerned Leo; he was simply intent on guarding the integrity of either nature, as a necessary condition of true redemption. Christ must be *totus in suis* as the Redeemer; *totus in nostris*, because it was our nature which He had created originally, and which needed renewal (c. 3).

4. From Leo's *Tome* we pass to the *Definition of Chalcedon*, with which it evidently stands in close relation. Some of the terms of the *Definition* appear, in fact, to condense the teaching of Leo, e.g. the four words, ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαίρετως, ἀχωρίστως, while its main thesis—the distinctness and perfection of the two natures—seems to expand the Leonine phrases *salva proprietate utriusque nature*; *totus in suis*, *totus in nostris*.¹

The *Definition* appears to be the revised form of a previous document which had been drawn up with the express purpose of meeting the views of the Egyptian element in the council. The Egyptian adherents of Dioscurus, in fact, formed a party which it was dangerous to offend or ignore. Dioscurus had been deposed for having denied the two natures of Christ; accordingly in the new formula was inserted the phrase ἐκ δύο φύσεων, which on the one hand secured the duality of natures, yet on the other could be adopted without scruple by the monophysite or Eutychian party.² Naturally the

¹ Cp. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, p. 63. Loofs, § 38, 2.

² The *Definition* seems also to have omitted the title θεοτόκος.

formula was strongly objected to by the Roman legates and the Orientals; and a commission was appointed to revise it. The choice lay between following Dioscurus or Leo; between making concessions to the obstinate Egyptian party, and embodying in the decree the most salient propositions of the *Tome*. The result was that the equivocal phrase ἐκ δύο φύσεων was altered into ἐν δύο φύσεσιν, and thus the permanence of Christ's manhood, as Leo had taught it, was finally secured.¹

The *Definition* begins by ratifying the symbols of Nicæa and Constantinople; it then states the two forms of corruption which the faith has suffered at the hands of (1) those who deny to the Virgin the title *Theotokos*; (2) those who introduce a confusion or mixture of the two natures, representing the nature of the manhood and the Godhead as one (μίαν φύσιν), and so ascribing passibility to the Divine nature. On account of these, the *Definition* endorses the letters of Cyril to Nestorius and John of Antioch; and also the *Tome* of Leo, "inasmuch as it accords with the confession of the great Peter, and is a common pillar against the heterodox."

Next, the *Definition* condemns those who teach a dual sonship; or the passibility of the Son's Divine nature; or the confusion of the two natures; or a non-human origin of Christ's body; or the existence of two natures before, but of only one after, the union. The positive confession of faith comes last, and is in effect an expansion of the second article of the creed: *and in Jesus Christ, His only Son, our Lord*. "We teach and confess," says the formula, "one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν θεότητι, τέλειον

¹ On the part played by the Emperor and the State authorities, see Dörner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 98 ff. note 25. Cp. Harnack, ii. 372. It was in the fifth session of the Council that the *Definition* was adopted and declared authoritative.

τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι, θεὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθῶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιον τὸν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα . . . ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστόν, Ἰόν, Κύριον μονογενῆ, ἐν δύο φύσεσιν¹ ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως γνωριζόμενον, κ.τ.λ."

Here is stated (1) the unity of our Lord's Divine person, (2) the reality and permanence of each nature, (3) the relationship of the two natures. They are united without confusion or intermingling (ἀσυγχύτως); without alteration or change (ἀτρέπτως) of their distinctive attributes; without any division of person (ἀδιαιρέτως), or any subsequent severance of the two natures united (ἀχωρίστως). "His two natures have knit themselves the one to the other, and are in that nearness as incapable of confusion as of distraction. Their coherence hath not taken away the difference between them. Flesh is not become God, but doth still continue flesh, although it be now the flesh of God."² The historical importance of the *Definition* may be

¹ The present Greek text has ἐκ δύο φύσεων, but the old Latin trans. in *duabus naturis*. Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte*, ii. p. 451 note 3, shows convincingly that the original reading was ἐν δύο φύσεσιν. Probably ἐκ δύο φύσεων was a later deliberate alteration, intended to favour monophysite tendencies (so Gieseler, Neander, Harnack). Routh (*Opusc.* ii. 119) thinks both expressions were originally used in the formula. Cp. Dorner, *div.* ii. 1, note 26. Petav. *de Incarn.* iii. 5, §§ 3, 4. Obs. the point of ἐν δύο φύσεσιν is that it secures what Leo insisted on, viz. the permanence of our Lord's manhood. *In integra veri hominis perfectaque natura verus natus est Deus, totus in suis, totus in nostris* (*Ep. ad Flav.* iii.). The phrase "in two natures" was like saying "two natures exist under the Incarnation," or "He is, at this moment, man as well as God" (Bright, *S. Leo*, note 35). Petavius points out that Catholics confess both expressions (*de Incarn.* i. 14, § 8), and quotes Maximus as saying, "Christ is never more separated from the natures in which He exists, but abides ever ἐν αὐταῖς ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐστίν" (*de Incarn.* iii. 5, § 7).

² Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.* v. 53, § 2 (quoting Cyril).

gathered from a comparison of it with the *Tome* of Leo. It practically involved the acceptance by the Oriental Church of a Western type of Christology,¹ which supplied an element undeveloped in the teaching of Cyril. Indeed, the Alexandrian school generally was impatient of any scientific distinctions that seemed to contradict the completeness of the union between the human and Divine natures in Christ's person.² Even earlier Church teachers had been disinclined to distinguish precisely between the Divine and human in the incarnate Christ; "for, by so doing, they would have believed themselves to be detracting in some measure from the marvellous greatness of the final result."³ The fact is that prior to the Council of Chalcedon the tendency was to regard the Divine nature and the human rather from the side of their *homogeneity*; to shrink from positing distinctions within the one person of the Divine Redeemer. But the problem raised by Apollinaris compelled the Church to examine more closely the very question of the *distinctions* which hitherto had been practically left on one side.

From this point of view we can estimate the real value of the Chalcedonian *Definition*. It guards as a fundamental and necessary fact the distinction between the Divine and human natures, and thus protects the foundations of Christianity against "an anti-ethical theory of a physical character—against pantheism." Hitherto the union of the two natures had been regarded in a manner somewhat mystical and unreflective. The

¹ Cp. Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogm.* i. 222; Loofs, *Dogm.* § 38, 1.

² Thus even to Athanasius was attributed the phrase *μία φύσις τοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*. The Cappadocian school had, as we have seen, exaggerated the idea of the union into that of "mixture" (*μίξις, κράσις, κ.τ.λ.*). Greg. Nyss. had used the simile of the drop of vinegar absorbed in the ocean. Cp. above, p. 60.

³ Dorner, *div. ii. vol. i.* p. 106.

monophysitism of Eutyches and his followers was dangerous because it posited such a union without doing full justice to the distinction between the two elements, human and Divine. It is probable that this pantheistic tendency was to some extent corrected in the West by the deep anthropological questions involved in the Pelagian controversy and by the spiritual experience of men like Augustine, to whom sin and grace were supremely important realities. There is a certain tendency even in Cyril to speak of sin as if it were a disease of humanity, a foreign usurping power to be expelled by the redemptive might of the Logos, rather than as personal guilt. The school of Antioch, as we have seen, had endeavoured to do justice to the ethical conditions and requirements involved in the Incarnation; the reality of human freedom, and the necessity of man's co-operation in the work of his deliverance.¹ Thus in spite of the fact that the *Definition* does little more than state precisely the two sides of the Christological problem, it is of great value as recognising and guarding the figure of the historical Christ of the Gospels, so protecting the reality and finality of the act whereby the Son of God "laid hold" of human nature in order to redeem it.² The permanence and perfection of Christ's manhood; the reality of His brotherhood with men in suffering and temptation; the fulfilment of man's ideal destiny in His person,—all these necessary conditions of a true redemption are secured by the assertion of His "consubstantiality" with us.³

¹ Cp. Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 74. Aug. expresses the thought, "ipsam humanam justitiam operationi Dei tribuendam esse . . . quamvis non fiat sine hominis voluntate" (*de Spir. et litt.* vii.).

² Heb. ii. 16.

³ It is important to notice the history of the phrase, *συνυψύχως*. It may be traced back to Tert. *adv. Prax.* xxvii.; Cyril in many passages protests against any admixture or confusion of the natures (*e.g. adv.*

On the other hand, there is a weakness in the formula which perhaps was inevitable under the circumstances of its compilation. That which to writers like Augustine presents itself as an act of Divine *grace*,—the assumption of human nature by God,—is regarded by the Orientals, and even by Leo himself, mainly as a miracle of Divine *power*. The Incarnation is a union of strength with weakness; of majesty with lowliness. “The majesty of the Son of God,” says Leo, “when clothing itself with the lowliness of a servant, neither feared diminution, nor needed increase; and *by the sole power of Godhead* could effect that operation of its own mercy which it was bestowing on the restoration of man, so as to rescue from the yoke of a dreadful tyrant the creature formed after God’s image.”¹ Not, indeed, that redemption was a mere unethical display of omnipotence;² Leo, at least, is fully alive to its significance as an act of wise and pitying love; but the manner in which the human and Divine natures are united is regarded by the Chalcedonian Fathers almost as a physical process (cp. the phrase *ἐνωσις φυσικῇ*), wherein the Divine nature assumes human nature as its vesture or instrument. In fact the distinction between the two natures is quasi-physical; they are conceived as two independent *φύσεις*, whereof the higher acts through and in the lower. Further, the Council may be said to have failed to recognise the *ethical* aspect of Christ’s humanity as the unique archetype of manhood,—a point which had held such a prominent place in the thought of earlier writers like Irenæus and

Nest. v. 4), any conversion or change (*τροπή, ἀλλοίωσις*). Cp. *Ep. ad Nest.* ii. (Pusey, p. 20). The catholic writers are very careful in their use of language on this point, and observe current philosophical distinctions, e.g. allowing *κρᾶσις* or *μίξις*, but declining *σύγχυσις*. See a note in Harnack, ii. 359.

¹ *Serm.* xxviii. 3 (tr. Bright).

² See *Serm.* lxiii. *de pass. Dom.* xii. 1.

Athanasius. "The image of the person of Christ in its totality must have receded very far into the background as compared with the interest in maintaining the distinctions, and yet at no period was there a greater necessity for keeping firm hold on it than now, when the duality of natures and their infinite distinction had been definitely posited."¹

We are not altogether unprepared for the reaction which followed Chalcedon,—a reaction of which Monophysitism, Monothelitism, Adoptianism are three successive stages.

¹ Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 118. Cp. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, p. 66.

PART VII

MONOPHYSITISM

§ I. The Monophysite and Monothelite struggle.

Monophysitism : causes of its persistence.

1. First stage (457-527).

The *Henoticon*.

Severus.

2. Second stage (527-565).

Justinian.

The *Three Chapters*.

3. Different types of monophysitism.

(i.) Theopaschitism.

(ii.) Christology of Severus : the *Phthartolatæ*.

(iii.) Julian : the *Aphthartodocetæ*.

4. Defence of the Chalcedonian *Definition*.

Leontius of Byzantium.

Note : the work *de persona et duabus naturis* [ascribed to Boethius].

5. Monothelitism ; historical survey.

Heraclius and Sergius : the *Ecthesis*.

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The sixth general Council (680).

6. The doctrine of monothelitism : different types of belief.

7. The catholic doctrine.

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§ II. The later theology of the Greek Church.

1. Christology of John Damascene.

Note : *the doctrine of Christ's human will in John Damascene*.

2. Scholasticism and mysticism in the Eastern Church.

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The Hesychastic controversy.

§ III. Adoptianism in the Latin Church.

1. Elipandus and Felix.

Character of their doctrine.

2. Course of the controversy.

Alcuin *contra Felicem*.

§ I. MONOPHYSITISM

The history of the century following the Council of Chalcedon is extremely perplexing, and full of distressing and disgraceful incidents. Eutychianism still held its ground among the fanatical monks of Egypt and Palestine. Passionately adhering to the theology of Cyril, and embittered by the defeat which the Alexandrine dogmatics seemed to have suffered at Chalcedon, the Eutychian party became a source of violent disturbance, and even danger to the empire. Palestine, Egypt, and Syria were their strongholds, whereas Rome tended more and more to become the centre of orthodoxy. Indeed, the monophysite struggles form a kind of transition period, in which the process of dogmatic development passes from the East to the West.

After Chalcedon, the adherents of Cyril and Eutyches became known as *μονοφυσῖται*, conceding one composite nature in Christ, but denying the two natures, on the ground that the doctrine implied a Nestorian duality of persons in Christ.¹ There were many causes tending to the persistence of the monophysite view. The proceedings of the Council of 451 had been marked by such unseemly passion and violence, that it commanded little moral respect; further, the opponents of the Chalcedonian theology were, for the most part, superior in attainments and ability to the orthodox; it is also possible that the growing cultus of the Virgin, under the name of *Theotokos*, assisted, and to some extent popularised, the monophysite tendency. Finally, the Eastern jealousy of the West must be taken into account, and perhaps also the growth of a desire to assert the

¹ The name *Acephali* frequently applied to the monophysites originated in a local schism at Alexandria after the issue of the *Henoticon* (482). See Gieseler, *E.H.* ii. 92; Robertson, *Ch. Hist.* ii. 277; Petav. *de. Incarn.* i. 16, § 9.

independence of national Churches, as against the increasing influence of the Byzantine patriarchate.

In the dreary history of the conflict, the following important epochs may be distinguished:—

1. The period from the death of Marcian to the accession of Justinian (457–527). The fearful outbreak of monophysite violence at Alexandria, in which Proterius the patriarch perished (457), necessarily led to imperial interference. The resolute efforts of the Emperor Leo restored a brief interval of peace to the Alexandrine Church; but after his death (474) the usurper Basiliscus, who successfully invaded the throne of Zeno, and held it for two years, actively favoured the monophysites, restored the banished monophysite prelates Timothy Aelurus and Peter Fullo to their respective sees, and went so far as to issue an encyclical letter condemning the decisions of Chalcedon and the *Tome* of Leo.¹ The effect, however, of this high-handed action was neutralised by the energy of Acacius, patriarch of Constantinople. On his restoration to power, Zeno, at the advice of Acacius, issued the so-called *Henoticon*, or symbol of union (482), with the immediate object of allaying the disorders at Alexandria, though the document was intended to be used as a standard for other Churches also.² This document ignored the *Definition* of Chalcedon, by observing strict silence on the question

¹ The historians note that this is the first instance of an imperial document dealing with doctrine.

² See it ap. Gieseler, *E.H.* vol. ii. p. 92 note 14. It acknowledges only the creed of Nicæa, confirmed at Constantinople and accepted at Ephesus; anathematises Nestorius and Eutyches; adopts the anathemas of Cyril; and finally states Christ's consubstantiality with the Father and with us, and the entire oneness of His person, ἐνὸς γὰρ εἶναι φημὲν τὰ τε θαύματα καὶ τὰ πάθη, reprobatng those who "divide," or "confuse," or "introduce the notion of a fantasy," and anathematising all who now, or at any other time, think or thought anything to the contrary, either at Chalcedon or in any other synod whatever.

whether there were two natures, or one alone, in the incarnate Christ. It condemned both Nestorianism and Eutychianism, but obviously was intended to shelve the point in dispute. In any case, nothing could be more disastrous than the effect of this unfortunate step on the Emperor's part; the number of contending parties increased from two to four, the moderates on both sides being now abandoned by the extremists. At the head of the dyophysite defenders of the Chalcedonian *Definition* stood Felix of Rome. He even took the unexampled step of condemning and deposing Acacius for his leniency towards the monophysite Peter Mongus, who had subscribed the *Henoticon*, and was consequently confirmed in the see of Alexandria. Acacius received the intimation of his deposition with contempt; and the result was a schism of thirty-five years' duration (484–519) between East and West, communion being restored only in the reign of Justin. It is at this period that the doctrinal break-up of monophysitism fairly begins, the controversy turning upon questions relating to the nature of Christ's body, in view of the *ἔνωσις φυσική*. The *Henoticon* continued to be the test generally prescribed during the disturbed reign of Anastasius (491–518), and the schism between Rome and Constantinople continued.

The most prominent monophysite of this period was the fanatical *Severus*, who had formerly been a heathen, had studied the law, and had devoted particular attention to the philosophy of Aristotle. He embraced Christianity, and became a monk at Alexandria, but was expelled in 510 as a turbulent monophysite. Thence he went with a band of monks to Constantinople, and endeavoured to rouse popular feeling against the bishop Macedonius, who was a strict Chalcedonian. The attempt of Severus to introduce the theopaschite addition of the words *ὁ σταυρωθεὶς δι' ἡμᾶς* to the *Trishagion* led to a violent

tumult in the city. The protests of Macedonius were in vain; he was deposed, while Severus, on the other hand, was raised (513) to the throne of Antioch in place of Flavian, who had been falsely charged with Nestorianism, and deposed. The elevation of Severus to the vacant see marks the point at which monophysitism became prevalent in the East. On the accession of Justin, however (518), he was deprived, and took refuge at Alexandria, where he founded one of the numerous sects into which the monophysite party rapidly broke up. The restoration of communion between Constantinople and Rome soon reversed the drift of events, and the confession of Chalcedon became once more the acknowledged faith of the empire, except in Egypt.

2. Justinian (527-565), whose imperial policy absolutely required the pacification of the Church, was inclined to insist on the Chalcedonian decree as the sole standard of orthodoxy, a course in which he was encouraged by the theological tendencies of the time, as represented by the learned monk *Leontius* of Byzantium (*circa* 485-543), the first example of a scholastic theologian, who by diligent use of the logical distinctions of Aristotle was enabled to effect a reconciliation between the theology of Cyril and the language of Chalcedon. But the efforts of Justinian were thwarted by the intrigues of the court, and specially of the Empress Theodora, who was at heart a monophysite. She induced the Emperor to favour monophysitism, and in fact Justinian inclined more and more decidedly towards his wife's opinions. Matters reached a crisis in the affair of the "three chapters." Justinian was led to intervene in the matter of the Origenistic dispute which had agitated Palestine during the earlier years of his reign. Certain of Origen's opinions were condemned, first in a letter from the Emperor himself, afterwards in a synod held at Constan-

tinople (543). The condemnation was apparently regarded by many as an anti-monophysite demonstration.¹ Accordingly Justinian was pressed by the Origenistic monk, Theodore Ascidas, bishop of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, to condemn by edict three teachers most odious to the monophysite party, namely, Theodore of Mopsuestia, the reputed founder of Nestorianism ; Theodoret, who had so strenuously opposed Cyril ; and Ibas, bishop of Edessa, who had written a letter to a Persian bishop, Maris, complaining of the Cyrilline faction in Edessa, this last document having been pronounced orthodox at Chalcedon. After long and violent dispute an imperial edict condemning the "three chapters" was subscribed by almost all the prelates of the East ; but in the West it was obstinately resisted. The Pope Vigilius was summoned to Constantinople (547), and ultimately gave way, but was soon induced by the pressure of the Western bishops to qualify his assent² to the condemnation. His attempts to satisfy both Westerns and Orientals completely failed, and ultimately he made a humiliating submission to the decisions of the fifth General Council held at Constantinople in May 553, at which the "three chapters" were condemned, and an anathema pronounced against all who should defend them by any appeal to the authority of the council of Chalcedon.³ In the tenth anathema of the council the Antiochene formula was sanctioned : " If anyone refuse to acknowledge that He who was crucified in the flesh, our Lord Jesus Christ, is very God and Lord of glory, and One of the Holy Trinity, be he anathema." ⁴

Justinian himself towards the close of his life endeav-

¹ As to expressions in Origen of monophysite tendency, see Redepenning, *Orig. de Princip.* p. 194 note.

² In the document known as his *Judicatum*, Gieseler, ii. 101 note.

³ See Labbe and Coss., *Concil.* vi. pp. 214 ff. Cp. Petav. *de Incarn.* i. 18, §13.

⁴ See next page, and cp. Labbe and Coss., *op. cit.* vii. p. 211 ; Gieseler, *E.H.* ii. p. 103 note 22.

oured to establish by decree as a catholic belief the view of the *Aphthartodocetæ* which he had himself adopted; the resistance of the orthodox was, however, rendered unnecessary by the Emperor's death in 565, after which event monophysitism found its stronghold in Syria (the Syrian Jacobites) and Egypt, where an excited nationalist feeling did much to keep alive the repugnance to the Council of Chalcedon. But for the most part monophysitism passed beyond the borders of the empire, and became an organised heresy in Armenia and Abyssinia.¹

3. Different types of monophysitism.

i. *Theopaschitism*. Peter the Fuller, the usurping bishop of Antioch, and a violent opponent of the Chalcedonian theology, introduced into the *Trishagion* the favourite monophysite formula "God crucified": ἅγιος ὁ θεός, ἅγιος ἰσχυρός, ἅγιος ἀθάνατος, ὁ σταυρωθεὶς δι' ἡμᾶς, ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς. The formula as it stood was not only an innovation, but dogmatically objectionable, although in the sense that "One of the Trinity was crucified," it ultimately met with toleration as a useful barrier against Nestorianism. A determined effort to introduce equivalent language at Constantinople was made by John Maxentius and some Scythian monks (*circ.* 519), and it found favour among the laity; but the Pope Hormisdas regarded the formula as heretical, in spite of the fact that it was defended by theologians of repute, such as the African divines Fulgentius and Ferrandus. In the year 533 the statement *unum crucifixum esse ex sancta et consubstantiali Trinitate* was sanctioned by Justinian, acting in agreement with the successor of Hormisdas, John II. Finally, it was approved by the Council of Constantinople in 553.² Thus theopaschite language was so

¹ For the later history, see Pressel in *Real-Encykl.* vol. ix. s.v. "Monophysiten"; Hefele, *Conciliengesch.* ii. 545 ff.; Dörner, *div.* ii. vol. i. note 36.

² See the tenth anathema, quoted above, p. 117.

far sanctioned by the Church, and the action of the Council may be regarded as the counterpart to the decision of Ephesus which had ratified the use of *Theotokos*. Practically, then, while the addition to the *Trishagion* was disallowed, the confession that "One of the Trinity suffered" was admitted into the language of orthodoxy.¹ But we should observe that the admission had a decided influence on current conceptions of the Trinity. The necessary consequence of the Church's recognition of the phrase was a modification of the entire idea of personality as applied to the Godhead. The distinctness of the three blessed Persons was overpressed by some, partly through anxiety to escape from the conclusion that the Godhead could suffer; partly also as the result of the practical identification of φύσις and ὑπόστασις in relation to Christology. It was urged that three φύσεις might be fairly regarded as identical with three ὑποστάσεις. In the monophysites John Philoponus (*circ.* 530) and John Ascunages tritheistic tendencies displayed themselves.²

ii. A second type of monophysitism is exhibited by those who, like Severus, most closely approached to the Christology of Cyril. These rejected the Chalcedonian decree as an innovation, but were quite ready to acknowledge the theoretic distinction between the two natures of Christ. Severus, indeed, adheres closely to the position of Cyril, recognising the distinctness of the two natures, but laying chief stress on the union (ἀσύγχυτος ἔνωσις) and its consequences, especially the "one energy" or operation of Christ's will (μία καὶνὴ θεανδρική ἐνέργεια).³ To him the Chalcedonian decree appeared to imply a dual

¹ The considerations in its favour are stated, with authorities, by Petav. *de Incarn.* v. 2, §§ 6-9.

² See Dörner, *div. ii.* vol. i. note 30. Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doc.* § 96. Philoponus distinctly identifies φύσις and ὑπόστασις. Leontius traces his error to the influence of Aristotle (*de Sectis*, act. v. § 6).

³ This expression was borrowed from the writings of ps.-Dion. Areopag.

personality and dual will. But though Severus disliked the express recognition of two natures as set forth in Leo's letter and the formula of Chalcedon, he approximated very closely to orthodox writers like Leontius in his general position. It would seem that there was little more than a difference of terminology between them.¹ Thus Severus insisted strongly on the theoretic distinctness of the two natures, and the permanence of the characteristic attributes of each after the union; he laid stress on the language of the Gospels as to Christ's human infirmities—hunger, thirst, weariness, etc.—as proving that the body of Christ was of the same creaturely nature as ours, capable of suffering and corruptible (*φθαρτόν*). Hence the followers of Severus were nicknamed *Φθαρτολάτραι* by their opponents.

Later monophysites, *e.g.* the deacon Themistius of Alexandria, extended the same line of thought to the subject of Christ's human soul, and taught that it was in all respects similar to ours, and therefore limited in knowledge. The Themistians, or *Ἀγνοηταί*, as they were called, met with strenuous opposition, were finally excommunicated, and became a separate sect.

iii. An opposite type of monophysitism is that of Julian, bishop of Halicarnassus. The tendency of the Julianists, reasoning logically from the *ἔνωσις φυσική*, was to deny that Christ's humanity was consubstantial with ours. His body being inseparably united to the Logos, was from the moment of its creation endued with the Divine attributes; it was sinless, imperishable, and incorruptible, not, indeed, by a process of entire transmutation of the human nature into the Divine, but by a

¹ So Harnack, ii. pp. 385. "Even between Severus and Leontius there is no trace of a *theological* difference. The difference lies merely in the degree of willingness to conform to the Chalcedonian formula, and to interpret Leo's letter *in bonam partem*," etc.

heightening of its natural attributes. Whatever capacity for suffering Christ possessed was the result of a conscious exertion of His will; in itself His body was exempt from ordinary human experience. This view was dictated no doubt by a desire to emphasise the condescending love of the Logos, who yielded up His human body to a real experience of suffering; it also naturally commended itself to many ordinary Christians as tending to glorify Christ, and was even adopted by Justinian before his death. The Severians called the Julianists *Ἀφθαρτοδοκῆται* or *Φαντασιασταί*. The same line of thought was exaggerated by an extreme party, who, not content with asserting the incorruptibility of Christ's body, declared that from the moment of its assumption by the Logos it was uncreated, so that even as man Christ could be called God and Creator. This idea involved in effect a *transmutation* of the human into the Divine nature; its adherents were called *Ἀκτιστῆται*, or, from the name of the founder, Gaianists (Gaianus, a follower of Julian, and sometime bishop of Alexandria). They ridiculed their opponents as *Κτιστολάτραι*; but their own views were developed to an extreme point by the *Adiaphorites*,¹ who went so far as to deny all distinction between the manhood and the Godhead in Christ, a position which ultimately led some of its Syrian and Egyptian adherents to a kind of pantheistic mysticism. Thus about the close of the fifth century, the abbot Stephen Barsudaili of Edessa seems to have taught, on the basis of 1 Cor. xv. 28, the actual identity in essence of the Divine and human; the consubstantiality of the creature with the Creator.² He apparently

¹ Their founder was Stephen Niobes, an Alexandrian sophist.

² See Neander, *Ch. Hist.* iv. 275 ff. It was related that on the walls of his cell were found written the words, "All creatures are of the same essence with God."

taught a doctrine of universal restoration; all existence having proceeded by an original emanation from God was destined finally to return into God.

These exaggerated deductions from the mystery of the *ἔνωσις* seem indeed to be due to the tendency to dwell exclusively on the thought of Divine redemption. Christ is the *Λόγος ἑνσαρκος*; accordingly His human infirmities (so it was argued) cannot be the natural consequences of ordinary human nature. His sufferings must mean the voluntary acceptance (*κατὰ χάριν*) of conditions non-natural to human nature after its assumption by Deity. The Julianists argued that since the Logos came to set human nature free from corruption (*φθορά*), His body could at no time have been subject to it. In this general idea these later monophysites were no doubt akin to earlier Fathers of the Church. Verbally Julian seems to have allowed that Christ's humanity was consubstantial with ours; but the body assumed by the second Adam was sinless, and therefore incorruptible; it was *at once* lifted into the conditions of the Divine life. And here lies the point of the Church's objection to these and other kindred monophysite theories. Their tendency is to represent as an immediate physical effect of Divine power what the New Testament regards as the necessary result of a continuous ethical process.¹ They exaggerated a fact which their opponents acknowledged in common with themselves, namely, that the human nature of Christ was, in virtue of its union with the Logos, "many ways above the reach of our capacities

¹ Cp. Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 104. The monophysite view "represents the process [of the Incarnation] as advancing with a physical rapidity, so that either the Divine nature, being converted into human, ceases to exist, . . . or at the first contact of the Divine with the human, the latter is transmuted into the former. But a true Incarnation of God is incompatible with either of the just-mentioned alternatives."

exalted.”¹ They overlooked the mystery of the gradual advancement of Christ’s humanity; His willingness to merit by obedience that which was already His by right; His assumption of human nature *in its weakness* that it might pass over into indestructible strength.² In fact, “the very cause of His taking upon Him our nature was to change it, to better the quality, and to advance the condition thereof, although in no sort to abolish the substance which He took, nor to infuse into it the natural forces and properties of His Deity.”³

4. The most able and prominent defender of the Chalcedonian theology was the learned monk *Leontius* (circ. 485–543). Apparently he was a Byzantine by birth, and at one time an advocate by profession; then he became a monk of S. Saba, and was probably known to some as “Leontius of Jerusalem.” Of his authentic works the most important are the *de Sectis*, which gives a full account of different phases of the monophysite error, and the philosophical tract *adv. Nestorianos et Eutychianos*.⁴ The main importance of Leontius’ work is that he first gives to the Chalcedonian decree a systematic philosophic treatment, applying to it the categories of Aristotelian logic and metaphysic—*οὐσία, γένος, εἶδος, ἄτομον, κ.τ.λ.*⁵ Leontius maintains, in agreement with

¹ See Hooker’s admirable statement, *Eccl. Pol.* v. 54. 9.

² S. Leo. *Serm. in Res.* ii. 6: “Impassibilis passibilem substantiam suam fecit: non ut virtus deficeret in infirmitate, sed ut infirmitas in incorruptibilem posset transire virtuem.” Cp. *in Res.* i. 4: “Resurrectio enim Domini non finis carnis sed commutatio fuit, nec virtutis augmento consumpta substantia est. Qualitas transiit, non natura deficit; et factum est corpus impassibile quod potuit crucifigi; factum est immortale quod potuit occidi; factum est incorruptibile quod potuit vulnerari.”

³ Hooker, v. 54. 5.

⁴ See Migne, *P.G.* 86. Cp. *Bibl. vet. patrum*, Lugd. vol. ix. p. 660 ff. For an account of Leontius, see Cass in *Real-Encykl.* xix. 780. Cp. Harnack, ii. p. 381 ff. Moeller, *Hist. of the Church*, 1–600 A.D., p. 413.

⁵ The doctrine of Leontius is examined by Loofs, *Leontius von Byzanz*

his monophysite opponents, that there is no such thing as a φύσις ἀνυπόστατος. The essence or nature never actually exists save in an individual form (ἄτομον); consequently the acceptance of two natures would seem inevitably to lead to the Nestorian view. But Leontius escapes from this conclusion by maintaining that, though there is no φύσις ἀνυπόστατος, there may be a φύσις ἐνυπόστατος, i.e. a nature which has its *hypostasis* in another.¹ So the human nature of the Redeemer was not without hypostasis, but became hypostatic in the person of the Logos. This is illustrated by the simile of the individual man, compounded of soul and body; and the lighted torch, which displays a kind of close relationship or unity between two distinct and independent substances.² In this doctrine of *enhypostasia* Leontius maintains the orthodox distinction between nature and person, and teaches also that human nature might in a sense exist as a distinct substance (φύσις or οὐσία) without independent personality of its own.³

(in *Texte und Untersuchungen*, bd. iii.), esp. pp. 65 ff. According to Loofs, Leontius' idea of φύσις or οὐσία corresponds to Aristotle's δευτέρα οὐσία; his idea of ὑπόστασις to A.'s πρώτη οὐσία (Arist. *Categ.* 5, §§ 1, 2). "As in Aristotle the genus and the διαφορά, which constitute the δευτέρα οὐσία, are individualised by the εἶναι ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, so in Leontius the human nature in Christ is individualised through the εἶναι ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει τοῦ λόγου, the ὑποστῆναι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ" (Loofs, p. 68).

¹ ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεωρεῖται. See Mai, *Script. vet. nov. coll.* vol. vii. pp. 52-54; Leont. *adv. Nest. et Eutych.* lib. i. (Migne, *P.G.* No. 86, 1277 D ff.).

² *adv. Nest. et Eutych.* 1304 B, C. Leontius explains that an ἔνωσις φύσεων (ἐτεροειδῶν) may take one of two forms. It may be (1) a mixture or confusion of natures, producing an altogether new εἶδος, or (2) a conjunction, resulting in a numerical unity in which each nature preserves its integrity (the two things τὸ διάφορον σώζοντα τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῆς ἐνότητος). In this case there is an interchange of attributes (ἀντίδοσις ἰδιωμάτων), but each φύσις remains distinct. The illustration of the lighted torch halts, however, when it is asked which of the two substances, wood or fire, is τὸ ἐνυπόστατον.

³ Leontius illustrates his idea by a reference to the qualities (ποιότητες αἵ τε οὐσιώδεις καὶ ἐπουσιώδεις) in an object, e.g. colour in a body, or

At a later period it was definitely taught that Christ's humanity was *μὴ ἰδιοὔποστατον*, and eventually an explicit theory of fusion or absorption in the sphere of the *person* was adopted, akin to the monophysite theory of the *natures*. In the seventh century Maximus describes the person of Christ as *μία ὑπόστασις σύνθετος*;¹ and John Damascene develops the doctrine of Athanasius and Cyril, that the manhood of Christ, since it had no independent personality, was an *accident* (*συμβεβηκός*) of the Divine person who assumed it. The theology of Leontius on this point is in fact completely formulated by his successors. The following passage of a later writer states his doctrine succinctly: *ἡ μὲν θεία αὐτοῦ φύσις, ἰδιοὔποστατος· ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπινὴ οὔτε ἀνυπόστατος, οὔτε ἰδιοὔποστατος, ἀλλ' ἐνυπόστατος, ὡς ἐν τῇ θείᾳ ὑποστᾶσα*.² This amounts to saying that Christ's human nature was so incorporated with the person of the Logos as to possess personality in Him. The Divine person was the substance in which the human nature had its subsistence. So far the element of truth contained in Apollinarianism meets with its recognition.

[NOTE.—The work *de persona et duabus naturis*, ascribed on very insufficient grounds to Boethius,³ is worthy of special mention in connection with the monophysite con-

knowledge in a rational soul. A quality, he says, is neither an accident nor a substance. An independent *φύσις* is related to an *ὑπόστασις* as qualities to a substance (*adv. N. et E.* 1277 D). Here again the simile fails, for *ποιότητες* cannot subsist independently of the object to which they belong, whereas *ex hypothesi* human nature can subsist apart from personality (*e.g.* that of Christ). Leontius is no doubt following Aristotle; see *Categ.* 8.

¹ Maxim. *de duab. naturis*, 3. See also Damasc. *de orth. fid.* iii. 3; cp. generally Petav. *de Incarn.* iii. 12, § 4; iii. 4, §§ 15, 16.

² Euthymius Zigabenus (d. *circ.* 1118) ap. Petav. *de Incarn.* iii. 13. 4.

³ Boethius, b. *circ.* 470 at Rome, d. 525. His translations from Aristotle and Porphyry did much to stimulate the study of Greek logic and metaphysic in the West. The work *de pers. et duab. nat.* is contained in Migne, *P.L.* No. 63, pp. 1338 ff.

troversy. It is important as being a systematic attempt to fix precisely the significance of the Latin terms employed in connection with the subject: *persona*, which is defined as *rationabilis naturæ individua substantia* (cc. 3, 4); and *natura*, as *cujuslibet substantiæ specificata proprietas*. There is also a careful explanation of *essentia* (οὐσία), *subsistentia* (οὐσίωσις), *substantia* (ὑπόστασις), *persona* (πρόσωπον).¹ In c. 5 the writer points out that the errors both of Nestorius and Eutyches spring from the same source—an idea that *nature* implies personality. Thus *Nestorius recte tenens duplicem in Christo esse naturam sacrilege confitetur duas esse personas; Eutyches vero recte credens unam esse personam impie credit unam quoque esse naturam*. In c. 6 and 7 it is explained in what sense Catholics admit the two phrases ἐκ δύο φύσεων and ἐν δύο φύσεσιν. The first of these is equivocal, and needs precise elucidation. The catholic belief is not that there was a confusion or mixture of natures whereby a third new nature was produced; rather Christ is to be acknowledged *in utrisque, quia manent utræque; ex utrisque vero, quia utrarumque adunatione manentium una persona fit Christi*. Two natures cannot become one nature, unless either (1) one of the two is converted into the other, or (2) both are blended together so as to produce a new third thing. In the same way Leontius maintains that Christ cannot be correctly called μία φύσις, because φύσις is either (a) common to an entire species (εἶδος), or (b) applicable to one individual member of a species, as partaking in its common attributes. But there is no species or class of Christs (εἶδος Χριστῶν). How, then,

¹ Thus, the writer explains, man is οὐσία, quoniam est; οὐσίωσις quoniam in nullo subjecto est (he has independent subsistence—is not a mere attribute or quality of something else); ὑπόστασις, quoniam subest ceteris quæ subsistentiæ non sunt (he is the subject of qualities or attributes); πρόσωπον, quoniam est rationabile individuum (c. 3).

can He be described as *μία φύσις*? *One nature* could only be the result of a mixture (*σύγχυσις*) by which *ἐξ ἑτεροειδῶν ἑτεροειδὲς ἀποτετελέσται*.^{1]}

5. The "ethical complement" of monophysitism is monothelitism, which may be regarded as "an attempt to effect some kind of solution of the vital unity of Christ's person, which had been so seriously proposed by monophysitism, on the basis of the now firmly-established doctrine of the two natures."²

The history of the controversy makes it plain that political considerations largely determined its course. About the time of Heraclius' succession (610), the empire was threatened by the hostile movements of the Persians and afterwards of the Saracens. It was imperatively necessary to secure unity within the empire,³ and it was probably with the aim of conciliating the numerous monophysite sects that Heraclius, at the advice of Sergius, patriarch of Constantinople, opened communications with some leading members of the heretical party (622), suggesting as a basis of reconciliation the thesis that our Lord, though possessed of two natures, yet had only one will and operation (*μία θεανδρική ἐνέργεια*). At a synod held in Alexandria, the newly-appointed patriarch Cyrus effected the reunion of the Theodosian sect of monophysites with the Church, on the basis of the *μία θεανδρική ἐνέργεια*.⁴ This was regarded naturally

¹ *adv. Nest. et Eutych.* [Migne, *P.G.* 86, p. 1292 B].

² Dorner, *div. ii. vol. i. p. 156*; *cp. p. 199*. The name *μονοθεληται* seems to occur first in Joh. Damasc.

³ The danger was specially great in Egypt, where the monophysite movement had assumed a nationalistic, patriotic character. This is clearly pointed out by Pressel in *Real-Encykl. s.v. "Monotheliten"* (ix. p. 752). *Cp. Hefele, Conciliengesch. iii. p. 119.*

⁴ For the symbol of union of 633, see Hefele, *l.c.* pp. 126-128. The seventh article described Christ thus: *τὸν αὐτὸν ἕνα Χριστὸν καὶ υἱὸν ἐνεργοῦντα τὰ θεοπρεπῆ καὶ ἀνθρώπινα μία θεανδρική ἐνέργεια, κατὰ τὸν ἐν ἁγίοις Διονύσιον, κ.τ.λ.*

enough as a monophysite triumph. The active opposition to the Emperor's policy was led by the monk Sophronius, who was present at Alexandria while the discussion was proceeding, and who in the next year (634) became patriarch of Jerusalem.

Alarmed at Sophronius' elevation, Sergius wrote to Honorius of Rome, whose reply practically endorsed the opinions of his correspondent: the question of the dual operation was trifling and fit only for grammarians; "we confess," said the Pope, "one will of our Lord Jesus Christ." In a later epistle Honorius quoted the expression of Leo, *agit utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium est*. Honorius was apparently desirous to shelve the question; for himself he was not opposed to either mode of expression, "one energy" or "two energies."¹ As disturbances continued, Heraclius issued (638) an edict composed by Sergius, called the *ἐκθεσις* or *Exposition of Faith*.² This document simply prohibited the use of the expressions "one" or "two operations." It was, in fact, an attempt to "put an end to differences by concealing them," and it roused intense indignation both in East and West, partly as being false in doctrine, partly as an unwarrantable intrusion of the State into matters beyond its province. The Pope (John iv.) repudiated it, and the learned monk Maximus roused the Churches of Africa against it. The vehement opposition of the Roman bishops John iv. and his successor Theodore, to the *Ecthesis*, caused the Emperor Constans II. to issue a stern mandate (the *Typos*) peremptorily enjoining silence as to the disputed point

¹ Hefele, *Conciliengesch.* iii. 147. "Anxiety to maintain peace, want of clearness, complaisance towards Constantinople" were the reasons why the Pope chose to follow this course. Cp. Harnack, ii. 401 note 3.

² See Gieseler, *E.H.* vol. ii. p. 174 note 6. Cp. Robertson, *Hist. of Chr. Church*, vol. ii. pp. 425 f.

(648).¹ But in the very next year Pope Martin I. held a synod in the Lateran at Rome which condemned both the *Ecthesis* and the *Typos*, and anathematised the doctrine of one will, as inconsistent with the decree of Chalcedon.² Martin, who gave fresh provocation to the court by the tone he assumed in communicating the decisions of the Roman synod, was some years later (653) carried off to Constantinople, and after much suffering died in exile (655). Maximus also was seized, imprisoned, and treated with such barbarity that he ultimately succumbed to his sufferings (662). The two following Popes, Eugenius and Vitalian, lived on peaceable terms with the Emperor; but in 677 Adeodatus excommunicated the Greek patriarch, and a new schism was the result. The Emperor Constantine Pogonatus, son and successor of Constans, now found himself obliged to adopt a changed policy. He made overtures to the Pope, Agatho (678-682),³ who, after holding a synod at Rome, wrote a letter which was designed to serve the same kind of purpose as Leo's celebrated *Tome*, by giving an authoritative decision on the point of controversy. In 680 a synod was held at Constantinople (the Sixth General Council), attended by nearly 200 bishops. Agatho's letter ⁴ confirming the doctrine of two wills was read; Sergius, Cyrus, and Honorius were condemned,⁵

¹ Gieseler, *l.c.* note 9.

² The action of the Pope was probably intended to be an energetic assertion of the independence of the Roman see. The addition which the council made to the Chalcedonian *Definition*, and its canons, are given by Hefele, *Conciliengesch.* iii. pp. 199 ff.

³ Agatho succeeded Donus while the Emperor's letter was on its way to Rome.

⁴ ap. Gieseler, *l.c.* 176 note.

⁵ As to the case of Honorius, see the literature mentioned by Gieseler, *l.c.* 177, or Robertson, ii. 438; cp. Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. note 38. Petav. *de Incarn.* i. 21. 11 defends Honorius on the ground that "duas voluntates haud absolute denegavit, sed tantummodo contrarias, cuiusmodi in nobis ex corrupto naturæ statu reperiuntur."

and together with them Macarius of Antioch, who at the Council pertinaciously defended the monothelite view. The definition of the Sixth Council declares on the basis of Scripture (S. John vi. 38) that Christ possesses δύο φυσικά θελήματα οὐχ ὑπενάντια . . . ἀλλ' ἐπόμενον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον αὐτοῦ θέλημα, καὶ μὴ ἀντίπιπτον ἢ ἀντιπαλαῖον, μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν καὶ ὑποτασσόμενον τῷ θεῷ αὐτοῦ καὶ πανσθενεῖ θελήματι.¹ "For just as His flesh is, and is said to be, the flesh of the Word, so also His human will is, and is said to be, proper to the Word. . . . Just as His holy and spotless ensouled flesh was deified, yet not annihilated, so also His human will, though deified, was not annihilated." The definition ends with a quotation from Leo's *Tome* (*agit utraque*, etc., c. iv.): ἐνεργεῖ γὰρ ἑκάτερα μορφή μετὰ τῆς θατέρου κοινωνίας ὅπερ ἴδιον ἔσχηκε, κ.τ.λ. Thus peace was restored within the empire. The subsequent history of monothelitism among the Maronites of Syria, until the date of their submission to the Latin Church, is not of special dogmatic interest.

6. As a doctrine monothelitism owes much to the mystical writings of pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, which probably first appeared in Egypt during the fifth century, and exercised a wide and profound influence on Christian speculation. The writer may have been connected with the school of the Platonist Proclus. Certainly in their highly transcendental conception of God, his works embody the spirit of Neo-platonism, and are even marked by the pantheistic tendency which seems to lie at the root of monophysitism. The writer found favour in the Church, partly owing to his mystical tone which fell in with prevailing habits of thought, partly owing to his exaltation of monachism.² From him was borrowed the

¹ See the definition in Gieseler, *H.E.* ii. 176 note.

² For a list of works relating to Dion. Areop., see Harnack, *D.G.* ii.

phrase *θεανδρική ἐνέργεια* which became the watchword of the monothelite party, and corresponded closely to the *μία φύσις σύνθετος* of the monophysites. In the *fourth epistle* (to the monk Caius) we find the statement, "Not as God did He perform what was Divine, not as man what was human; but inasmuch as God had become man, He exhibited a kind of new activity, the Divine-human."¹ This expression, apparently first brought into notice by Severus, seemed to describe accurately the composite activity of a composite nature. God having become man in Christ there resulted a new form of will-energy, the Divine-human. The phrase repeated in a new shape a doctrine which had probably been traditional in the school of Antioch, and closely corresponded with the teaching of Cyril himself. It admitted of a catholic sense as denoting—not the *unity* of Christ's energy as if it proceeded from one composite nature,—but the *harmonious activity* of two perfect natures closely associated, acting each *cum communione alterius* (Leo, *Ep. ad Flav.* iv.). Those actions, for instance, which our Lord performed through the body as an instrument, *e.g.* healing with the touch of His hand, might be correctly described as *theandric*; indeed, so far as there is an "association always" of the natures in Christ, all His actions may be described as theandric.²

But the monothelites made a significant alteration in the phrase of the Areopagite, substituting *μίαν* for *καινήν*,³ arguing, doubtless, from the monophysite *μία*

p. 423 note 2; Loofs, *Dogmengesch.* § 42. Cp. Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 303, 304; Bigg, *Neoplatonism*, chap. xxv.

¹ Dion. Areop. *Opera* [ed. Corderius], vol. ii. p. 75: *καινήν τινα τὴν θεανδρικήν ἐνέργειαν ἡμῖν πεπολιτευμένον*. On the relation of this doctrine to the Areopagite's entire view of the Incarnation, see Dorner, *div. ii.* vol. i. pp. 161 ff.

² Cp. Petav. *de Incarn.* viii. 10, esp. § 7.

³ This alteration is imputed to Cyrus of Alexandria. See Petav. viii. 10, § 3.

φύσιν σύνθετος. The monothelites, in fact, believed in *one operation* as in *one nature*. They did not mean by the phrase to imply *harmonious* co-operation of two natures, but the *single* operation of one who is God-man.¹

We can distinguish more than one type of monothelitic belief among those who refused to draw the necessary inference from the Chalcedonian doctrine. Some, like Theodore of Pharan, whose name is known only in connection with this controversy, regarded the human soul and body of Christ as merely the passive, impersonal organ of the Divine Logos; the only *ἐνέργεια* being that of the dominant Godhead. Others, of whom Honorius may be taken as the example, were more careful to distinguish between (1) the operation (*ἐνέργεια*) of will—volition, and (2) the *effect* of the volition—the completed act of will. Honorius seems to allow that there was in Christ a duality of operations, each nature acting in its own way; but dominating and controlling the natures was the Divine person with His one will. "Instead of one *operation*," he says, "we ought to acknowledge one *operator*; instead of *two operations*, we ought rather to proclaim *two natures* in the one person of the only begotten, both fulfilling (*operantes*) their proper functions."² Honorius evidently attempts to draw a distinction between the two natures which "operate," each according to its own law (cp. Leo's *agit utraque forma quod proprium est*), and the one personality who alone "wills."³

¹ Petav. *de Incarn.* viii. 10, § 10: "Proinde vox illa non unitatem actionis velut ex una profectæ natura composita significat (ut stulte nugati sunt hæretici) sed ἐνεργειῶν ambarum summam et arctissimam copulationem, salva utriusque proprietate ac naturali differentia." Cp. can. 15 of the first Lateran synod, 649 [Hefele, *Conciliengesch.* iii. p. 202].

² ap. Dorner, *div. ii.* vol. i. p. 177 note 1.

³ The view of Honorius was not very different from that of Sophronius; both of them admit that the two natures are active, and fulfil definite

The point, however, which appears to be common to these two classes of monothelites is the view that will belongs, not to the nature, but to the personality (θελήματα are ὑποστατικά, not φυσικά). Thus Pyrrhus, the successor of Sergius, in his disputation with Maximus, insisted that if Christ was one, He could have but one will, for it was impossible that there should be two wills coexistent in the same person (πρόσωπον) without contrariety.¹ Probably this theory was intended to exclude all such possibility of sin in Christ as might arise from the conflict of a higher with a lower will.

We also meet subsequently with an intermediate doctrine, that of a *composite* will. Some monothelites were so far convinced by the authority of patristic statements adduced by their opponents, as to allow the independent operation of the two natures, and so far, of two natural wills. But the very unity of the wills might be regarded as a kind of higher will (ἐκ τῶν δύο φυσικῶν θελημάτων ἓν τι σύνθετον). This, then, was an advance on the idea that the humanity was simply a passive organ of the Deity. It conceived the result of the dual volition as a single *theandric* operation. In the earlier stages of the ἔνωσις, the human will might even be conceived as passing through a process of discipline, gradually accustoming itself, as it were, to perfect correspondence with the Divine will. This idea of the self-determination of the human will (γνώμη βουλευτική, γνώμη τῶν ἀντικειμένων κριτική) might easily lead to a Nestorian view of Christ's person; it seems, however, to have resulted from the inability of the monophysite mind to conceive of two natures coexisting without dual personality.²

functions; both assign *will* to the personality of the Logos. Cp. Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. pp. 166 ff.

¹ Petav. *de Incarn.* i. 19. 5, 6; i. 21. 12.

² See Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. note 43.

7. The opponents of monothelitism took, as the foundation of their reasoning, the Chalcedonian *Definition*. The phrase, "perfect as touching His humanity," must imply the complete perfection of human nature; and since free self-determining movement (*κίνησις αὐτεξούσιος*) is the most distinctive thing in human *nature*, Christ must have possessed it.¹ Otherwise His manhood is deficient (*ἀτελής, ἐλλείπων*).

Such is the general argument of the acute and learned *Maximus* in his *Disputation with Pyrrhus*. The reality of Christ's human will not only follows from the admission of the perfection of His manhood, but is essentially implied in the idea of rational being. Further, the idea of *contrariety* is excluded in the case of a sinless being; the human "freedom" of Christ was that true freedom which belongs to sinless humanity; in Him the two wills are parallel, and never come into collision, but ever choose that which is Divine. *Anastasius*,² the pupil of *Maximus*, who suffered cruelly in defence of his opinions (d. 666), developed his master's teaching on its ethical side. To deny Christ a human will would not only lower His humanity to the level of an irrational creature, it would virtually make true human virtue impossible for Him; it would empty His example of value, and render impossible that true human obedience which was the declared purpose of His coming.³

The merit of *Maximus* was that he treated Christology in close connection with anthropology. As in the case

¹ That will is an element in *nature* seemed to follow from the conception of nature as something living and active, not passive and motionless. Cp. [Boeth.] *de persona et duab. nat.* 1: "Natura est vel quod facere, vel quod pati possit. . . . Natura est motus principium, secundum se non per accidens." Cp. *Maxim. Disp.* pp. 162, 163.

² See some writings of *Anastasius* (the presbyter) in *Mai, Scrip. vet. nov. coll.* vii. pp. 195 ff. Cp. *Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p.* 188.

³ *S. John vi.* 38.

of universal human nature, so in that of Christ, the Divine operated according to the law and constitution of the human. The Logos who formed the personality in Christ operated through the natures, but allowed each to work in its own appropriate way, in harmonious conjunction with the other. By a deeper analysis of the strictly human element in Christ, Maximus anticipates the distinction more clearly stated by Hooker: "As man's will, so the will of Christ hath two several kinds of operation, the one natural or necessary, whereby it desireth simply whatsoever is good in itself, and shunneth as generally all things which hurt; the other deliberate, when we therefore embrace things as good, because the eye of understanding judgeth them good to that end which we simply desire."¹

While Maximus reasons from the perfection of Christ's human nature as posited by the *Definition* of Chalcedon, and insists that will is an essential element of a complete nature,² *Agatho*, in his letter, lays special stress on the scriptural passages which establish the truth of the dual will in Christ. He discredits the idea that will belongs to the personality by a reference to the Blessed Trinity, in which the Three *Persons* are yet one in will.³ But he passes on to a recital of the passages in the Gospels, which attest the presence in Christ of two wills, making special reference to S. Mt. xxvi. 39; S. Lk. xxii. 42; S. Jo. v. 30, vi. 38; and to passages which describe our Lord's obedience, S. Lk. ii. 51;

¹ *Eccl. Pol.* v. 48, § 9. Cp. Maxim. *Disp. cum Pyrrho* [*Opera*, ed. Combefis, vol. ii. p. 166].

² *Disp. c. Pyrrh.* p. 191: ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια, φυσικὴ οὐσα, φύσεως ὑπάρχει συστατικὴ καὶ ἐμφυτὸς χαρακτήρ.

³ This argument is borrowed from Maximus, *Disp.* p. 161. (See *Agatho's* letter described and partly quoted in Gieseler, *H.E.* ii. p. 176 note.) It is expressly repeated by Jo. Damasc. *de orth. fid.* iii. 14. For a criticism, see Dorner, *l.c.* pp. 194, 195.

Phil. ii. 8. To these he adds two Old Testament passages, Ps. xl. 9, liv. 6. Finally, Agatho represents the whole body of those who supported the Chalcedonian decree, in arguing from the existence of the two natures in Christ to a duality of wills and operations. "The Church," he says, "acknowledges Christ as *ex duabus et in duabus existentem naturis . . . consequenter itaque duas etiam naturales voluntates in eo et duas naturales operationes esse confitetur et prædicat.*" He does not, however, say anything respecting the mode in which the two wills operate. The decree of the Sixth Council goes somewhat further, and declares that the two wills coexist *ἀδιαρίτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀμερίστως, ἀσυγχύτως.*

With two remarks we may leave the study of this difficult and perplexing controversy.

1. We notice the prominence of the word *φύσις* throughout the disputes of the fifth and sixth centuries. The word in itself testifies to the universality of the belief that the God-man stood in an essential relation to the whole human race. It was man's *nature* which He had assumed in its completeness and totality, with all its endowments and faculties; in order that He might renew it after the image of God. This thought,—a precious heritage from the Church of the past,—reappears towards the close of the monothelite struggle, and indicates the deeper interest that underlay an apparently sterile and unprofitable controversy. It is expressed in a somewhat original form by a writer to whom allusion has already been made, Anastasius the presbyter. "The Word of God having visited us for the purpose of renewing Adam, created for Himself such a soul as He had imparted from Himself to Adam by means of the original inbreathing, a soul fashioned *after the image and likeness* of the Word of God, as the Scripture declares,—yea, wholly subsisting (*ὑπάρχουσαν*) after His image; after His likeness having its sub-

sistence (*ὑπαρξιν*), after His image determining (*διαγράφουσιν*) its volition, after His image its operation; a soul pure, spotless, ineffable, sinless; a soul having no need of any essential re-creation, like the body and all that pertains to it; requiring no alteration or refashioning of its proper parts and elements (*μελῶν*); not possessing any volition that needed to be quenched, nor any operation that required to be arrested. For how should such a soul require essential re-creation—that soul which came forth from God, which subsisted in the image and likeness of God, above all, the soul of the Word, which was utterly free from defilement? For the soul of Adam had its origin from God (*ἐκθεον*) by means of the in-breathing; but the soul of Emmanuel had a substantial existence (*οὐσίωσιν*), Divine (*ἐνθεον*), and . . . equal with God (*ὁμόθεον*); from Him, and through Him, and with Him, and in Him, by personal incorporation (*καθ' ὑπόστασιν συσσωμώς*), having its subsistence in the undefiled womb which received God.”¹ Here reappears the thought of a Redeemer, essentially Divine,—exhibiting in His assumed humanity the type after which mankind was to be renewed; the Creator Himself becomes the author of a new creation, as a true member of our race, but also its eternal archetype and head.

2. It should also be noticed that the tendency of the time was to overpress the subordination of Christ's human will; to withdraw from it the *αὐτεξούσιον* which Maximus regarded as an integral element of true humanity, and rather to insist on its *ὑπεξούσιον*, its perfect subjection to the Divine will.² So far the

¹ Anast. ap. Mai, *Pat. vet. nov. coll.* vii. p. 199. Cp. Jo. Damasc. *de orth. fid.* iii. 14 (p. 229 D).

² Jo. Damasc. *instit. elem.* c. x. [*Opera*, ed. Lequien, vol. i. p. 520]. For a much later statement, cp. Petav. *de Incarn.* v. 12, § 6: “Siquidem vel adoptivi filii sunt ii qui spiritu Dei aguntur (Rom. viii. 14): quanto propius excellentiusque naturam ac mentem propriam Deus ipse modera-

Deity in Christ is still regarded as entirely predominant; the Church substantially adheres to the doctrine of the *unus operator*, if not of the *una voluntas*.¹ This practical assertion of the omnipotence of the Logos determined the general course of Christology during the Middle Ages. The Adoptianist reaction, however, may perhaps be viewed as an early attempt to secure due recognition for the human element in the Redeemer.

§ II. THE LATER THEOLOGY OF THE GREEK CHURCH

1. The theology of the Greek Church, now formulated and developed to its highest point, finds an exponent in JOHN OF DAMASCUS (d. about 760), whose task it was to summarise and exhibit in exact phraseology the results of the dogmatic activity of the preceding ages. To him faith appears to be an "easy assent"² to the doctrine of the Triune God, the dogmas of the Church, and the utterances of the Fathers. His chief work, *περὶ ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως*, exercised a great influence on the thought of the Western Church. The third book treats of Christology in general, but devotes special attention to the question of the two wills or operations. The following are the most distinctive points of John's theology.

(1) The writer is an adherent of Chalcedon, and a dyothelite. Christ is at once perfect God and perfect man, possessing all that belongs to the Father *πλὴν τῆς ἀγεννησίας*, and all that belongs to the first Adam, save sin. He has a body and a reasonable, intellectual soul;

batur, impulsuque suo quam vellet in partem flectebat? In quod intuens Apostolus dixit *caput Christi* Deum, quæ vox *capitis* τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ respondet," etc. So Bp. Pearson speaks of Christ's "directed will" (*On the Creed*, art. 3, p. 284).

¹ Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 205.

² *de orth. fid.* iv. 11 (Lequien, i. 263 E) *πίστις δὲ ἐστὶν ἀπολυπραγμώνητος συγκατάθεσις.*

and corresponding to His two natures all the natural attributes of each,—two natural modes of volition (*θελήσεις*), a human and Divine, two natural operations, two principles of free choice (*αὐτεξούσια*), the human and Divine, and even a double wisdom and knowledge,¹ human and Divine.

Then follows a strong statement: *ὁμοούσιος γὰρ ὦν τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ, αὐτεξουσίως θέλει καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ὡς θεός· ὁμοούσιος δὲ ὦν καὶ ἡμῖν, αὐτεξουσίως θέλει καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτός· αὐτοῦ γὰρ τὰ θαύματα, αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ παθήματα.*² Here, then, is a consistent evolution of the Chalcedonian theology, especially in the ascription to Christ of a dual will, on the ground that will belongs to the perfection of either nature, of human nature equally with Divine.³ Elsewhere the human will is described as in all respects subject to the Divine.⁴

(2) John follows Leontius, whom he mentions by name, in teaching the union of the two natures in one *hypostasis*. No nature is *ἀνυπόστατος*, but two natures may have a common *ὑπόστασις*. So Christ's humanity has no independent subsistence. It becomes "enhypostatized" in the Logos: *αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ ὑπόστασις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ἐγένετο τῇ σαρκὶ ὑπόστασις* (c. xi.), *οὐ γὰρ προϋποστάση καθ' ἑαυτὴν σαρκὶ ἠνώθη ὁ λόγος* (c. ii.).⁵ The one *hypostasis* embraces (*περικεκτική ἐστι*) the two natures. In this view the distinctive theology of Cyril and his school is recognised.

[(3) The relation of the two natures is next described]

¹ See iii. 19—a remarkable passage describing the reflective self-consciousness of Christ's human *νοῦς*; cp. iv. 1 (Dorner, *l.c.* note 45).

² *de orth. fid.* iii. 13.

³ This is argued at length in c. 14.

⁴ See c. 15 (p. 235 D).

⁵ Cp. especially cc. 3, 6, and 9. In general the logical conceptions and language of Leontius reappear in John's treatment of the *hypostasis*.

From the unity of the hypostasis¹ in Christ follows the *ἀντίδοσις ἰδιωμάτων* and the *περιχώρησις*. The doctrine of the *περιχώρησις* "permeation" of the human by the Divine nature may be traced to Maximus.² The phrase is intended to express that intimate union between the two natures in virtue of which there was an *ἀντίδοσις ἰδιωμάτων* a reciprocal interchange of properties: *ἐκατέρας φύσεως ἀντιδιδούσης τῇ ἑτέρᾳ τὰ ἴδια διὰ τὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως ταυτότητα καὶ τὴν εἰς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν περιχώρησιν*.³ In theory indeed the permeation is mutual, the Divine nature in some way being affected and pervaded by the human. "The human nature," we may think, in some mysterious way "penetrated and pervaded the Divine in all those moral and religious departments in which the two natures are akin."⁴ But in point of fact it was the fixed idea of later Greek theology that the Divine so entirely dominated the human element that the *περιχώρησις* was necessarily one-sided. So it is expressly stated in ch. 7, "Though we declare that the natures of the Lord permeate each other, yet we know that the permeation issues from the Divine nature; for this penetrates through all things according as it wills and permeates them, while nothing can permeate it; it imparts to the human nature of its own glories, remaining itself impassible and without part in the passions of the humanity." Thus the Deity in Christ "appropriates" (*οἰκειοῦται*) all that belongs to humanity; the One person is the author of all action in either nature;⁵ and the *ἀντίδοσις* resolves itself into a mere *ἀντίδοσις ὀνομάτων*. "For Christ (who is both together)

¹ John teaches that Christ has a *composite personality* (*σύνθετος ὑπόστασις*). "The hypostasis of the Logos, formerly simple, became composite" (*σύνθετον ἐκ δύο τελείων φύσεων*), c. 7; cp. bk. iv. 5.

² Dorner, *div. ii. vol. i. note 41.*

³ c. 4.

⁴ Milligan, *The Ascension, etc.* p. 177.

⁵ c. 3.

is *spoken of* as God and man, created and uncreated, passible and impassible; and when on the one part He is called 'Son of God' and 'God,' He receives all the attributes of the nature conjoined with Himself, the humanity; He may be *called* 'God passible' and 'Lord of glory crucified.' . . . We are able to *say* concerning Christ, 'This is our God who appeared on earth and conversed with men'; and conversely, 'This man is increate, impassible, and incomprehensible (ἀπερίγραπτος).'" ¹

It is then the human nature only which is affected by the union; the human nature which is inconceivably exalted, and lifted into the conditions of the Divine life in virtue of its assumption by the Logos. On the part of the Logos there is an οἰκείωσις of human nature; but of the human nature there is a θέωσις.² Accordingly as man Christ is omniscient; He is enriched by the Logos with entire and comprehensive Divine knowledge. Only by a mental abstraction can the manhood of Christ be described as ignorant or dependent (δούλη). Just as the flesh of Christ was endued with life-giving power in consequence of the union, so the soul of Christ was filled with perfect knowledge of the future.³ John distinctly denies that Christ could really *advance* in wisdom or knowledge. He only "advanced" in the sense that there was a progressive manifestation of omniscience which kept pace with His bodily growth.⁴ Similarly His human will shared in the omnipotence of the Logos. His prayer in S. Mt. xxvi. 39 was only intended to teach us, for τὸ ἡμέτερον οἰκειούμενος πρόσωπον ταῦτα προσήξατο.⁵ In taking our manhood the Word in fact "assumed the rôle" of manhood. In virtue of its union

¹ c. 4.² c. 17.³ c. 21.⁴ c. 22. He says that to teach any real advance is practically to assert with Nestorius a mere σχετική ἐνωσις or ψιλὴ ἐνὸικησις.⁵ c. 24. See also 25 on the two modes of οἰκείωσις.

with Deity the manhood is the proper subject of adoration.¹ The word *Theotokos* is spoken of as "the title which comprehends the entire mystery of the economy."²

(4) John devotes special attention to the subject of the two wills and operations in Christ. Although his view of the union in one aspect reduces the humanity to the position of a mere organ or instrument of the Logos,³ yet he admits that there is a co-operation of the two natures. The one person of the Word wills and operates *ἡνωμένως*, i.e. He acts and wills in each nature, *μετὰ τῆς θατέρου κοινωνίας*.⁴ The two wills and operations, though conjoined, are numerically distinct, although the human will shares in the deification of the human nature.⁵ The joint operation of the two wills may be described as *θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια* in the sense that Christ's "human operation was deified and shared in the Divine operation; and His Divine operation shared in the human." But, says John, "this mode of speech is a periphrasis whereby two things are comprehended in one phrase"; and he illustrates his meaning by the accepted simile of the heated iron,⁶ which both cuts and burns. Cutting and burning are distinct operations (*ἐνέργειαι*) and belong to different substances (*φύσεις*), but in actual effect they are one. "So also in speaking of Christ's *theandric operation*, we understand a dual operation of His two natures, the Divine operation of His Deity, the human operation of His manhood."⁷

¹ Bk. iv. 2, *προσκυνεῖται μὴ προσκυνήσῃ μετὰ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ*; cp. iii. 8.

² Bk. iii. 12.

³ c. 19, p. 243 c; cp. *de duab. vol.* 42, where the human will "ministers" to the Divine. See also Dörner, *div. ii. vol. i. p. 214*.

⁴ c. 14. (This is Leo's *agit utraque forma*, etc.)

⁵ c. 15, p. 232 A.

⁶ Cp. Maxim. *de duab. vol.* [ed. Combefis, vol. ii.], p. 102.

⁷ See the whole of c. 19, esp. the conclusion.

But the Logos alone controls by His will the operation of the humanity which "was moved in accordance with its constitution (*φύσις*) at the will of the Logos." Practically, therefore, the human nature loses its independence (*αὐτεξούσιον*); the Logos "allowing it economically to suffer and to fulfil its proper functions, in order that by means of its actual works the reality of the nature might be ensured." Thus in the last resort there is one determinant will (*θέλημα γνωμικόν*), that of the One person in His Divine nature.¹ On the whole, it must be admitted that the Greek Christology in this, its definitive form, while retaining the dyophysitic formulæ which practically originated in the West (Leo's *Tome*), retained a monophysitic element. The spirit of Cyril dominates the entire system of the Damascene, viewed on its religious side; so far as formulæ could secure it, the doctrine of Christ's perfect humanity was accepted by the Eastern Church. But the Cyrilline, and hitherto never quite forgotten, thought of the Incarnation as a supreme act of loving condescension on the part of God practically disappears, or, to speak more accurately, the possibility of such a condescension is explained away on the basis of a quasi-physical treatment of the mystery.² It is fair, perhaps, to say of the result, "The Chalcedonian *Definition* is victorious, but Apollinaris is not overcome."³ For though he intended to assert the independence and completeness of the humanity, ascribing to it freedom as

¹ c. 15 (235 D); cp. c. 18 [p. 241 c]. "The human will followed and was subject to His [Divine] will, not being self-determined (*κινούμενον γνώμη ἰδίᾳ*), but willing those things which the Divine will willed."

² Notice the "self-cancelling" passage quoted by Bruce, *Humil. of Christ*, p. 73: τὸ ἀταπεινωτὸν αὐτοῦ ὕψος ἀταπεινώτως ταπεινώσας, συγκαταβαίνει τοῖς ἐαυτοῦ δούλοις συγκατάβασιν ἀφραστὸν τε καὶ ἀκατάληπτον (*de orth. fid.* iii. vol. i. p. 203 D).

³ Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogm.* i. p. 234. Cp. Harnack, ii. 411 note; Loofs, § 43, 2.

a constant element in human nature and a necessary condition of human virtue,¹ John yet "takes away with one hand what he gives with the other." It would seem as if his reasonings were based on a defective idea of personality, and an excessive confidence in the doctrine of the *enhypostasia* which he had learned from Leontius. In the form it had now reached it is clear that this doctrine did not do justice to the highest element in the humanity which the Logos had assumed—the freedom of the human will.

"It is evident enough," says Dorner, "that the Christological result thus arrived at by the ancient Church, whatever may have been the extent of its traditional influence even down to recent times, was far from bringing the matter to a close. The human nature of Christ was curtailed in that, after the manner of Apollinaris, the head of the Divine *hypostasis* was set upon the trunk of human nature, and the unity of the person thus preserved at the cost of the humanity. . . . [John] overlooked the circumstance that the Christian doctrine of the second Adam implies that the true idea of man was not realised at the first creation, but solely at the second creation." Indeed, in order to understand the relation in which Christ's humanity stands on the one hand to the Logos, on the other to mankind at large, "we must start with the conception of man which Christianity is at once capable of realising and requires to be realised, and which was first actually realised in the person of Christ. But the idea of humanity revealed and embodied in Christ does not require us to separate between it and God; and as this necessarily reacts upon the conception of God, the distinction between God and humanity will need to be otherwise defined than it was when the natural Adamitic humanity was taken as a

¹ *de duab.* vol. 19 [p. 538 c], τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, τὸ ἀπερὴς συστατικόν.

starting-point in estimating the nature even of Christ's humanity." ¹

[NOTE.—*The Doctrine of Christ's Human Will in John Damascene.*

It should be noticed that John follows Maximus in making some precise distinctions on this subject. In *de orth. fid.* iii. 14, he distinguishes between "will" (τὸ θέλειν) and "determination" (γνώμη). Thus θέλειν, θέλησις, θελητικὴ δύναμις, θέλημα φυσικόν, κ.τ.λ. are set over against θελητόν, θέλημα γνωμικόν. Christ possesses the human faculty of willing (θέλησις) or self-determination (αὐτεξουσιότης). But this verbal admission is qualified by the statement that in Christ there can be no ἐναντιότης γνώμης: for speaking strictly Christ has no γνώμη or προαίρεσις, which would imply a want of perfect knowledge, whereas He knew all things and needed no consideration (σκέψις) or deliberation; He was free from all hesitancy or doubt (cp. *de duab. vol.* 28, p. 544 D). But although in Christ there were two volitional natures directed towards one and the same object, the θέλημα γνωμικόν or "determining will" belonged only to the Logos. The human will, nominally αὐτεξουσίος, was yet without freedom over against the Divine will; the Logos determined both the form and matter of its volitions. So in *de duab. vol.* 40, John explains that the Word took a human nature and not a human personality: ἵν' ἡ φυσικὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος θέλησις μὴ κατ' οἰκείου ὑποστατικὸν καὶ γνωμικὸν θέλημα πολιτεύσῃ ἐναντίως τοῦ θείου θελήματος, ἀλλ' αὐτεξουσίως κατὰ πάντα ὑπήκοος γένηται, κ.τ.λ. In effect, therefore, the "freedom" of Christ's human will is reduced to a natural psychical impulse of volition. It is purely passive in relation to the will of the Logos. Cp. Dorner, *div. ii. vol. i.* pp. 213–215.

¹ *Person of Christ*, *div. ii. vol. i.* pp. 220 ff.

In relation to the "dual operation" in Christ, the following distinctions are made—(1) *ἐνέργεια*, the active and essential operation or movement, of a particular nature: (2) *ἐνεργητικόν*, the nature from which such operation proceeds: (3) *ἐνέργημα*, the accomplished effect of the operation (*ἀποτέλεσμα τῆς δυνάμεως*): (4) *ὁ ἐνεργῶν*, the person or *hypostasis* operating. Of these (1) and (3) are interchangeable, like *κτίσμα* and *κτίσις*.

Each nature has its appropriate operation. Human life itself is an *ἐνέργεια*, whether regarded as a process of growth, or an expenditure of force, or a continuous movement of self-determining will. Such an *ἐνέργεια* Christ possessed as man, and He displayed it in conjunction with the *ἐνέργεια* of His Deity. Thus the miracle of multiplying the loaves was an operation of His Deity; the actual breaking of bread was an operation of His humanity. But the total result (*ἀποτέλεσμα*), though both natures co-operated in producing it, displayed a single operation, and that Divine. For though it is impossible in the abstract that there should be *one operation* of two diverse natures, yet we may speak of Christ's operation as one, because of the unity of the person who wills and acts both *θεϊκῶς* and *ἀνθρωπίνως*. See *de orth. fd.* iii. 15, esp. pp. 231 c–232 c. It is clear on the whole that in the last instance John regards the humanity as a mere organ of the Logos. The "free obedience" is in reality no more than an obedience pre-determined by the controlling will of the Logos.]

2. In the Eastern Church the period which followed the publication of John Damascene's great work was in some respects analogous to the age of scholasticism in the West. The tendency to systematisation, and the dialectical treatment of the received theology, found late representatives in such writers as the monk Euthymius Zigabenus (d. *circ.* 1118), author of the *Dogmatic Panoply*

of the *Orthodox Faith*; Theophylact (d. 1107), archbishop of the Bulgarians, who devoted himself mainly to scriptural exegesis; Nicetas of Chonæ (d. *circ.* 1206), author of a *Thesaurus of Orthodoxy*; and Nicolas, bishop of Methone,¹ whose principal work was a polemic against the Neoplatonist Proclus. For our present purpose it must suffice merely to mention these names. The fact is that any true intellectual progress was impossible in an age when freedom was stifled by political and spiritual despotism.² Further, the decay and corruption of the Eastern Church was unfavourable to originality in speculation and to depth of spiritual insight. Futile and arid controversies arose from time to time, in regard to the doctrines of the Trinity and of the two natures in Christ; but there was a general neglect of practical Christianity, and among the unlearned and ignorant a prevalence of gross and barbarous superstition. It was not to be wondered at that from the seventh century onwards reactionary movements appeared both within and without the Church. Such was the heresy of the Paulicians, a strange revival of Manichæism, which in the first instance appears to have been an attempt to revive apostolical Christianity;³ such also was the iconoclastic movement of the eighth century,⁴ which though it was not the result of any deep conviction, or any widespread desire of reform, yet betrayed an element of religious discontent with the prevailing tendencies of Christian worship.⁵

On the other hand, the immense influence of the Areopagite, which had already affected the doctrinal controversies of the Church, is to be traced in the

¹ His date is uncertain, but probably falls in the twelfth century. Cp. Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 146.

² See Gieseler, *E.H.* iii. pp. 484–489, the notes.

³ *Ibid.* ii. p. 203 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 200 ff.

⁵ Cp. Neander, *Hist. of Christ. Dogmas*, vol. ii. pp. 430, 431.

mystical and contemplative theology of the seventh and following centuries. The writings of Dionysius had transferred to the later Greek Church elements of Platonistic thought which penetrated deeply into the Oriental mind, and became the basis of later mysticism in the West also. To the Areopagite is due the conception of theology as affirmative (*καταφατικός*) and negative (*ἀποφατικός*). The object of the cataphatic theology was God regarded as knowable, active, and self-communicating; the apophatic theology laid stress on the impenetrable mystery which surrounded the Divine Being,—His absolute transcendence and incommunicable essence. This habit of thought discovered a deep significance in the symbolism and worship of the Church. The whole constitution of the Church, with its hierarchy, its rites, its dogmas, appeared to be symbolic of spiritual and heavenly truths, veiled beneath earthly forms. Thus a lofty spiritual idealism was blended with the whole practical system of worship; and while, on the one hand, the multiplication of “mysteries” and rites tended in the case of the ignorant masses to a low materialistic conception of religion, the more contemplative minds, on the other hand, aimed at soaring above all that was sensuous and material to a direct intuition of heavenly realities, and an immediate contact with Deity itself. Herein reappears the element of individualism which had characterised Neoplatonic mysticism.

In *Maximus* this mystical theology already found a typical representative as early as the seventh century; in him, however, it is combined with a genius for dialectic and an entire devotion to the received theology. To Maximus the mystery of the union of the Divine and human natures in Christ was the symbol and pledge of an essential affinity between God and man; a necessary correspondence between Divine revelation and human

faculties. "The grace of the Holy Spirit," he says, "neither produces wisdom in the saints without a mind to receive it; nor knowledge without the receptive faculty of reason; nor faith without a rational mental persuasion of things future and hitherto evident to none; nor gifts of healing without a natural humanity of character (*φιλανθρωπία*); nor any other gift without a habit and faculty receptive of each."¹ But the end of all such communication between God and man is an immediate mystical contact or union of the soul with Deity—a union which is the effect of love. Love is to be accounted the highest good, because by it man embraces and is possessed by God. An element, however, of pantheism, or at least of docetism, is discernible in the idea of Maximus that the Logos continually becomes incarnate in believers, in so far as human life is taken up into union with Christ and penetrated by His Divine life. The fulness of the Godhead which dwelt in Christ by nature (*κατ' οὐσίαν*) is communicable to Christians by grace,² and the deification of man is the fulfilment of his true destiny.³

Enough has been said to illustrate the tendency of Maximus. His system appears to assign little or no significance to the actual humanity of Christ, except as the firstfruits of a universal exaltation of man into the conditions of the Divine life.⁴ But the mystical ideas of Maximus are tempered by a strong vein of ethical zeal, and he is saved from the pantheistic denial of distinctions between the Divine and human nature by a practical sense of the restrictions and imperfections of man's earthly condition.

¹ *Quest. in Scrip.* lix. [ed Combefis, vol. i. p. 200]. The reference is given by Neander, *Ch. Hist.* vol. v. 239.

² *Opera*, vol. i. p. 489.

³ *Ibid.* p. 517.

⁴ Dorner, *div. ii.* vol. i. pp. 228–236; Neander, *l.c.* pp. 236–242.

Considering the powerful influence of the monastic ideal in the Greek Church, it is not surprising to find that the monasteries were the favourite seats of this mystical theology. In the cells of the monks, religion naturally assumed the form of mystic quietism. The exhortations of the Areopagite fell on congenial soil in many a laura of the East. The *Hesychasts* (Quietists), a school of contemplative mystics which sprang up among the monks of Athos in the fourteenth century, regarded themselves as spiritual descendants of "the divine Dionysius"; renouncing the hope of an immediate knowledge of the Divine essence which is for ever incommunicable, they endeavoured by a system of intense and motionless abstraction to attain to some perception of the uncreated but communicable Divine light which shone upon our Lord in the Transfiguration. This Divine light, according to the Hesychasts, was the *activity* of God as distinguished from His *essence* (the *ἐνέργεια* contrasted with the *οὐσία* of God). A controversy arose about the year 1337, which, though not of long duration, engaged the attention of several synods,¹ the Hesychasts being defended by *Nicolas Cabasilas*, bishop of Thessalonica (*circ.* 1350), who may be described as the last of the Greek mystics. The real point in dispute between him and his opponents turned on the distinction assumed by the apophatic theology between the *essence* and the *activity* or operation of God. Cabasilas adhered to the distinction, and endeavoured to show its bearing on Christology; the communicable properties of the Divine nature, which were the efficient cause of Christian perfection, resided, as he supposed, in the person of Christ. Thus from his conception of the Divine nature, which after all was non-essential to his main purpose, Cabasilas passed to sacramental and mystical theology. The distinctive

¹ Gieseler, *E.H.* iv. p. 267.

feature of his teaching is a quasi-physical view of the holy Eucharist as a means of appropriating the deified humanity of Christ. "Not the Logos in Himself, but the Logos in union with human nature—His Divine-human substance, in which the human is superhuman and commingled with the Divine—is the vital essence which, when received into our organism, ennobles it and transforms it into its own substance."¹ Happily the "hesychastic" idea of Cabasilas gives way to the instincts of practical piety; to him Christ is a being in whom the essence of God, the supreme good, the eternal love, necessarily communicates itself to man; indeed, not only was the human race created with a view to its union with the God-man; He on His side was predestined for humanity, foreordained to exhibit the pattern of sinless manhood.²

At this point our brief survey of later Greek theology naturally ends. The two tendencies we have been considering, the dialectical and the mystical, bore comparatively little fruit in the Greek Church, which was already in its decline and verging to decay; in the West, scholastic theology was the massive and imposing product of an intellect which had newly awakened to a sense of its capacities.

§ III. ADOPTIANISM IN THE LATIN CHURCH

The so-called Adoptianist controversy which engaged the attention of the Churches of Spain and France towards the close of the eighth century, is not without peculiar interest for the student of dogmatics, but its exact origin is somewhat difficult to trace. Hitherto the relations between East and West had brought Constantinople into contact or collision mainly with the

¹ Dorner, *div. ii.* vol. i. p. 243.

² *Ibid.* p. 246.

Roman pontiffs. The Western Church as a whole remained comparatively unaffected by the controversies which raged so fiercely in the East during the fifth and sixth centuries, and indeed the clergy of the West were as a body too deficient in theological culture to take active part or interest in questions so deep and subtle as those in dispute. But there seem to have been special causes why the Church of Spain should be the centre of a new movement in Christological thought. For Adoptianism was a fresh phase of the old controversy between the theology of Antioch (Nestorius) and Alexandria (Cyril); it was the outcome of a long-standing tradition, and was certainly intended by its authors to be only a continuation, or development, of the dyophysitism which was finally sanctioned at Chalcedon. Probably the necessary task of defending Christianity against Mohammedan objections in a country which was by this time to a large extent under the dominion of the Saracens, determined in some degree the form under which the doctrine of Christ's person was taught. And it is fairly certain that the controversy about the three chapters (544-553) had revived the views of the Antiochene school, which, through the medium of translations from the writings of Theodore the Mopsuestene, became widely known in the West.¹

1. The phrase "adoption" as applied to the person of Christ was already familiar in Spain. A council of Toledo, indeed, had in 675 declared Christ to be Son of God by nature, not by adoption.² But probably this was specially aimed at Arianising views of Christ; and since the word was not unfrequently used in the liturgies of the Church, had been employed by Western Fathers, and was quite capable of orthodox interpretation, the

¹ Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* iii. 253; Loofs, *Dogmengesch.* § 57.

² Conc. Tol. xi. See Labbe and Coss. *Concil.* vii. p. 558.

use of it was revived by Elipandus, archbishop of Toledo, and was defended by him when called in question with needless vehemence (*circ.* 780). It is possible that, having been already engaged in conflict with a form of neo-Sabellian error,¹ he had been led to distinguish somewhat too emphatically the two natures in Christ; but he does not seem to have been skilled in controversy, and he soon sought for aid from his friend Felix, bishop of Urgella, an acute and gifted theologian, who must be regarded as the real representative and champion of the new opinions.

The expression *Christus Filius Dei adoptivus*, which Elipandus had defended, perhaps from an exaggerated idea of its importance, is systematically employed by Felix, reasoning on the basis of the Chalcedonian distinction between the two natures in Christ. The dispute appeared to turn on a mere phrase, but really was soon seen to involve a profound difference of view between the disputants. Felix denied that the expression *Son of God* was applicable in its strict or natural sense to Christ as man. Christ, he said, could only be called *natura* or *genere Filius Dei* as Divine; as human, He was *adoptione Filius*. Felix thus introduced into Christology a formal distinction between natural or proper and adoptive sonship. In fact, together with the Spanish prelates who followed him, he was influenced by several considerations which it will be worth while to notice.

(1) They considered that a distinction between two modes of sonship in Christ was implied in the duality of

¹ In the case of Migetius; see Neander, *Ch. Hist.* v. p. 216 ff. Possibly also the doctrines of Priscillianism were still rife in Spain. The Priscillianists were a sect of heretics who in the fourth century revived a system of Manichæan dualism. They seem to have represented Christ docetically as *innascibilis*, incapable of true human birth, and to have denied the distinction between His Divine and human natures. See Neander, v. pp. 491-502.

natures. For the nature assumed by the Word was human nature in its entirety; according to a traditional phrase in Western theology, the Incarnation was held to be *assumptio hominis* (rather than *humanæ naturæ*). What was meant by *homo*? Certainly not a mere impersonal *thing*, but a complete and personal human being, for “that the manhood was *personal* they were convinced, although they held that it was constituted such by the Divine *Ego* which really and truly lent itself, as it were, to the Son of man in the act of assumption; and that this *Ego* became the veritable property of the humanity.”¹ The Adoptianists, however, expressly denied that they taught a double personality; they wished rather to declare that one and the same person was in two aspects a Son, in virtue of His relation to two different natures. The Son of man as a created being must be of another substance than the Son of God; a created being cannot, it was urged, be by nature Son of God. Clearly the view of Felix arose from his anxiety to preserve the necessary and eternal distinction of the natures. “You,” he says to his opponents, “so blend the natures into a singleness of person as to imply that there is no difference between God and man, the Word and the flesh, the Creator and the creature, Him who assumes and that which is assumed.”² The Adoptianist view, on the contrary, was, to use their own statement, as follows:—“We believe that the Divine Son of God, begotten from all eternity of the Father, not by adoption but by birth, not by grace but by nature—that He when *made of a woman, made under the law*, was Son of God not by origin (*genere*) but by adoption, not by nature but by grace.”³

(2) The Adoptianists also appealed to the authority

¹ Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 261.

² Alcuin, c. *Felic.* iii. 17.

³ *Ep. Episc. Hisp. etc.* c. 2 [Alcuini *Opera*, ed. Froben, ii. p. 568].

of Scripture and the Fathers. They pointed to passages which seemed to imply Christ's inferiority, as man, to the Father; which represented Him "as anointed," or an "advocate for men," or a servant, or as advancing in bodily growth, knowledge, and wisdom; or which described God as the "head" of Christ, or "in Christ," or "greater" than Christ. They also laid stress on any texts which seemed to class Christ with men, as the *firstborn among brethren*, or as sharing with them the dependence of creaturely life.¹ Further, they were able to point to the traditional language of the Spanish liturgy, in which Christ was referred to as *adoptivus homo* and His incarnation as *adoptio carnis*; ² finally, they claimed the support of various Western Fathers.³ It may be fairly allowed that the word "adoption" as synonymous with "assumption" had been occasionally employed in the West with an orthodox intention.

(3) But a more powerful argument was based on the general relationship existing between Christ and the human race. "We are brethren of Christ," said the Adoptianists: "He is *primogenitus in multis fratribus* (Rom. viii. 29), the brother of God's adopted sons. How can we be brethren save only in virtue of His adoption of the flesh, whereby He deigned to have many brethren? We are *adoptivi cum adoptivo, servi cum servo, Christi cum Christo*." Christ as man is the acknowledged head of humanity, which can attain no higher destiny than to be adopted by God; beyond this nothing more is possible than a total transmutation, or annihilation, of

¹ See *Ep. Episc.* 9. They refer specially to S. Jo. xiv. 28; S. Lk. i. 80; Heb. ii. 17, v. 5; Rom. viii. 29, besides various O.T. passages.

² *Ep. Episc.* 8 cites the different passages from the Mozarabic liturgy. Cp. Gieseler, *E.H.* ii. p. 280.

³ Hil. *de Trin.* ii. 29: "Ita potestatis dignitas non amittitur dum carnis humilitas adoptatur" (a later reading is *adoratur*). Cp. *in Ps.* cxxvii. 8. The quotations from Augustine in *Ep. Episc.* 6 are irrelevant.

human nature. Accordingly in the Incarnation "the Son of God so united to Himself in the singleness of His personality a man, from the very moment of His conception, that the Son of God actually became Son of man, not by change of His own nature, but by an act of condescension; likewise also the Son of man became Son of God, not by any conversion of substance, but [by being constituted] a true Son in the Son of God."¹ Accordingly the man Christ is only *nuncupative Deus*; ² and though He is pre-eminent among His human brethren, He is on a level with them in regard to election, adoption, grace, and the name and condition of a servant. Felix allowed indeed that all was an act of gracious condescension on the part of the Word, who desired to be deified and to attain to the name of God through the grace of adoption in fellowship with His chosen ones. But in general he applied the notion of adoption to Christ in the same sense that it is applied by Scripture to Christians; only so, he thought, could there be true fellowship between the Son, and the sons, of God; only so could their redemption be ensured. And to such lengths was this idea of Christ's consubstantiality with mankind pressed, that He was declared to have taken human nature in the state to which the Fall had reduced it, in its defilement and filthiness; He was partaker of the *old man*, subject to the law of sin, and needing the new birth in baptism.³ It would seem that these strong expressions relate to the external condition of mortal humanity — its weakness, frailty, and mortality, and

¹ Alcuin, *c. Felic.* v. 1.

² *Ibid.* iv. 2 (an important passage).

³ See Alcuin, *c. Felic.* vii. 8: "Dicis enim eundem sacræ historiæ interpretem hæc reponere verba *Et Jesus erat indutus vestimentis sordidis* (Zech. iii. 3) utique ex transgressione de carne peccati sordidus, quam induere dignatus est: unde et pannis involutus et scissuris humani generis, dum in se illa suscepit, inspicitur donec radio crucis innocentiae tunica texeretur," etc. Cp. ii. 13, 16.

are not intended to impute inherited sinfulness to our Lord.¹

(4) In what then did the actual "adoption" consist? when did it take place?

Felix answered this question by consistently carrying out his idea that Christ was the firstborn among brethren; he distinguished between a natural or fleshly and a spiritual birth of the Saviour. His *natural* birth as man was the nativity at Bethlehem; He underwent His second or spiritual birth in order to become the *adopted* Son of God. The initial stage of this second birth took place at the baptism in Jordan; it was consummated in the moment of the resurrection,² to which the second psalm refers in the words *Filius meus es tu; ego hodie genui te*.

The Adoptianist view has now been described. It is to be noticed that their opponents in the controversy³ did not charge them with actually teaching a dual personality; they only insisted that this would be the logical result of a dual sonship. As a fact, the Adoptianists were not Nestorians; they accepted the term *Theotokos*, they protested against the idea of a dual personality in Christ,⁴ and they declined the old Antiochene view that Christ owed His Divine exaltation to His sinless virtue. They were not concerned to revive an old dispute, but rather made an attempt to solve the problem involved in the Chalcedonian theology: that of the relation of Christ's one personality to the two

¹ Cp. Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 258. In Alcuin, *c. Felic.* i. 15, Felix speaks of Christ as "per omnia similis factus nobis, excepta lege peccati." Bruce (*Humil. of Christ*, pp. 248 ff.) seems not to judge Felix quite fairly in comparing him to E. Irving.

² Alcuin, *c. Felic.* ii. 16.

³ Besides Alcuin, Agobard, abp. of Lyons (779-840), and Paulinus of Aquileia (d. 802) wrote against Felix.

⁴ *Ep. Episc.* 10.

natures. Recognising the term "Son" as an accepted expression of the Redeemer's personal unity, they thought that the dual nature implied at least *a dual aspect* of the personality. One and the same *ego* was common to both natures—raising them to personality and fulfilling the true idea of each; the *ego* of the Son of God was also the true *ego* of the Son of man. In this way "they deemed themselves by one and the same principle to have established both the completeness of Christ's humanity and its union with the Son of God at the inmost centre of its being, and yet at the same time a place remained for that process of adoption by which the human nature became assimilated to the Divine."¹

2. The general course of the controversy was as follows: Elipandus and Felix were opposed by two Spanish clergy, Beatus and Etherius. The dispute enlarged its area; it passed from Spain to France, and soon attracted the attention of Charlemagne. A synod, summoned by the Emperor, met at Ratisbon in 792, at which Felix was invited to explain his opinions. He attended, and was induced to recant, but on his return to Spain after a period of detention at Rome, he re-affirmed his error. Adoptianism was again condemned at the Synod of Frankfort (794); it was at this point that the devout and gentle Alcuin of York took public part in the dispute. After long and patient efforts, his influence prevailed. Felix made his submission, possibly not quite in good faith, at the Synod of Aix la Chapelle (799). Elipandus, however, resisted all Alcuin's overtures; within the area of Moorish domination he continued safely to proclaim the Adoptianist tenets.²

The controversy was indeed a conflict between two

¹ Dorner, *div. ii. vol. i. note 51* (p. 439).

² Gieseler, *E.H. ii. 279 ff.* Cp. Hundeshagen in *Real-Encykl. s.v.* "Adoptianismus."

types of thought. Adoptianism represents in a measure the Christology of the West as coloured by the ideas characteristic of Augustine, the conceptions of freewill, predestination, and grace. Alcuin inherits the mystical habit of mind which had been traditional in the East. Wonderful indeed had been the influence of this type of thought. It had allied itself equally with the philosophical speculation of the time, and with the superstitions of the vulgar. "Plato and Aristotle," says Harnack, "were its evangelists, while on the other hand every celebration of the Eucharist, every relic, was a silent missionary on its behalf."¹ Alcuin represents the mystical tendency in conflict with rationalism. "Never think," he says to Felix, "that by human reasoning you can investigate the nativity of the Word of God; for by no human possibility ought you to measure the omnipotence of Deity. He who is the law of all natures is subject to no law of any other natures; He, the incomprehensible, will never be comprehended by the petty surmises of human conjecture. . . . You ask, *What else than a servant could be born of a handmaid?* . . . Surely the mystery of this nativity, this union between God and man, is higher than the framing of the entire creation. Allow therefore that God is able to achieve something which human infirmity cannot comprehend; nor let us by our ratiocination impose limits to the power of eternal majesty, seeing He is all-powerful and can do all things."² Here we have the older Greek standpoint,—the deep and reverent sense of an ineffable mystery in the Incarnation, in the union between God and man. Felix represents the opposite type of mind; the keen logical sense which insists on distinctions; the practical instinct which discerns the ethical importance of Christ's human life and example. Adoptianism is, in

¹ *Dogmengesch.* ii. p. 250.

² *c. Felic.* iii. 2 and 3.

fact, a revival in a new form of the opposition between Antioch and Alexandria.

Alcuin, following the lead of the prevalent Christology, insists principally on the logical consequences of Adoptionism.¹ Ultimately it implies the independence and juxtaposition of two personal beings, moving in parallel lines, but never really united. The unity of the person in Christ is sacrificed; the true idea of an incarnation is lost. For the Incarnation is no mere self-abasement of God to the level of a creature; it is essentially the exaltation of man.² But Alcuin contributes little that is positive to the solution of the problem which Adoptionism raised. He falls back on the power of God. "Why do we attempt," he exclaims, "with perverse temerity to force the omnipotence of God within the limits of our necessity? He is not bound by the law of our mortality; *all things whatsoever He wills the Lord doeth in heaven and in earth*; and if He has willed to beget for Himself a true Son, born from a virgin's womb, who has ventured to say He could not do so?"³ But after all, this appeal to Divine power is unsatisfying, and the tendency of Alcuin's view is to reduce the human nature in Christ to a mere predicate of the higher nature, or an element in the person, of the Divine Son. On its positive side, Adoptionism is a protest against any dissipation of the human nature; but Alcuin's only reply is a kind of *transubstantiation-theory* of Christ's person. *In assumptione carnis a Deo*, he boldly declares, *persona perit hominis, non natura*.⁴ And this theory of the *extinction* of the human personality was apparently for a

¹ *c. Felic.* i. 11.

² *Ibid.* ii. 4: "Non enim minoratio fuit divinitatis in assumptione humanitatis, sed humanitatis exaltatio in participatione divinitatis."

³ *Libell. adv. hæc. Fel.* 13 [*Op.* i. p. 763].

⁴ *c. Felic.* ii. 12; cp. Dorner, *div.* ii. vol. i. note 53.

time the received doctrine of the Western Church.¹ It is very significant as appearing to allow that personality is a necessary element in the perfection of a human nature. It is also a tacit recognition of the danger to which the received theology was exposed: the danger of reducing Christ's humanity to a mere appendage of His person, the mere organ for a theophany.² Thus in Alcuin's treatment of the personality of Christ we see the lingering trace of a monophysitic mode of thought; and the same tendency is illustrated in the reception given to the doctrine of Paschasius Radbertus as to the transubstantiation of the species in the Eucharist.³ Adoptianism was, in a word, the close of a prolonged series of efforts to uproot monophysitism; nevertheless it only served to show how deeply that conception of Christ's person had moulded the thought even of those who most earnestly repudiated it.⁴

¹ See passages in Dorner, *l.c.* The question *Utrum Filius Dei assumpserit personam* is discussed by Aquinas (*Summa*, pars. iii. qu. 4, art. 2). He says (ad 3): "Quod *consumptio* ibi non importat destructionem alicujus quod prius fuerat, sed impeditionem ejus quod aliter esse posset. Si enim humana natura non esset assumpta a divina persona, natura humana propriam personalitatem haberet; et pro tanto *dicitur persona consumpsisse personam*, licet improprie; quia persona divina sua unione impedit ne natura humana propriam personalitatem haberet."

² Elipandus did in fact accuse his opponents of docetism or Euty-chianism.

³ *Lib. de corp. et sang. Domini*, written about 830. It is significant that he starts with the thesis of Alcuin, the omnipotence of God. Thus in c. i.: "*Omnia quaecunque voluit Dominus fecit in caelo et terra. Et quia voluit, licet figura panis et vini hic sit, omnino nihil aliud quam caro Christi et sanguis post consecrationem credenda sunt.*"

⁴ Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 268.

PART VIII

THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION IN THE SCHOLASTIC PERIOD

§ I. General characteristics.

The system of Scotus Erigena and its subsequent influence.

§ II. Sketch of the scholastic age.

- (1) First period: to the end of the twelfth century.
- (2) Second period: the thirteenth century.
- (3) Third period: decline of scholasticism.

§ III. Christological thought in the scholastic age.

The questions in dispute.

- i. The doctrine of the Atonement: survey of patristic opinion prior to Anselm.
The *Cur Deus Homo?* analysis and criticism.
Abelard, Peter Lombard, Bernard, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus.
- ii. The effects of the Incarnation on the Godhead.
Nihilianism of Peter Lombard.
- iii. The question *Utrum Christus venisset si Adam non peccasset*. Rupert of Deutz and others.
- iv. The effects on Christ's human nature of its union with Deity.
The teaching of Thomas Aquinas, and of Duns Scotus.

§ I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

The Adoptianist controversy brings us to the threshold of the Middle Ages, the period in which was developed a new Christian and theological culture among the Germanic nations. For it may be justly maintained that in the eighth century the Church virtually entered into a new inheritance—the awakening powers, moral and intellectual, of the Teutonic peoples. To them she transmitted, as a heritage from the older world, the accumulated treasures of early Christian thought and toil,—the canon of Scripture, the decisions of the early Councils, the immense mass of patristic literature, and specially the writings of Augustine. Nor should it be forgotten that the spirit of Neoplatonism had already penetrated deep into the thought of the Church, owing mainly to the influence of the works ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite, while the logical system of Aristotle had been transmitted to the West through the medium of translations made by Boethius. The contemplative tendency of Neoplatonism fostered the growth of mysticism; the dialectical method of Aristotle largely determined the form and direction of scholastic speculation; the authority of the Church and the influence of Augustine tended to prescribe the limits within which intellect must be content to move. Accordingly, the age which is now to be surveyed is not one of production or dogmatic development, but rather a period in which current beliefs receive a purely intellectual treatment; in which the faith is regarded mainly as an object of knowledge, engaging the powers of the reflective understanding. The task of the new age is, in a word, that of bringing the doctrinal tradition of the Church into harmony with reason; of reconciling the culture and philosophy of the age with the temper of faith.

In some respects the pontificate of Gregory I. (d. 604) may be said to have inaugurated a new epoch. As being the last of the great Latin Fathers and the first of the mediæval popes, Gregory naturally forms a link between two periods of history; nor can we overlook the importance of his work in reviving and organising the Christianity of the Anglo-Saxon race. The centuries which intervened between his death and that of Scotus Erigena formed a period of transition; the controversies of the time were merely the continuation or completion of earlier struggles; theological energy was mainly absorbed in systematising the results of the past, and thought was busied in learning its newly-discovered powers and measuring the extent of its heritage. During this period the Church entered into a close alliance with the general education of the age; Charlemagne, with the assistance of Alcuin and others, endeavoured by the foundation of the cloister schools to raise the standard of learning and to revive the spirit of religion. The prominence of dialectic in the curriculum of these schools is significant; by continuous exercise and discipline the Western mind was gradually trained to feel confidence in its powers; but as yet there were very few who could be called independent thinkers.¹ The two most celebrated theologians of the ninth century are Alcuin (d. 804) and JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA (d. *circ.* 877).² Of the former something has been said already;

¹ During the Carlovingian period schools were established of various kinds—palatine, monastic, cathedral, and parochial. The course of instruction in the liberal arts embraced the *trivium* (grammar, dialectic, rhetoric), and the *quadrivium* (geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music). But as logic and dialectic attracted the keenest interest, the term *Doctor Scholasticus* came to mean one occupied in teaching logic or philosophy.

² It would seem that Scotus received his training in the Irish Church, which from the seventh century onwards was a main source of religious life, theological learning, and missionary enterprise to the Western Church.

it is necessary, however, for our purpose to give some account of Erigena.

The main characteristic of Scotus Erigena is his remarkable attempt to fuse Christian beliefs with Neoplatonic thought. The foundation of his system seems to be the Platonism of the Areopagite, whose works Scotus translated into Latin. In his abstract and negative conception of God, Scotus at once displays the influence of the pseudo-Dionysius and his affinity to the later theology of the East. He may, indeed, be accounted a connecting link between the East and the West; he hands on the traditions of the apophatic or mystical theology which he had inherited from writers like Maximus and John Damascene. Scotus then to a great extent follows the lead of the Areopagite, and of the more mystical writers of the East, such as the two Gregories of Nazianzus and Nyssa (whose names, strangely enough, he appears to confuse), but he inaugurates a new period in his characteristic declaration that the true philosophy is identical with true religion. This was a needful reassertion of the rights of human reason; and Scotus went so far as to maintain that, in the event of a collision between reason and authority, the former was to be preferred: *omnis auctoritas quæ vera ratione non approbatur infirma esse videtur*.¹ His rationalism, however, was not unqualified, for he did not deny the necessity of revelation: *nisi ipsa lux mentium nobis revelaverit, nostræ ratiocinationis studium ad eam revelandam nihil proficiet*. But he regarded authority (by which term he seems to mean the teaching of the Fathers) as useful only for corroboration of the results achieved by reason. Accordingly, although these opinions of Scotus were not generally adopted, he may be regarded with some justice as the earliest founder of scholasticism, if understood

¹ *de div. nat.* i. 69 [Migne, *P.L.* 122, p. 513]; cp. ii. 31 (p. 601).

broadly as a systematic effort to co-ordinate reason and faith.

In his famous work, *de divisione naturæ*, Scotus investigates the whole sphere of being, for in the term nature he comprehends at once God, matter, and the ideas or essences of things which are both created and creative. In Scotus' view, which may be described as monistic, God is the supreme and only substance of all things: *ipse omnium essentia est qui solus vere est*.¹ But in reality God is exalted above all predicates; He transcends all categories—all being, all knowledge, all utterance; in Him contradictories are both true, for He transcends the sphere in which the law of contradiction is valid.² Hence the Trinity is a mere name; for God's being is incognisable both by men and angels. The Father is a name denoting the *essentia*, the Son the *sapientia*, the Holy Spirit the *vita, Dei*.³ There appears, in the system of Scotus, to be no recognition of objective distinctions within the Deity corresponding to the names *Father, Son, Spirit*.

Such is Scotus' conception of God; it is however his description of the creative process that gives him occasion for a definite theory of Christology. God is the source of the natures which at once are created and create, *i.e.* those ideas or archetypes (*primordiales causæ*) which constitute the intelligible world. These "ideas" are contained in the Word, or Wisdom, or Only-begotten of God. In Him they eternally exist, although they are "created" *ex nihilo*; for "creation" as applied to these ideas signifies merely that there was a time when they

¹ *de div. nat.* i. 3.

² This conception of deity is qualified by an idea derived mainly from Gregory of Nyssa—that the human soul is triune, and therefore an image of the Divine nature. Cp. ii. 23.

³ i. 13, 16.

had not manifestation.¹ The Word is the *mundus intelligibilis*²—the home of the ideas; and creation means that eternal act or process wherein God passes through the primordial causes or *principia* into the sensible world of visible and invisible creatures (the nature created and not creating).³ God is Himself the substance of all finite things; creation means simply the self-revelation of the eternal nature; and just as the eternal procession of God from Himself originates the complex multiplicity of visible phenomena, which are so many theophanies—so many different aspects of the one omnipresent God, so the goal of creation is the return into unity. The “nature neither creating nor created” is God Himself, regarded as the supreme ultimate unity into which all things return.

Two things are remarkable in Scotus’ doctrine of creation: (1) it is frankly pantheistic in statement and tendency. “God is in all things as their essential substance.” “All that is good and beautiful and lovely in creatures is Himself.”⁴ He loves and contemplates Himself in His creatures. Every creature is therefore a theophany, but in a special degree *man*, since he is the image of God and the end of His creative operation.⁵ The world of phenomena is that sphere in which the eternal ideas of the Divine mind find their manifestation. *Non duo a se ipsis distantia debemus intelligere Deum et creaturam sed unum et idipsum.*⁶ Scotus however is not strictly speaking a pantheist; he does not worship nature as God. His belief in the essential unknowableness of God distinguishes his view from that of ordinary pantheism. “For him nature is God indeed, but God is more than

¹ iii. 15. Creation *ex nihilo* means that the ideas proceeded from the ineffable nature of the Word which transcends being.

² ii. 16, v. 23.

³ iii. 25.

⁴ i. 74 and 76.

⁵ iii. 20.

⁶ iii. 17 (p. 678).

nature.”¹ Scotus is in fact more of a mystic than a pantheist; but there can be no doubt that later thinkers, such as Amalric of Bena and David of Dinanto, misunderstood and misused his teaching. (2) Again, the system of Scotus assigns a high dignity to man; man is made in the Divine image; he is the microcosm of creation, comprehending the universe of things in his constitution;² having a mind like that of God, all-pervading and all-embracing, so that his nature is inscrutable even to himself.³ Further, man, being a creature rational and spiritual, is the end and aim of God’s self-manifestation; the highest and most perfect theophany; an end in himself.⁴ Here we have a basis in nature for the possibility of a Divine incarnation.

What, then, is the significance of Christ in the system of Scotus?

He stands in close relation to the world as the *mundus intelligibilis*, the sum of the ideas or causes which find visible embodiment in the created universe. But the Incarnation was necessary in order to uphold the universe in being; the effects would be nothing apart from the descent into them of the “primordial causes”; they would become extinct, and causality itself would perish.⁵ The universe, apart from Him who is its life, must pass into nothingness. It accordingly follows that the Incarnation is an act coeternal with the process of creation; or rather, it is a mere symbol, an allegory, of the essential relation between cause and effect. Thus Scotus contemplates the Incarnation *ideally* as an ex-

¹ I quote from a paper on the *de div. naturæ* by Mr. C. C. J. Webb to which I am much indebted.

² ii. 13.

³ ii. 28.

⁴ i. 7, 8, ii. 9.

⁵ v. 25 (p. 912): “Si Dei sapientia in effectus causarum quæ in ea æternaliter vivunt non descenderet, causarum ratio periret; pereuntibus enim causarum effectibus nulla causa remaneret.” Cp. Dorner, *div. ii.* vol. i. p. 291.

pression of the necessary dependence of the universe on the Logos (cp. Col. i. 16, 17); while, at the same time, he views it *historically*, as the actual assumption in time of a complete human nature by Deity itself. From this point of view Christ is the ideal embodiment of the human race, in whose person the restoration of humanity to its original unity begins. In His birth Christ abolishes those distinctions of sex which resulted from the Fall; in rising again He began to annul the difference between the visible world and paradise; in His ascension, the difference between earth and heaven. For the end of His work is a complete restoration of the universe. In assuming the nature of man, He restores the whole of creation to unity with itself and God;¹ and if the goal for humanity is its exaltation in Christ and conversion into Deity,² the goal for the universe at large is a return into God and into the primordial causes; a passage from multiplicity and division into unity and simplicity; from the state of movement and change into that of immutability and repose. In God, "the nature which neither creates nor is created"—the source of existence and its goal—all things find their rest: *omnia quieta erunt et unum individuum atque immutabile manebunt.*³ God will be all in all.

Christ then is to Scotus rather the symbol of a necessary Divine operation or process, than a historical person: a symbol of the immanence of the eternal and infinite in the transitory and finite; of the essential dependence of effects on their causes. But in Christ existence is regarded not so much in its eternal

¹ ii. 6, 8.

² v. 25 (p. 911): "Hoc enim proprium caput ecclesiæ sibi ipsi reservavit, ut non solum ejus humanitas particeps deitatis, verum etiam ipsa deitas, postquam ascendit ad Patrem, fieret."

³ ii. 2 (p. 527).

emanation from God, as in its eternal return to God. The Incarnation of the Word and His redemptive work are the allegory or symbol, under which the Godward movement of creation is to be conceived. What in one aspect, that of creation, is contemplated as *division* and *process*, is in another aspect, that of redemption, *reunion* and *return*. Consistently enough, Scotus revived the Origenistic idea of the restitution of all things. The universality of redemption excluded the idea of any limitation of the benefits of salvation.¹

The system of Scotus gave considerable impetus to the pantheistic tendencies which came to maturity some centuries later. But he himself was unjustly charged with the heresies which sheltered themselves under the authority of his name. The free speculative mysticism which he derived from the teachers whom he most venerated, was held in restraint by the instincts of deep Christian piety which he had imbibed in the Irish monasteries. Though he himself regarded Christianity mainly as a system of cosmical philosophy, he did not incur serious suspicion, at least in his own day. On the contrary, he was called to take part as a champion of orthodoxy in contemporary controversies. It was only in 1209 that his principal work was condemned by the University of Paris—a condemnation repeated by Honorius III. in 1225, when the *de divisione naturæ* was found to be in circulation among some of the numerous pantheistic sects.

The importance of Scotus Erigena may be gathered from the fact that scholasticism in its stricter sense is a systematic continuation of Erigena's attempt to unite philosophy and theology, though its general course follows a direction very different from that in which his thought travelled. It was the task of the scholastic age

¹ v. 26, 27.

to exalt faith into a science, to rationalise Christian dogma. And we may notice that this was the aim not of a few prominent individuals like Anselm, but of a continuous series of thinkers, employing a fixed method, and starting from the basis of the Church's acknowledged teaching. "No Christian," says Anselm, the father of scholasticism, "ought to contend that what the Catholic Church believes and professes is not true; but he ought, by holding the same faith without wavering, by loving it, and living conformably to it in humility to the utmost of his power, to inquire how it is true."¹ The result in general was a rigorous definition and formulation of dogma, the method of dialectic being gradually extended even to the highest mysteries of the faith. At first the influence of Plato predominated, but gradually yielded to the authority of Aristotle, as the tendency to systematisation became more strongly developed. During the polemical period of Christian theology, when scientific statements of doctrine were being slowly elaborated, Plato had been the constant ally of the Church, Aristotle had for the most part served the purposes of heresy.² It was not until the twelfth century that the moral and metaphysical works of Aristotle became known in the West through the medium of Arabic translations, and though these were regarded with suspicion and aversion by popes and councils,³ the voice of ecclesiastical authority was powerless to restrain an irresistible movement of thought. Aristotelianism finally supplanted Platonism in the schools, though the latter reappeared as a dominant influence, first in the mystics of the four-

¹ Cp. Hardwick, *Church History* (Medieval), p. 258. In *Proslog.* i. occurs the celebrated dictum "Neque enim quæro intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam."

² Cp. Iren. ii. 14. 5: "Minutiloquium et subtilitatem circa quæstiones cum sit Aristotelicum, inferre fidei conantur,"

³ See below, p. 177.

teenth century, and later in the humanists of the Renaissance,¹ thus forming, as it were, the dawn and the sunset of mediæval philosophy.

§ II. SKETCH OF THE SCHOLASTIC AGE

The scholastic period may be viewed historically as embracing three well-marked periods.

1. During the period of the rise and development of scholasticism were propounded the great questions with which thought busied itself for nearly three successive centuries: the religious question as to the relation between faith and knowledge, authority and reason; the philosophical problem of universals; the theological question as to the nature and conditions of our Lord's redemptive work.² Moreover two divergent tendencies, or habits of mind, emerge during this period, which in different forms reappear at every stage of the scholastic movement: there appears the opposition between the rationalistic and the mystical tempers, in their relation to the problems both of faith and knowledge.

In the great *Anselm* (1033–1109) the two tendencies are more or less combined; he represents the Platonic realism and mystical temper of Augustine, while at the same time he illustrates that lofty confidence in the reasonableness of Christianity which constituted the great merit of the schoolmen. His beautiful Christian temper and instinct formed a bond of union between the religious and speculative sides of his mind.³ He united profound feeling with severe thought; the mystical

¹ *e.g.* Marsilius Ficinus (d. 1499) and John Picus of Mirandola (d. 1494), who were the leaders of a reaction in favour of Platonism.

² These three questions are concisely stated by Dr. Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* i. c. 6.

³ See Neander's fine sketch of Anselm, *Church History*, vol. viii.

temper with practical piety. The tendencies, however, which he, with some few others,¹ succeeded in combining so admirably were destined to diverge and ultimately to come into sharp collision. In the nominalism of Roscellin, and in the rationalism of Abelard (d. 1142), appears the critical, innovating, speculative, and restless temper which naturally accompanies any great awakening of intellect; while *Peter Lombard* (d. 1160) lays the foundation of scholastic method in his *Sentences*,—a work which became the favourite manual of the twelfth century, and the model on which, for a long period, the treatment of theology was based. On the other hand, Abelard's great opponent *Bernard of Clairvaux* (d. 1153), and the theologians of the monastery of S. Victor in Paris, Hugh (d. 1141), Richard (d. 1173), and Walter (d. circa 1180) are examples of the devotional temper by which rationalism was kept in check.² Nor must we leave out of sight the vague mysticism which was a legacy from the Areopagite and fell in with the great outburst of pantheistic thought which, as the aggregate result of several causes, disturbed the Church of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

2. In the second stage of scholasticism—the era of its bloom and perfection—the confused tendencies of the preceding epoch became fixed in determinate forms. This period, which, speaking roughly, extends to the close of the thirteenth century, has a many-sided character, which is not easily described. It witnessed the attainment by the papacy of its highest point of influence under Innocent III.; the founding of the mendicant

¹ e.g. William of Champeaux (d. 1121), the teacher of Abelard.

² Neander observes that the influence of the Victorines was useful in Paris, where the life of university students and teachers was apt to be very loose and worldly. They also, no doubt, did much to conciliate men like Bernard in favour of the dialectical treatment of theology. Like Anselm, they laid great stress on the study of Scripture.

orders by Francis (1209) and Dominic (1216);¹ a great extension of intercourse with the East, resulting from the crusades; and, what was perhaps of chief intellectual importance, the recovery of the lost works of Aristotle. Indeed the main feature of the period, regarded from the point of view of the history of dogma, was the contact of the Christian mind with the Aristotelianism of the Moorish schools of Spain. This was one of those facts which constitute an era in the intellectual history of Europe, and is worthy of special notice. The Arabic philosophy which passed from the schools of Cordova into the universities of Italy and Spain, seems to have been introduced mainly through the study of medicine. Oriental physicians were everywhere its missionaries; "philosophy stole in under the protection of medicine";² and with the works of Hippocrates, Galen, and the Alexandrine astronomers, there entered by degrees the philosophy of Greece. Thus escorted as it were by physical science, Aristotelianism was introduced into the universities of Europe. The study of the Stagirite had for more than a century flourished in the Moorish schools; and it received a new impulse from the translation and commentary made by Averrhoes at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Gradually, as intercourse became more frequent between the Moorish teachers and the universities of Western Christendom, Latin translations were made from the works of Arabian Aristotelians, and these were prematurely assumed to represent the genuine Aristotle.³ Thus tainted by an admixture of foreign elements, the moral, metaphysical,

¹ The founding of the orders doubtless was an event of immense importance; it did much to awaken a feeling of religious unrest, and perhaps of spiritual independence, which contributed in great measure to the movement in favour of a reformation of the Church.

² Milman, *Latin Christianity*, ix. p. 110.

³ Gieseler, *E.H.* iii. p. 296.

and physical writings of "the philosopher" found an entrance into the homes of learning, and the effect was nothing less than a revolution of thought. An effort was made by the Church to suppress Aristotle,¹ which, as we have noticed, was ineffectual. But it is fair to observe that there were at first good grounds for the alarm and suspicion which the new learning excited. For it was largely in consequence of the introduction of Aristotelianism in its Moorish guise that pantheism again raised its head. The Aristotelian natural philosophy of the Arabs was largely tinged with Neoplatonic and pantheistic ideas; and it was not long before this element in their Aristotelian commentaries and translations produced pernicious results in the West. It was easy to trace a connection between the Arabic pantheism and the errors of two prominent theologians, *Amalric of Bena*, a teacher in Paris (d. 1205), and *David of Dinanto*. Amalric seems to have revived a form of Sabellianism, which had undoubtedly points of contact with the teaching of Scotus Erigena; but David of Dinanto expressly made use of the metaphysics and physics of Aristotle; and as the pantheistic errors of both teachers had the effect of encouraging in their disciples a tendency to antinomian excesses, it was not unnaturally assumed that the study of Aristotle was a source of peril to Christianity.² It was not until the genuine works of Aristotle were distinguished from those of his Arabian commentators, that the prohibition of the philosopher's works became a dead letter. Ultimately indeed the effect of the revived pantheism was rather to discredit

¹ His works were prohibited by the synod of Paris (1209), and again by the papal legate in 1215. In 1231 Gregory ix. again forbade the introduction of "profane science"; but after that date Aristotelianism reigned supreme.

² See Gieseler, *E.H.* vol. iii. pp. 296-301; Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. pp. 300 f.

Erigena and Neoplatonism than to hinder the influence of Aristotle.

The result of the new Aristotelianism was displayed to more advantage in the great monuments of learning which give to the thirteenth century its most distinctive character. The *Summa universæ theologiæ* of the Franciscan Alexander of Hales (d. 1245) was the first of a series of attempts to exhibit the faith of Christendom as a reasoned and ordered whole, with the aid of strict Aristotelian method,—analysis, definition, and syllogistic inference. To the same class of works belong the commentary of the Franciscan Bonaventura (d. 1274) on the *Books of the Sentences*; the *Summa* of Albert the Great (d. 1280), who was the first commentator on the complete works of Aristotle; the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), and the *Commentary on the Sentences* of Duns Scotus (d. 1308). The last two writers, though devoted to the Aristotelian dialectics, were by no means servile adherents of “the philosopher.” Thomas, in particular, owed much to the teaching of the Areopagite,¹ while Duns Scotus was largely influenced by Platonism. Towards the close of the thirteenth century a marked divergence arose between the schools of “Thomists” and “Scotists”—the scholastic disputes being closely connected with the academic rivalry of the monastic orders, Dominican and Franciscan, to which Thomas and Scotus severally belonged. While the Thomists treated theology from the scientific or theoretic standpoint, the Scotists insisted on its practical aspects; the Thomists’ system was rooted in the Augustinian doctrines of sin and grace,

¹ Corderius, *Op. S. Dion. Areop.* præf. p. xxvi: “Observatu quoque dignissimum quomodo S. Dionysius primus scholasticæ theologiæ jecerit fundamenta; quibus ceteri deinceps theologi eam quæ de Deo rebusque divinis in scholis traditur doctrinam omnem ædificarunt.” He proceeds to illustrate in detail the debt of Aquinas to the Areopagite.

the Scotists, inclining to Pelagianism, laid special stress on the freedom of the human will; the Thomists professed a modified Aristotelianism, the Scotists were Platonists; the difference in fact corresponds to the general contrast between the Dominican order with its zeal for dogma, and the Franciscans who insisted on practical morality.¹ The work of Duns Scotus marks the close of this period; with him begins that formal and arid use of dialectic which ultimately led to the downfall of scholasticism. A practical attempt to defend Christianity against the inroads of the Arabian pantheism was made by Raymund Lulli in his *Ars generalis*; but a better testimony to the power of the faith was offered by his own life of missionary activity and the martyrdom in north Africa with which it closed (1315).

3. The decline and decay of scholasticism began with the opening of the fourteenth century. Duns Scotus had laid the foundations of a sceptical reaction against the teaching of the Church, partly by his elaborate use of the dialectical method, but much more by his doctrine of moral distinctions as having their basis only in the arbitrary will of God. In the nominalism of *William of Occam* (d. 1347) the discordance between the objective truths of religion and the subjective mode of treating them became painfully apparent. Objections to revealed doctrines and to the system of the Church had hitherto been stated hypothetically with a serious purpose of meeting them, but they were now urged ironically and in a spirit of veiled rebellion.² This sceptical temper was favoured by the nominalism which

¹ Cp. Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, ii. p. 130. The Pelagianising tendencies of the Scotists were opposed by Archbishop Bradwardine (d. 1349) in his *de causa Dei contra Pelagium*. Bradwardine himself was a very rigid Augustinian (*ibid.* ii. p. 301).

² Cp. Hardwick, *Ch. Hist.* (Mediæval), p. 352.

denied the existence of any objective realities corresponding to general ideas. A reaction was already setting in against the authority of the Church,—a reaction destined to produce not only the independent and sometimes extravagant movements of the later mysticism,¹ but also the revolt against papal absolutism which found a voice in the reforming councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basle. *Raimund of Sabunde* (circ. 1436) and *Gabriel Biel* (d. 1495) may be accounted the last of the schoolmen; for the fifteenth century witnessed the rise of a new culture, and of a new zeal for truth, with which the later scholasticism was powerless to cope. In the Renaissance and the Reformation the intellect of Europe asserted its freedom and refused any longer to be fettered by scholastic traditions and methods, whether in the cultivation of science and letters or in the pursuit of moral and religious truth.²

§ III. CHRISTOLOGICAL THOUGHT IN THE SCHOLASTIC AGE

We may now pass on to inquire what was the special contribution of scholasticism to Christological thought. It was not, we must remember, a creative age which gave birth to scholasticism. The ninth and following centuries were largely occupied with missionary work, the conversion of heathen nations, and the organisation of churches. Hence it came about that the person of Christ was on the whole less decidedly an object of attention than the dispensation of grace committed to the Church. The scholastic period accordingly witnessed

¹ *e.g.* the tenets of Eckart of Cologne (d. circa 1325). Tauler (d. 1361), Suso (d. 1365), Ruysbroek (d. 1381), the author of the *Deutsche Theologie* (publ. 1519), Thomas à Kempis (d. 1471), and Gerson (d. 1429) adhered in the main to the doctrines of the Church.

² On the scientific opposition to scholasticism, see Hagenbach, § 154; on the precursors of the Reformation, § 155.

no marked development in the doctrine of the Incarnation; the keenest controversies between 850–1050 related to the subjects of Predestination and the Eucharist. Further, in repudiating Adoptianism theology still adhered to a mode of contemplating Christ's person which assigned a disproportioned prominence to His Deity. The tendency displays itself in the system of Scotus Erigena, who regards Christ exclusively as the incarnate Wisdom of God, and attributes but little significance to the earthly life of Christ; and although the Crusades revived to some extent the interest of Christians in the actual figure depicted in the Gospels, yet professed theologians like Peter Lombard were apt to ignore, or minimise, the historic humanity of our Lord, while some of the later mystics seem to transform the Christ of the New Testament into a mere ideal. Thus the Beghards were charged with teaching that every believer is Christ Himself; that the name Christ is merely a symbol of an incarnation of God which takes place in every devout Christian. Indeed, speaking generally, the prevailing inclination of theologians was to regard the Incarnation as a theophany, Christ's earthly history being a non-essential phase of the Divine self-manifestation and little more.

Notwithstanding this tendency however there was a very decided awakening of interest in soteriology. Possibly this was due to the profounder conceptions of sin which had been awakened, partly through the influence of Augustine, partly by the penitential system of the Church. Augustine, indeed, had himself started the main questions which occupied the minds of the schoolmen; and foremost among these was the problem of redemption—the question Why redemption was necessary, and why it assumed one particular form? and this problem led on to the deeper inquiry *Cur Deus homo?*

and that again to the question, *Utrum Christus venisset si Adam non peccasset?*

These may be said to have been the chief topics of discussion in regard to Christology, which occupied the earlier scholastics, and they were, of course, dealt with formally by the systematic theologians of the thirteenth century. For the sake of clearness however, and with a view to limiting and systematising in some degree the treatment of the subject, we may at the outset indicate the main Christological questions which arose during the scholastic age, mentioning the names of those who are prominently connected with the discussion of each.

I. Anselm propounds the most important of these inquiries in his *Cur Deus homo?* This book marks a turning-point in the history of doctrine, because it is the first attempt to deal systematically with the mystery of the Atonement. The question whether it was possible for God to have redeemed mankind in any other way had passed over to the schoolmen from Augustine. Anselm endeavours to show the objective necessity of the actual method of redemption adopted by God, and his work shows how widespread and keen was the interest aroused by such discussions.

II. The effects of the Incarnation in their relation to the Divine Being Himself who assumed man's nature were discussed by Peter Lombard, with the result that his treatment of the subject exposed him to the charge of "nihilianism."

III. The wider question, whether in any case and apart from the consequences of sin, God would have become incarnate, seems first to have been explicitly raised and answered by the abbot Rupert of Deutz.

IV. The effects of the union of the two natures on our Lord's humanity—the problem of His human growth, knowledge, and experience—are systematically dealt with

by the various writers of *Sentences*, *Commentaries*, and *Summæ*. Attention will, however, be confined in this connection mainly to Thomas Aquinas and to the two mystical theologians, Hugh and Richard of S. Victor.

I. We have postponed to this point a task which must be discharged if we are fairly to estimate the significance of Anselm's treatment of the Atonement. Augustine had maintained that some other method of redemption would have been possible to an omnipotent God, but that no other way was more suitable for healing man's misery, for raising his hopes and kindling his love than that which involved the death of Christ.¹ This ethical, subjective mode of regarding the Atonement passes on to Anselm; but he aims at a more objective treatment, the motive of which may be gathered from a rapid survey of the history of Christian soteriology from the earliest times to the age of Anselm.

i. Even in the earliest period a redemptive virtue was ascribed to the sufferings and death of Christ. The apologists had indeed laid special stress on the preaching and teaching of Jesus as a factor in redemption, which, in their view, consisted chiefly in moral and spiritual enlightenment;² but the most typical soteriologist of the apologetic age, Irenæus, while he regards the entire appearance of Christ as redemptive, yet treats the passion and death as the crown of the Saviour's work.³ Hence in Irenæus, as in other early writers, the doctrine of Satan plays a prominent part. Their general view is that the death of Christ was a victory over the devil. Attributing an almost magical efficacy to the Redeemer's cross, they look upon His death less as an exhibition of Divine justice than as a triumph of Divine

¹ *de Trin.* xiii. 10-13.

² Cp. vol. i. pp. 192 ff.; and see Justin M. *Apol.* i. 23; *Dial.* §§ 83, 121.

³ *Iren.* ii. 22. 4; v. 23. 2, etc.

wisdom and power, by which man is ransomed from the tyranny of Satan, and the lost gift of incorruption is restored.¹ A sacrificial virtue indeed is assigned to the Redeemer's blood, both as a ransom-price and as a means of moral cleansing;² but the prevailing conception is that Christ came *to destroy the works of the devil*. This idea is also prominent in the Alexandrine Fathers, Clement and Origen. They may have been influenced by the Gnostic conception of sin, as corruption and bondage, rather than guilt; and, consequently, they look upon suffering as purgative and remedial, rather than penal. They share to some extent the view of the Gnostics that justice is a lower attribute of Deity than love.³ The result is that Origen and Clement are somewhat optimistic in their estimate of suffering. Origen, for instance, compares Christ's death to the heroic deaths of other great men;⁴ and though he has a profound sense of the cosmic significance of Christ's passion, he has but little conception of a doctrine of vicarious satisfaction for sin. He inclines to fall back on the prevailing doctrine that in the death of Christ, Satan has been outwitted by a master-stroke of Divine wisdom.⁵ Clement's optimistic view of moral evil leads him to overlook the retributive element in the punishment of sin; he treats it merely as a Divine discipline of the soul.⁶ Generally speaking, the primitive Church does not seem to advance beyond the idea of vicarious *suffering*; the deeper sense of the necessity of *satisfaction* for

¹ See esp. Iren. v. 1. 1.

² Justin M. *Apol.* i. 32; cp. Clem. Rom. i. 7; Ignat. *ad Smyrn.* 6.

³ The Gnostics made "justice" the special characteristic of the inferior deity, the Demiurge, who stood, as it were, at a point intermediate between God and Satan, between perfect good and perfect evil.

⁴ c. *Cels.* ii. 17.

⁵ Cp. *in Matt.* xvi. 8; *ad Rom.* ii. 13.

⁶ *Protrept.* 74, 79, 82, 89.

sin hardly makes its appearance.¹ Certainly, however, the biblical idea of Christ's death as a propitiatory sacrifice is consistently maintained throughout the whole period, while the Anselmic thought, that man who had been overcome must himself vanquish his enemy Satan, is also found in Irenæus.²

ii. During the polemic period, from the death of Origen to John Damascene (254–730), the doctrine of the Atonement in the West was to some extent coloured by anthropological speculations. The Pelagian controversy aroused deeper conceptions of sin, which however was discussed rather in reference to the free will of man and the work of grace than in its objective relation to the Divine justice and moral government. On the other hand, in the East, men's minds were more absorbed in the problems of Christ's person and natures than in His redemptive work. Nevertheless Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa in the East, like Ambrose, Leo, and Gregory the Great in the West, devoted considerable attention to the mystery of the Atonement. Athanasius, for example, regards Christ's work mainly as *expiatory*, as the payment of man's debt and the destruction of death.³ He also recognises the element of *substitution*; Christ suffers in the stead of those who are united to Him as their mystical head and representative.⁴ But both he and Gregory Nyssen⁵ assign great importance to the claims and destructive work of Satan. Gregory develops the idea of a fraud justly practised on the devil, his argument seeming almost to justify the

¹ "Satisfactio" in Tertull. *de pœn.* 5–10; *de pat.* 13; *de pud.* 9, seems to mean *man's satisfaction for his own sin*. It is to be connected with his other juristic phrases, *e.g.* culpa, reatus peccati, meritum, etc. (Cp. vol. i. p. 267 note.)

² iii. 18. 7.

³ Cp. p. 29.

⁴ Cp. *de Incarn.* ix.; *Orat. c. Ar.* i. 41, 45, 60, ii. 62, iv. 6.

⁵ *Orat. catech.* xxii.–xxvi.

impression that he considers the means to sanctify the end. In fact, the notion of a Divine victory over Satan was elaborated during this period into a theory. Some Fathers busied themselves with the doctrine of the ransom, which they regarded as a price paid to Satan in compensation for his just rights over mankind; others who repudiated this idea,¹ yet recognised an element both of artifice or fraud in the passion, and of strict justice in the Divine dealing with Satan. The device by which Satan, the deceiver, was himself entrapped was the concealment of a Divine and sinless nature under a human form. Bernard well expresses the point on which earlier teachers insisted: "He assumes the *reality* of human nature but the mere *semblance* of sin, in the one extending a precious consolation to the weak, and in the other wisely concealing a snare of deception for the devil."² Even Augustine maintains that Satan overstepped his rights in dealing with Christ as a sinner, and so forfeited his claim over his other prisoners, so far as they belong to Christ: *justissime dimittere cogitur quem injustissime occidit*.³ In the loss of his power over mankind, the devil was dealt with according to the *lex talionis*.

The attraction of this theory for writers so numerous and so gifted shows that it satisfied a certain sense at once of *justice* and of *fitness*: it appeared just that some satisfaction should be paid to Satan for the loss of rights, however unjustly acquired; and there seemed to be a Divine fitness in the idea of deception practised on the deceiver. Certainly there is something deeper in these speculations than a mere "mythological" fancy. The

¹ *e.g.* Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xlv.

² *in Cant.* xx. 3. Cp. Greg. Nyss. *l.c.*; Amb. *in Luc.* iv. 1; Leo Mag. *Serm.* xxii. 3; Greg. Mag. *in ev. Luc.* i. hom. xvi. 2, xxv. 8.

³ *de Trin.* xiii. 10. Cp. *de lib. arb.* iii. 10.

treatment, however, of the subject by Athanasius reaches a higher level than that attained by most of his successors, inasmuch as he throws Satan comparatively into the background by emphasising the idea of death,¹ and by giving prominence to the moral attributes of God—His veracity and compassion. God had threatened death for man's disobedience; and His love discovered a way by which He might at once save the race of men, and yet be true to His own righteous decree.² Further, Athanasius grasps in some measure the conception of the infinite worth of Christ's Divine personality, as imparting merit and efficacy to His acts and sufferings,—a conception which is very prominent also in Cyril of Jerusalem, to whom the inestimable effects of the passion appear to result directly from the fact that the sufferings were those of God.³ The debt of man was by the death of God's own Son more than paid. Athanasius, indeed, represents an advance of Christian thought, in that his theory of the Atonement is so intimately connected with a comprehensive view of the Incarnation and its necessary effects.⁴ Augustine, on the other hand, whose authority in the succeeding age gives him special importance, tends to fall back within the narrower lines drawn by Irenæus. He raises, but rapidly dismisses, the question how far the actual method of redemption was necessary; and he shows an inclination to limit the extent to which the benefits of redemption can be applied.⁵ The main importance of John Damascene is that he accepts the current belief in a victory over Satan by the wise and just method of

¹ *de Incarn.* ix. etc.

² *Ibid.* xiii.

³ Cp. *Catech.* xiii. 33.

⁴ The same is true in a large degree of Gregory Nyssen.

⁵ See *c. Jul. op. imp.* vi. 24. Leo, on the contrary, and Greg. Mag. enlarge the scope of the atoning work; Leo, *Ep.* cxxxiv. 14; Greg. Mag. *Moral.* xxxi. 49.

deception, but rejects the notion that the devil received a ransom-price.¹ It is evident that the idea of the tyrannous dominion of Satan over man was deeply rooted in the theology of the East.

iii. The theory which Anselm inherited is now sufficiently plain, namely, that of a quasi-legal transaction with Satan as a being possessed of independent rights in consequence of man's sin; he also was familiar with the doctrine of satisfaction as represented in the Church's penitential discipline. It is possible that the system of penance colours Anselm's view more decidedly than is generally supposed. What he himself brings to the solution of the problem *Cur Deus homo* is a profound conception of sin, derived from Augustine, and a proportionate insight into the nature of Divine justice and the punishment of guilt. He begins by noticing some current criticisms of the doctrine of redemption, and definitely sets aside the æsthetic idea of the Atonement as merely *conveniens* or *pulchrum*. He aims at showing its absolute necessity as being in the highest degree conformable to reason. He also rejects the notions that a mere man could redeem our race, or that any ransom was paid to the devil (i. 6, 7). Once and for all this latter theory is discarded. Satan himself, being only a rebellious creature of God, could have no possible "rights" over the fellow-creatures whom he had seduced. The positive elements in Anselm's theory will be best presented in a brief analysis of the book.

(a) The book opens with a consideration of some possible objections to the Christian doctrine of redemption. Anselm insists that the humiliation of the incarnate Son involved no degradation of His Godhead; nor was His death the unjust punishment of a sinless victim; it was a free and spontaneous self-oblation (c. 8).

¹ *de orth. fid.* iii. 1, 27.

(b) The cause of Christ's death is next investigated. Christ could not deserve to die, being sinless. His death was the simple consequence of persistent obedience to God's will. He died *libera voluntate*; and God only willed His death in the sense either that He willed the obedience which inevitably led Him to death, or that He bestowed the goodwill which moved Christ to sacrifice Himself (cc. 9, 10).

(c) Sin and its remission. If man is to attain his true end¹ there must be remission of sin; and sin is simply *Deo non reddere debitum: Deum exhonore*. Further, sin demands satisfaction; and this can only take place if more is restored than was wrongfully withdrawn or withheld from God by man. God demands compensation for the wrong done to Him (c. 11).

Sin is in fact lawlessness: the necessity for its punishment lies in the character of God as righteous judge. He cannot allow something unregulated (*inordinatum*) to exist in the universe; nor can He forgive sin if it remains unatoned for, for this would be inconsistent with His justice: *non decet Deum aliquid injuste aut inordinate facere* (c. 12).

(d) The homage withdrawn by man (*ablatus honor*) must accordingly be restored by man (c. 13). Not indeed that God ever actually loses His honour; if it is not freely yielded by man, God "gets Him honour" on man against his will. In any case the Divine will is done; for in trying to escape from the will that *commands*, the sinful creature falls under the will that *punishes*, nor can he ever withdraw himself from the will that *permits*. Every sin must be followed by satisfaction or penalty

¹ "Ut deo fruendo beatus sit." See this point enlarged on in cc. 16-18, a passage which is introduced to show the true end of which man has fallen short. Cp. ii. 1 ff.

(cc. 14, 15). Man must accordingly make satisfaction if he is to attain his true end (c. 19). How is the debt to be discharged? Man has nothing wherewith to pay—no overplus to meet his debt; for he owes all that he is, or has, already. His only possible satisfaction is to give back to God something greater than all that is not God (cc. 20, 21). Further, God's honour requires that man should conquer Satan by refusing to sin; and this he is too infirm to do, because he is already infected with birth-sin (c. 22), yet such victory is absolutely necessary (c. 23). Neither the *debt* of man nor his *penalty* can be remitted. If God remits man's *debt*, He only remits what man is too weak to pay; if He remits man's *penalty*, He contradicts His own justice (c. 24). Accordingly man in his helpless condition must look for a Divine deliverer, Christ (c. 25).

The ground having been thus cleared, Anselm proceeds in part ii. to describe the actual method of redemption.

(e) The purpose of God for man can only be fulfilled if something be rendered to God greater than all that is not God. But there is nothing such except God Himself. The satisfaction must be paid by Him, yet offered by man. Therefore God must needs be made man (cc. 1–6).

Anselm at this point lays down some general conditions under which the Incarnation must be supposed to occur. The necessity of satisfaction excludes any mere conversion of Deity into manhood; any mixture or mere conjunction of natures (or persons). The same person must be at once both God and man, since God alone can *pay* the debt, and man alone *owes* it (c. 7). Accordingly the Son of God assumes human nature, taking it from the stock of Adam by the most fitting mode (*i.e.* the only one hitherto unemployed by God),

namely, birth of a Virgin (c. 8).¹ The *Son* becomes incarnate, because it was against Him specially that Satan and man had sinned: both had claimed to be as gods, whereas He alone is the true image of God (c. 9).

(*f*) How, then, does the Divine Son make satisfaction?

(1) He is sinless. He cannot sin, because He cannot *will* to sin: *non potuit velle mentiri, potuit mentiri si vellet*. Yet His sinless righteousness is not "necessary," but free and meritorious (c. 10).

(2) He dies—but His death is not a debt due from Him to God; it is a free oblation—something over and above the debt of creaturely obedience which He owes to God (c. 11). Thus the merit of Christ's sacrifice immeasurably outweighs man's sin. If to assail His life is the worst of sins, His life must be the most precious of all goods—more than sufficient to pay the debt of all mankind (c. 14), and to atone even for the sin of His murderers, which they committed ignorantly (c. 15). The death of Christ was "necessary," not in any external sense: necessity in God only means the immutability of His will (cc. 17, 18). Christ offers freely what He does not actually owe to God, namely His death. Therefore He may justly claim as a reward the salvation of His brethren. The sacrificed Christ is the Father's gift to man. God says, *Accipe Unigenitum et da pro te*. The Son says, *Tolle me et redime te* (cc. 18–20).²

Such is Anselm's theory of the Atonement. It has been often criticised and from many points of view.

The foundation of his theory is his conception of sin, which is too exclusively legal. Anselm is dominated

¹ Cp. c. 16, in which Anselm answers the question, How can God bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Obs. in 12 and 13 some conditions of the incarnate life are mentioned, *e.g.* that Christ was never miserable, nor ever ignorant.

² 21 is a note explaining why the devil and his angels are not redeemable.

by the notion of sin as a debt; he is unduly influenced by a metaphor, just as his predecessors, since Leo, had been influenced by the associations connected with the word *ransom*. Sin is viewed by Anselm legally as a personal injury done to the Divine majesty; God is, as it were, a powerful private person, demanding satisfaction for His outraged rights, rather than a gracious and holy being striving to undo the consequences of creaturely self-assertion.¹ Nor is Anselm entirely consistent, for his theory of satisfaction or compensation implies that God and man stand on one level, as wrongdoer and injured party, whereas in i. 19 he insists that man is precluded from treating with God on equal terms.² Again, Anselm's theory seems to involve a severance between the justice and the goodness of God. His successors discerned this weak point in his system—the undue predominance which he assigns to justice demanding satisfaction, and his neglect of the element of redemptive compassion in God; nor does he entirely avoid the tendency to draw a distinction between the Father who claims satisfaction and the Son who offers it, thus imperilling to some extent the ethical unity of the Godhead in the work of redemption. Moreover, the significance of Christ's self-oblation is distorted by a legal theory of merit; Christ's transcendent act of self-devotion prevails, in Anselm's view, to win the salvation of men as a *reward*—an idea which is not strictly in harmony with a rigidly consistent theory of satisfaction for sin. It has also been justly objected that Anselm's conception of the Atonement lays too

¹ Anselm's idea of "justice" also is too strictly legal. See (*e.g.*) i. 23: "Nullatenus ergo debet aut potest accipere homo a Deo quod Deus illi dare proposuit, si non reddit Deo totum quod illi abstulit; ut sicut per illum Deus perdidit, ita per illum Deus recuperet."

² "Non expedit homini ut agat cum Deo quemadmodum par cum pari."

little stress on man's part in the work of reconciliation. Anselm scarcely indicates the way in which the objective work of Atonement acts upon man, or enables him to fulfil the Divine requirement; he says nothing of Christ's representative character, or of the need on man's part of moral self-identification with the Redeemer's work through penitence and faith. From the religious point of view in fact Anselm's theology is somewhat defective, in so far as he overlooks the spiritual effects of the Divine work, and thinks more of the payment of man's debt than of the forgiveness of his sin. There is finally some truth in the criticism of Petavius¹ that Anselm implicates God in an absolute necessity, by maintaining that redemption could not have been accomplished in any other way; he virtually holds that whatever appears to human reason "suitable" (*conveniens*) or "God-worthy" is morally necessary for God and absolutely determines His mode of action.² It seems to have been mainly on this ground that his theory found comparatively little favour with later scholastic writers, their characteristic tendency being to insist on the absolute freedom as to choice of means involved in the Divine omnipotence.³

On the other hand, in spite of some inconsistencies, Anselm's answer to the question, *Cur Deus homo?* represents a true advance in Christian thought. For instance, he recognises that redemption is a deliverance from sin, whereas most of his predecessors regarded it mainly as liberation from the consequences of sin,—death, corruption, and Satanic tyranny. He also qualifies his somewhat juristic conception of God as the supreme

¹ *de Incarn.* ii. 13 and 14.

² Anselm, however, to some extent anticipates the criticism of Petavius; see *Cur Deus Homo?* bk. ii. c. 5.

³ Cp. Aquin. *Summa*, iii. qu. 46, artt. 1 and 2.

personality by suggesting the ethical truth that the Divine will is synonymous with the eternal law of righteousness: *libertas enim non est nisi ad hoc quod expedit aut quod decet*.¹ God's will is not arbitrary; it is not the case that if He wills anything immoral it is thereby constituted good. Moreover, Anselm appears to grasp clearly the *moral* element in the Atonement, namely Christ's freewill offering of spontaneous obedience, winning acceptance for man as rendered by man;² the will of God perfectly embraced and fulfilled by man. And although Anselm says little in regard to the significance of Christ's historic life and teaching, or of His work as founder of the Church, yet there can be no doubt that the figure of the God-man is the centre of his system; Christ is very man, the actions of His humanity acquiring infinite value in virtue of the divinity of His person. In regard to the sufferings of the Cross, Anselm is far removed from the idea that Christ endured the torments of the lost.

iv. Anselm's work contained the earliest systematic theory of the Atonement. It was the first philosophical attempt to give scientific precision, and a basis of rational necessity, to the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction. Anselm believed that the Atonement was a mystery rooted in immanent attributes of the Divine nature; and in asserting the absolute claims of Divine justice, he aimed at imparting a necessary and metaphysical character to the doctrine. But his book provoked a reaction, of which *Abelard* is the representative; it was the starting-point of a new polemic. Abelard, whose character and temper

¹ Bk. i. 12. Cp. the words which follow: "Quod autem dicitur, quia quod vult justum est, et quod non vult justum non est, non ita intelligendum est, ut, si Deus velit quodlibet inconveniens, justum sit quia ipse vult."

² Bk. i. 10. Anselm speaks of Christ's submission as "acceptæ bonæ voluntatis spontanea et amata tenacitas." See the whole chapter.

of mind presents a sharp contrast to that of Anselm, looks at the Atonement from an entirely different standpoint. He starts from the idea of the Divine benevolence, and the necessity of man's reconciliation with God. He regards the death of Christ as a display of love intended to kindle the cold hearts of sinful men, to awaken in them contrition and gratitude, to bring them into the state of reconciliation with God. In fact, the redeeming element in the passion was the manifestation of Divine love eliciting the response of love on man's part: *Redemptio nostra est illa summa in nobis per passionem Christi dilectio*.¹ This theory has undeniable merit in so far as it exalts the grace of God and recognises the subjective moral element in man's redemption; but it betrays the absence of deep spiritual experience and a lack of insight into the true nature of sin. It starts not from the thought of God's outraged holiness, but from that of His benevolence. God, according to Abelard, can freely pardon the sinner on his repentance, apart from satisfaction; redemption might have taken place by mere *fiat*; penitence is the only required condition for acceptance with God. Consequently the only object of Christ's sufferings is to produce sorrow—to make a certain moral impression on man's heart. Abelard lays stress on the teaching and example of Jesus: "On this account the Divine wisdom became man, that we might be enlightened by His doctrine and life, by His sufferings and death, and by His glorification: since He taught us by His sufferings how much God loves us; by His resurrection He gives us the pledge of eternal life; by His ascension to heaven He receives our souls to heaven."² Again, "Christ died for us in order to show how great was His love to mankind and to prove that

¹ See *Comm. in Ep. Rom.* lib. ii.

² *Theol. Christ.* iv. (ap. Neander, *Hist. of Christ. Dogmas*, p. 519).

love is the essence of Christianity.”¹ Abelard thus represents a type of thought entirely opposed to Anselm’s. He only so far agrees with his opponent as to concur with him in denying the rights of Satan over man; Satan is merely a slave who has led astray his fellow-slave.²

Peter Lombard in the main follows Abelard. He regards the Atonement as a supreme display of Divine love: “The death of Christ,” he declares, “justifies us, in that by it love is kindled in our hearts”;³ but he also recognises an objective necessity in Christ’s death, and seems to accept the older view of a fraud practised on the devil. *Bernard* takes a more evangelical view. Venerating as he does the opinions of the Fathers, he defends against Abelard, with something of passion, the current idea of Satan’s claims; he holds that Satan’s rights over man were “iniquitously acquired, but justly permitted.” He also repudiates the view that remission of sins necessitated no objective satisfaction and depended merely on the exercise of God’s sovereign will. He clings to the Athanasian idea of a mystical connection between Christ and His members—the head and the body; and he also expresses nobly the moral element of propitiation in Christ’s sufferings, in the famous saying, *Non mors Deo, sed voluntas placuit sponte morientis*.⁴ Bernard adheres in short to the traditional view, but accepts freely the moral aspect of the passion on which Anselm had insisted. Akin to him is *Hugh of S. Victor*,

¹ *Sent.* c. xxiii.

² Abelard says (ap. Bern. *Ep.* exc., *de error. Abael.*): “Ut nobis videtur nec diabolus unquam jus aliquod in homine habuit, nisi forte Deo permittente sicut carcerarius; nec Filius Dei, ut hominem liberaret, carnem accepit.”

³ *Sent.* iii. dist. 19.

⁴ See *Ep.* exc. cc. 5–9; in *Cant. serm.* xxv. 9. Bernard speaks as if Abelard wished to limit the redemptive work of Christ simply to His doctrine and example.

who takes a mediating position between Anselm and Abelard, but holds fast to the notion of a legal transaction with Satan.

v. Anselm then and Abelard represent two schools of thought, the one holding the atoning work of Christ to be objectively necessary, the other regarding it from the side of its subjective effect on man; the one tracing it to the necessities of Divine justice, the other regarding it as a free display of grace. A somewhat similar divergence reappears in the treatment of the doctrine by *Thomas Aquinas*¹ and *Duns Scotus* respectively. Thomas inclines to an objective and mystical view of the atoning work of Christ; Scotus lays stress on the arbitrary will of God as the sole ground of its acceptance. A brief review of their teaching may be given in this place. Aquinas holds that the sufferings of Christ were "necessary" in the sense that they were the means best suited to effect the Divine purpose (*convenientissimum*), in view of man's need both of assistance and instruction.² He deals exhaustively with the subject of redemption, treating the sacrifice of Christ under four different aspects.

(a) From the point of view of *merit*,³ Christ by His atonement merited eternal salvation for all the members of His Body. This effect of His death corresponds to the mystical union which subsists between Him and the Church, of which He is the head. "He was glorified not only in Himself, but also in His faithful, as He Himself says (S. Jo. xvii.)." His merits redound to all those who are united to Himself.

(b) Christ also makes *satisfaction* in that He offers to

¹ Aquinas is specially akin to Anselm in his view of sin; *Summa*, iii. 1, art. 2, ad 2. See also iii. 47, artt. 2, 3, and 6.

² *Summa*, iii. 46, artt. 1-3. Notice in art. 4 the mystical view of the cross.

³ iii. 48. 1.

God something in which God takes a delight which outweighs the hatred He feels towards man's offence. The satisfaction is a superabundant one,—transcending what was necessary in the way of compensation for the wrong done. The value of the satisfaction depends partly on the supreme love displayed in Christ's sufferings, partly on the dignity and worth of the life laid down, partly also on the comprehensiveness (*generalitas*) and greatness of the sorrow endured. Further, in Him as the head of the mystical body all the members suffered, consequently *satisfactio Christi ad omnes fideles pertinet, sicut ad membra sua*.¹

(c) The death of Christ was also a *sacrifice*, a self-oblation, an act of homage to God whereby He was pleased to be propitiated. The voluntariness of the suffering was a great element in its acceptableness.² And the perfection of the sacrifice consisted in its fulfilling every necessary condition: the body offered was that of man, it was capable of suffering death, it was sinless, it was the very flesh of the offerer.

(d) Once more, the passion of Christ was an act of *redemption*, releasing man from servitude to sin and from the penalty of guilt. The passion of Christ, being a sufficient and superabundant satisfaction for sin, was in effect a ransom-price (*pretium quoddam*) by which man was released from a twofold obligation—the service of his captor Satan, and the necessity of enduring the penalty of guilt.³

Duns Scotus made it his aim to rebut the view of Anselm and Thomas as to the infinite merit of Christ. This merit, *Scotus* maintains, belonged only to the

¹ iii. 48. 2.

² iii. 48. 3: "Hoc ipsum quod voluntarie passionem sustinuit Deo maxime acceptum fuit, utpote ex charitate maxima proveniens." Aquinas expressly refers in this art. to Aug. *de Trin.* iv. 14.

³ iii. 48. 4; 49. 1 and 2.

human nature and must accordingly be finite.¹ The worth of Christ's sacrifice depends on the arbitrary value assigned to it by God, according to the maxim, *tantum valet omne creatum oblatum pro quanto acceptat Deus illud*.² It follows that a mere man might have made satisfaction for the sins of the human race, had God so willed; indeed, with the aid of Divine grace men might have made atonement for themselves. The actual redemptive work of Christ was only so far "necessary" as it was actually accepted by God. Redemption was not connected with Christ's sufferings *ex insito valore*, but *ex divina acceptatione*. The result of this view is to represent the Incarnation as a thing almost unnecessary; redemption might have been achieved, and sacramental grace bestowed, by other means, if God had chosen to use them. Scotus is akin to Abelard in seeming to make light both of sin and of the holiness of God; He eliminates from the Atonement the element of moral necessity,³ and thereby cuts at the root of Anselm's theory.

It is unnecessary to describe the soteriology of the later mystics. They give up the effort to arrive at doctrinal precision and fall back on inward contemplation of Christ's sufferings. Those of a pantheistic tendency maintained that Christ suffered only for Himself, or that all Christians, being members of Christ, participate in His sufferings, thus annulling the objective value of the Atonement.

II. Towards the close of the twelfth century the question was raised by *Peter Lombard*, what was the

¹ *in Sent.* iii. dist. 19. For the same reason Scotus holds that sin cannot be an "infinite" wrong done to God.

² *in Sent.* iii. dist. 20. Cp. Loofs, *Dogm.* § 67. 1, 2.

³ Dorner, *div. ii.* vol. i. p. 353. The Pelagianising tendency of Scotus drew a protest from Bradwardine (see above, p. 179, note 1).

actual effect of the Incarnation on the Deity of the Son. He boldly gave an answer which was denounced by his contemporaries as "nihilianism." He argued that no change can take place in the nature of Deity. Consequently in the Incarnation *Deus non factus est aliquid*; the Son of God became "nothing which He was not before"; the Incarnation was not the assumption of any real nature, for the human nature of Christ, being without personality, was not a real or substantial thing; it was merely apparitional. In taking this position Peter Lombard wished to exclude the current idea¹ that the personality of the Word became *composite* after the union. He regarded the effect of the union as a mere clothing of the Word with a bodily form or vesture (*indumentum*) under which He might manifest Himself in a way suited to the capacities and condition of men. God, in a word, became clothed with manhood; He became man *secundum habitum*,² or in the way of possession, and the Incarnation might accordingly be looked upon as a kind of theophany. It followed that Peter minimised the mediatorial significance of Christ's humanity; he also rejected the ancient idea of man's participation in the Divine nature. Nihilianism, in fact, is a reappearance of the Antiochene tendency to regard Christ as the mere organ or temple of God, with the exception that while the Antiochenes maintained a dual personality, the Lombard reached his conclusion as the logical consequence of the Alexandrine view that the human nature was an accident or non-essential element in the person of the Word. Doubtless, his motive was a desire to guard the inalterability of the Divine sub-

¹ Cp. Aquin. *Summa*, iii. 2, art. 4.

² Dörner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 315. The expression "denotes something that is superadded to another, that pertains to it accidentally, so that that to which it is added might exist without it."

stance; and it is a question whether he really intended to go beyond the maxim of Cyril that the Word after the Incarnation "remained what He ever was" (μεμένηκεν ὅπερ ἦν).¹ Further, the object of the Antiochenes was to vindicate the completeness of Christ's human nature; the Lombard's intention appears to be that of drawing the logical consequences from his conception of the Divine nature. His view illustrates the general tendency of the later Greek theology, which he generally follows, to assign an excessive predominance to the Deity in Christ; a tendency resulting from an *a priori* method of reasoning in regard to the Incarnation, drawing conclusions not from the picture in the Gospels, but from the probable conditions under which an incarnation of Deity may be supposed to have occurred. The views of Peter Lombard were vehemently contested by John of Cornwall (*circa* 1175)² and Walter of S. Victor, and the proposition *Deus non factus est aliquid secundum quod est homo* was examined and condemned by a synod of Tours (1163), and again in the Lateran synod of 1179. The same habit of thought had already been displayed by Abelard, who also conceived the Incarnation as a theophany, intended for the instruction of mankind, a self-exhibition, so to speak, of the Divine wisdom, in order to save men by doctrine and example. Abelard, however, started from a conception of God more akin to Sabellianism³ than that of Peter Lombard.

III. The inquiry whether the Incarnation was independent of man's Fall and formed an element in the original creative purpose of God, seems to have been prompted, to some extent at least, by the historical conditions of the twelfth century, the wide diffusion of Christianity,

¹ See *Sent.* lib. iii. dist. 5-7.

² Cp. Gore, *Dissertations*, p. 176 note.

³ See Dorner, *div. ii. vol. i. pp. 320, 321.*

and the enlarged knowledge of the material universe which was being acquired through the researches of the now active scientific faculty. It was moreover a period in which the traditional theology of the Church was practically fixed, and independent thought could only venture to move freely in regions of speculation hitherto unexplored.¹ Already in the ninth century Scotus Erigena had taught that by the Incarnation Deity had come into contact and relation with the entire universe of material things, the whole creation being destined to participate in man's redemption; and this thought may be traced even in the earlier Fathers, especially Irenæus and Athanasius; but they do not ever appear to dissociate the Incarnation from the Fall, the renewal and perfection of the universe from the redemptive purpose concerning man. It was only at a much later stage in the history of doctrine that an idea, ultimately suggested by expressions in the New Testament itself, became a subject of systematic discussion. From the beginning of the thirteenth century onwards the question *Utrum Christus venisset si Adam non peccasset* became a topic of debate in the schools.

The traditional view that the Incarnation was dependent on the Fall could claim for itself the authority of Athanasius and Augustine; and during the scholastic age it received the decided adhesion of the mystical theologians of S. Victor. Richard of S. Victor, for example, dwells on the Incarnation mainly as a display of Divine pity, and as an event ardently longed for by a burdened world;² and he goes so far as to exult in

¹ Bp. Westcott's essay on *The Gospel of Creation* will be known to most readers. My debt to it will be obvious in what follows. See also Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 182.

² *de Incarn. Verbi*, viii.: "Ecce venit desideratus cunctis gentibus; non dicit desiderandus, sed desideratus, ut intelligas in omni gente aliquos aliquando in eius desiderio flagrasse. . . . Erat igitur eius adventus a

the consequences of the Fall. *O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem!*¹ In the same way Hugh regards "deliverance" as the sole object of the Incarnation;² it was a redemptive act—the first stage in the victory of wisdom and strength over deceit and cunning. The deeper view, that the Incarnation was an event predestined apart from the Fall was apparently first maintained by *Rupert, abbot of Deutz* (d. 1135). He was deeply imbued with the idea of the dignity of Christ's manhood, as an end in itself, an end predestined to be the climax of creation—that towards which the upward movement of the universe tended as its goal. He argues, chiefly on the basis of such passages as Heb. ii. 10,³ that since the whole universe of things was created for the sake of the one man Jesus Christ, it was part of God's original purpose that His Son should as man appear among men, king in His own nation, lord in His own house.⁴ Sin in no way interfered with the Divine purpose of love, according to which the Son of God was destined to wear a human form and to take His *delight with the sons of men*—nay, *where sin abounded grace did much more abound*; the Fall did but redound to the greater glory of Christ. Though the conditions under which the Incarnation took place were modified by sin, the fact itself was predetermined apart from sin; sin has been overruled to enhance the glory of the exalted Redeemer. The same view was adopted by *Alexander of Hales* (d. 1245) on the general ground that

multis gentilium præcognitus et ardentè desideratus." Cp. *de Emman.* i. 11 (on the Divine pity and readiness to help and redeem).

¹ Quoted from the missal in *de Incarn. Verbi, l.c.* ² *de Sacr.* ii. 2.

³ Obs. that in this text Rupert reads *consummari* for *consummare*, thus referring *eum propter quem omnia et per quem omnia* to Christ.

⁴ *de glorif. Trin.* iii. 20: "Rectius dicitur quia non homo propter angelos, imo propter hominem quendam angeli quoque facti sunt et cetera omnia." Cp. iv. 2.

it is of the essence of the chief good to diffuse or communicate itself.¹ Albertus Magnus inclines, with some hesitation, to the same view, but gives no definite opinion; and Duns Scotus agrees with Rupert; he shrinks from the idea that the Incarnation, the highest work of God, is merely contingent (*occasionatum*); it must have been a final aim of creative wisdom to exhibit the perfection of humanity in Christ—an end willed by God previous to His foreknowledge of human sin.² At a later period *Wessel* (d. 1489), reasoning on the basis of scriptural statements, regards the incarnate Christ as the predestined object of God's love; he cannot conceive of the introduction of God's "noblest creature" into the world as an event merely contingent. The community of the blessed must from the first have been destined to rejoice in its true head; "the Lamb has the promise from the Father that men should be given Him at His request for His inheritance."³

On the other hand Aquinas, after weighing the considerations on either side, decides on the ground of scriptural statements that Christ would not have become man, but for the Fall. He allows indeed that "it is of the essence of the chief good to communicate itself," and the self-communication of God to His creatures could only be fulfilled *summo modo* by an incarnation. Further, he recognises that the Incarnation was an exaltation of human nature and a consummation of the universe. But he finally adheres to the opinion that since Scripture everywhere describes the Incarnation as a remedy for human sin, "it is more fittingly said" that it was con-

¹ "Si ergo eius debet esse summa diffusio quia est summum bonum, convenientius est quod se diffundat in creaturam. Sed hæc diffusio non potest intelligi summa nisi ipse uniatur creaturæ; ergo convenit quod Deus uniatur creaturæ et maxime humanæ." *Summa theol.* pars iii. qu. 2. 13.

² *Sent.* iii. dist. 7, qu. 3, etc.

³ Quoted by Westcott from *de causis Incarn.* c. xv.

tingent on the Fall;¹ “although,” he adds, “the power of God is not limited to this consequence, seeing that God might have become incarnate, even if sin were non-existent.” Practically he seems to agree with the Victorines that there is no reason why human nature should not have been more highly exalted in consequence of sin than apart from it: *Deus enim permittit mala fieri, ut inde aliquid melius eliciat.*

There is a multitude of considerations which may well incline us to favour the view of the Incarnation held by Rupert and his successors. In modern times we have become accustomed to a teleological view of the universe; we are familiar with the idea of the ascent of man. Ancient writers, on the other hand, reasoning backwards from the Incarnation, looked for indications of man’s final destiny in the history of God’s dealings with our race. To Irenæus, for example, the phenomenon of Hebrew prophecy appeared to point to an intimate relationship between man and God—a state of fellowship and moral likeness; a state in which man should bear, or be possessed by, the Spirit of God. Either line of thought justifies the inference that the Incarnation was a result originally aimed at in fundamental tendencies of man’s being; an event which was destined completely to fulfil the Divine idea and intention concerning man’s nature. Without the Incarnation it is impossible to conceive how the human race could have arrived at the creaturely perfection for which it was manifestly intended; while, on the other hand, the contemplation of the Divine love, and of its essential impulse towards complete union with its object,

¹ *Summa*, iii. 1, artt. 1–3. Bonaventura displays the same hesitation as Aquinas, but finally comes to a similar conclusion. The view of Rupert was not without supporters in the Lutheran Church; e.g. Melancthon (see Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. note 61) and Osiander. Westcott collects the opinions of other writers also.

makes it difficult to suppose that God would have withheld from man His highest gift, but for the contingency of sin. We are accustomed to speak of the Incarnation exclusively as an act of self-humiliation, which indeed it could not fail to be under the actual circumstances of a fallen world. From another point of view, however, that act is necessarily glorious which affords a supreme display of the Divine nature, character, and purpose. When we contemplate the perfect humanity of Jesus Christ as the archetype of manhood,—revealing its essential affinity to the Divine nature and its capacity for union with God,—we may conclude that the event which crowns and consummates God's purpose for man, is also a revelation of the *Father of glory*, which was predestined from the first. We behold in the Incarnation not only the work of infinite wisdom and love, but that which is wider than both: we behold *the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ*.¹

It is in accordance with this view that Irenæus, speaking of humanity as an end which God set before Himself, says that while man is the "receptacle" of Divine gifts, man himself is the glory of God: *Gloria Dei vivens homo*.²

IV. The last point to be considered in connection with the scholastic Christology is the doctrine of the Redeemer's human nature and the effects upon it of its union with Deity. The treatment of this subject was of course largely determined by the general type of Christology which had been transmitted to the scholastic age by the theologians of the East; in its mystical elements, its monophysitic tendency, and its deference to the Areopagite, the theology of *Thomas Aquinas* is typical as illustrating the powerful and enduring influence of Neoplatonism upon the higher thought of the Church. The root of his system

¹ 2 Cor. iv. 6.

² Cp. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, chap. vi. § 2.

is in fact Areopagite Platonism of the type which moulded the Christology of John Damascene and Erigena. In his general point of view concerning our Lord's humanity, he follows Peter Lombard; Christ as man, in relation to the Church, is to be regarded as the recipient of grace; His humanity possesses, in virtue of its union with Deity, the fulness of Divine attributes.

1. As to the general conditions of the *Unio hypostatica*, Thomas adheres to the received theology. He teaches, for instance, that the person of the Word became composite after the union,¹ in consequence of the two modes under which it subsisted; he holds that the union "hindered" the manhood from arriving at personality,² and that the Son of God assumed the flesh *mediante anima*.³ He also recognises the "fitness" of the Divine method whereby the Word, who had framed all things, became the restorer of a ruined universe.⁴

2. In *quæst.* 7 Thomas passes immediately to his main thesis,—the effects of the union on Christ as the recipient of grace. This grace is twofold,—*gratia unionis*, that special and personal self-bestowal of the Word, vouchsafed to Christ's manhood in virtue of its assumption by Deity; *gratia habitualis*, the grace of sanctification which was vouchsafed to Christ as man, sustaining the manhood in its high relationship to God.⁵ The main

¹ *Summa*, iii. 2. 4.

² iii. 4. 2 (quoted above, p. 62).

³ iii. 6. 1: "Si attendamus gradum dignitatis, anima media invenitur inter Deum et carnem: et secundum hoc potest dici quod Filius Dei univit sibi carnem mediante anima." Aquinas rejects the phrase which had been largely the occasion of the Adoptianist heresy, *hominem assumpsit* (iii. 4. 3).

⁴ iii. 8. 3.

⁵ iii. 6. 6; 7. 11. Obs. Aquinas speaks of the union as "*relatio quædam inter divinam naturam et humanam*" (iii. 2. 7; 16. 6). In iii. 16 he allows the statements "God is man" and "man is God"; but denies that Christ can be properly "*homo dominicus*," an expression which Augustine had used, but afterwards retracted (see art. 3).

subject of the seventh and following questions is the nature and conditions of this habitual grace, in relation both to Christ's human perfection and to His office as head of the Church; for the "habitual grace" resulting from the union must necessarily overflow to the members of His body (S. John i. 16).¹

The totality then of grace and virtue is ascribed to Christ as man; but with limitations. He who ever enjoyed the vision of God cannot be thought to have possessed the grace of faith or of hope;² but as man He must needs experience the feeling of holy fear in greater degree than His brethren.³ The absence in Him of faith and hope, and the presence of fear, corresponds to His twofold experience, as at once *comprehensor* and *viator*; ⁴ at once blessed with the Divine vision, yet walking with men in the way of earthly life. A further consequence of the union necessarily follows, namely, that no advance in virtue was possible for Christ. He only "advanced in wisdom and grace, as in age, because in proportion to His growth in years He wrought more perfect works, in order to show Himself to be true man."⁵ This position is, in effect, a return to the Cyrilline theory of our Lord's growth in human perfection, as merely "exhibitive," not real.

3. Before touching upon other points connected with Christ's Divine endowment as man, Aquinas briefly deals with His relation to the Church as the source of grace. In three respects He is "head" of the Church,—*secundum ordinem, perfectionem, virtutem influendi gratiam*. In respect of rank, Christ stands nearer to God than His brethren; in respect of perfection, He transcends them by His possession of the plenitude of all graces; in

¹ iii. 7. 1.

² iii. 7. 3 and 4.

³ iii. 7. 6, specially alluding to Isai. xi. 3 and Heb. v. 7.

⁴ iii. 7. 8; 15. 10.

⁵ iii. 7. 12.

respect of power, He alone can infuse His own habitual grace into His members: *of His fulness have all we received* (S. Jo. i. 16).¹ We have already noticed the postulate which underlies this doctrine of infusion, namely, that Christ and His members are so united as to form mystically *una persona*.²

4. The difficult subject of Christ's human knowledge is approached in *quæst.* 9. As man, Christ possessed a knowledge distinct from that which was His as Son of God. His human knowledge was twofold: *infusa scientia* and *scientia acquisita*; the *infusa scientia* was however, though perfect in its kind, subject to creaturely limitations; it could not therefore comprehend the Divine essence, but only what actually is, has been, or will be, in the universe;³ the *scientia acquisita* was that experimental knowledge which Christ, as man, arrived at by use of His reasoning faculties.⁴ Only by the *scientia beata*, which is proper to His higher nature, did Christ comprehend the essence of Deity.⁵

Was then the soul of Christ omniscient in virtue of the union? Aquinas replies that the soul of Christ knows all actual *effects*, past, present, or to come; for all things are subject to Him, even as man. But He does not know all things which are *in potentia*, *nunquam reducenda vel reducta in actum*. In a word, He knows all that God actually brings, or purposes to bring, into existence; He does not, as man, know all that is possible for Divine power to effect.⁶ In virtue then of the *scientia beata* the Son of God knows all things, even the Divine essence. In virtue of *scientia infusa* He knows intuitively all that can be known by men (*quæ-*

¹ iii. 8. 1 and 5. On the connection between Aquinas and Peter Lombard, see Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. pp. 355 ff.

² iii. 19. 4.

³ iii. 9. 3; 10. 1.

⁴ iii. 9. 4.

⁵ iii. 9. 4 resp.

⁶ iii. 10. 2.

cunque pertinent ad scientias humanas), and all that by revelation is actually made known to them;¹ consequently there was no room in the soul of Christ for hesitancy in regard to any actual choice of means.² In virtue of *scientia acquisita* He knew all that can be known through the action of intellectual faculties.³ He "advanced" in knowledge, not in the sense that His capacity for acquiring it increased, but only in the sense that, in proportion to His growth, "He wrought works which displayed greater wisdom and grace."⁴

It is worth while to notice in connection with this mysterious subject the position of some writers of the mystical school. There seems to have been a divergence of view between Richard and Hugh of S. Victor. Richard was by no means satisfied with the "exhibitive" theory of Cyril. Christ, he says, advanced in knowledge. "When the evangelist expressly asserts this, who can dare to deny it?" He concludes that there must have been real advance in experimental knowledge.⁵ Hugh frankly adhered to the "exhibitive" theory; Christ is said to have "advanced" *quia hominibus quam ipse habebat (sed latebat) sapientiam et gratiam, prout ratio temporum postulabat, magis semper ac magis aperuit*.⁶ The human soul of Christ was omniscient; He was not however as man, very Wisdom itself. He comprehended all things *non in æqualitate naturæ, sed plenitudine gratiæ et unitatis*.⁷

5. Aquinas denies that our Lord's human soul was omnipotent, for omnipotence is inconsistent with the

¹ iii. 11. 1.

² iii. 11. 3 ad 1.

³ iii. 12. 1.

⁴ iii. 12. 2.

⁵ *de Emman.* lib. ii. 16: "Ab ipso itaque incarnationis exordio experiendo didicit et per experientiam scivit," etc.

⁶ *de Sacr.* lib. ii. 6. Hugh also says Christ "learned" in the sense that "quod in excellentia Deitatis expertus non fuit, per inferiorem naturam in usum assumpsit."

⁷ *de sap. an. Christi.*

condition of a creature; it could only control material things as the instrument of the Deity. Thus the soul of Christ roused the body from the sleep of death, not by its inherent powers, but *secundum quod erat instrumentum divinitatis*.¹ Further, the soul of Christ was subject to sinless human affections, sorrow, sadness, fear, wonder, anger; but in Him natural passions *neque ad illicita ferebantur, neque rationis iudicium præveniebant, sed secundum illud oriebantur, neque rationem ullo modo impediabant*.²

In relation to Christ's human will, Aquinas closely follows John Damascene in ascribing ultimate causality to the Divine nature. "The operation which belongs to Christ's human nature," he declares, "in so far as it is the instrument of the Deity, is not other than the operation of His Deity."³ The human will is in fact twofold: *voluntas naturalis* (θέλησις) and *voluntas rationalis* (βούλησις). There is the natural or sensuous will which, in accordance with the laws of human nature, desires *differently* from the Divine will, *i.e.* it is directed to different objects; but divergence of this necessary kind does not imply *contrariety*. The natural or sensuous will was, so to speak, ever allowed to act according to its true law by the rational will and by the will of the Deity; it was acting according to its true nature; and consequently there was no *contrariety* of wills in Christ.⁴ But in the last resort the Divine will must be regarded as *using* the operation of the human will instrumentally.⁵

The most distinctive points of the Christology of

¹ iii. 12. 1 and 4.

² iii. 15. 4 ff.

³ iii. 19. 1.

⁴ iii. 18. 6 resp. "Placebat enim Christo secundum divinam voluntatem et etiam secundum voluntatem rationis, ut voluntas naturalis in ipso et voluntas sensualitatis secundum ordinem suæ naturæ moverentur. Unde patet quod in Christo nulla fuit repugnantia vel contrarietas voluntatum."

⁵ iii. 19. 1 resp. In 21. 3 Aquinas says that the prayers of Christ, as expressing deliberatæ voluntatis affectum, were always heard, for they were the utterance of a will always conformed to the will of God.

Thomas have now been stated. It remains however to notice his somewhat peculiar view of the mediatorial office of our Lord. As God, Christ was not mediator, but only as man: for as man He stood, as it were, in a position equidistant between the two extremes that were to be united; "as man, He is distinct from God in nature, and from men in excellence of grace and glory; as man, also, it befits Him to unite men to God, by imparting to men the Divine precepts and gifts, and by making satisfaction and intercession to God on their behalf."¹ This conception of Christ's mediation is in accord with Aquinas' general point of view of the humanity as the recipient of grace.

Duns Scotus, starting from the idea of the omnipotence of the Divine will and the predestination of Christ's humanity to a dignity which it only possessed by a *fiat* of Divine good pleasure, yet seems to assign greater ethical significance to Christ's manhood. The soul of Christ possessed not merely a finite, but an infinite capacity for the grace of God. In the incarnate state the Word practised a kind of restraint in order that the human nature might freely determine itself to conformity with the Divine purpose, might really suffer and act in accordance with its true law. There was in Christ something that needed development; something that could co-operate with God, as it were, towards the attainment of the true end of man, *i.e.* his possession or penetration by God. Scotus accordingly had no interest in denying the limitation of Christ's knowledge and power of volition. The two wills, he thought, were so conjoined in Christ's person that while the Divine will was the determining element, the human was so determined by God as to also determine *itself* in the direction of increasing susceptibility to the will and purposes of

¹ iii. 26. 2.

God.¹ Scotus seems to have believed that the impulse to self-determination of this kind was derived by Christ from His mother, the virtue of her obedience being as it were transmitted to Him. The whole theory of Scotus, though coloured by his Pelagian bias, is valuable and suggestive as an attempt to vindicate the relative independence of the manhood in Christ. "To the idea of an exaltation of human nature by grace," says Dorner, "Scotus objects; the supernatural, on the contrary, he regards as the complement of human nature itself; and whereas Thomas thought to do honour to grace by putting in the place of the old something absolutely new, which altogether transcends the limits of human nature; and further, was unable to conceive of man's receptive capacity as other than limited . . . Duns Scotus, on the contrary, lays down the principle that God can only enter into the higher beings in virtue of a capacity in them for receiving the Divine. Nay more, the reception of grace is, in his view, at the same time a development of human capacities; the nature of man being, in its final roots, supernatural, and his destination God. He further teaches that the vitality or activity of this capacity must bear proportion to the grace which is to be received. In short, since we are intended to receive God, the Infinite, the soul must possess an infinite capacity; although this infinite capacity can only be developed gradually and co-operate towards the impletion of itself with God."²

¹ Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 345.

² *Person of Christ*, div. ii. vol. i. p. 343. Cp. the maxim *Gratia naturam non tollit sed perficit*.

PART IX

CHRISTOLOGY DURING THE REFORMATION PERIOD

§ I. The Reformation ; the influence of Luther.

Anti-Trinitarian reaction.

1. Servetus.

2. Socinus.

§ II. Christology of the Lutheran Church.

Christology of Luther.

(1) Controversy as to the ubiquity of Christ's human nature.

Difference between the Lutherans and the Reformed.

(2) The question as to the *Kenosis*.

The theologians of Giessen and Tübingen.

§ III. Christology of Richard Hooker.

Conclusion.

§ I. THE REFORMATION; THE INFLUENCE OF LUTHER

The following brief survey of the Christological controversies of the Reformation period is merely intended to serve as an introduction to the study of Hooker's careful statement of the doctrine of the Incarnation in the fifth book of his *Ecclesiastical Polity*.

It must be observed at the outset that the reformers did not apparently make it their main object to systematise Christian doctrine; their efforts were prompted by the practical desire to return to the principles of primitive Christianity. In many respects the Reformation may be called an "old catholic" movement; but its religious centre and core was the endeavour to restore to its rightful position in Christian practice and thought the system of S. Paul; it was in a real sense a restoration of Pauline Christianity. "The living faith in God, who for Christ's sake and in Christ proclaims to the guilty and despairing soul *Salus tua Ego sum*; the sure confidence that God is a being on whom one may rely,—this was Luther's message to Christendom."¹ Luther did indeed restore to Christendom the sovereign significance of the historical person of Christ, obscured as it actually was in the popular mind by an immense formal system of mediation. He recalled men's minds from a false to a true conception of faith; from blind and mechanical reliance on a complex system to simple trust in a living person, the Divine Christ. Through this faith in redemption Luther "rose above the dualism which had held sway during the Middle Ages; and the deathblow was thus given to the alternation between a physical and magical view of grace on the one hand and a Pelagian subjectivity on the other."² He revived in men's hearts the consciousness of their personal relation to Christ, not

¹ Harnack, *Grundriss der Dogm.* § 78.

² Dorner, *div. ii.* vol. ii. p. 58.

only as Judge but as Saviour. He himself did not deny the greatness of his debt to the nobler mysticism of the preceding age; but his work was to translate his own experiences into popular language—to put within the reach of the multitude of Christian people the idea of living faith as a personal possession and treasure, bringing the soul into direct contact with the Redeemer.

The Reformation then grew out of the profound consciousness in a few powerful minds of the widespread spiritual needs of the time, and of the failure of the Church system, as it actually existed under men's eyes, to satisfy these needs. But before long each great section into which Christendom became divided was compelled to define its position and relation to other bodies; controversies necessarily arose which led to the formulation of doctrine and to systematic statements on the various points in dispute. Even in the Lutheran Church, which may be said to have originated in a conscious revolt against scholasticism, the scholastic and mystical tendencies presently reappeared. Accordingly a large mass of symbolic writings and confessions soon became current; and even the Roman Church, confronted by the new Protestantism, was forced to examine, and so far as was necessary restate, her principles in opposition to the demands of the Reformers.¹ On the other hand, the dogmatic rigorism of the Protestant Churches led to the organisation of numerous types of opinion outside their pale, and these practically defied all attempts at comprehension. In

¹ The Council of Trent lasted from 1545 to 1563. After the Council various Jesuit writers made the defence of the Tridentine theology the work of their lives, *e.g.* R. Bellarmine (d. 1621), considered to be the best controversial writer of his age, Dion. Petavius (d. 1652), J. Maldonatus (d. 1583), F. Suarez (d. 1617). Jansenism was an Augustinian movement within the Roman Church. Mysticism had its representatives in C. Borromeo (d. 1584), F. de Sales (d. 1622), Mich. Molinos (d. 1696).

regard however to Christology there was a general agreement among all the larger sections of the Church, and accordingly even the great antithesis between Romanism and Protestantism is relatively unimportant for our present purpose. Speaking broadly, the doctrine of the Trinity, and that of the two natures in Christ, remained unaffected by the fierce conflicts of opinion on minor points. Rome in her practical system, and the Reformed Churches with conscious dependence on Scripture, adhered to the received doctrine of the Incarnation. But very early in the history of the Reformation certain types of error appeared which questioned this fundamental truth. These it may be well to investigate first.

1. The name of *Michael Servetus* (d. 1553) is unhappily notorious as one of the many victims of the spirit of persecution which in the sixteenth century possessed Romanists and Protestants alike. There can be little doubt that leaders of opinion on both sides were equally alarmed at the evident reaction against Trinitarian doctrine which set in simultaneously with the liberation of intellect from the authority of the mediæval Church. Anti-Trinitarian thinkers appeared on the scene—men who, regarding the Reformation on its intellectual side as a movement of enfranchisement from old superstitions, displayed a rationalistic tendency to revise not merely the system of the Church but its fundamental dogmas also. This mode of thought assumed different shapes: it appeared in the false spiritualism of the Anabaptists, in the pantheistic Sabellianism of Servetus, and in the formal unitarianism of Socinus. But common to each of these systems was antagonism to the traditional belief of Christendom in regard to the person of Christ. Servetus however may be mentioned as the first systematic thinker who formulated an anti-Trinitarian Christology.

His doctrine was in some respects akin to that of Sabellius; but he distinguished, somewhat after the manner of Marcellus, between the Logos and the Son of God who appeared in time. Starting from the historic figure of Christ the Son of God, Servetus held that He was a man supernaturally born, and allowed that He might be called *Verbum* or *Vox Dei*, not in the sense that He possessed a duality of natures, but merely that in Him the mind of God was revealed, the message of God uttered, the knowledge of God imparted. The "Word of God" is not a distinct person in the Godhead. "The Word" is an abstract phrase denoting the Divine self-revelation in the world, the "utterance" of God; God bringing Himself within the reach of man's faculties. Further, Servetus distinguishes between the *Word* and the *Spirit* of God; the Word is the *self-manifestation* of the Divine essence to the world; the Spirit is the *self-communication* of that essence to human spirits. Both movements in God are simultaneous: *prodebat cum sermone spiritus, Deus loquendo spirabat*; but in the abstract they can be considered as distinct.¹ Both are only aspects or modes of Divine activity.² Since then God communicates Himself through and in Christ, Christ is a mode of the Divine essence, revealing itself to finite spirits human and angelic. Accordingly no interval is to be supposed between the "generation of the Son" and the human birth of Christ; the *generatio carnis* and the *prolatio verbi* are two names for one and the same fact. The inner thought of God, the idea of the universe, became manifest at the Incarnation; then first did it

¹ Neander, *Hist. of Christ. Dogmas*, ii. p. 648.

² "Tres sunt, non aliqua rerum in Deo distinctione, sed per Dei *οικονομίας* variis Deitatis formis; nam eadem Divinitas quæ est in Patre communicatur filio Jesu Christo et spiritui nostro, qui est templum Dei viventis" (ap. Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 262, note 2). "Sermonis et Spiritus erat eadem substantia sed modus diversus" (Neander, p. 649).

attain actuality. For the eternal idea of the universe included the archetypal manhood of Jesus Christ; the Word attained to personal subsistence in Him.

This conception of Christ need not detain us. It is not indeed without an element of grandeur; for the human Christ is none other than the manifested substance of God, "whose nature it is to tend towards a limited organised existence as towards a fuller reality."¹ But ultimately the Christological idea of Servetus is non-ethical and even pantheistic. The world is merely the self-realisation of God's thought, and there is nothing to differentiate the mode of the Divine presence in Christ from its mode in every human soul. The spirit of man is the temple of God.² Nay, all things are *ex substantia Dei*, and Christ differs from other creatures merely in the accident of His supernatural birth and His sinless character. It is enough to observe that some elements in the system are akin to Neoplatonism; and its tendency is towards the denial of distinct personality even in the Godhead, of which the Word and Spirit are the self-manifestation.

2. We also meet with indications of a return to a kind of Arian subordinatianism among some of those who rejected the doctrine of the Church,³—a conception of Christ as the minister and messenger of the Father; but in Socinianism we find a definite return to the old unitarianism of the Nazarenes, Christ being regarded as an inspired or deified man, and the Holy Ghost merely a Divine energy or operation. *Laelius Socinus* (d. 1562) was a priest of Siena,

¹ Dorner, div. ii. vol. ii. p. 165.

² "Sunt enim Filius et sanctificatus spiritus noster consortes substantiæ Patris, membra, pignora, et instrumenta, licet varia sit in iis Deitatis species" (Hagenbach, *l.c.*).

³ *e.g.* in Campanus; see Neander, *op. cit.* p. 646.

whose nephew, *Faustus Socinus* (d. 1604), elaborated the system which is connected with his name. It would seem that Faustus arrived at his peculiar tenets through the study of Scripture with an interest mainly juristic; he was anxious to discover the principles of right which lay at the root of legal equity, and a cold intellectualism naturally inclined him to low and one-sided views of Christ's person. He was equally hostile to the Arian and to the Nicene doctrine, since both maintained the existence of a pre-existent being in the incarnate Christ. Socinus' view may be roughly described as closely akin to that of Paul the Samosatene: Christ is the Logos in the sense that through Him God reveals His will; He may be called "God" in virtue of the authority committed to Him to reveal the Divine mind.

The Christ then of Socinus is a man supernaturally begotten, and endowed with special powers by God with a view to an authoritative revelation of the Divine will. He is the "mediator" between God and man. The passages in the New Testament referring to the Logos were explained by Socinus to relate to the predestined work of the Redeemer as the author of the new moral creation. He also held that Christ, during His earthly life, was occasionally caught up into heaven, and honoured with Divine communications.¹ Other supernatural events in the human life of our Lord he frankly accepted; he believed in the resurrection and ascension, and acknowledged the supernatural birth. Christ was, in a word, a perfect man, in whom human nature was exalted to the dignity of Godhead; and Socinus allowed that he might be truly worshipped in accordance with the express command of God; to Him, as the possessor of delegated power, prayer might be lawfully

¹ So he explained S. Jo. vi. 38. Such things, he said, were not recounted in the Gospels because they were never actually witnessed.

addressed.¹ Indeed, Christ was *actually God*, in the sense that He was allowed to exercise the delegated power of God and to participate in His Divine life.² But Christ was not *ex essentia Dei genitus*; and the Holy Spirit was only a name for the sanctifying energy of God. According to the *Racovian Catechism*, those who hold the catholic doctrine of the Trinity "gravely err therein, by alleging arguments drawn from the Scriptures misunderstood."³

Socinus denied that Christ was a mere man (*purus et vulgaris homo*), but only on the ground that from the moment of His conception He was the son of God, since He had no father except God.⁴ But in spite of its supra-naturalistic colouring, the theory of Socinus is simply rationalistic or humanitarian; and his view of Christ accords entirely with his conception of religion in general, and of redemption in particular. He defines Christian religion as follows—"Heavenly doctrine teaching us the true way of arriving at eternal life; and this way is nothing else than obedience to God, according to the precepts He has given to us through Jesus Christ our Lord."⁵ To this "didactic" view of Christ's life corresponds his theory of the Atonement. Socinus denied any objective element of satisfaction in the death of Christ; that death was merely designed for instruction and example: it was nothing more than a powerful seal or confirmation of Christ's teaching, and of the Divine

¹ This point gave natural offence to strict Unitarians (like F. Davidis), who held that the worship of a man was illogical and profane. Cp. Winer, *Comparative View of Doctrines and Confessions, etc.* (Eng. tr.), p. 65.

² There is a secondary sense of *Deus*, "cum eum denotat, qui potestatem aliquam sublimem ab uno illo Deo habet aut deitatis unius illius Dei aliqua ratione particeps est . . . Et hac quidem posteriore ratione filius Dei vocatur Deus in quibusdam Scripturæ locis." *Cat. Racov.* 32 (ap. Hagenbach, § 262, note 4).

³ ap. Winer, p. 64.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 116.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 128 note.

forgiveness which He offered, and a strong incentive to departure from sin. The sufferings of Christ were necessary, partly as an example of faithful obedience, partly as a discipline in sympathy, partly as a confirmation of God's promises. They also formed a preliminary stage in Christ's glorification, His resurrection being the moment of His exaltation to heavenly dignity, setting a seal, as it were, to man's hopes of eternal life.¹

Here, then, we have the meagre view of Christ's person and work, which at different stages in the history of our doctrine has tended to reappear: a view according to which the essential point in Christ's work is His prophetic mission to be a teacher of Divine truth and pure morality. His death only ministers to this, His real work, as a signal element in His example. He showed to man the way of reconciliation with God; and the love which He manifested in His passion was a mighty incentive to conversion; but all elements of mystery—all ideas as to the necessity of an objective work of grace in order to redeem the world—are banished from Socinus' system. He rejected entirely the thought of Christ's high-priestly work, and it is obvious to remark that this negative feature in his system was connected with an entire absence of any deep sense of human sin and guilt. Christianity is nothing more to Socinus than the publication, by precept and example, of a perfect moral law. Christ is, at best, "a saint and the viceroy of God."² A real incarnation of God, on Socinus' principles, is impossible, the Divine essence being by its very idea incommunicable;³ at best there is a certain

¹ Cp. *Cat. Racov.* p. 234, in Winer, p. 134.

² Dorner, div. ii. vol. ii. p. 262.

³ Christ was not begotten *ex essentia Patris* . . . eo quod sit *impartibilis* essentia divina; . . . adde quod essentia divina sit una numero ac proinde *incommunicabilis*. *Cat. Racov.* p. 58 (ap. Winer, p. 64).

moral relation established between God and man, by means of the transference or delegation to Christ of Divine prerogatives.¹ The Socinian conception of God is limited by the metaphysical assumption that there is a necessary and fundamental opposition between a finite and an infinite nature; no real possibility of the infinite communicating itself to the finite. Socinianism fell into an old mistake—the error of overlooking the fact that in His inmost essence God is not infinitude, or bare power, or mere being, but love; and that love is the link between the finite and the infinite.

§ II. CHRISTOLOGY OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH

The Christology of the Lutheran Church next engages our attention. Concerning Luther himself, it is sufficient to remember that his entire system is “christocentric.” His reformation started with the recognition of Christ as the sufficient and only mediator. He adhered tenaciously enough to the existing theology of the two natures, but his conception of the union was coloured by his own personal religious experience; he was deeply imbued with the idea of the susceptibility of human nature to the Divine, and conversely he believed “that the Divine nature, owing to the power exercised over it by love, not only presented no hindrance to a union of natures in the person of Christ, but was able to possess, and to be conscious of, all that is purely human as its own.”² Luther, in fact, perhaps as the outcome of his monastic training, combined the accepted doctrine of Christ’s person with the mystical ideas which he derived from such writings as the *Deutsche Theologie*.³

¹ Dorner, div. ii. vol. ii. p. 254.

² *Ibid.* p. 102.

³ First published with a preface by Luther himself in 1516. He says, “Next to the Bible and S. Augustine, I do not know of any book from

Love—self-surrender—this is the link or point of connection between Deity and manhood, the Divine ever enlarging its self-communication according to the measure of human receptivity. In Christ the love of God towards man first attained its absolute goal; the manhood assumed by the Son of God is that which makes a perfect response to Divine love.

Accordingly Luther found no difficulty in the received doctrine of the Church. The inseparable union of the Divine with the human nature, and the consequences that seemed necessarily to flow therefrom: the *communicatio idiomatum*, the ascription to God of human experiences, birth, suffering, and death—these are characteristic theses with Luther.¹ He laid equal stress on the reality of man's exaltation in Christ. The exalted Christ in heaven, uniting in His own person Deity and glorified humanity, was "the sun of the world," the central object of religious contemplation and devotion.² Indeed it seems to have been his habit of thought in regard to Christ's humanity which determined the nature of the controversy which agitated his successors—the dispute as to the mode and degree in which the exalted Christ exercised the Divine attributes. He regarded the Eucharist, for instance, as the occasion of a presence—the presence of the exalted and glorified Christ, bringing in His train and imparting along with Himself all the blessings earned for man by His earthly life and work.³ He insisted that in the sacrament there is an actual reception of the glorified body and blood of Christ, present in the elements, and was thus led

which I have learnt, or would wish to learn, more of what God, Christ, man, and all things are" (Hagenbach, § 153, note 9).

¹ See some quotations in Hagenbach, § 266, note 1.

² Cp. Dorner, div. ii. vol. ii. p. 88.

³ *Ibid.* p. 121; see also Hagenbach, § 259.

to insist upon the ubiquitarian theory which to the Reformed Churches became a matter of such sharp controversy.

In this dispute we may for convenience' sake distinguish two stages. (1) The question of the blessed Sacrament naturally arose first; it was inevitable that the central act of Christian worship, around which so many abuses had actually gathered, should attract the early attention of the Reformers. It disclosed a deeply-rooted difference between the followers of Luther and Calvin in regard to the relation of the two natures in Christ. Luther clung to the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*,—the inseparable cohesion of the two natures in Christ, the "permeation" of the human by the Divine; and from this mode of thought seemed to follow the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's human body. "Wherever God is," said Luther in effect, "there must needs be present the humanity of Christ." Brenz and Melancthon followed Luther in teaching that the human nature of Christ was unconditionally capable of being omnipresent, and therefore present in the Sacrament. The Lutheran *Formula Concordiæ* (1577) says: *Christus . . . revera omnia implet et ubique non tantum ut deus verum etiam ut homo præsens dominatur et regnat a mari ad mare, etc. . . . Ex hac communicata sibi divina virtute homo Christus, juxta verba Testamenti sui, corpore et sanguine suo in sacra cæna, ad quam nos verbo suo ablegat, præsens esse potest, et revera est.*¹ Here the power of Christ is made a determining factor; the Divine nature in virtue of the *communicatio idiomatum* imparts its attributes to the human nature, but the exercise of these is dependent on the Divine will of the Son. On the other hand, Zwingli

¹ ap. Winer, *Comparative View, etc.*, p. 119. The Lutherans referred specially to S. Jo. vi. 53 f.; cp. i. 14, v. 27; S. Mt. xxviii. 18; Phil. ii. 9, 10; Col. ii. 9.

and Calvin, while adhering to the doctrine of the two natures, insisted that such "communication" of Divine attributes was impossible in so far as it contradicted the necessary limitations of a true human nature. By its glorification the nature of Christ's human body was not abolished; at the ascension it was made illustrious, glorious, immortal, but it still remained subject to the limitations of humanity. The human body of the Saviour could no longer be present corporeally on earth; it could not be omnipresent; it remains locally present in heaven alone.¹ The Lutherans appeared to the Reformed to teach a Eutychian confusion of natures. "Our adversaries," says one document, "in attributing some Divine properties to man and some human properties to God, confound the natures; and in their withdrawal of some properties they dissolve the unity of Christ's person."² In Zwingli's view, the *communicatio* was only nominal; the scriptural passages on which the Lutherans relied were merely figurative.³ For instance, the words *My flesh is meat indeed* are to be explained to mean, My Divine nature is the food of the soul; the word "flesh" being used *per commutationem* to denote the Deity in Christ. The divergence between these two types of thought is interesting if we regard it as a modern reappearance of the old controversy between the schools of Antioch and Alexandria. The Lutheran view is akin to that of Cyril and his successors; the Reformed insist, after the manner of the Antiochenes, on the fundamental contrast between Divine and human nature. They hold that the attri-

¹ See passages from Reformed confessions in Winer, pp. 121 ff.

² Winer, p. 122.

³ Zwingli uses the term *ἀλλοίωσις* (an expression borrowed from rhetoric) as conveying the idea that the interchange of attributes is only figurative and nominal. He explains it thus: "*desultus vel transitus ille, aut si mavis permutatio qua de altera in Christo natura loquentes alterius vocibus utimur.*" (Winer, p. 123.)

butes of Deity can only be so far imparted to humanity as the limits of its finitude allow. To them the Incarnation is an exinanition of Deity—a Divine Being “emptying Himself,” and submitting to the limitations of creaturely life; to the Lutherans it is the exaltation of human nature, in the person of the Logos, into the conditions of the Divine life. In their view the Incarnation implies a real self-communication of Deity to a nature ethically capable of receiving it.¹ The practical consequences which resulted from these distinct types of Christology, in regard to the nature of the Eucharistic presence, do not concern us; but some idea will have been given of the state of the controversy when Hooker devoted his attention to it.²

(2) The later stage of the Christological controversies which divided the Reformed Churches began early in the seventeenth century, when the question of the *status exinanitionis* came to the front. The point in dispute was analogous to that involved in the sacramental controversy, and divided into two opposed schools the theologians of Giessen (Menzer and Feuerborn), and those of Tübingen (Osiander and Thummus). Both sides agreed in acknowledging the reality of the *communicatio idiomatum*; they differed in regard to the conditions under which the Divine attributes were exercised by Christ in His manhood. Did He voluntarily *lay aside* those attributes, or use them only in certain cases? or did He always possess, but *conceal* them? The Giessen theologians, who accepted the former of these possible alternatives, were known as *Kenotiker* (κένωσις); the

¹ “Ad recte declarandam majestatem Christi vocabula (de reali communicatione) usurpavimus ut significaremus communicationem illam vere et reipsa, sine omni tamen naturarum et proprietatum essentialium confusione, factam esse.” *Form. Conc.* p. 778, ap. Winer, p. 120.

² The fifth book of the *Ecclesiastical Polity* was published in 1597; Hooker's life extended from 1554–1600.

Tübingen divines, who held the latter view, were styled *Kryptiker* (κρύψις).¹

Both schools of thought approach the question on the basis of the *Formula of Concord* between the Suabian and Saxon Churches, composed in 1577. The most salient Christological feature of this document was its insistence on the *communicatio naturarum*, in virtue of which the Divine nature appropriates the human with its incidental weaknesses, and the Divine attributes communicate themselves to the human nature; by the very fact of the hypostatic union, the "majesty of God" becomes the possession of the humanity, and the person of the Logos supplies personality to the manhood. The Formula waives the difficulties which had been raised by those Reformed theologians who urged the essential limitations of the finite nature, and simply declares that human nature in Christ was "capable" of receiving the Divine attributes (*proprietas*). The relation of the natures is illustrated by the ancient simile of heated iron.

The merits or demerits of this document, regarded as a compromise, need not detain us. In the main it favoured the view that the humanity of Christ, from the first moment of its existence, entered into possession of the Divine attributes, omnipresence and omniscience. The point to be observed is that the document makes dogmatic statements as to the effect of the union, which inevitably provoked further controversy, and indeed seem virtually to dissolve the distinction of natures in Christ's person. The fundamental assumption is made that in the moment of the union a plenary communication took place of the Divine attributes; a kind of deification or conversion of manhood into Deity, which robbed the former of its characteristic elements—

¹ A list of works on either side is given by Dorner, div. ii. vol. ii. note 38 (p. 422).

the possibility of development, limitations of knowledge, etc. Such an assumption would seem to lead logically to a docetic view of the manhood, and it is rooted in an imperfect anthropology—a defective insight into the ethical laws of human growth and perfection.¹ We must understand however that this assumption underlay the reasoning of both sides in the Giessen-Tübingen controversy: “the presupposition that the entire fulness of the Divine majesty communicated itself to the humanity of Jesus in the very first moment of His life.”² It is this questionable premiss that gives a somewhat artificial and academic character to the dispute, which is also marked by a tendency to fall back on a non-ethical conception of the Divine nature and attributes: as though the essential and determining elements in Godhead were majesty, omniscience, and omnipresence. The same evangelical portrait of Christ lay before each school, but it was very differently interpreted: the Giessen theologians insisting on the distinctness of the two successive phases or stages in the life,—the humiliation and the glory; while the Tübingen thinkers regarded the two stages as necessarily simultaneous states, and thereby landed themselves in a tissue of contradictions. Both schools made the fundamental mistake of substituting *a priori* argument for devout study of the scriptural image of Christ.

The Giessen divines were oppressed by the difficulties involved in the doctrine of Christ’s omnipresence as man. They distinguished between two *stadia* in the life of Christ: the stage of exinanition, during which the Logos remained in a state of quiescence, allowing to the manhood the potency and possession, but not the actual use or exercise (except on rare occasions) of the Divine attributes omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence. In this

¹ Dorner, div. ii. vol. ii. p. 219.

² *Ibid.* p. 296.

quiescence consisted the *κένωσις* of the Logos. In the exalted state, however, when the process of Christ's human development had been completed by the ascension, He entered as man on the free use of the Divine attributes (*plena usurpatio*). It was naturally objected to this view that the distinctness of operations, human and Divine, which it postulated, the severance of the world-governing and omnipresent Logos from the lowly humanity following its own natural course of development, was fatal to the unity of the person. Further, if (as was alleged) the Divine attributes were really imparted to the manhood, in what sense could they be regarded as "quiescent," seeing that they must necessarily be conceived as ever *in actu*? The difficulties however of the theory need not blind us to its merit: it was an honest attempt to recognise the reality of our Lord's human development—the contrast between the historic conditions of His earthly life and the subsequent state of glory into which He entered at the ascension.

The school of Tübingen regarded the distinction between these two states as a difference between the concealment (*κρύψις*) and the exercise of Divine attributes, which as the immediate result of the union necessarily passed over to the humanity. The self-communication of the Logos must be conceived as complete from the beginning; and the humanity as present and co-operating with the Logos in all His activities. The state of exaltation thus subsisted simultaneously with that of exinanition. Christ was at once omniscient, yet in a state of advancing knowledge; omnipotent, yet subject to human weakness; omnipresent, yet circumscribed in space. These divines even went so far as to maintain that the body of Christ, while lying dead in the grave, was, in virtue of its union with the Logos, full of life and energy, taking its share

in the government of the world. To this position they were led by the principle with which they started—the absolute unity and identity of the person resulting from the union of natures; but their solution of the Christological problem was no more successful than that of their opponents. If the divines of Giessen destroyed the unity of Christ's person, those of Tübingen virtually annihilated the truth of His humanity. Some later Lutheran theologians perceived the insurmountable difficulties of either theory, and the necessity of revising and restricting the doctrine of the *communicatio*; but it is difficult to point to any productive result of the thorny controversy. In days when questions relating to the *status exinanitionis* are again attracting attention, it is well to take warning from the failures of the Lutheran scholastics, and to bear steadily in mind the real source of their mistakes.¹

§ III. CHRISTOLOGY OF RICHARD HOOKER

Richard Hooker is the most prominent representative of Anglican orthodoxy at the close of the sixteenth century. His famous statement of the doctrine of the Incarnation² is introduced incidentally in connection with the discussion of the sacraments. √ He teaches that sacraments are “instruments” by which the Divine life is imparted to the soul, and the actual means of its re-creation. They have, he says, “generative force and virtue.” His leading idea is that the sacraments impart to us the life-giving properties of Christ's humanity, our life supernatural consisting in an immediate union of the soul with God. In order that sacraments may be endued

¹ For an account and criticism of the Lutheran Christology, see Dr. A. B. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, chaps. iii. and iv.

² *Eccl. Pol.* bk. v. §§ 50–56.

with this life-giving efficacy, two preliminary conditions are necessary: the humanity of Christ must be permanently united to His one Divine person; and it must be communicable to us. ^v The Incarnation is accordingly treated by Hooker with this practical consideration in view (ch. l.).

In ch. li. 1 the doctrine of the Trinity is stated. Perhaps the insistence on the distinctions between the Divine Persons is somewhat over-emphatic, but it is qualified by a later passage (lvi. 2), in which it is explained that "distinction cannot possibly admit separation."¹

Hooker proceeds to state the doctrine of the Incarnation with admirable precision. He inclines to the "Thomist" view that the Incarnation was contingent upon the Fall, and follows Athanasius and Aquinas in the view that "the institution and restitution" of the world were fittingly accomplished by the same natural mediator between God and His creatures. The Incarnation was necessary in the sense that any other mode of salvation was "impossible, it being presupposed that the will of God was no otherwise to have it saved than by the death of His own Son."

In ch. lii. Hooker points out the tendency of heresy to give expositions of the Christian faith "more plain than true," aiming at logical completeness, and thereby simplifying mystery at the expense of some essential element of truth. Then follows a description of the heresies of Arius, Apollinarius, Nestorius, and Eutyches, which calls for no special remark. The positive points insisted upon are as follows:—

(a) The unity of Christ's person, and its consequences.

¹ It is noticeable, in connection with Hooker's balanced statement, that the Arminian tendency to press the doctrine of the Son's subordination (see Hagenbach, § 262, note 5; Dorner, div. ii. vol. ii. pp. 349 ff.) found favour among later English theologians. Bull's *Defence of the Nicene Creed* (1680) is a vindication of the doctrine; the revived Arianism of Samuel Clarke was an exaggeration of it.

A Divine Being took human nature and *dwelt in us*, i.e. in "that nature which is common unto all," not in an individual *person*, "for then should that one have been advanced and no more." The Son of God is the subject who acts and suffers; the assumed nature is that which makes His person capable of receiving human attributes; and "the infinite worth of the Son of God is the very ground of all things believed concerning life and salvation," imparting infinite merit to all that He does or suffers on man's behalf.

(b) The duality and distinctness of the natures. Eutyches denied the permanence of the manhood; the "difference which still continueth" between the natures. They are never confused, though "for ever inseparable." "The very person of Christ therefore," says Hooker carefully, "for ever one and the self-same, was only *touching bodily substance* concluded within the grave, His soul only from thence severed; but by personal union His Deity still unseparably joined with both."

In ch. liii. the consequences of the union of natures are further developed. There is "no *abolishment* of natural properties appertaining to either substance, no *transition* or transmigration thereof out of one substance into another, finally no such mutual *infusion*, as really causeth the same natural operations or properties to be made common unto both substances." But positively, the utmost that can be said in regard to the relation between the natures is that "of both natures there is a *co-operation* often, an *association* always, but never any mutual *participation* whereby the properties of the one are infused into the other." In virtue of the perpetual *association* of the natures an interchange of attributes is possible; in such "cross and circulatory speeches"¹ we

¹ Hooker is as yet speaking only of a verbal *communicatio idiomatum*. Cp. Pearson, *On the Creed*, art. 4, notes 58 and 59; and see below, p. 272.

are to understand always the whole *person of Christ* in whom both natures are united. The converse truth is also to be guarded, namely, that what belongs essentially to one nature may not be predicated in the abstract of the other. Thus Divine nature is not capable of death; human nature "admitteth not" ubiquity.¹

(c) The relation of the two natures (ch. liv.). Hooker's general view is in accord with that of Aquinas: Christ as man is a recipient of grace; but also in one respect as God.

(a) Christ is a "receiver" in respect of the Divine substance. By "the gift of eternal generation" He has received the Divine substance,—“one and in number the self-same substance, which the Father hath of Himself unreceived from any other.” This gift is bestowed “naturally and eternally, not by way of benevolence and favour”; and in this respect is distinguished from the other gifts.

(b) In respect of His manhood, as *homo singularis* Christ receives the gift of union with Deity: a gift by which the manhood which He had assumed was exalted, enriched, and its condition advanced, without abolition of its substance. The union, says Hooker, “doth add perfection to the weaker, to the nobler no alteration at all.” The only thing attained by the Divine person who became incarnate “was to be capable of loss and detriment for the good of others.”² So far indeed by

¹ Here Hooker rejects the later Lutheran doctrine that even before the exaltation the manhood of Christ was ubiquitous.

² Hooker differs from Aquinas in holding (with Augustine) that the *nature* of God in the person of the Son took human nature; “Incarnation may neither be granted to any person but only one, nor yet denied to that nature which is common unto all three” (li. 2); Aquinas maintains that the person of the Son, and not the Divine nature, became incarnate, and bestowed Divine graces on the nature assumed. He allows, indeed, that “secundario potest dici quod etiam natura assumpsit naturam ad sui

becoming incarnate the Word has some change in regard to "the manner of subsistence," while yet continuing in all essential properties what He ever was. And the manhood of Christ experiences glorious effects from its copulation with Deity; it is deified by the communication of supernatural gifts and graces; it is the possessor of unique and incommunicable dignities and excellences; it shares in the exercise of Divine power and the reception of Divine praise.

(c) In respect of the nature He shares with us Christ receives "the grace of unction." Hooker considers the grace of unction only as it affects Christ Himself, not as it overflows to His members. So far as the limitations of its proper nature will allow, our manhood is in Him "replenished with all such perfections as the same is any way apt to receive." The manhood of Christ is in every way heightened and exalted by the union, like a red-hot sword which both cuts and burns; but the infusion of Divine graces and attributes is limited partly by the actual capacities of human nature, partly by "the exigence of that economy or service" for which the Son of God became man.¹ Can then the manhood be endued with *omniscience* or *omnipresence*? Hooker answers that the powers of Christ's human soul were illuminated by its conjunction with Deity, and it was "of necessity endued with knowledge so far forth universal, though not with infinite knowledge peculiar to Deity itself." Again, there was imparted to the human body in its glorified state the gift of incorruption, "vital efficacy," and "celestial power," but "a body still it continueth, a body consub-personam" (*Summa*, iii. 3. 2); but he wishes to exclude the idea that the Father or Spirit became man, as touching their nature. Cp. Dorner, div. ii. vol. i. p. 331.

¹ "For as the parts, degrees, and offices of that mystical administration did require which He voluntarily undertook, the beams of Deity did in operation always accordingly either restrain or enlarge themselves" (liv. 6).

stantial with our bodies, a body of the same both nature and measure which it had on earth."

Hooker devotes a separate section (ch. lv.) to the question which Lutheran theology had raised as to the *omnipresence* of Christ's human body. In effect his teaching is as follows. Christ is essentially present with all things as God, but not as man; omnipresence does not agree with the essence of humanity. But since the ascension, as the result of its complete spiritualisation, the manhood of the Redeemer is capable of being made present wheresoever He wills, in virtue of its conjunction with Deity. Christ as man, with soul and body, is in heaven; but "in some sense," "after a sort," He is omnipresent as man, "by being nowhere severed from that which everywhere is present." "Presence by way of conjunction is in some sort presence." So in regard to the mode of Christ's bodily presence Hooker says: "Albeit therefore nothing be actually infinite in substance but God only in that He is God; nevertheless as every number is infinite by possibility of addition, and every line by possibility of extension infinite, so there is no stint which can be set to the value or merit of the sacrificed body of Christ, it hath no measured certainty of limits, bounds of efficacy unto life it knoweth none, but is also itself *infinite in possibility of application*."¹

The same consideration, *mutatis mutandis*, applies to the attribute of *omnipotence*. Christ exercises government over the world "both as God and as man; as God by essential presence with all things, as man by co-operation with that which essentially is present"; for

¹ Cp. Hugo de S. Vict. *de Sacr.* ii. 12: "Christus . . . ubique per id quod Deus est, in cælo autem per id quod homo. Secundum hanc formam non est putandus ubique diffusus; cavendum est enim ne ita divinitatem astruamus hominis ut veritatem corporis auferamus. . . . Ubique [Christum] non dubites esse totum præsentem tanquam Deum . . . et in loco aliquo cæli propter veri corporis modum."

“by knowledge and assent the soul of Christ is present with all things which the Deity of Christ worketh.”

The merit of this mode of treatment is obvious. It avoids over-insistence upon *a priori* considerations; it leaves unexplored what must from the nature of the case be mysterious and even insoluble; it suggests the important point that the mode and conditions of the *status exinanitionis* depended upon the “exigence of the economy,” as to which we have no faculties enabling us to determine with any certainty what was essential and what non-essential; lastly, it assigns due supremacy to the determining element of will, as the main factor in the self-humiliation of the Word.

In ch. lvi. the manner of our participation in Christ is discussed. The doctrine of the second Adam is the basis of the argument. Incorporated into “that society which hath Him for their Head,” the faithful “make together with Him one body.” Christ is the source of life to the body; His flesh that wherewith He quickens it.¹ “We participate Christ partly *by imputation*, as when those things which He did and suffered for us are imputed unto us for righteousness; partly *by habitual and real infusion*, as when grace is inwardly bestowed while we are on earth, and afterwards more fully both our souls and bodies made like unto His in glory.” Hooker means that the righteousness of Christ is “imputed” to us as really belonging to us by virtue of our incorporation into the second Adam. His doctrine of imputation stands in the closest possible connection with that of our mystical union with Christ.²

¹ Cp. Aquinas, *Summa*, iii. 8. 1 ad 1: “Dare gratiam aut Spiritum Sanctum convenit Christo secundum quod est Deus, auctoritative; sed instrumentaliter convenit etiam ei secundum quod est homo; in quantum scilicet ejus humanitas instrumentum fuit divinitatis ejus.”

² “Thus we see . . . what communion Christ hath with His Church,

"We are adopted sons of God to eternal life by participation of the only begotten Son of God."

Ch. lvii. briefly connects the doctrine of the sacraments with that of the Incarnation. They are "marks whereby to know when God doth impart the vital or saving grace of Christ," and "means conditional which God requireth in them unto whom He imparteth grace." Hooker insists that they are not merely physical, but "moral instruments of salvation," their operation being dependent upon worthy and faithful use of them.¹ In baptism Christ is received "once as the first beginner, in the Eucharist often, as being by continual degrees the finisher of our life."

Hooker's fine statement of the doctrine of the Incarnation forms a natural limit to our historical survey,—not because Christology has remained unaffected by the developments of criticism and speculation during the last three centuries, but because the process of catholic definition in regard to the doctrine may be said to have reached its final point at the close of the sixteenth century. The interest of modern times has centred mainly in the historical life of Jesus of Nazareth, the circumstances of His time, and the nature of His teaching.² The Socinian view of His person in variously modified forms divides the field with the catholic view. The speculative conception of Christ as the embodiment of a great moral idea seems to have given way to a

how His Church and every member thereof is in Him by original derivation, and He personally in them by way of mystical association wrought through the gift of the Holy Ghost" (liv. 13, *s. fin.*).

¹ Cp. Bellarm. *de Sac.* ii. 1 (ap. Winer, *Confessions*, etc. p. 244): "Voluntas, fides, et penitentia in suscipiente adulto necessario requiruntur ut dispositiones ex parte subjecti, non ut causæ activæ, non enim fides et penitentia efficiunt gratiam sacramentalem, neque dant efficaciam sacramenti, sed solum tollunt obstacula quæ impedirent, ne sacramenta suam efficaciam exercere possent, unde in pueris, ubi non requiritur justificatio, sine his rebus fit justificatio." Cp. Hagenbach, § 190, esp. note 7.

² A brief sketch of later Christology will be found in Hagenbach, § 299.

purely humanitarian interest in His life and work ; while the mythical theory of His history, as elaborated by Strauss,¹ has been superseded by a rationalistic criticism of the Gospel narratives. Within the Church there seems to be a decided and beneficial tendency to deprecate further definition of the doctrine, and something of "a return to the historical Christ" in the sense that dogmatic statements are more generally tested by the actual evidence of Scripture. The historical and literary criticism of the last fifty years has done valuable service in teaching us the limitations of our speculative faculties in regard to that which must continue to be what it has ever been, the *great mystery of godliness*.

¹ Cp. Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology*, pp. 232 f.

PART X

FINAL SYSTEMATIC FORM OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION

§ I. The doctrine of the Trinity and its terminology.

A. The Unity in Trinity.

B. The Trinity in Unity.

The term *Person*.

οὐσία and *ὑπόστασις*.

Substantia and *Persona*.

C. The doctrine of subordination.

D. The doctrine of the Divine generation.

§ II. The doctrine of the Incarnation and its terminology.

1. The hypostatic union.

2. The two natures in one person.

The term *φύσις*.

3. The *communicatio idiomatum*.

4. The Athanasian Creed.

§ III. The doctrine of Christ's Humanity.

1. The perfections of the manhood.

2. Its limitations.

3. Christ's temptation.

4. Christ's mental and moral development.

§ IV. The work of Christ in relation to His person.

1. Christ as Teacher and Example.

2. Christ our Redeemer: the Atonement.

Note : Why did not God restore man by mere *fiat*?

3. Christ the Re-creator of manhood through grace.

Consummation of the Redeemer's work.

§ I. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY AND ITS TERMINOLOGY

A distinction is usually recognised between "theology" used in a special or technical sense and "the economy."

Θεολογία includes the doctrine of the Divine nature and properties; it deals with that nature and those properties in general (*θεολογία ἡνωμένη*), or with the distinctive attributes of the Divine Persons of the Trinity considered separately (*θεολογία διακεκριμένη*).

Οἰκονομία embraces all that relates to the Divine self-revelation or operation as it affects the condition of mankind. Perhaps the complete expression would be that of Gregory of Nyssa, *ἡ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον τοῦ θεοῦ οἰκονομία* (*Orat. cat.* xx.). The word *οἰκονομία*, "dispensation," is derived from S. Paul (Eph. i. 10), and comes to be employed in a sense practically equivalent to "Incarnation."¹ It is obvious that the connection of this department of truth with the first mentioned is most intimate and essential; it is therefore necessary to review briefly the substance of that which is included under the name *θεολογία*, which in fact for present purposes means the doctrine of the Trinity. From the historic revelation (*οἰκονομία*) we reason back to the essential Trinity; from the self-revelation of God (*τρόπος ἀποκαλύψεως*) to His essential nature (*τρόπος ὑπάρξεως*).

The doctrine of the Trinity emerges necessarily as a consequence of the claims of Christ which confront us in the Gospel. For those claims suggest both to conscience and intellect the problem of the relationship between Jesus Christ and the Father and the Spirit

¹ Cp. Tert. *adv. Prax.* 3, 4; Hippol. *c. Noet.* iii.; Lightfoot on Ignatius, *ad Eph.* c. xviii.; Bigg, *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 166 note.

who are revealed by Him. In unfolding the nature and attributes of God, He indicates the existence of mutual relations between Himself as sent and the Father who sends; in describing the meaning and issues of His coming and work He imparts a doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Hence we find the apostolic writers, in spite of their earnest monotheism and exalted moral conception of God, habitually co-ordinating Christ with the Father, and the Spirit with both, whether in benedictions or in salutations. Further, the baptismal formula, coupled with the worship of Christ, witnesses to the immemorial belief of Christendom, and forms the basis of the latter dogmatic creeds. It is very important to remind ourselves that it is Christ's own words about Himself which raise the main problems of theology. Even if we were to restrict His self-revelation to the teaching contained in the Sermon on the Mount, we should be nevertheless confronted by questions as to the person and authority of the speaker, which could only be answered by balanced statements of doctrine and the use of theological terms. The claim which Christ makes compels us to think of Him as connected with the Father by no mere moral relationship, like that of an ordinary good man, but by a dynamic unity,—a real unity of essence. And thus God is revealed as a Being within whom subsist relationships and distinctions; His unity is not that of bare and abstract simplicity, but of rich and complex moral life.¹ As Aquinas insists, the actual approach of God to man implied in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation has brought the Divine Being

¹ Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 90: "The unity is not a simplicity, but, as it were, a rich and complex manifold, an absolute which is the home of all relations, a unity which is the bosom of all difference, the source and ground of all variety." Augustine speaks of the Divine substance as "simplex multiplicitas vel multiplex simplicitas" (*de Trin.* vi. 6).

more within the range of human knowledge and contemplation : *ex hoc quod nobis appropinquare voluit per carnis assumptionem, magis nos ad se cognoscendum attraxit.*¹

In the Old Testament there are, as we have noticed, only scattered hints and tokens of the Christian doctrine of a Trinity. Any premature revelation of it at a time when polytheistic beliefs and practices were rife might have been disastrous to the interests of Divine truth. For it was Israel's special function to guard the doctrine of the Divine unity and transcendence, and so to secure the foundation of that ethical monotheism which the doctrine of a Trinity elucidates and protects. Nevertheless we find described in the Old Testament various manifestations of the one God, which ultimately tend to become limited to two : the Word or Wisdom of God and the Spirit of God. Each seems to be in large measure personified ; each is invested with special, constant, and peculiar functions ; each is represented as ministering to God the Father, and so far subordinate to Him ; yet in each is contained the fulness of Divine prerogatives and powers. The Old Testament thus prepares the way for the solemn formula of baptism, in which the Three Persons of the Godhead are distinctly co-ordinated (S. Mt. xxviii. 19).²

With regard to the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity, it is only necessary to say here that it summarises and expresses in carefully-sifted terms the sense of Scripture. Definitions of faith are sometimes objected to as merely "inferential," as mere "interpretations" of the facts recorded in the Gospels.³ But such definitions are absolutely inevitable as soon as the faith of the Church

¹ *Summa*, iii. 1. 2.

² The doctrine of the Trinity as indicated in Scripture is discussed by Augustine, *de Trin.* lib. i.

³ See Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, for an exposition of this idea.

is challenged by philosophical inquiry, and she endeavours to apprehend intellectually a revelation which primarily commends itself to the heart and conscience as spiritual truth, and only secondarily needs expression in abstract terminology. False doctrine leads to the analysis by the Church of her own beliefs, her object being to exclude all erroneous presentation of that which is her treasure, and which she is fain to guard securely from encroachment.

While, however, we are dealing with the scriptural proof of the doctrine, it is important to remember the significance of the moral revelation of God as Love. The human intellect, indeed, without actually anticipating the Christian doctrine, is prepared to recognise its harmony with the highest reason. Accordingly, analogies have been found for the possibility of a Trinity in Unity in the facts of human consciousness and personality—analogs which were suggested by the teaching of Plato and his followers, and which have found favour in every age of Church history.¹ It has been increasingly recognised that the mysteries of the Divine existence find their counterpart in man, who is made in the Divine image, and science has made it intelligible that the highest type of life is that which is most highly differentiated. It has also been customary to adduce the many parallels to the Christian doctrine supplied by Oriental religions, which, like the speculations of Greek thought, indicate “necessities of thought which the Christian Godhead satisfied.”² But the ground of Trini-

¹ See Plato, *Rep.* ix. 588, etc.; and cp. Augustine, *de Trin.* viii. 10, ix. 2, etc.; *Conf.* xiii. 11; Petav. *de Incarn.* 2. iv. § 3. For a valuable modern analysis of personality in its bearing on the doctrine, see Illingworth, *Bampton Lectures*, esp. lect. viii. (cp. note 27).

² Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 396. Dr. Fairbairn well remarks that in Greek speculation we see “thought feeling after some mode of breaking up, as it were, the solitude of Deity, and saving Him from the impotence which clings to a mere isolated absolute.” Thus we may con-

tarian belief is to be found rather in the moral revelation of God. It may be said, in fact, that the Christian doctrine of God has been more intelligently grasped and stated in proportion as metaphysical conceptions have been displaced by ethical ideas. The moral consciousness of man gives us the most trustworthy guidance as to the being and character of God. The doctrine of the Trinity coheres with the revelation of Divine love. Love must imply relationships, and only if there be such internal relationships in God, can we conceive of Him as self-sufficing, as ever-blessed independently of created life. It is significant that Origen, with his abstract monistic idea of God, represented the act of creation as eternal; only so could the idea of self-imparting love be represented as an essential element in the Divine Being. But the doctrine of Divine love at once suggests a life of moral relationships, of communication, reception, and participation. Thus God realises His own personality as loving, in possessing an eternal object of love worthy of Himself,—a coessential and perfect image of Himself; and the life of intercommunion finds its consummation and completeness in a mutual participation by Father and Son in a third Person, who is a supremely worthy object of mutual love, and is the living interpreter of each to other.

Such is the train of thought which we connect chiefly with the name of Augustine,¹ who, by analysing the concept of love, finds an analogy for the notion of a Trinity in Unity. As he tersely summarises the argument, *Trinitatem vides si caritatem vides*. But another theologian is, perhaps, specially conspicuous in connection with this

nect together Plato's *idéai*, the Stoic *λόγος*, and the Gnostic *æons*. On Oriental religions, see Wordsworth, *Bampton Lectures*, no. ii.

¹ *de Trin.* esp. vi. 7, viii. 12, ix. 2. Cp. Sartorius, *Doctrine of Divine Love*, chap. i.

doctrine, Gregory of Nyssa, who endeavours to face the problem of distinct personalities within the one Divine essence. The question is why the analysis of human consciousness should suggest the notion of distinct personality? To this Gregory answers by insisting that all relationships within the Deity must be living; and to be living in the highest sense they must be personal. God has life in Himself. All that is included in His Being is and must be life. Accordingly, argues Gregory, the *Logos* in God corresponds to His nature. The *Logos* in man partakes of the transitoriness and nothingness of a mortal nature. But "the immortal and ever-existent nature possesses a *Logos* who is eternal and has personal subsistence"; and if the *Logos* lives, and, indeed, is the Life itself, He must possess will and power to effect His purpose. By the same line of argument Gregory demonstrates the existence of a Spirit in God. In man *πνεῦμα* is the necessary accompaniment of *λόγος*. So in God there is a Spirit inseparable from the *Logos*, which, like the *Logos* itself, exists as a person having will and energy.¹

It may be said that this reasoning falls far short of the point at which it can be called an ontological proof. But it may be taken as a good illustration of the attempt to grapple with a theological problem which far transcends any power of logical analysis. It must be again repeated that such speculations as those of Augustine and Gregory are only intended to give some form of rational expression to facts which are immediate matters of Christian experi-

¹ See *Cat. orat. mag.* i., ii. *Aug. de Trin.* vi. 7, argues that the Spirit of God being Love is a *substance*, for "God is Love." "If love is not a substance," he asks, "how is God Love?" Cp. vi. 11: "Ubi est prima et summa vita, cui non est aliud vivere et aliud esse, sed idem est esse et vivere: et primus ac summus intellectus, cui non est aliud vivere et aliud intelligere, sed id quod est intelligere, hoc vivere, hoc esse est, unum omnia."

ence; they are attempts to explain intuitions of Christian consciousness, and we have no right to complain if they do not satisfy the critical reason.¹ It will, in short, be understood that while the doctrine of the Trinity seems to satisfy anticipations of the natural reason, it plainly transcends its capacity; while its mystery seems to be reflected in the moral consciousness of man, the existence of different faculties does not carry us all the way to the thought of personal distinctions; finally, while it corresponds, as it certainly does, to the destiny and needs of man, it is altogether independent of human speculation. Thus the distinction usually made between the "Economic Trinity" and the "Trinity of Essence"² is of real importance if it be understood to imply that the mode of the Divine existence cannot be explored by our faculties.

The following is a brief summary of the systematic doctrine of the Trinity taught by the Church:—

A. The Unity in Trinity. Christian teachers take as their starting-point the unity of God (*μοναρχία*). There is one and only one Divine essence (*οὐσία, φύσις*), which is indivisible. The entire fulness of the one undivided essence of Godhead, with all its attributes, subsists in each Person of the blessed Trinity.³ In the phraseology of the two Dionysii, *τρίας εἰς μοναρχίαν συγκεφαλαιοῦται*. A strong statement of the *μοναρχία* is given by Athanasius, *Orat. c. Arian.* iv. 1. In Augustine's statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, the appearance of tritheism is expressly excluded by the formulæ *non tres Deos sed unum Deum dicimus*. . . . *Trinitas unus Deus* (*de Trin.* v. 9, 12, etc.).

¹ Cp. Aug. *de Trin.* ii. 1.

² *τρόπος τῆς ἀποκαλύψεως* and *τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως*. Cp. Martensen, *Dogm.* § 55.

³ The word *τρίας* is first found in Theophilus, *ad Autol.* ii. 15.

B. The Trinity in Unity. The final form of statement is that in God there is one substance, but three Persons or Hypostases; three modes of subsistence (τρόποι ὑπάρξεως) of the one undivided Divine essence; *μία οὐσία ἐν τρισὶν ὑποστάσεσιν*.

We should notice at the outset the limitations of the word *person*. Aquinas says that as a term it is "convenient," but cannot be applied to God in the same sense as to creatures, but only in a more transcendent sense (*excellentiori modo*).¹ As applied to human relations "a person" means a self-conscious, limited, circumscribed, separately-acting being. It is very possible that our use of the term is too rigid, and that we are apt to overrate the *exclusiveness* of personality.² The mystery of original sin may well restrain us from over-confident statements on this point. But in relation to the Godhead the term "person" means something between (a) mere manifestation or personation, and (b) the independent, exclusive individuality of a human being.

It is a keen sense of the inadequacy of the expression that leads Augustine to apologise for it. Thus in the *de Trinitate*, v. 10, he observes that human language labours under great difficulty in answering the question, What are the three Divine Persons? *Dictum est tamen tres personæ, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur*.³ The fact is, as Augustine remarks, that there is no "special name" that expresses what the Divine Three are (*de*

¹ *Summa*, i. 29. 3.

² Cp. Strong, *Manual of Theology*, p. 250; Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. pp. 82, 83.

³ *de Trin.* vii. 7, 8, 9, viii. 1, where the same thought is emphatically repeated. Cp. Rich. de S. Victor, *de Trin.* iv. 1: "Non facile capit humana intelligentia, ut possit esse plus quam una persona ubi non est plus quam una substantia . . . Nam si quis velit personæ nomen *sub communi et propria acceptione* intelligere, nullo modo putet plures personas *sub ea acceptione* intellectas posse subsistere in unitate substantiæ."

Trin. vii. 7): "the excellency of the Deity surpasses the power of ordinary speech." And whatever the term "person" may imply, Scripture points to certain truths which limit the application and define the sense of the term. For the Persons of the Trinity are described as *mutually inclusive*. We may well believe that in the domain of spirit, distinctions of person do not necessarily, as in the finite material world, imply mutual exclusiveness.¹ Scripture plainly teaches that the Three Divine Persons are in one another by mutual indwelling.² "Where one hypostasis of the Trinity," says Chrysostom, "is present, the whole Trinity is present; for it is inseparably united, and conjoined together with the utmost exactness."³ There is an "inseparable operation" of the Three Persons which leads to the result that frequently the attributes belonging to all are ascribed to each.⁴ In later theology, as in John Damascene, the term applied to this absolute intercommunion is *περιχώρησις* (coinherence), which expresses the scriptural doctrine that the Son is *in the bosom of the Father*, and the Spirit is *in God*.⁵

On the other hand, though the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity thus interpenetrate and include each the

¹ Cp. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. p. 83.

² See, e.g., S. Jo. xiv. 10, 11. Cp. Ath. *Orat. c. Arian.* iii. 1.

³ Chrys. *Hom. in Ep. ad Rom.* viii. 10.

⁴ Aug. *de Trin.* i. 25.

⁵ See S. Jo. i. 18; 1 Cor. ii. 11, and cp. Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* ii. 41, iii. 3, 4; Newman, *Athan. Treatises*, vol. ii. p. 72. There is doubt as to the derivation of *περιχώρησις*, which may be derived from *χωρεῖν* in the sense of "move" (*commovere, ambulare*), or in that of "contain" (*capere, continere*). Petavius decides that both senses are combined in *περιχώρησις* as it is used in *θεολογία*: for the Divine Three both mutually pervade each other (*circumincessio*), and contain or rest in each other (*circumin sessio*). In relation to *θεολογία*, however, Petavius prefers *circumin sessio* (from *sedere*) as expressing the repose of the blessed Persons in each other, a term best represented perhaps by the English *coinherence* (*de Incarn.* iv. 14). Cp. Bull, *Def. Fid. Nic.* part ii. c. ix. *sub fin.*

other, each Person has His own special property (*ιδιότης*, *proprietas*). Accordingly the Cappadocian Fathers Gregory and Basil speak of each Person as having an *ιδιότης χαρακτηρίζουσα* or a *διαφορά*. The Divine essence subsists in each under a different mode. Thus the property of the Father is *to be of none* (*ἀγεννησία*); of the Son *to be of the Father* (*γέννησις*); of the Holy Spirit *to proceed from the Father and the Son* (*ἐκπόρευσις*).¹ The doctrine, however, of the *περιχώρησις* remains a safeguard of the Divine unity, as implying within the Godhead “an ineffable and incomprehensible both communion and distinction.”

We now pass to the Latin and Greek equivalents of the term “person.” As we have seen, the formula which under the influence of the Cappadocian Fathers ultimately prevailed was *μία οὐσία ἐν τρίσιν ὑποστάσεις*. These Fathers practically created the scientific terminology of the Athanasian doctrine, and it should be noted that the sense which the two famous words *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* ultimately received was a balanced and *mediating* one. *οὐσία* received a sense midway between abstract being and concrete (individual) being, but inclined to the former; *ὑπόστασις* finally received a connotation between “person” in the exclusive individual sense and “attribute” or “personation” (the so-called modalistic view), but with an inclination to the former sense.

Οὐσία.—This term had a history in heathen speculation before it was adopted by the Church.

Plato had used the word to denote the “idea” or “form” the inherence of which in an individual object makes it what it is. The *οὐσία* of a thing is thus *ὃ ἕκαστον τυγχάνει ὄν*, and is logically prior to the thing itself. Aristotle is not quite consistent in his use. At times he inclines to the Platonic conception: *οὐσία* is

¹ See above, p. 43.

the *form* or *ideal essence* of an object (τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἔνουν *Metaph.* vi. 11; cp. vi. 1). In another passage he defines οὐσία as an individual concrete *substance*; a sensible *material thing* (πᾶν σῶμα φυσικὸν μετέχον ζωῆς οὐσία ἂν εἴη: *de an.* ii. 1. 3). It is this latter usage which is developed by the Stoics, who denote by οὐσία the material part (ὕλη) of a thing.¹ Thus the visible universe is regarded as the οὐσία of God; and sometimes οὐσία seems simply to mean the "matter" of which the universe consists. With the Stoics οὐσία is practically equivalent to σῶμα. We see the influence of this Stoic conception in Tertullian. The later Platonists, on the other hand, regard οὐσία as the *summum genus* (γένος τὸ γενικώτατον), the real permanent world of intelligible essences or ideas, as opposed to the world of phenomena (Plato, *Soph.* 246 c, νοητὰ ἅπτα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη . . . τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι — an interesting passage, describing the "war of giants" between materialists and idealists as to the nature of οὐσία). It may be noticed that, speaking broadly, the effect of usage had been to widen the sense of οὐσία, and make it more generic.²

Οὐσία, with other terms, passes into theology through the Gnostics (*Iren.* i. 5. 1), and the Platonistic sense tends to prevail. In pseudo-Dionysius (*de Div. nom.* 5), the idealistic view is carried to the extreme point; God is there described as ὑπερούσιος, and it is even denied that οὐσία can be predicated of the Divine Being.³ Others were content with denying that the οὐσία of God could be defined. But practically it was necessary to admit that

¹ Orig. *de orat.* 27: οὐσία ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη τῶν ὄντων ὕλη (quoted by Bigg, *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 164 note).

² See Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 269 ff. Bigg, *l.c.* pp. 163–165. Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 86.

³ Such was the opinion of Celsus. See Orig. *c. Cels.* vi. 64, ap. Bigg, *l.c.* p. 179.

as God *is*, there must be some *οὐσία* of Him, unique, immutable, and incommunicable.¹

ὑπόστασις. — This word also seems to have been introduced into theology by Gnostic writers (Iren. i. 5. 4), and was not without a history. Its fundamental idea is "reality." Thus Aristotle (*de Mundo*, iv. 21), opposes that which exists *κατ' ἔμφασιν* (*apparently*), to that which exists *καθ' ὑπόστασιν* (*in reality*). In Stoic usage *ὑπόστασις* was equivalent to *οὐσία*, and so in the earliest ecclesiastical use the two words appear to be synonymous. Thus *ὑπόστασις* is found in the sense of *οὐσία* in Dionysius of Rome, in a passage repudiating those who sever the Godhead into three separate *hypostases* and three Deities,² and this interchange of the two words lingered long into the period of the Arian controversy: even Gregory of Nyssa still uses the words as synonymous.³ But at an early stage there arose a tendency to discriminate, and to restrict *ὑπόστασις* to the Divine Persons. This tendency appeared first at Alexandria,⁴ and though Athanasius at first uses the terms as equivalent,⁵ his later usage seems to suggest the distinction afterwards fixed by the Cappadocian Fathers.⁶

For a catholic agreement in this final distinction was necessitated by the confusion which the Arian troubles introduced. The phrase *τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις* was dangerous so long as the word *ὑπόστασις* was synonymous with *οὐσία*, as "dividing the substance" of Deity.

¹ Aug. *de Trin.* v. 3.

² ap. Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iii. p. 373; cp. 383.

³ The creed bids us speak of the Logos *ἐν οὐσίᾳ* and the Spirit *ἐν ὑποστάσει* (*Orat. cat. mag.* iv. s. *fin*). The Nicene symbol is another instance in point—in the anathemas, *ἐξ ἐτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας*. Cp. Ath. *Orat. c. Arian.* ii. 33, iv. 1. But see Basil, *Ep.* cxxv.

⁴ Orig. *in Joh.* tract 3; Dion. Alex. ap. Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iii. 397.

⁵ e.g. *Orat. c. Arian.* iii. 65, iv. 1.

⁶ See passages quoted by Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 276 note.

Athanasius had already anticipated the work of discrimination: *οὐσία*, he taught, was the common undifferentiated substance of Deity; *ὑπόστασις* was Deity existing in a personal mode, the substance of Deity with certain special properties (*οὐσία μετὰ τίνων ιδιωμάτων*). The Council of Alexandria, held in 362 after the death of Constantius, was important as marking an attempt to adjust the confusions and difficulties produced by the divergence which had grown up between East and West. It offered an opportunity for explanation of the chief terms in dispute: *ὁμοούσιος* was cleared of all Sabellian connotation; the phrase *τρεις ὑποστάσεις* was sanctioned as an allowable mode of speech, though not without protest on the part of some prominent Western bishops. Ultimately the Nicene formula was recommended as a standard, and the use of other phraseology was discouraged. The work of this council was supplemented by the labours of the three great Cappadocian Fathers, Basil and the two Gregories. Starting from the *ὁμοούσιον*, they elaborated the terminology which finally became accepted throughout the East: *μία οὐσία, τρεις ὑποστάσεις*, or *μία οὐσία ἐν τρίσιν ὑποστάσεσιν*. In a later age the accepted distinction between the terms was clearly stated by John of Damascus (*de Orth. fid.* iii. 6) in the following passage, which embodies the results arrived at by the Cappadocians:—

κοινὸν ἡ οὐσία ὡς εἶδος· μερικὸν δὲ ἡ ὑπόστασις· ἐν ἐκάστη τῶν ὁμοειδῶν ὑποστάσεων τελεία ἡ οὐσία ἐστι. διὸ οὐδὲ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ ὑποστάσεις κατ' οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα, ἅτινα ἐστι τὰ χαρακτηριστικὰ ιδιώματα. καὶ γὰρ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ὀρίζονται οὐσίαν μετὰ συμβεβηκότων . . . ὥστε τὸ κοινὸν μετὰ τοῦ ἰδιάζοντος ἔχει ἡ ὑπόστασις καὶ τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὑπάρξαι· ἡ οὐσία δὲ καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐχ ὑφίσταται ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς ὑποστάσεσι θεωρεῖται.

Φύσις.—In relation to *θεολογία*, *φύσις* became identified in the fourth century with *οὐσία*, from which it had been originally distinct;¹ thus Gregory of Nyssa appears to use the terms as synonymous (*Orat. cat.* 3). It should be also observed that, as applied to the God-head, both *οὐσία* and *φύσις* tended to acquire the meaning *person*.²

Latin Equivalents.—At Alexandria in 362 an effort was made, as we have seen, to remedy the confusion produced by the divergent phraseology of the East and the West. In the West two words were in ordinary use, to both of which objections might be urged.

The word *substantia*³ was practically introduced by Tertullian as the equivalent of *οὐσία*. Tertullian uses the term in the Stoic sense of *τὸ ὑποκείμενον*, i.e. the substratum of things, the basis of real existence. As such, *substantia* implies corporeity; and Tertullian does not hesitate, as we have seen, to ascribe a kind of corporeity even to spirit.⁴ From the fact, however, that *substantia* was the Latin equivalent of the two words *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, an ambiguity arose which was serious in proportion as the Eastern inclination to discriminate these terms became more marked. Accordingly, recourse was had to another term, also apparently first adopted by Tertullian,⁵ namely, *persona*.

The term *persona* was derived from Roman law,

¹ See, e.g., *Ath. Orat. c. Arian.* iii. 65.

² This point acquires importance in relation to Cyril's famous phrase, *μία φύσις τοῦ λόγου*.

³ *Essentia* was a synonym for *substantia*, but much less frequent (*Aug. de Trin.* v. 9): *Aug.* gives reasons for preferring *essentia*, *ibid.* vii. 10. The introduction of the word *essentia* is traced by Seneca to Cicero.

⁴ See *adv. Hermog.* 34-36; *adv. Prax.* vii., ix.; *de carne Chr.* xi. etc. Cp. Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* pp. 96-98.

⁵ See Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 277 note. Cp. *Cic. Pro. Cluent.* xxix. etc.

meaning any "party" to a suit or contract having legal duties and rights; it thus came to mean "an individual" or "person" in the modern sense. The older Greek school had agreed with the Latins in using the phrase *τρία πρόσωπα*. During the latter part of the fourth century, however, the phrase appeared to be open to the objection that it was capable of a Sabellian construction. Thus the Eastern theologians preferred *ὑπόστασις* as implying distinct and independent subsistence; while the Latins continued to use *persona*, with the effect, indeed, that in the East its equivalent *πρόσωπον*,¹ though hesitatingly employed, yet remained a recognised synonym for *ὑπόστασις*.

Augustine pointed out the differences between the Greek and Latin terminology, and concluded by adopting *tres personæ* as more suitable than the older *tres substantiæ*. He also declares that the terms *essentia* and *substantia* were in his time of comparatively recent appearance in theological terminology, and that the older Latin writers had used instead the word *natura* (*φύσις*).² The recognised Latin phrase is accordingly *una substantia, tres personæ*.

C. The doctrine of subordination (*ὑποταγή τάξεως*) as taught by the Nicene theology.

The Father (*ὁ θεός, αὐτόθεος*) is the fountain-head or root of Deity (*πηγή* or *ρίζα τῆς θεότητος*). The Son and the Spirit, though coeternal and coequal, are subordinate in rank, because the Divine essence in them is derived from the Father. So in the language of Nicene theologians the Father alone is *ἀγέννητος*, the Son is *γέννητος*: the Father is *αἷτιος*, the Son *αἷτιατός*: the Father is *ὁ θεός*; the Son is of Divine essence (*θεός*).

¹ *Πρόσωπον* is first found in Hippol. c. *Noët*, 14; *Philos.* ix. 12.

² *de Trin.* v. 10, vii. 7, 11.

This doctrine is implied in the language of the creed, *φῶς ἐκ φωτός, θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ*.¹ As the original source of the Son's Deity, the Father may be termed "greater" than the Son.² So far the Nicene theology recognises the subordinationist ideas which had prevailed, and had been carried to excess, in third century writers. Athanasius, for example, insists on the ministerial office of the Son in creation, and in this connection applies to Him the scriptural title of the Lord's Hand (*χείρ*).³ Fourth century theology in fact assigns to the Father a predominance, but the tendency was towards a complete equalisation of the Divine hypostases.⁴ This tendency, it should be observed, was mainly due to a change in men's conception of God. So long as the Platonistic conception of God as the absolute Monad, the transcendent cause and source of all existence, generally prevailed, it was natural, and indeed logically necessary, to insist on the pre-eminence of the Father as the fount of Deity. But the more ethical doctrine of Augustine lays stress on the co-eternal Deity of the three Divine Persons; on the fact that the very idea of God as Love involves a Triune Being. At the same time the conception of the co-

¹ Hil. *de Trin.* v. 39: "Quod enim Deus est, ex Deo est." Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxix. 3: *ἐκέλευεν [ἐστίν, h.e. ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς] εἰ καὶ μὴ μετ' ἐκείνον*. Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* iii. 35: *ἔχων ἀδίδως ὁ Ὑιὸς ἃ ἔχει, παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἔχει*. Cp. *ibid.* 36. Aug. *de Trin.* iv. 29: "Totius divinitatis, vel si melius dicitur deitatis, principium Pater est."

² S. Jo. xiv. 28. The Father is "greater," *τῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς αἰτίας λόγῳ*. The subordination is a *τάξις* not of time, but involved in the relationship of cause and effect. Such subordination is entirely compatible with equality of essence and majesty (*τὸ ὀυόντιμον τῆς ἀξίας*), Bas. *c. Eun.* i. 25. Chrys. *hom. in Ep. ad Phil.* p. 246 A: *ἵκανον τὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὄνομα δεῖξαι τὰ πρεσβεία τοῦ Πατρὸς· χωρὶς γὰρ τούτου πάντα τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶ τῷ Πατρὶ*. Aug. *de Trin.* iv. 27 *seqq.*

³ See *Orat. c. Ar.* ii. 31, 77; iv. 26. The Arians preferred the non-scriptural term *ὄργανον* (Newman, *Athanasian Treatises*, vol. ii. p. 142).

⁴ See the catena of passages collected by Bp. Westcott on S. Jo. xiv. 28,

inherence (περιχώρησις), and of the inseparable will and operation of the blessed Persons, tended towards the same result. In the Western theology, represented by Augustine and the Athanasian symbol, we find that the older idea of "subordination" has almost disappeared. The Father stands higher than the Son only in being ingenerate;¹ the Son is inferior only in having assumed human nature in the Incarnation.² Further, the insistence on the dual procession of the Holy Spirit prepares the way for the recognition of an absolute equality of the Father and the Son, such as is implied in the Western addition of the *Filioque* to the creed.³ There was evidently a close connection between the single procession and the ante-Nicene subordinatianism. Further development of the doctrine of God led to the more scriptural mode of statement which is found in the Western Creed.

D. The doctrine of the Divine generation (γέννησις). The "generation" of the Son means that intemporal act or process of Divine self-communication by which the Godhead of the Father reproduces itself in the Son.

The ante-Nicenes maintained that the γέννησις of the Son was "necessary," but not in a mechanical or fatalistic sense. It was to protest against this latter idea that they spoke of the Son as begotten by an act of *will* (θελήσει). On the other hand, Athanasius insists that the Son is a Son by *nature* (φύσει):⁴ the fact being that in the Godhead freedom and necessity coincide, for God

¹ Aug. *de Trin.* xv. 31: "Pater enim solus ita Deus est, ut non sit ex Deo."

² *de Trin.* ii. 2. Aug. insists "*minorem* Filium in assumpta creatura"; so *ibid.* iv. 26.

³ *de Trin.* iv. 29. Cp. *tract. in Joh.* xcix. 8. The addition *Filioque* found its way into the creed after the Council of Toledo, A.D. 589.

⁴ Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* ii. 17, φυσικὴ γέννησις; 24, φύσει υἱός.

ever acts according to the law of His own perfection.¹ The act of generation cannot be represented by any human or physical analogies;² it implies neither physical affection nor division of the Divine substance.³ It is an inner movement, the spring of which lies in the eternal goodness and love of God. Consequently, as Athanasius teaches, Fatherhood belongs eternally to the essence of God. The mode of the Divine *genesis* is therefore inscrutable and ineffable;⁴ and the effect of the images habitually employed by the Fathers—light and its radiance, fountain and stream, root and plant—is not only to exclude all material and corporeal ideas in relation to so high a mystery, but to discourage speculation or attempts at explanation. In the careful language of Pearson: “The essence of God is incorporeal, spiritual, and indivisible, and therefore His nature is really communicated . . . by a total and plenary communication. . . . The Divine essence, being by reason of its simplicity not subject to division, and in its infinity incapable of multiplication, is so communicated as not to be multiplied; insomuch that He who proceeds by that communication has not only the same nature, but is also the same God. The Father God and the Word God . . . Abraham one man, Isaac another man; not so the Father one God, and the Word another, but

¹ This *moral* conception of the *γέννησις* distinguishes the Catholics from the Arians. Athanasius is not afraid to use inconsistent *expressions* in defence of the point. Thus, *Orat. c. Ar.* iii. 63, he says, *θεὸς οὐ βουλήσει ἀλλὰ φύσει τὸν ἴδιον ἔχει Λόγον*; but in iii. 66, *θελόμενός ἐστι παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς*. *Ibid.* ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς δεῖ καὶ τῇ φύσει, οὕτως δεῖ γεννητικὸς τῇ φύσει ὁ Πατήρ.

² *Ath. Orat. c. Ar.* i. 23, *γεννᾷ οὐχ ὡς οἱ ἀνθρώποι γεννῶσι, γεννᾷ μέντοι ὡς θεός*. *Cyr. Hieros. Cat.* xi. 7, *πνεῦμα ὁ θεός, πνευματικὴ ἡ γέννησις, κ.τ.λ.*

³ *Orat. c. Ar.* i. 17, *τὸ γέννημα οὐ πάθος οὐδὲ μερισμός ἐστι τῆς μακαρίας ἐκείνης οὐσίας*. *Ibid.* ii. 35, *γέννημα τέλειον ἐκ τελείου*. *Ibid.* iii. 67, *βουλὴ ζῶσα καὶ ἀληθῶς φύσει γέννημα*. Cp. Newman, *Arians*, p. 160.

⁴ Cp. the language of early writers, quoted vol. i. p. 312.

the Father and the Word both the same God.”¹ The one Godhead is common to the three Persons by simple identity, *identitate, ut loquuntur scholæ, simplici* (Petav. *de Incarn.* v. 5. 5).

In earlier ante-Nicene writings, the word *γέννησις* was freely used to denote four moments, so to speak, in the being of the Son of God.² Language became more precise in later times, and it was recognised that there were two “generations” of the Son,—the first, the intemporal Divine *γέννησις*; the second, the assumption of human nature in the womb of the blessed Virgin.³ And a distinction was made between the different terms used to denote the eternal Sonship and the Incarnation. As God, the Son is *γεννητός* or *γεννηθείς*, “begotten” from all eternity: He is *γέννημα ἄιδιον, γέννημα ἰδίου τῆς οὐσίας*.⁴ These phrases imply the truth of the derivation of the Son’s essence. He is “generate” as being the Son of God. But being very God, the Son is also “increate” (*ἀγέννητος, i.e. οὐ ποιηθείς*). Athanasius points out that the idea of Divine Sonship excludes the idea of a temporal beginning of existence or creation (*γένεσις*). Accordingly it was sometimes said that the Son was “increately generate” (*ἀγενήτως γεννητός*).

As man, on the other hand, the Son is a creature. He is *γεννητός, κτιστός, or ποιητός* (cp. S. Jo. i. 18, *σὰρξ ἐγένετο*; Phil. ii. 7, *γενόμενος*). “The word *γενέσθαι*,” says Athanasius, “we assign to the manhood of the Son

¹ *On the Creed*, art. ii. pp. 237–247 (and notes). Cp. Ath. *de Nic. Def.*: “Men in their time become fathers of many children, but God who is individual is Father of the Son without being parted or affected, for there is neither loss nor gain to the immaterial, as in the case of men; and being simple in His nature, He gives absolutely and utterly all that He is, and thereby is Father of one only Son” (Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, vol. i. p. 27).

² See vol. i. p. 286.

³ See, e.g., Fifth Council, anath. 2 (ap. Petav. *de Incarn.* i. 9. 9).

⁴ Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* i. 9, 29, etc.

which is created, and came into being.”¹ For creation (*ποίησις*) is an outwardly directed, free act of Divine will bringing a substance out of nothing; whereas the generation (*γέννησις*) implies an internal, necessary process within the Godhead, the Father’s eternal communication of essence to the Son.²

It is noticeable that Athanasius persistently deprecates the use of technical language, on the ground that it is non-scriptural. He would prefer to speak of God under His revealed title of “Father” as directly implying a Divine and essential Sonship.³ And this suggests a remark which is of importance in view of modern theories as to the “development” of the Christian creed. Nothing is more striking in the writings of the Nicene period than the anxiety to avoid innovations in the creed of Christendom. It has been justly said: “If the Catholics used new terms, they did so in order to guard old beliefs. . . . From Athanasius to Gregory of Nazianzus there comes an unbroken appeal to Holy Scripture and catholic tradition, which repels the unworthy suspicion that the great Nicene teachers were guilty of consciously tampering with the ancient faith.”⁴ In the treatise which may be said to have exercised most influence on the Athanasian Creed, the *de Trinitate* of Augustine, we certainly find a remarkable effort of Christian reason, but reason moving deliberately within

¹ Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* i. 25 and 60. So the body of Christ is called *ποίημα*, (*Ep. ad Epict.* ix.). See also *Orat. c. Ar.* ii. 8, 12, 46.

² The tendency to apply the term *ἀγέννητος* to the Son, though defensible, was soon abandoned, *ἀγέννητος* being reserved for the Father. See Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, i. p. 51. Cp. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. p. 307.

³ See *Orat. c. Ar.* i. 33, 34; iii. 3. *de Decret. Nic.* § 30 (*Ath. Treatises*, i. p. 52).

⁴ Swete, *The Apostles’ Creed*, p. 38.

the lines of Scripture. "Men," says Augustine, "have gone astray because they have lacked diligence in the scrutiny and study of the whole range of Scripture."¹ Here lies the point. What we see in the progressive effort of the Church to adjust and perfect its terminology, is not the unrestricted tendency to speculate in matters of faith, but the deliberate endeavour to embrace in a coherent and intelligible system the entire revelation of God contained in Scripture. It cannot be too often repeated that Christian theology was not the outcome of metaphysical subtlety, but "arose, like all other human thought, in meditation upon a fact of experience—the life and teaching of Jesus Christ."² It is fair, however, to acknowledge that the recurrence to Scripture becomes more decided a habit in the West than in the East, and Augustine is specially conspicuous in this respect. Owing to his influence the Scriptures practically received a position in the life of the Church more prominent in the West than in the East, the speculative temper being less actively developed in the West.³ In any case the result was that Scripture perpetually controlled and regulated the development of dogma: New Testament thoughts and reminiscences checked the tendency to over-definition, at least during the period when under stress of conflict Christology was receiving its final dogmatic form, namely, the period between the fourth and seventh centuries.

Harnack observes that in the West there was, as a rule, only a limited amount of speculation on the doctrine of the Trinity.⁴ The Divine unity, he says, was the

¹ *de Trin.* i. 14: "Erraverunt homines minus diligenter scrutantes vel intuentes universam seriem Scripturarum." Cp. iii. 22.

² Illingworth, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 11.

³ Harnack, *Grundr. der Dogm.* § 30, s. *fin.*; cp. § 29.

⁴ *Ibid.* § 39, p. 189.

dogmatic basis; the distinction of the Persons tended to become formal, and was stated with a kind of legal precision. Augustine's great work may be said to give expression to this conception of the Divine Trinity. It is quite true that the analogies adduced by Augustine from the phenomena of consciousness are of a "modalistic" kind, *i.e.* they emphasise rather the relationships of the Three Persons to one another than the distinctness of their hypostatic subsistence. Augustine is more concerned to sustain monotheism than to insist, as earlier writers had done, on the distinct functions of the different Persons. The enduring influence of Augustine's work on later theology can only be explained when we consider that the *de Trinitate* was an attempt to find expression for the facts of spiritual experience; it was not a mere effort to formulate a philosophical tradition.¹

§ II. THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION AND ITS TERMINOLOGY

There are certain technical expressions relating to the mystery of the Incarnation which may be briefly discussed at this point.

The Incarnation² is variously described by the terms *ἐνανθρώπησις*, *ἐνσάρκωσις*, *ἐνσαρκος παρουσία* or *ἐπιδημία*, *σωματική παρουσία* (*præsentia corporalis*, Aug. *de Trin.* iv. 27), etc. These expressions all imply the union (*ἔνωσις*) of human nature with the Divine in one Divine person. They are, of course, mostly derived from S. John's Gospel, i. 14, *ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*; *Verbum caro factum est*. S. John's phrase *ἐγένετο* does not imply

¹ Harnack says (*Grundr.* p. 190): "Er selbst nie auf die Trinität gekommen wäre wenn er nicht an die Überlieferung gebunden gewesen wäre."

² Cp. Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* i. 44, 64; ii. 6; ii. 10, etc. A list of terms is given by Casaubon on Greg. Nyss. *Ep. ad Eustath* (notes).

conversion into flesh; it is obviously to be qualified by such expressions as ἔλαβεν, ἐπιλαμβάνεται (Heb. ii. 16), and so limited ἐγένετο means the *assumption* of a new nature, without connoting the abandonment of an existing one. S. John's words in fact teach (a) the reality of the human nature assumed, σὰρξ meaning the entirety of human nature;¹ (b) the oneness of the person who *became flesh*; while, at the same time, they exclude the idea that the flesh existed before it was thus assumed.

We now come to consider the term of most prominent importance—ἔνωσις, *unitio* (later *unio*²): the union of two natures in one person. Before the terminology had been precisely fixed the Eastern writers employed various synonyms for ἔνωσις: such as σύνοδος (*conventus*), συνδρομή εἰς ἐνότητα, σύμβασις οἰκονομική, συμφυία. The general intention of theologians in using these forms of expression was to *exclude* certain other modes of describing the connection between the two natures in our Lord. Thus ἔνωσις is carefully distinguished (a) from συνάφεια, *conjunction*, or σχετική ἔνωσις, *union of relation*, terms in which Nestorius desired to embody his view of the relation between the Godhead and manhood in Christ;³ (b) from κράσις or σύγχυσις, *blending* of the two natures;⁴

¹ Aug. *de Trin.* ii. 11: "Caro enim pro homine posita est in eo quod ait Verbum caro factum est, sicut et illud Et videbit omnis caro pariter salutare Dei. Non enim sine anima vel sine mente: sed ita omnis caro ac si diceretur omnis homo."

² *Unio* was more often used in the West as equivalent to *unitas*. The unity of Christ's person would thus be *unio personæ*. Cp. *unio divinitatis* in Tert. *de Res.* ii.

³ Cp. p. 71.

⁴ On the other hand, it is noticeable that Latin writers frequently use *misceri*, *mixtura*. See esp. Tert. *de carn. Chr.* 15, *Apol.* 21; Cyp. *de idol. van.* 2; Leo, *de nativ. Serm.* 3; Aug. *ep. ad Volus., de Trin.* iv. 16, 30. See also Thomassin, *de Incarn. Verbi*, iii. 5. σύγκρασις is used by Greg. Naz. *Ep. ad Cled.* i. 4, 6; *ad Cled.* ii. 2.

(c) *σάρκωσις*, conversion into flesh of the Divine substance; (d) *ἀποθέωσις*, exaltation of the manhood to Divine rank; (e) *ἐνοίκησις*, mere indwelling of God in a human nature,—as Augustine says (*de Trin.* ii. 11), “Aliud est enim *Verbum in carne*, aliud *Verbum caro*.”

1. The result of the mysterious union thus described is the person of Christ. The catholic doctrine teaches that the union of natures in the incarnate Lord is *hypo-static*, i.e. personal, by which is meant that the result of the union of natures is *one indivisible person*. The union is therefore described as *ἔνωσις ὑποστατική* or *καθ’ ὑπόστασιν*, *ἔνωσις φυσική* or *κατὰ φύσιν*,¹ *ἔνωσις οὐσιώδης* or *κατ’ οὐσίαν*, i.e. *real*; resulting in *one really subsisting being*. But the expression which prevailed is *ἔνωσις καθ’ ὑπόστασιν*, i.e. union in a person (*personalis unitas*).² The one person of the Redeemer is Divine, the Divine nature being the seat of His personality. This is the foundation of all that Christians hope and believe concerning redemption and the possibility of acceptance with God. Christ, then, is a Divine Being—the Son of God (*φύσει υἱός*). The redemptive work of Christ secures its infinite worth, its meritorious efficacy, from the fact that His person is Divine. The acts and sufferings of Christ owe their transcendent power and value to the fact that they are the acts and sufferings of God. On the other hand, the manhood of Christ is *impersonal*. It had no existence before it was assumed by the Logos; and it was created in the act by which it was assumed.³ Thus it

¹ *φυσική* in this connection implies that the union is (1) true or real, i.e. ἀληθής, as opposed to the simulated union taught by Nestorius; (2) personal, not merely moral or relative.

² See generally Petav. *de Incarn.* iii. 4.

³ Jo. Damasc. *de orth. fid.* iii. 2.: οὐ γὰρ προϋποστάση καθ’ ἑαυτὴν σαρκὶ ἡνώθη ὁ θεὸς λόγος. *Ibid.* iii. 11, 12: ἀπαρχὴν ἀνέλαβεν τοῦ ἡμετεροῦ φυράματος, οὐ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὑποστᾶσαν . . . ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσει ὑπάρξασαν. Cp. the older statements of Hippol. c. *Noel.* xv.: οὐθ’ ἡ σὰρξ

is not unusual with the catholic writers to speak of the manhood of Christ as an *accident* or *instrument* of the Godhead.¹ As Dr. Newman expresses it, "In comparison of the Divine person who had taken flesh, what He had taken was not so much a *nature* . . . as the *substance* of a manhood which was not substantive."² The human nature became personal (*ἐνυπόστατος*) only by being incorporated with, assumed by, the person of the Logos.³ In later theology it is insisted that the personality of the human nature was extinguished or absorbed by the person of the Word.⁴

2. It is important to observe further that while theology denies that Christ's *nature* is composite,⁵ in order to guard the absolute integrity and permanence of the two natures, Divine and human, conjoined in the person of the Word; it allows that there is in Christ a composite *personality* (*composita hypostasis*), resulting from the conjunction of two natures. Our Lord is acknowledged to be of *dual nature* (*διπλοῦς*),⁶ and consequently

καθ' αὐτὴν δίχα τοῦ λόγου ὑποστῆναι ἠδύνατο διὰ τὸ ἐν λόγῳ τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν, and of Leo M. *Ep.* xi. : "Natura nostra non sic assumpta est ut prius creata, post assumeretur, sed ut ipsa assumptione crearetur."

¹ Petav. iii. 4, §§ 15, 16. : "Adventitia et accessionis instar velut substantiæ accidens." Thus Jo. Damasc. applies the verb *προστρέχειν* to the manhood of Christ. We find already the phrases *συμβεβηκός*, *ὄργανον* in Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* ii. 45. Ath. seldom even speaks of the manhood as a *nature* (*φύσις*), and Cyr. Alex. follows Ath. in this point by calling the Logos alone *φύσις*. Ath. in fact distinguishes in one passage between *φύσις* and *σάρξ* (*Orat. c. Ar.* iii. 34). Cp. Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, vol. ii. p. 293f.

² *Ath. Treatises*, vol. ii. p. 327.

³ Thus the manhood is described sometimes as *ἐτεροῦπόστατος* or *συνυπόστατος*, i.e. ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου ὑποστάσει ὑποστάσα.

⁴ See pp. 160, 161.

⁵ See Jo. Damasc. *de orth. fid.* iii. 3; Petav. *de Incarn.* iii. 14, § 7.

⁶ Cyr. Hier. *Cat.* iv. 9; Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxxviii. 15; Petav. iii. 15, § 7 : "Non est imperfectum Deus verbum, quia non ut perficeretur assumptione carnis indiguit, sed ut caro perficeretur in melius commutata, carni se uniens *compositus factus est* qui ante erat sine dubio *summe simplex et incompositus* perfectusque per omnia utpote Deus."

though His person is one, it may be described as composite (*μία ὑπόστασις σύνθετος ἐκ δύο φύσεων*).

In fact the word *φύσις* in relation to the doctrine of the Incarnation was open to misconception. As applied to the persons of the Trinity *φύσις* was employed as a synonym for *οὐσία*.¹ The substance (*οὐσία*) of God was no other than Himself. The person or nature of the Father, for instance, was identical with His substance.² Hence as applied to God both *οὐσία* and *φύσις* tended towards the meaning *Person*; and consequently when employed in connection with the Incarnation the word *φύσις* had a double signification, which led to the confusions of monophysitism.

(a) Thus in Cyril's famous phrase, *μία φύσις τοῦ Λόγου*, Cyril practically means the *person* of the Word, or rather that Divine *nature* or *substance* of the Word, which, as one with His person, took to itself manhood.³ Indeed it is fair to say that with Cyril *φύσις* and *ὑπόστασις τοῦ Λόγου* practically coincide:⁴ *φύσις* means the Divine nature as it subsists in the *person* of the Logos. Cyril guarded the reality of the human nature by the word which Eutyches seems to have ignored, *σσεσαρκωμένη*. There can be no doubt that by his unfortunate use of the term *φύσις* he intended simply to secure the oneness and continuity of the person who became incarnate; but his monophysite followers stereotyped a misleading phrase, and identified *φύσις* with *ὑπόστασις*.

¹ In Aug. *de Trin.* vii. 7 *natura* is used as synonymous with *substantia*.

² Aug. *de Trin.* vii. 11: "Neque in hac Trinitate cum dicimus personam Patris, aliud dicimus quam substantiam Patris. Quocirca ut substantia Patris ipse Pater est, non quo Pater est, sed quo est; ita et persona Patris non aliud quam ipse Pater est."

³ See above, pp. 93 ff. Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iii. p. 323, gives examples in which even *οὐσία*=the *person* of Christ. Conversely Melito, ap. Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* i. p. 121, speaks of Christ's two *natures* as *οὐσῆαι*.

⁴ Cp. Harnack, *Grundr. der Dogm.* § 41; Petav. *de Incarn.* iv. 6; see also Bright's *S. Leo*, note 35.

(b) The Council of Chalcedon made the careful distinction between two natures (δύο φύσεις) and the one person of Christ (μία ὑπόστασις). Thus in Christology φύσις was gradually withdrawn from its Cyrilline use. Cyril, as we have seen, followed Athanasius in distinguishing between the Divine φύσις and human nature (σάρξ). φύσις, as ordinarily used in theology, means *nature*. In Christ there was, as Cyril expressly taught, a *difference* of natures (διαφορὰ τῶν φύσεων) though not a *severance* (διαίρεσις). Once conjoined in Christ the two natures can only be separated in thought, not in fact. They are eternally united in His person. He is in this sense *indivisible* (ἀδιαίρετος). To the person or nature of the Word is united the nature of man.

3. The *communicatio idiomatum*, ἀντίδοσις ἰδιωμάτων, follows from the relation in which the two natures in Christ stand to each other. That relation is described by Damascene in the term περιχώρησις, which thus acquires a sense distinct from that in which it is used in θεολογία. The word when used in Christology means that *interpenetration* of the two natures—that *pervasion* of the human by the Divine—which may be compared to the relation of soul and body,¹ or to the heat of red-hot iron. It is this interpenetration of natures which underlies the *communicatio idiomatum*, that *participation of attributes* in virtue of which the properties strictly belonging only to one nature are predicable of the other, so that we may say The Son of God was crucified, or The Son of Man is in heaven. Thus we have to distinguish between the *communicatio* viewed as a *mode of speaking* and as a *fact*.

(a) As a mode of speaking, the *communicatio idiomatum* means simply this: that the union of two natures in

¹ In relation to the natures of Christ περιχώρησις thus = Lat. *circuminsessio*, the *pervading* of the human by the Divine nature.

Christ justifies the interchange of predicates (ἡ ἔνωσις κοινὰ ποιεῖ τὰ ὀνόματα).¹

(b) As a fact the *communicatio* is based on the truth so often insisted on by Athanasius and others that the Divine Son really appropriates human nature and makes it His own, and imparts to it by the virtue of His person a "grace of unction" and a "grace of union," whereby its natural properties are inconceivably heightened, expanded, and in fact "deified."² Various rules are laid down by Petavius to limit and guard the *communicatio idiomatum*, but the main points may be reduced to three.

i. We may not predicate of either nature *in the abstract* attributes which belong only to the other. The attributes can be only ascribed *as personal* (*ratione subjecti*) to the other nature. When we say *God suffered*, we do not mean that Deity is passible, but that He who was personally God suffered. In short, all predicates, whether Divine or human, belong to the one person. So Cyril insists in his fourth anathema.

ii. It has been usually held that the *περιχώρησις* is possible only for the higher nature, which controls, dominates, and pervades the lower. But theologians may be thought to have insisted too peremptorily on this point:³ the *ἀντίδοσις* is surely not entirely one-sided. So far as we can speculate on so profoundly mysterious a subject, we may dare to think that in some sense the

¹ Theod. *Dial.* iii. ; cp. Greg. *ad Cled.* i. 6 : κινημένων ὡς περ τῶν φύσεων οὕτω δὴ καὶ τῶν κλήσεων, κ.τ.λ. See Gore, *Dissertations*, p. 182 no.

² "Deification" is a phrase freely used in early theology. See, e.g., Ath. *de Incarn.* x. ; *Orat. c. Ar.* iv. ; Greg. Naz. *ad Cled.* i. 10 ; Greg. Nyss. *Orat. cat.* xxv., xxxv. (and note *ad loc.* in *Lib. of Nic. and post-Nic. Fathers*). The expression is generally applied (1) to Christ's human nature ; (2) to our human nature in His. The usual phrases are *θεοῦσθαι*, *θεοποιεῖσθαι*, *θεὸς γίνεσθαι*, Lat. *deificari*, *deitari*. The word *ἀποθέωσις* is a discredited term as conveying the idea of Nestorius that Christ was a man advanced for his merit to the state of Deity. Cp. Petav. *de Incarn.* iv, 9.

³ e.g., Jo. Damasc. *de orth. fid.* iii, 19.

“measures of humanity” were suffered to “prevail” over the Deity, in such degree and sense that the Divine attributes themselves became modified or coloured by the union of the manhood with the Godhead.

iii. There is another phrase which expresses one logical consequence of the above doctrine, namely, *θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια*, the *Divine-human operation* of Christ’s will. Of the two natures in Christ there is an “association always,” so that all His acts partake of that composite character which may in some sense be ascribed to His personality. He is the God-man, and His acts accordingly are *Divine-human*. On this expression we have already commented elsewhere.¹

The chief technical terms employed to describe the mystery of the Incarnation have now been briefly discussed. The terminology went through a long and slow process of elaboration, each term being tested, disputed, and carefully defined before it was finally adopted. Thus in regard to terminology we may readily admit that there has been a process of development, whereas in regard to the substance of the faith there has been none. The exact phraseology of the Creed was intended merely to guard the central fact which Christians knew to be the essence of their faith. Whatever tended to secure the reality of that redemptive union between God and man which was a matter of intimate experience to Christian hearts; whatever tended to guard it amid the shocks of intellectual disputation; whatever commended it to the minds of thoughtful men, was only adopted after patient scrutiny as the fitting vehicle of a saving truth. And thus in the exact and luminous definitions which we meet with in later Greek theology we may well

¹ See p. 131; cp. [Hippol.] *c. Beron. et Helic.* Fragm. viii.: *μηδὲν θεῖον γυμνὸν σώματος ἐνεργήσας· μηδὲν ἀνθρώπων ὁ αὐτὸς ἀμοιβὸν δράσας θεότητος.*

recognise "that the great thoughts of the Greek mind were guided by a higher power, and consecrated to a nobler end, than ever their authors dreamed of."¹ We may readily admit that the process of definition was carried perhaps to the extreme limit of what was useful and salutary, but we ought to frankly acknowledge that the process was an inevitable one if the faith of Christians was ever to receive intellectual expression; inevitable, because (in the words of the writer already quoted) "thoughtful men must meditate upon the things which they believe, and endeavour to give articulate expression to what is implicitly contained in the principles by which they live."² Yet nothing can be more explicit than the declaration of Christian writers that the subject of theological inquiry transcends not only the capacity of language, but thought itself. "Inasmuch as our thought," says Augustine, "when we meditate on the Divine Trinity, feels itself very far from equal to the subject on which it thinks, nor can conceive that subject as it really is, . . . I ask help of God, and pardon if in aught I offend. For I am mindful, not only of my good intent, but of my infirmity."³

The philosophical habit of mind which the Greek Fathers inherited was to a certain extent naturalised in the Western Church, and it is thought by some writers to have been a disastrous factor in the development of theology, overlaying the original facts of Christianity with an accretion of mere inferences and human speculations.⁴ But it is a mistake to forget that the philosophical temper of the great Greek theologians, and of their successors in the Latin Church, was constantly kept in restraint both by a profound apprehension of the

¹ J. R. Illingworth in *Lux Mundi*, p. 202.

² J. R. Illingworth, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 9, 10.

³ *de Trin.* v. 1.

⁴ Cp. Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 137.

fundamental Christian facts, and by a devotional temper to which dogmatic statements ever appeared secondary in importance to the truths enshrined in them. Athanasius expressly declares that "formal modes of statement (λέξεις) are not prior to realities (οὐσίαι), but the realities are first, and secondary to them the formulæ."¹ In any case it should be borne in mind that the high elaboration of the terminology corresponds to the complexity of the Christian facts themselves. The Incarnation is one of those mysteries "which unless it were too vast for our full intellectual comprehension would surely be too narrow for our spiritual needs."² Consequently we have no just reason to be surprised if the theological terms and definitions by which precision is given to a particular doctrine, wear a somewhat formal and scholastic appearance. On the other hand, one advantage of a closer acquaintance with patristic literature is that the student gains an increasing sense of the perennial motive which underlay the efforts of Christian teachers to construct a scientific terminology. That motive was the desire more intelligently to grasp and more securely to guard the revealed facts on which the doctrine and ethics of the Church ultimately rest. Augustine truly says: *Non impudenter in illa quæ supra sunt divina et ineffabilia pietas fidelis ardescit; non quam suarum virium inflat arrogantia, sed quam gratia ipsius creatoris et salvatoris inflammat.*³ The technical language of theology is no mere product of "an instinctive tendency to throw ideas into a philosophical form."⁴ For throughout the process of definition philosophic interest was quickened by religious faith, and the love of speculation was restrained by the temper of reverence.

¹ *Orat. c. Arian.* ii. 3.

² Balfour, *The Foundations of Belief*, p. 259.

³ *de Trin.* v. 2.

⁴ Hatch, *l.c.* p. 133.

4. *The Athanasian Creed* ¹

It seems natural at this point to say something of the formulation of the two august doctrines which have been under review, as it appears in the Athanasian Creed.

This Creed seems rather to be the product of the Western Church at large than of any single writer. Waterland was inclined to assign the authorship to an individual, possibly Hilary, abbot of the monastery of Lerins, and afterwards bishop of Arles. In this case the date of the Creed would be about 430. But later inquiry shows that in its present shape the Creed is of much later origin. Before 809 there appears to be no trustworthy notice of any confession called by the name of Athanasius; and in the Greek Church the symbol does not appear till some centuries later. It would rather seem that before that date we find traces of two separate compositions which may have formed the groundwork of the present *Quicumque*. All we can say with certainty is that the symbol displays the influence of Augustine's treatise *de Trinitate*, and perhaps that of Vincent of Lerins. Its formal acceptance dates from a period a good deal subsequent to its composition; in its present form it seems to have been first known during the earlier part of the ninth century.² It deals with the doctrines (1) of the Trinity chiefly in relation to unitarian and tritheistic³ error; (2) the Incarnation, in opposition to Nestorianism and monophysitism.

¹ The Creed should rather be called a *canticle*, or *exposition* of the Creed.

² For Waterland's view, now generally discarded, see his *Works*, vols. iii. and iv. The question of the origin and use of the Creed is carefully discussed by Lumby, *Hist. of the Creeds*, chaps. iv. and v. See also Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 97; Loofs, *Dogmengesch.* § 48. 4.

³ A doctrine indistinguishable from tritheism was professed by John Ascanages of Constantinople in the reign of Justinian. See Hagenbach, § 96.

(1) The equality and unity of the three Divine Persons is stated in verses 3–20 of the symbol. After excluding (v. 4) the Sabellian *confusion of persons*, and the Arian *division of the Divine substance*, in language akin to that of Augustine, “*hæc omnia nec confuse unum sunt, nec disjuncte tria*,” the Creed proceeds to state the doctrine of the Trinity in a form which appeared in the Latin Church during the second half of the fourth century: *Et tamen non tres æterni sed unus æternus, etc.* (vv. 11, 12). The Eastern Church appears never to have adopted this mode of expression. It seems to be first used by Ambrose in 381, and is explained and defended by Augustine in the *de Trinitate* (v. 9). This mode of speech served to meet the Arian charge that the catholic doctrine was *tritheistic*; it also guarded against the Arian assertion that the three Persons of the Trinity differed in kind and degree of perfection. The Catholics by “one Divinity” mean “equal, undivided, inseparable Divinity.” *In illa summa Trinitate . . . tanta est inseparabilitas ut cum Trinitas hominum non possit dici unus homo, illa unus Deus et dicatur et sit; nec in uno Deo sit illa Trinitas, sed unus Deus.*¹ The three Persons of the Godhead do not differ in kind, or attributes, or perfections. Thus “omnipotence” or “incomprehensibility”² is one attribute common to the three.

The distinctions between the Persons are given in vv. 20–23. The property (*ιδιότης*) of the Father is “to be of none” (*ἀγεννησία*). This is expressed in the words *Pater*

¹ Aug. *de Trin.* xv. 43. So v. 9, “*Trinitas unus Deus.*” Cp. Leo Magn. *Serm.* lxxv. 1 and 2: “*Huius enim beatæ Trinitatis incommutabilis deitas una est in substantia, indivisa in opere, concors in voluntate, par in potentia, æqualis in gloria*” (quoted by Hagenbach, § 95).

² *Immensus* = either (1) “not to be comprehended by the mind,” or possibly (2) Gk. *ἀκατάληπτος*, “not contained within local bounds,” “omnipresent.” Cp. Aug. *de Trin.* v. 9: “*Sicut non dicimus tres essentias sic non dicimus tres magnitudines; sed unam essentiam et unam magnitudinem.*”

a nullo est factus, for which Waterland suggests *a nullo est [neque] factus*, in accordance with one Greek copy which has ὁ πατήρ ἀπ' οὐδενός ἐστι, omitting ποιητός altogether. The Son is described as *a Patre solo*, in contradistinction to the Holy Spirit, who is *a Patre et Filio*. With regard to the expression *nec genitus* applied to the Holy Spirit, we should notice that *non genitus*, "unbegotten," came to be distinguished from *ingenitus* (ἀγέννητος) absolutely "underived," which could only be predicated of the Father. Waterland quotes Abelard as saying *solum Patrem ingenitum dicimus*, h.e. *a seipso non ab alio*.¹

In the verses (24–26) which sum up the doctrine of the Trinity, the words *in hac Trinitate nihil prius aut posterius, nihil majus aut minus* refer not to order or office, but only to duration and dignity. Later theology does not altogether ignore the doctrine of subordination (ὑποταγή τάξεως), which is recognised in the Augustinian doctrine that the distinctions of the three blessed Persons are distinctions of relationship, though not of nature.

(2) The doctrine of the Incarnation is expounded in vv. 29–39. In general we should observe (a) the absence of any expression that directly recognises two natures in Christ, or absolutely excludes the monophysite view; (b) the absence also of any mention of Christ's human nature as being *consubstantial* with ours, which is a mark of post-Eutychian theology. Waterland seems to argue correctly that this portion of the Creed probably is earlier than 451.² He points out that the phrase *non conversione Deitatis in carnem* (v. 35) would have been more cautiously expressed in post-Eutychian theology: the error aimed at is clearly Apollinarian, as in *perfectus homo*, v. 32. The phrase *unus Christus* is

¹ Cp. Aug. *de Trin.* iv. 27.

² *Works*, vol. iv. p. 246.

derived from Augustine.¹ It is meant that Christ is *one person*, though His two natures remain distinct (φυσικὴ διαφορά). This truth is illustrated in v. 35 by the celebrated comparison *sicut anima rationalis, etc.* This comparison meets us in Gregory Nazianzen,² Augustine,³ and others. It played an important part in theological controversy. The Eutychians used the simile to illustrate their tenet that there was only *one nature* in Christ. The point of its use by catholic theology is simply this: in *man* we see two distinct substances combined—a material and mortal substance, with an immaterial and immortal. So in *Christ's* one person are inseparably united two distinct substances, the human nature and the Divine. The simile is in fact an illustration of the distinctness of the two natures (φυσικὴ διαφορά), but it is not more than an illustration. Petavius acknowledges that the point where the simile fails is that soul and body are two *imperfect natures*; neither apart from the other has personality (προάγουσαν ὑπόστασιν); whereas the two natures conjoined in Christ are *perfect*. He is “perfect God and perfect man”; whereas body and soul are but parts of one whole,—human nature. If not overpressed, however, the simile is important: it illustrates the unity of personality, with the distinctness of natures.⁴

The following verses describe the historical manifesta-

¹ *Tract in Joh.* lxxviii. 3.

² *Ep. ad Cled.* i. 4.

³ See Aug. *Ep. ad Volus.*: “Nam sicut in unitate personæ anima unitur corpori ut homo sit; ita in unitate personæ Deus unitur homini ut Christus sit. In illa ergo persona mixtura est animæ et corporis; in hac persona mixtura est Dei et hominis,” etc. Cp. *Enchir.* xxxvi.; *Serm.* clxxiv.; Maxim. *de duab. nat. Chr.* 2: ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ταυτότης μὲν ἐστὶ προσώπου, ἐτερότης δὲ οὐσιῶν· ἐνὸς γὰρ ὄντος ἀνθρώπου ἄλλης οὐσίας ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἄλλης ἡ σὰρξ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεσπότου Χριστοῦ· ταυτότης μὲν ἐστὶ προσώπου, ἐτερότης δὲ οὐσιῶν· ἐνὸς γὰρ ὄντος προσώπου ἦτοι ὑποστάσεως, ἐτέρας οὐσίας ἐστὶν ἡ θεότης, καὶ ἐτέρας ἡ ἀνθρωπότης.

⁴ See Petav. *de Incarn.* iii. 9, where the point is fully discussed.

tion of the Son, on the lines of the Nicene Creed. With regard to the last clause, Waterland remarks that "this is to be understood like all other such general propositions, with proper reserves and qualifying constructions." The positive truth implied is man's accountableness for his belief as well as his practice,¹ and the dependence of character on creed. "If," says Augustine,² "we believe falsely concerning the Trinity, our hope will be empty and our charity not unsullied."

§ III. THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST

1. *The Perfection of Christ's Human Nature*

The definitions of the Church which excluded the tenets of Apollinaris and Eutyches were so framed as to guard the *reality, integrity, and permanence* of that human nature which the Son of God by an act of infinite condescension assumed. Only if human nature in its completeness had been taken into the Godhead was the fact of salvation assured. The Son of God became perfectly human (τελέως ἄνθρωπος). Thus human nature was in Him, in virtue of His person and work, really redeemed.³ He assumed our nature in its entirety, "was made like unto us in all things sin only except." He was *ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα*.

Such was in fact the teaching of the Gospels concerning the historical Christ. Jesus Christ had a body subject to the ordinary laws of nurture and growth; liable to sinless human infirmities, weariness, hunger, and pain, but not to defects or disease. He *partook of flesh*

¹ So in verse 26, *ita sentiat de Trinitate* is to be observed. A man is to be thus minded, "if not thus explicitly or in every particular yet thus in the general or implicitly" (Waterland, quoting Wycliffe).

² *de Trin.* viii. 8.

³ Ath. *ad Epict.* vii. *ὅλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σωτηρία ἐγένετο.*

and blood; and the flesh which had become to mankind the sphere and organ of sin was by Him assumed as the instrument of service and obedience, of healing power and atoning sacrifice.¹ Christ also had a human soul, the seat of His human affections and emotions, compassion, distress, fear, so that a real experience of trial and suffering was possible for Him. Before His passion His soul was *troubled*, and *exceeding sorrowful even unto death*.² Further, He was endowed with a real human will, to which there are repeated allusions in the Gospels, and which is indeed implied in the fact that our Lord frequently prayed. The human will in Christ was real, though it was ever united to the Divine will, and subject to its control. The temptation however is a proof that this subjection did at times involve painful and prolonged effort and struggle.³ Finally, our Lord possessed a true human spirit. He is said to have *waxed strong in spirit*; to have *sighed in spirit*; and in His death He *commends His spirit* to the Father. The spirit in man is that element in his nature which is capable of communion with God; that by which he enters into relation with God; that on which the Spirit of God acts. This element our Lord possessed in its integrity. It was His spirit which could be possessed, reinforced, enabled, sustained by the Holy Spirit. *In the power*

¹ S. Lk. ii. 52, etc. As to our Lord's exemption from sickness or disease, see Bp. Kingdon, *God Incarnate*, pp. 87 ff. It would seem that our Lord accepted all that was common to man without taking on Himself special and individual forms of infirmity. He experienced what was universal, not what was peculiar or eccentric. It was in the passion, we believe, that He sustained actually "all the collective burden of human sickness." Cp. S. Mt. viii. 17; 1 Pet. ii. 24; and see Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 19-23.

² S. Jo. xii. 27; S. Mt. xxvi. 38; on which passages Origen remarks, "Unde videtur quasi medium quoddam esse anima inter carnem infirmam et spiritum promptum" (*de Princ.* ii. 8. 4).

³ See Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 263-267.

of the Spirit He could work miracles. In the moment of dereliction it is the spirit that passes through the experience of desolation. But perhaps the most important point to remember is that it is Christ's human spirit that may be regarded as the seat of His Divine personality.¹

Thus our Lord's manhood was so completely akin to ours, that it was possible for Him to pass through a complete human experience, and to sanctify each stage of normal human development. This is the point of a beautiful passage of Irenæus.² "Jesus Christ," he says, "came to save all through means of Himself. He therefore passed through every age, becoming an infant for infants, a child for children, a youth for youths, an elderly man for elderly men, that He might be a perfect Master for all," etc.

One or two points which seem to present special difficulty may be most appropriately touched upon in this place. And first, in spite of the fact that Christ's human nature was endowed with a spirit and a will, the Church has ever taught that His manhood was impersonal. It was felt that, if Christ was an individual human person, the redemption of human nature would be illusory. As Hooker insists, "that one [individual] should have been advanced and no more," a consequence which would conflict with the fundamental fact of Christian consciousness — the assurance of universal

¹ See Westcott, note on *Heb.* ix. 14 ; Godet on *Corinthians*, vol. i. pp. 157, 158 ; Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, pp. 146 f. The most important passages are S. Lk. ii. 40, x. 21, xxiii. 46 ; S. Jo. xi. 33. Cp. S. Mk. viii. 12. The word *πνεῦμα* appears to have four distinct meanings in relation to Christ—(1) His human spirit ; (2) the Holy Spirit acting in His manhood—see S. Mt. xii. 28 ; S. Lk. iv. 1 ; 1 Pet. iii. 18, 19 ; (3) vaguely the "higher nature" of Christ—see Rom. i. 4 ; 1 Tim. iii. 16 ; (4) possibly "the Godhead" in Heb. ix. 14.

² Iren. ii. 22. 4.

redemption in Christ. The later Greek theologians even insisted that, if Christ's manhood were personal, a fourth person would have been introduced into the Divine Trinity, and sometimes this very charge was urged against the Nestorians.¹ The human nature of our Lord "loses the privilege of a personality of its own in order to gain the special prerogative of belonging to the second Person of the Trinity." It subsisted in the Divine nature "not existing as we exist, but, so to say, grafted on Him, or as a garment in which He was clad."² It will be said that this doctrine is unintelligible and self-contradictory; that will is inconceivable apart from personality, and manhood incomplete, but the answer is that in some way it expresses facts of Christian consciousness which lie beyond analysis, nor can it be said to do violence to the profound mystery which encompasses the whole subject of personality.³ The fact which the doctrine is intended to guard is that a Divine person actually assumed our nature, sanctified it, and won for it acceptance with God. The personality which took manhood,—“laid hold” of it, as Scripture vividly says (Heb. ii. 16),—remained ever one and the same, supreme, independent, and sovereign over the created nature. Consequently all that the eternal Word did or suffered as man belongs and is attributable to His person. “Being God, He took a body to be His own (ἰδιον), and using this as an implement, He became

¹ See Petav. *de Incarn.* v. 10. 3, quoting Proclus, *ἐὶς ἄλλος ὁ Χριστὸς καὶ ἄλλος ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐστὶ τρεῖς ἀλλὰ τέρας*.

² Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, ii. 293.

³ See Illingworth, *Bampton Lectures*, note 10 (p. 240). It has been suggested that the absence of human personality may correspond to the fact that our Lord had no human father; that “while the plastic form of humanity is derived from the woman, personality is transmitted in some mysterious way from the father.” Consequently the manhood taken by the Word from Mary's substance would be impersonal. See R. M. Benson, *Comm. on Romans*, p. 187.

man for our sake. And therefore what is proper to the flesh is ascribed to *Him*—hunger, for instance, and thirst and suffering; . . . and the flesh ministers to the operations of the Godhead; for the body was that of God . . . and while *He*, indeed, suffered no detriment therefrom, *we* were being delivered from our own evil affections, and were being fulfilled with the righteousness of the Word.”¹

This is the real kernel of the Christian belief as it finds expression in the doctrine of the impersonal manhood. But there is another point to be briefly noticed, touching the nature of the manhood assumed. It is the catholic doctrine that the Word took our flesh *physically such as the Fall had left it*. As Athanasius insists, “He took upon Him the flesh which had been enslaved to sin,”² subject to corruption, infirmity, and death, “for death was proper (*ἰδιον*) to human beings”; but untainted by sin, which is no true element in human nature, no original defect of unfallen man, but incurred by moral transgression and transmitted by descent. The Word assumed human nature, then, sinless indeed and untainted, but subject to the inheritance of weakness, suffering, and death, which had resulted from sin. For it was the very nature which had fallen under the curse that was to be cleansed, exalted, and redeemed, and accordingly the Son of God came into the world *in the likeness of human flesh*.³ The very body that was subject to corruption was by Him, the Life indeed, to be lifted into the glory of incorruption; for His control over the body was complete. He had power even to overrule or counteract the proper laws of bodily existence, as when

¹ Ath. *Orat. c. Ar.* iii. 31. Cp. a fine passage in *Ep. ad Epict.* vi.

² *Ibid.* i. 43, 44. Leo, *ad Flav.* [*Ep.* xxviii.] 3, “Suscepta est ab æternitate mortalitas.”

³ See below (on the Temptation of Christ), p. 292.

He walked upon the waves or fasted forty days and nights. He had power to check the natural emotions of His human nature.¹ He was troubled, Augustine observes, because He willed it; sorrowed because He willed it; died because He willed it. And this thought forms a natural transition to the next section, in which we shall consider the effects as they are revealed to us of that operation of an invincible and perfect will which we adore in the humiliation of Christ.²

2. *The Self-limitation of the Son of God*

The *kenosis* or self-limitation of the Divine Son is necessarily a mysterious fact of which no adequate conception can be formed from a metaphysical or purely logical *a priori* standpoint. It must throughout be viewed ethically, as the act of a being who is akin to man in that which is highest and most distinctive of moral personality, namely, self-determining will and self-sacrificing love. Further, the Incarnation is only one stage in a process which had already begun in creation. In creation God voluntarily limited Himself. He showed Himself willing to forego part of His absolute prerogative in admitting other beings to a relative independence as over against Himself.³ The Incarnation is a further self-limitation, conditioned by a purpose of love, the desire to aid mankind by sympathy from within rather than by power from without, or, more strictly, by a blending of pity and

¹ Cp. S. Jo. xi. 34, ἐνεβριμήσατο.

² *Tract. in Joh.* xlix. 18: "In Illius potestate erat sic vel sic affici vel non affici . . . Anima et caro Christi cum Verbo Dei una persona est, unus Christus est. Ac per hoc ubi summa potestas est secundum voluntatis nutum tractatur infirmitas; hoc est turbavit semetipsum." Cp. *Ath. Orat. c. Ar.* iii. 57, to the same effect.

³ *Ath. Orat. c. Ar.* ii. 64: καὶ κατ' ἀρχὴν μὲν δημιουργῶν ὁ λόγος τὰ κτίσματα, συγκαταβέβηκε τοῖς γενητοῖς, κ.τ.λ.

power in one supreme act of condescension. In what manner and under what conditions the Son of God could deliberately forego the natural mode of Divine existence, we cannot conceive. But we believe that He did "become poor" in such sense that He voluntarily laid aside the exercise of those attributes of Deity that would have hindered a real human experience. In taking flesh the infinite Being entered on an existence subject to limits of space, time, and development. But regarded on its ethical side, such self-limitation does not seem to contradict the essence of the absolute personality. Finally, there is a further stage in this Divine process; the act of condescension seems to reach its climax in the mystery of God's indwelling Presence as it is effected through the agency of the Holy Spirit. There is a *kenosis* in what we may call the sacramental life of our Lord, which is an extension of the incarnate life. *God with us* is the preliminary stage of a revelation of self-sacrifice, which culminates in the mystery *Christ in us, the hope of glory*.¹

It has been justly said that we ought to have no interest in minimising Christ's experience of humiliation,² because it is in itself morally glorious. It is a supreme display of the moral energy of a righteous and loving will; and there is no necessary limit to the possibility of self-abnegation—at least for a holy being—except such as is imposed by perfect sinlessness. At the very outset we should clearly set before ourselves the nature of the series of acts which we speak of as the humiliation of Christ. The entire process of condescension is a display not of weakness, but of infinite moral strength. What we should venerate in the *kenosis* of the Son of God is the triumphant power of an unswerving will, persisting under the utmost pressure of

¹ Col. i. 27 ; Eph. iii. 17.

² Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, p. 35.

distress and trial in a morally glorious action. As Gregory of Nyssa well says, "That the omnipotence of the Divine nature should have *had strength to descend* to the lowliness of humanity, furnishes a more manifest proof of *power* than even the greatness and supernatural character of the miracles. For something pre-eminently great to be effected by Divine power is in a manner accordant with and consequent upon the Divine nature. . . . But this His descent to the lowliness of man is a kind of superabundant display of power,¹ which thus finds no check even in directions which contravene nature. . . . It is not the vastness of the heavens and the bright shining of its constellations, the order of the universe and the unbroken administration over all existence, that so manifestly displays the transcendent power of the Deity, as this condescension to the weakness of our nature,—the way in which sublimity is actually seen in lowliness, and yet the loftiness descends not."² This is a note which was not uncommonly sounded in the age when the deeper questions connected with the mystery of the Incarnation were first raised. Thus Athanasius insists against the Arians that it is an error to insist on what is possible (τὸ δυνατόν) for a Divine Being; we must rather consider what is morally fitting (τὸ πρέπον).³ Hilary carries this thought more into detail when he insists that even the sufferings of our Lord were triumphs of love⁴ and power,—a conception which is plainly suggested by the language of S. Paul (Col. ii. 15), and which seems to be specially present to S. John's mind when he records those utterances of the Saviour in which

¹ Περιουσία τίς ἐστι τῆς δυνάμεως.

² *Orat. cat. mag.* xxiv.

³ Cp. also Greg. *op. cit.* c. ix.

⁴ *de Trin.* bk. x. 48. Cp. Chrys. *hom. i. in Act.* : οὐκ ἂν δέ τις ἀμάρτοι καὶ τὸ πάθος πρᾶξιν κάλεσας· ἐν τῷ γὰρ παθεῖν ἐποίησε τὸ μέγα καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἔργον ἐκείνο, τὸν θάνατον καταλύσας, κ.τ.λ.

the passion is regarded as glorification.¹ All will depend on our point of view; what was a stumblingblock to the Jew was, in the eyes of S. John, the manifestation of transcendent glory. If Love is the supreme attribute of the Divine nature, the metaphysical difficulties raised as to the "unchangeableness" of God² seem to give way to moral considerations; the abstract attributes of Deity must in the last resort be compatible with a real power of condescension, a real display of pity.

The question, however, next arises, How is the *status exinanitionis* to be understood? and we must clearly understand that it is only possible to speak on this point with the utmost reserve. Various ideas have been stated on the subject by early Fathers of the Church; and as we have seen, the subject of Christ's humiliation was the subject of keen disputation in Germany during the earlier period of the Reformation,—some contending for a concealment of the Divine attributes in Christ (*Kryptiker*), the possession but not the use of them, others for a kind of *self-depotentiation* of the Divine nature (*Kenotiker*). But instead of discussing these conflicting theories we shall content ourselves with stating what seem to be fixed points, leaving all that lies beyond those points as hid among the *secret things* of God. Thus it is safe to lay down the following propositions.

(1) The *status exinanitionis* implies a real voluntary act of condescension: *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν* (Phil. ii. 7), *ἐπτώχευσεν πλούσιος ὢν* (2 Cor. viii. 9). The point here is that to the Son of God His self-humiliation was a free

¹ Cp. S. Jo. vii. 39, xii. 23, 28, 32, xiii. 31, xvii. 1, 5; Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, p. 35; Martensen, *Christ. Dogmatics*, § 133.

² This difficulty is discussed by Aug. *de Trin.* v. 17,—an important passage. So in vii. 5: "Factus est nobis via temporalis per humilitatem, quæ mansio nobis æterna est per divinitatem . . . Semetipsum exinanivit, non mutando divinitatem suam, sed nostram mutabilitatem assumendo." Cp. Gore, *Dissertations*, p. 173.

and deliberate act of *will*. "He allowed economically the limitations of humanity to prevail over Himself," says Cyril;¹ they prevail then over the Logos, but *by His own consent*. According to Gregory of Nyssa, an essential faculty of the Logos is the power of deliberate choice; it is the main element indeed in rational existence.² The frequent habit of theologians since Cyril of Alexandria has been to represent the human growth and development of Christ docetically, because they have argued logically and have been apt to overlook the element of voluntariness in the *kenosis*. This tendency was carried, as we have seen, to disastrous lengths by John Damascene and Thomas Aquinas. They have forgotten the considerations so eloquently urged by earlier writers like Gregory of Nyssa as to the moral sublimity of the *kenosis* if viewed from the standpoint which asks not what is possible for God, but what is worthy of Him. The humiliation of Christ is to be regarded therefore—nay, it is surely revealed in Scripture—as being a voluntary act of love; a state maintained by a continuous act of unwearied will; a "voluntary perseverance in the mind not to assert equality [with God] on the part of one who could do otherwise."³ It was the great merit of some early Fathers, notably of Hilary, that they gave prominence to this truth. They represented our Lord's self-abasement as the effect of continuous loving acts of will. They insisted that the Son of God remained at every moment in absolute possession of power over Himself,⁴ and accordingly they revered in the incarnate Christ the tenacity and persistence of a holy will.⁵

¹ *Quod unus etc.* Migne, *P.G.* 75, p. 1332.

² *Cat. orat. mag.* 1: εἰ οὖν ὁ Λόγος ὁ ζῶν ὢν, καὶ προαιρετικὴν δύναμιν ἔχει πάντως.

³ Bruce, *Humil. of Christ*, p. 22.

⁴ Cp. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. i. vol. ii. p. 411.

⁵ Cp. Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo?* i. c. 10. "Acceptæ bonæ voluntatis spontanea et amata tenacitas."

(2) These considerations lead us to believe that there was occasionally at least a "quiescence" of the Divine nature of Christ; in His temptation, in His endurance of suffering, in His passion, we must think that there was a real self-restraint of the "beams of Deity"; the support of His Godhead was in a measure withdrawn.¹ This would be compatible with the possibility of a real human experience. "If," says Bishop Martensen, "the Incarnation and the idea of Christ's mediatorship are to be realities, it must also be a reality that God felt the limitations of human nature as His own limitations, that He experienced the states of human nature as His own states."² A Divine Being in the Incarnation assumed our manhood really, and not in semblance; passing through each stage of it; exalting but not extinguishing its proper faculties and functions; exercising a true human will; suffering the trials of a human spirit. In a word, in the *status exinanitionis* God was really acting and working under conditions of manhood. The protest of S. Ignatius against the docetists of his day must be repeated whenever the attempt is made to impugn the reality of the self-sacrifice which the Christian creed ascribes to God. There is moral sublimity in deliberately refraining from the exercise of faculties, and the use of capacities or privileges, which a Divine Being rightly claims. We must not in any case rob the words ἐπώχευσεν πλούσιος ὦν of their legitimate force, because we are not able to explain the conditions under which such a fact was possible.

¹ See the celebrated passage of Irenæus, iii. 19. 3: ἡσυχάζοντος μὲν τοῦ Λόγου ἐν τῷ πειράζεσθαι καὶ σταυροῦσθαι καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν· συγγινομένου δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐν τῷ νικᾶν καὶ ὑπομένειν καὶ χρηστεύεσθαι καὶ ἀνίστασθαι καὶ ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι. [Ambrose] explains *exinanivit se* as "potestatem suam ab opere retraxit" (*Comm. in Ep. ad Phil.* ii. 7). Hilary speaks of the Logos as "tempering Himself" to conformity with the habit and capacity of human nature: *de Trin.* xi. 48.

² *Christian Dogmatics*, § 136.

(3) There is, we frankly admit, real difficulty in forming a conception of a single personality occupying, as it were, a double sphere of consciousness: at once Divine and human, omniscient and nescient. There are, indeed, facts which may be said to appease the sense of mystery;¹ but perhaps an illustration is our best aid in forming some conception of a dual consciousness such as seems to be presupposed in the *kenosis*. We may, for instance, imagine the case of the ruler of a vast empire conversing with his young children. In this case there are two different spheres, one within the other, so to speak: the sphere in which powers of reason, wide knowledge of human affairs, and trained political capacities, are required and exercised; the other, in which all that is necessary is the gift of sympathy—the power of bringing a highly-developed and well-stored mind within the range of the ideas and capacities of children. In the narrower sphere, that of the father with his children, there would be a deliberate abstention from the use and exercise of the faculties necessary in the wider sphere; there would be a simplicity of dealing prompted by love—a self-limitation imposed by sympathy. There would be accommodation, reserve, nescience—in so far as the wider knowledge and experience gathered in the large sphere would be useless or unintelligible in the smaller one. It would seem that illustrations of this kind, drawn from the moral and social experience of mankind, are more likely to be helpful than abstract considerations and deductions from the observed phenomena of personality; for personality, after all, is a field which as yet is only partially explored. Such lines of thought seem in fact to suggest the conclusion that the *kenosis* consisted in a deliberate abstention on the part of the Logos from the exercise of

¹ See Newman, *Paroch. Sermons*, vol. iii. no. 12: "The humiliation of the eternal Son."

Divine powers that might at any moment have been resumed. From the first to the final stage the *status exinanitionis* was maintained by a persistent and invincible will. Thus, as Gregory pointed out, the submission to mortal infirmity was throughout an act of Divine power.¹

3. *Christ's submission to temptation*

He hath suffered being tempted; in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin. In such terms does an apostolic writer² insist on the truth that our Lord had a moral nature akin to ours; that He was *perfected* through moral discipline; that He *learned obedience* and submitted to the ordinary laws of human probation. Temptation was a part of that average human experience by which our Lord was prepared for the effective fulfilment of His high-priestly work. It was a training in the power of sympathy, and of equitable judgment in regard to human sin, which befitted one who reveals Himself as Saviour and Judge of mankind. The capacity for feeling sympathy depends, not on such intuition as a Divine being might have of the force of temptation, but

¹ Cp. Aug. *de Trin.* viii. 11. There is a passage in Cyril's works which suggests the same idea of one and the same person appearing in two different capacities, spheres, or relationships, which is worth quoting:—

“For just as the earthly emperor, if he should ever wish to appear in the guise of a consul, does not therefore cease to be emperor, nor in any degree lose his existing authority, but continues one and the same person, holding the consular office in addition to the imperial dignity; and were one to designate him ‘emperor,’ one would be aware that it was actually he who was also investing himself with the guise of the consul; and conversely, were one to call him ‘consul,’ one would be aware that he was also emperor;—so likewise our Lord Jesus Christ was ever Son of God, being by nature very God; but having in the latter days assumed also the nature of man, He yet remaineth one and the same person, whether He be called God, or man, or Jesus” (*Quod B. Virgo deipara sit*, xiv, Migne, *P.G.* 76, p. 272).

² Heb. ii. 18, iv. 15; cp. v. 2, 8, 9.

on actual experience of its pressure. So S. Chrysostom observes, "Not merely as God does He know, but also as man. He learned through the trial wherewith He was tried."¹ It is part of the perfection of His example that He willed to undergo the common discipline of human life, that the tempted might be upheld not only by the aid of His grace, but by the assurance of His fellow-feeling.

The following are the most important doctrinal points in relation to this subject:—

1. Christ's human nature was sinless. This is a truth required not only by the facts of His life and the impression produced on His followers by His words and works, but, as Christians have universally acknowledged, by the very conditions of a true redemption. The redemption of man means the union of His nature with God. It was necessary that He who came into saving contact with human nature should be none lower than *the Holy One of God*. It is a reasonable conclusion that the entail of transmitted sin should be cut off by the supernatural birth: for sin belonged to man by descent; it was not an original defect of human nature, but an acquired taint. The flesh of the Redeemer was sinless, though He came into the world *in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin*.²

¹ Chrys. *hom. ad Hebr.* ii. 18, quoted by Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 59. Cp. Orig. *in Num. hom.* xiv. 2: "Non probata vero nec examinata virtus nec virtus est."

² Rom. viii. 3. See Aug. *op. imperf. c. Jul.* iv. 57, and *de Trin.* xiii. 23. Cp. also the statement of the synod of Ancyra: ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας γενόμενον γενέσθαι μὲν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τοῖς αἰτίοις τῆς ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμαρτίας, πείνης φαμέν καὶ δίψης καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, μὴ γενέσθαι δὲ ἐν ταύτῳ τῆς σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας (ap. Epiph. lxxiii. 8). So 9: ὑπομένων δὲ τὰ σαρκὸς προειρημένα πάθη οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἁμαρτητικῶς ἐκινεῖτο. On the supernatural birth of our Lord, it must suffice to refer to a recent work, Gore's *Dissertations*, no. 1.

Further, the manhood of Jesus was exempt from any inward propensity to sin, any capacity of sinful self-assertion. He was sinless because He could not *will to sin*. He had indeed in their balanced perfection and purity all the human faculties to which temptation makes its appeal; but there was nothing within Him which responded to the appeal; no tainted disposition which lusted after evil. *In Him is no sin*, says S. John.¹ In Him accordingly as the perfect Son of Man is revealed the fact that sin, as we know it, is the disorder² and corruption of nature, not its essential truth or necessary condition. Christ possessed our nature in its primal perfection, without that which is its fault and defect. In Him the will, the defect of which constitutes sin, was essentially good and upright, and was kept from swerving by the power of the Word to which it was absolutely surrendered. S. Augustine very clearly states the truth: "We say not that Christ could not feel evil concupiscence in virtue of the blessedness of possessing a flesh removed from our senses [docetism]; but we maintain that He had no evil concupiscence in virtue of His sinless holiness, and the fact that His flesh was not begotten according to the ordinary law of generation . . . Yet Christ might have experienced this concupiscence had He possessed it; and He might have possessed it had He willed so to do; but God forbid that He should will."³ In a word, Christ could not *will to sin*. As Tertullian expresses the same truth, to Him belonged the very flesh

¹ 1 S. Jo. iii. 5.

² ἀνομία, 1 S. Jo. iii. 4; cp. *Lux Mundi*, App. ii. "The Christian Doctrine of Sin." "Ath.," c. *Apoll.* i. 12, 14, insists that it is Manichæism to hold *φυσικὴν εἶναι τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*.

³ The passage (slightly paraphrased above) occurs in Aug. *op. imperf. c. Jul.* iv. 48. The last words are the most important:—"Hanc cupiditatem Christus et sentire posset, si haberet; et habere, si vellet. Sed absit ut vellet." Cp. Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo?* ii. 10.

which in fallen man is sinful; He was exempt, not from the substance and material of human flesh, but from its corruption and fault. "In wearing our flesh, He made it His own; in making it His own, He made it sinless."¹

2. Yet temptation to Christ was real, though it was sinless in origin, and left Him sinless in the result. For He was not exempt from the ordinary, simple, and sinless instincts of human nature; those physical and mental affections² and innocent instincts, to which some things are necessarily desirable and others abhorrent, existed in Him in their simple integrity; such affections as hunger and thirst, weariness and desire of repose, capacity for toil and sorrow, repugnancy to suffer, and the shrinking from death. Thus temptation in its strict sense would result whenever the gratification of even one innocent affection was contrary to the Divine will, either in respect of time or occasion. "Every such conjuncture must produce a conflict between duty and these necessary instincts of humanity, sufficient to constitute temptation in the strictest sense."³ Although therefore, as we have pointed out, there were no *tendencies* to evil in Christ's human nature, though every natural power and faculty was ever kept in perpetual fidelity to the will of God, though sin could have for Him no "enticing" power,⁴ and could produce no excitement or illusion in His mind, He could nevertheless share with the tempted the fixed attitude of resistance to moral evil; and the maintenance of that attitude would depend in His case, as in ours, on a continuous exercise of will under manifold and painful

¹ Tert. *de Carne Chr.* xvi., xvii. (an important passage).

² Τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ ἀδιάβλητα παθήματα. Jo. Dam. *de orth. fid.* iii. 20.

³ W. H. Mill, *Sermons on the Temptation*, no. ii. p. 35. Cp. Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.* v. 48. 9.

⁴ Cp. S. James i. 14.

pressure. For Him too obedience took the form of effort and self-sacrifice. His will battled with desire, though it was desire always innocent, natural, necessary. He was really tempted to evade the law of holy obedience,¹ and it would accordingly seem to follow that in some sense the Deity of Christ was "quiescent in His temptation."² The Deity conferred on His human nature just such strength as was "infallibly sufficient, but not *more* than sufficient to sustain Him in conflict and bear Him through the fearful strife."

3. Thus the victory of Christ is an ethical and real one, not "necessary" in the sense that the power of the indwelling Deity overbore the free moral liberty of Christ's human will. He was free, though His victory was inevitable in virtue of the unction of the Holy Spirit that rested upon Him. He cannot be thought to have repelled the enemy's assaults "like smoke."³ Rather His human nature in the power of the Spirit was enabled to prevail over temptation, just as in a lower degree His members are enabled to prevail, through the power of the Spirit, yet not without acute suffering and even an agony of conflict. Throughout His trial the will of Christ was acting as ideally man's will ought ever to act. It was truly "free," just because it clung with unswerving fidelity to the will of God, in spite of His capacity for suffering temptation, and His possession of the faculties which ordinarily are employed in sinful

¹ Cp. Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, note C. Cp. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, pp. 266 ff.

² Irenæus, *ut sup.* Cp. Bruce, *l.c.* p. 269.

³ As Jo. Damasc. asserts, *de orth. fid.* iii. 20. Hilary maintains the same position in effect when he teaches (docetically) that our Lord was not subject to pain or fear. See p. 64 above. On the relation of the work of the Holy Spirit to the temptation, see Mill, *op. cit.* pp. 37-48.

action.¹ But we must remember that there was present with Christ's human nature a countervailing force which enabled Him to conquer the temptation by which He was beset, not coercing His human will, but acting upon it morally in the way of constraining appeal.

It is partly in virtue of this unswerving fidelity to Divine control and direction that our Lord is called in Scripture the *captain* or *leader of faith*: *faithful to Him that appointed Him*.² That He suffered as we suffered, that He was tried and tempted, and was subject to human limitations, are facts of the Gospel narrative to which we must be true, in spite of the difficulties which *a priori* suggest themselves when we confess that Christ is very God. "We may construct what appear to be conclusive arguments to show that since the Lord Jesus Christ was a Divine person, He must have known all things, must have been inaccessible to temptation, could never have had occasion to pray."³ So men have reasoned in effect—even thinkers so illustrious as Thomas Aquinas. But demonstrations of what must have been can avail little, at least in the judgment of instructed Christians, against the express testimony of Holy Writ. "Let this be our wisdom—to be sure

¹ Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, xxii. 30. 3: "Primum liberum arbitrium quod homini datum est, quando primum creatus est rectus, *potuit non peccare*, sed potuit et peccare; hoc autem novissimum eo potentius erit quo *peccare non poterit*. . . . Primum liberum arbitrium *posse non peccare*; novissimum, *non posse peccare*." Of our Lord both assertions are true (1) "*Potuit non peccare*": hence He possessed the faculty of sinning, had He willed to exercise it. (2) "*Non potuit peccare*." His human will, reinforced by the fulness of the Divine Spirit, could not choose to sin. As to these "old alternatives" Dr. Dale justly points out that "they are metaphysical, not moral, alternatives; they are philosophical abstractions, and do not cover the whole of life . . . Paradoxical as it may seem, moral inability may be the highest form of moral freedom" (*Christian Doctrine*, note H, p. 293).

² Heb. xii. 2, iii. 2. ³ R. W. Dale, *Christian Doctrine*, p. 75.

that the earnest desire to seek truth is a safer way than the presumption that we know what we know not."¹

4. *Christ's growth in knowledge as Man*

We find that the Gospels bear witness to a real development in our Lord's human nature, and it is important to collect the various statements which bear on this point before attempting to construct any theory as to their meaning.

The evangelists, then, attest the natural growth of Christ's bodily and mental faculties. *He advanced* (προέκοπτεν) *in wisdom and stature* (S. Luke ii. 52). There was growth in the powers not only of body, but also of mind and intellect. Moreover, the Gospels represent Christ as occasionally asking for information,² and occasionally surprised;³ while as to one matter in particular He professes ignorance.⁴ All these facts point to a certain limitation of knowledge; but they are to be qualified by those passages which ascribe to our Lord a supernatural illumination of mind. Thus He is spoken of as possessing a power of supernatural intuition into the hearts and thoughts of men.⁵ There are, indeed, passages which imply more than this. Christ occasionally speaks as one who is conscious of an eternal Sonship,⁶ as one who has an immediate knowledge of the Father, such as can only come to other men, in their measure, mediately, through union with Him.⁷ Speaking generally, however, the phenomena recorded

¹ Aug. *de Trin.* ix. 1.

² S. Mk. vi. 38, viii. 5, ix. 21; S. Lk. viii. 30; S. Jo. vi. 5, 6, xi. 34.

³ S. Mk. vi. 6, vii. 18, viii. 17-21.

⁴ S. Mt. xxiv. 36; S. Mk. xiii. 32.

⁵ S. Jo. i. 48; S. Mt. xii. 25; S. Jo. xvi. 19.

⁶ Cp. Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 253.

⁷ S. Mt. xi. 27; S. Lk. x. 22; cp. S. Jo. i. 18, iii. 35.

in the Gospels point to a human consciousness in Christ, subject to natural limitations, but supernaturally intensified and illuminated. The insight and foresight vouchsafed to our Lord's human spirit seems in fact to be analogous to that exercised by prophets and apostles. The indwelling presence of Deity does not altogether annihilate the action of human faculties, but intensifies and heightens it.¹ The fulness of the Divine Spirit which sustained and illuminated our Lord's human faculties does not appear to have involved a Divine omniscience, nor to have suspended altogether the ordinary laws and limitations of human intelligence.

We are then face to face with two divergent series of considerations: those which the Gospel narrative generally appears to suggest, and those which might be deduced *a priori* from the truth of Christ's Divinity.

It may be well briefly to describe the different lines of treatment accorded to the facts by ancient thinkers.

(1) It was somewhat inconsistently taught by a party of monophysites in Egypt (the *Agnoetæ*) that the human soul of our Lord was like ours in every respect, even in ignorance. It does not appear that they actually attributed ignorance to the Logos.² They seem, however, to have been regarded as heretics, though their teaching ran counter to the general current of monophysite opinion.

(2) Others reasoning *a priori* took what we can only call a docetic view. Our Lord's "advance" or "growth" in knowledge and wisdom was only exhibitivè. His human soul possessed perfect knowledge in virtue of its union with the Divine Logos. Accordingly His "growth" was nothing more than a *progressive manifestation* of the

¹ See on all this subject, C. Gore, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 147 ff., and *Dissertations*, no. 2; also Dale, *Christian Doctrine*, note F.

² So, e.g., Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 470; but see Gore, *Dissertations*, pp. 155 f. Cp. p. 120 above.

omniscience which He actually possessed. Thus Cyril of Alexandria attributes to Christ what he calls an "economic" ignorance: that is, such ignorance as properly accorded with the manhood He had assumed. Christ accordingly "seems" ignorant of that which, as man, it did not behove Him to know. Cyril even declares that He "pretends" not to know the day of judgment.¹ Of this theory it may be remarked (*a*) that it conflicts with the simple impression made by the Gospel narrative, which certainly does not suggest any notion of a merely simulated limitation of faculties; (*b*) that as actually held by Cyril it involves an inconsistency with his general conception of our Lord's humanity, which in the *physical* sphere at least he admits to have been subject to the ordinary laws of natural development; (*c*) that Cyril's view is dictated by his anxiety to vindicate the reality of the union of the human with the Divine nature which Nestorianism denied. To allow that Christ was really ignorant on any matter would have seemed to Cyril to favour the Nestorian idea that He was a human person intimately associated with the Logos,—not personally one with Him. We are in fact bound to admit that Cyril's theory appeared to be justified by the acknowledged dogmatic truth of which he was the most conspicuous defender. Moreover, the same general line of treatment is found in the Western Father Hilary.² In its more developed form this view of Christ's human nature meets us in John of Damascus, who goes so far as to declare peremptorily that whoever teaches that Christ really advanced (προέκοπτεν) in knowledge is practically a Nestorian, and

¹ The most important passages are given in Bruce, *Humil. of Christ*, Appendix, pp. 366 f. Cp. Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 469, note 3.

² See Hil. *de Trin.* ix. 62, quoted by Swayne, *Enquiry into the Nature of our Lord's Knowledge as Man*, p. 32.

holds the doctrine of a mere relationship between the Logos and the human nature; a special indwelling, and no more (σχετική ἔνωσις, ψιλὴ ἐνοίκησις).¹ Consistently with this, Thomas Aquinas denies to our Lord, even in His human nature, the graces of faith or hope, because they involve a certain state of imperfection. His knowledge was from the first "infinite in the sense of embracing all reality, though not all possibility"; and of course did not admit of growth.² It may be added that this has been the prevalent doctrine on the subject since the thirteenth century. Petavius, and our own Hooker, closely follow Aquinas in distinguishing between the knowledge of the world of *ideas* and the knowledge of all *facts* past, present, and future. This latter knowledge they believe to have been communicated to our Lord as man, though not the former, which belongs only to God Himself.³

(3) A view that appears to do more justice to the recorded facts is that of Athanasius and the Fathers who preceded him. Such writers as Irenæus and Origen, intent on establishing the truth and reality of the human nature in Christ, allow a true human development and limitation of knowledge. Thus Origen, in a passage of great beauty, says, "We cannot indeed say of wisdom in itself that it was ignorant and acquired knowledge by learning; but this is certainly true of wisdom as it was manifested in flesh. For Christ must needs learn to stammer and speak like a child with children."⁴ The general line,

¹ *de orth. fid.* iii. 21, 22.

² See Bruce, *op. cit.* p. 80; cp. *Summa*, iii. 7. 3 and 4. Christ had not *faith*, "cum a primo instanti conceptionis suæ plene per essentiam Deum viderit"; nor *hope*, "cum a principio suæ conceptionis plene fruitionem divinam habuerit"; see also qu. ix. artt. 1-4; x. art. 2; xi. artt. 1, 5; xii. artt. 1, 2.

³ Petav. *de Incarn.* xi. 2, § 12; Hooker, *E.P.* v. 54. Cp. Swayne, *op. cit.* p. 27; Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, ii. 162 f. See also Gore, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 151 ff. and note 48.

⁴ *Hom. in Jerem.* i. 8, quoted by Dorner, *div. i.* vol. ii. p. 136.

indeed, of early writers, especially Athanasius, is to draw a sharp distinction between the two natures without pressing further than necessary the question of the limitations of the inferior nature. The passage of Origen just quoted expresses in a simple and homely way the conclusion which is repeatedly insisted on by Athanasius. "In the Godhead there cannot be ignorance; but ignorance is proper to the flesh" (ἴδιον τῆς σαρκός).¹ He seems, in fact, to allow the possibility of a real ignorance in our Lord as man; but there is a certain hesitancy in his statements which is to be explained, partly by genuine reluctance to speculate on a subject so full of mystery, partly by the fact that his main purpose is to defend our Lord's true Deity.² Perhaps the most valuable suggestion of Athanasius is the simple one that the limitations of Christ's humanity were conditioned by a purpose of love.³ To the same effect is the teaching of Gregory Nazianzen (*Orat.* xxx. 15). It would seem on the whole that a return to the facts recorded in the Gospel will incline us to agree with these earlier Fathers in leaving the subject of Christ's human knowledge in the mystery with which the scriptural statements surround it, contenting ourselves with the following conclusions:—

i. The limitation of our Lord's knowledge, whatever was its degree, was a fact resulting from *love*. We have no right to set arbitrary limits to the possibilities of

¹ Ath. *Orat. c. Arian.* iii. 37, 38.

² Athanasius gives more than one explanation of S. Mk. xiii. 32. (1) Christ *knew* the day, as He shows by predicting all that was to happen before it. He said He knew not as *man* (σάρκα ἀγνοῦσαν ἐνεδύσατο· σαρκικῶς ἔλεγεν οὐκ οἶδα, *Orat. c. Arian.* iii. 42-46). (2) He knew, but may have said He knew not, τῆς ἡμῶν ἔνεκα λυσιτελείας (this is very tentatively suggested). (3) He said it to stop questioning.

³ *Orat.* iii. 43 (φιλανθρωπία). See reff. to Iren. and Greg. Naz. in Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 468, 469. Cp. Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, ii. pp. 161 f. Swayne, *op. cit.* 26-32.

self-sacrifice and self-humiliation for a Being whose essence is love. It is ethically conceivable, though on metaphysical grounds insuperably difficult, that a Divine Being should accept even the limitations of human knowledge. Thus it has been well suggested by Lange that Christ's voluntary acceptance of the mental conditions of a true human lot, are a just rebuke to the curiosity—the readiness to grasp at a higher knowledge—which has been to human beings so often the occasion of sin.¹ Indeed, if we contemplate the whole subject from this point of view, we shall not allow speculative difficulties to rob us of important ethical lessons. The action of love is antecedently incalculable both in its nature and effects. It is the truest wisdom on this, as on many other subjects, to check the promptings of restless curiosity; to remember that *He that loveth not knoweth not God, for God is love.*²

ii. Our Lord in His human nature possessed an *infallible knowledge*, so far as was required by the conditions and purpose of His incarnation. His mission was to reveal God, the destiny, needs, and true condition of man, the way of redemption, the laws of the spiritual world. On these subjects the purpose of love, which inspired His coming, required that He should teach with absolute and infallible authority. He is *the Truth*; and all things that it is needful for men to know for the conduct of life, and for the apprehension of God, He teaches infallibly. “He used and displayed an infused and perfect wisdom.”³

¹ Lange, *Leben Jesu*, p. 1280 (referring to S. Mk. xiii. 32). “Er setzt sein nicht-wissen von jenem Moment als ein heiliges nicht-wissen-wollen dem sündhaften wissen-wollen seiner Jünger entgegen, die göttliche Erhabenheit dieses nicht-wissens der menschlichen Kleinlichkeit eines vermeintlichen wissens dieser Art.”

² 1 S. Jo. iv. 8.

³ Swayne, *op. cit.* p. 42.

But as we do not know the requirements of the "economy," so we have no need to answer the question, whether outside its necessary scope our Lord might or might not be subject to the ordinary limitations of human knowledge. It might be suggested, for instance, that "the love which required Him to know that Lazarus was dead, did not require that He should know where Lazarus was buried." But here again it is better to fall back on the assurance that if He was ignorant on any point, He was ignorant through His willingness perfectly to share in our human experience. Thus both His infallible knowledge and His human nescience spring from one and the same root of Divine love. If in any degree He willed to partake, as the Gospels seem to suggest, of a creaturely ignorance, He did so from motives of pity and sympathy for man, and because such nescience was in no sense a hindrance to the purpose of His incarnation. We are struck, indeed, not only by the range and profundity of His disclosures concerning the nature and kingdom of God, but also by His great reserve in teaching. There are many points on which He refuses to pronounce, as if they lay outside the scope and requirements of the "economy." He does not pronounce on social or political questions; nor reveal facts which it lay within the province of ordinary human faculties to ascertain—facts of science, history, or criticism. This circumstance has hardly received the attention it deserves.¹ There may have been things which, as man, our Lord did not know; but His nescience was the result of a deliberate act of His own will. His consciousness, as we may surmise,

¹ See, however, the admirable introductory chapter of Mr. Latham's *Pastor Pastorum*. The writer forcibly points out our Lord's invariable respect for human personality and His carefulness to stimulate the action of men's faculties. "With Christ," he remarks, "the part that the man had to do of himself went for infinitely more than what was done for him by another" (p. 6).

was limited, but such limitation did not necessarily mean that He was Himself deceived; still less that He could mislead others. For we must believe that He would always be conscious of such limitation, and His perfect fidelity to the Holy Spirit of truth would assuredly restrain Him from making any pronouncement on points lying outside the range of His human knowledge.¹ His perfect truthfulness thus appears as much in His silence as in His utterances. It would be in accord with His usual method of sympathy to confine Himself to the ordinary modes of expression current in His own age, and even to accept its scientific or literary conceptions. The question is whether a Divine and perfect knowledge on such points was really necessary for His purpose; whether nescience in any degree interfered with His true work,—the revelation of the glory and love of God, the spiritual enlightenment and healing of mankind. Thus we may connect the fact of Christ's conscious and voluntary reserve in teaching with the fact of His true development under human limitations. This reserve is a difficulty and stumblingblock only to those who argue that our Lord, being Divine, must have intended to teach positively on all subjects which He incidentally touches, whereas we have good reason for thinking that as man He did not transcend the ordinary knowledge or conceptions of His time in matters not affecting the primary purpose of His coming. It is admitted that He never teaches positively on points of science; analogy makes it equally probable that He never taught as to the authorship of different books of Scripture, or their mode of composition. As it is likely enough that we may overrate the importance of certainty on these points, so it is certain that there are no statements of our Lord which indisputably prove either that He was possessed

¹ See Swayne, *op. cit.* pp. 16-18.

of modern critical knowledge, or that He intended to finally endorse the traditional views of His countrymen in regard to the nature of their Scriptures.¹

The conclusion at which we may most safely arrive is that in regard to this mysterious subject a sense of our own ignorance ought to play "a much larger part than it usually does."² We may well shrink from constructing any general theory as to our Lord's human knowledge. We are too apt to discuss and dispute where we should wonder and adore. It is the general aim of this book to recall students to the temper of sobriety and holy fear which marks the greatest among the ancient theologians. The subject we have been studying is one of those of which Augustine says: *de credendis nulla infidelitate dubitemus, de intelligendis nulla temeritate affirmemus.*

§ IV. THE WORK OF CHRIST IN RELATION TO HIS PERSON

There are three aspects of our Lord's work which have to be considered in close connection with the catholic doctrine concerning His person. These aspects must be dealt with in close mutual connection, if their true significance is to be understood. ✓ As our example, Christ is the revealer of the will and mind of God; as our High Priest, He represents humanity before God in offering an atoning and all-sufficient sacrifice; as the second Adam He infuses into His members the re-creative energy of His own exalted manhood. ✓

I. First, then, Christ is the perfect revealer of God; the teacher of truth; the Word of God *in whom are hid*

¹ On this subject, see Driver, *Introd. to the O.T.* pref. xviii, xix; Plummer in *Expositor* for July 1891; besides the works of Dr. Dale and Mr. Gore already referred to. See also some valuable words of Dr. Sanday, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 417 ff. as to the "law of parsimony" which underlies revelation.

² *Life and Letters of Dean Church*, p. 268.

all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge; the Truth itself. In the exercise of His prophetic office He preaches the kingdom of God, and reveals its principles and mysteries. He elucidates the moral law, and proclaims the Divine requirements for man. ✓ Both in His authoritative teaching and in His example He makes known the will of God; and in following the footsteps of His most holy life we are taught *how to walk and to please God*. ✓

What, then, is the significance of Christ's example? Athanasius observes that owing to man's mutable nature he needed an immutable example "in order that he might possess the unalterable righteousness of the Word as a pattern and example in the pursuit of virtue."¹ Consequently the true value of Christ's example from one point of view depends on His being unlike other men; and, indeed, the true pattern of manhood must be sinless, because sinlessness is a necessary element in the truth and perfection of human nature. In Christ is embodied the ideal of humanity—that which it was intended to be according to God's creative purpose; and His example assures us that sin is no essential part of human nature. While, therefore, as the pattern of manhood Christ is very man, yet as the archetype and restorer of human nature He must needs embody it in its ideal perfection.²

The question here naturally arises whether an example is of any avail unless there be *absolute identity* of moral circumstances; how can the sinless man be an object of imitation to the sin-stricken? In answer to this difficulty two considerations may be urged: (α) The

¹ *Orat. c. Ar. i. 51.*

² Cp. Aug. *de Trin.* iv. 4: "Non enim congruit peccator justo, sed congruit homini homo. Adjungens ergo nobis similitudinem humanitatis suæ, abstulit dissimilitudinem iniquitatis nostræ."

circumstances of Christ's human life are *sufficiently* similar to our own to enable Him to be in a true sense our pattern. It is the main object of the Epistle to the Hebrews to bring out this general similarity of conditions between Christ and those whom He deigned to call His brethren. The force of example, it may be admitted, does depend on general equality in the conditions; but these, it may be urged, are fulfilled in the human life of Jesus Christ. He like other men was subject to suffering and to the sinless infirmities of human nature; He was capable of being tried and tempted, and so far was not exempt from the ordinary laws of moral probation. He was like us in possessing a nature not exempted by its union with the Word from keen distresses and the assaults of temptation. Accordingly the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews is justified in speaking of Him as *in all things made like unto His brethren*.¹ His was a normal life in respect of its general conditions and experiences; "it was a universal human life in all its aspects of work and prayer, of waiting and action, at home and abroad, in popularity and ignominy, with poor and with rich, in success and in failure, through all the stages of human growth."² His was a normal human life, "for if He did not consist of the same nature as ours, in vain does He enjoin us to imitate our Master. If He was of some different substance to us, why does He bid me, with my natural weakness, act like Him? and how can He be good and righteous?"³ (b) Again, it must be borne in mind that, together with the presentation of an example, Jesus Christ reveals to us the means and conditions of renewal after His image and likeness. Pelagianism,

¹ Heb. ii. 17.

² See an article on "Our Lord's Human Example" in *Ch. Quarterly Rev.* no. 32; Martensen, *Christian Ethics* (general), § 72.

³ Hippol. *Philos.* x. 33.

which believed in man's inherent ability to raise himself, only asked for an example which man could follow in his unassisted strength. But Pelagianism was based on a shallow conception of sin, as an evil not of such gravity as to need satisfaction or atonement; as a misuse indeed of human freedom, but one resulting rather from weakness and miscalculation than from a radical defect of nature;¹ and the average experience of human nature shows that the question whether man needs an example, is inseparable from the further question whether he needs a Saviour. The mystery of salvation, of man's reunion with God, forms the dogmatic counterpart to the mystery of sin and the severance it has wrought between the Creator and the creature. The Church's doctrine of man's re-creation is based on a profound conception of all that is involved in human sin. Looking at man's actual condition, we see that if Jesus Christ had been revealed only as a pattern of righteousness, His coming would have plunged mankind into deeper despair than that in which they were already held captive. But the example exhibited by one, who is also Saviour and Restorer, stimulates us to imitation. And the assurance of Divine aid is the more welcome when we realise that men are called to follow not merely the footsteps of an earthly life, but the perfections of a risen and exalted Saviour. The Christian life, so far as it is conformed to its true pattern, will not consist merely in the fulfilment of every known duty which different relationships impose; it will bear the marks of a life *hidden with Christ in God*: separation from the world, consecration, heavenly tranquillity and freedom.²

¹ Cp. Dieringer, *Lehrb. der Kath. dogmatik*, § 94. An illustration of the Pelagian temper is found in Abelard. See Bern. *de error. Abael.* vii. 17, ix. 23; cp. also Aug. *de gratia*, esp. 43-45.

² Cp. Milligan, *The Resurrection of our Lord*, pp. 173 ff.

II. Next, Christ is our High Priest, that is our Redeemer; and this aspect of His work brings us to the doctrine of the atonement, the history of which has been already briefly traced. For our present purpose nothing more can be attempted than to indicate the main points to be studied in connection with the redemptive work of Christ.

i. The necessity of atonement.¹

Rom. iii. 25 teaches that the Divine patience with a sinful world had its ground in the future coming of Christ. The Divine holiness had never been completely vindicated or manifested, even in the great historic judgments in which inspired prophecy had traced the avenging hand of God: the Divine resentment against sin—the law of God that it must suffer—had not before Christ's coming been allowed to have free course. A signal display *then* of Divine righteousness was rendered necessary by God's past pretermission of human sin. The need of atonement thus lies in the outraged holiness of God; sin being His mortal enemy, and the necessary cause of man's alienation from Him, there falls upon Him the moral necessity of "asserting the principle" that sin deserves to suffer. The atonement is, in fact, in its primary aspect, the manifest embodiment of God's judgment against human sin.² And sacrifice is the recognition by man's conscience that such an atonement for sin is natural and necessary; it witnesses to his instinctive anticipation of punishment.³ The institution of sacrifice indeed, which had existed from the dawn of human history, had gradually come to have a spiritual

¹ The question has often been asked, Why God could not restore man by a mere *fiat* of His will? An outline of answers that might be, or have been, given will be found in an appended note, p. 326.

² See generally Dale on *The Atonement*.

³ See a striking passage on the witness of conscience in W. Bagehot, *Literary Studies*, vol. ii. 65.

significance. As the sense of guilt was deepened in man, as his conscience became more perfectly educated, sacrifice had lost its earliest character as an oblation of creaturely gratitude and joy, and assumed the aspect of a propitiatory offering for sin; and so far in sacrifice was embodied man's recognition of the fact that sin deserves suffering.

ii. The essence of atonement.

Man stands over against God as a moral being, and accordingly atonement is essentially a moral fact: the reunion of sundered wills, the reconciliation of hearts, the restoration of a broken harmony, the removal of the causes of moral alienation. The system of sacrifice, as organised and developed in the priestly law of Israel, was the visible and speaking embodiment of three main ideas: those of willing and entire self-surrender in a life of unbroken obedience (typified by the whole burnt-offering); the submissive acceptance of death as the righteous penalty of sin (the sin-offering); the renewal of fellowship with God in a feast of communion (the peace-offering). Here, then, are prefigured the moral elements in the atoning work of Christ. The only possible reconciliation between God and man is one that involves the surrender of man's will to God.¹

iii. The atonement fulfilled by Christ.

In Christ man presents himself before his Maker offering submission: *When He cometh into the world, He saith . . . Lo, I come to do Thy will, O God.*²

For Christ wears our human nature, and is our natural representative before God. In Him humanity is comprised; His acts are ours; His submission, His acceptance of death, His exaltation are ours. He fulfils each

¹ "The supremacy of God's will is the supremacy of good. . . . Salvation can only come by sin being vanquished, by the surrender of the sinner to God, not of God to sin" (Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 481).

² Heb. x. 5, 9.

necessary condition of atonement. First, [✓] His life is one of spotless, unswerving obedience, a life perfectly well pleasing to the Father. His active fulfilment of the Divine will is a no less essential element in His atoning work than His suffering. [✓] Scripture lays continual stress on the perfect voluntariness and freedom of Christ's work. In His obedience to the law of God, in His fulfilment of the obligations of humanity, His self-oblation was free; all rested on His own self-determination. If the first Adam died because he must, the second Adam died because He willed.¹ The great characteristic of His life is summed up by S. Paul in the one word *obedience*;² and it is noticeable that this feature in the atoning work has never been overlooked even by those who lay special stress upon the sacrificial death upon the Cross.³ Secondly, He accepts death on our behalf as the due penalty of human sin. His thoughts about sin are those of God; He hates it, and judges it in union with the heart and mind of God. [✓] And by the surrender of His life He makes an act of homage and representative submission to the justice of the Divine sentence on sin, retaining throughout His perfect freedom of will; He died, says Augustine, *quia voluit, quando*

¹ Dieringer, *op. cit.* § 92.

² Rom. v. 19. Cp. the reference of Ps. xl. to Christ in Heb. x.

³ See, e.g., Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo?* i. 10, 11, and the Lutheran *Formula Concordiæ*, p. 684: "Eam ob causam ipsius obedientia non ea tantum, quâ Patri paruit in tota sua passione et morte, verum etiam, quâ nostrâ causâ sponte sese legi subiecit eamque obedientia illa sua implevit, nobis ad justitiam imputatur, ita ut Deus propter totam obedientiam, quam Christus agendo et patiando in vita et morte sua nostra causa Patri suo cælesti præstitit, peccata nobis remittat, pro bonis et justis nos reputet et salute æterna donet." 697, "Fides nostra respicit in personam Christi, quatenus illa pro nobis legi sese subiecit, peccata nostra pertulit, et cum ad Patrem suum iret, solidam, absolutam, et perfectissimam obedientiam jam inde a nativitate sua sanctissima usque ad mortem Patri suo cælesti pro nobis miserrimis peccatoribus præstitit" (ap. Winer, *Confessions etc.* p. 131).

voluit, quomodo voluit,¹ and the acceptable element in His self-oblation was not the suffering, or the shedding of the sacred blood, but the unswerving will of the sufferer. *Non mors, sed voluntas placuit sponte morientis*.² But in the ancient sin-offering the death of the victim was only an initial stage in the great sacrificial transaction; and in conformity with the legal type, Christ, living through and beyond death, must needs pass within the veil as our perfected high-priest. The atoning work is not complete until, by His ascension, Christ passes into the Holy of Holies, which is *heaven itself*,³ *there to be manifested in the presence of God for us* as our representative. For as of old the blood of the sin-offering was sprinkled on the mercy-seat, on which the Divine presence vouchsafed to manifest itself, so the representative life of Christ is at the ascension finally brought into fellowship with God and consecrated to the life of Divine service; the ascended Lord taking with Him those for whom He died, "presents them in Himself to the eternal Father."⁴ Finally, the atoning sacrifice freely offered once for all, becomes the groundwork of a feast of communion. The "benefits which Christ by His precious bloodshedding hath obtained for us," are continually imparted in the sacrament of Holy Communion as the means of our spiritual sustenance and continual renewal; and the gift which He bestows is that of His precious body and blood; the very human nature which has been spiritualised by the passage through death, becomes *quickening Spirit* by which man is

¹ *de Trin.* iv. 16, 17.

² Bernard, *de err. Abael.* viii. 21. Cp. Anselm's "acceptæ bonæ voluntatis spontanea et amata tenacitas" (*Cur Deus Homo?* i. 10).

³ Heb. ix. 24.

⁴ Milligan, *The Resurrection of our Lord*, p. 179. So Christ *πρωτότης τῷ θεῷ τὸν ἄνθρωπον* (Iren. iii. 18. 7). Cp. Westcott, *Ep. to the Hebr.* p. 263: "The end of the restored fellowship is energetic service to Him who alone lives and gives life" (*λατρεῖν θεῷ ζῶντι*).

cleansed, healed, and hallowed.¹ Only so is the fulfilment of the Old Testament types rendered complete. The atonement culminates in the indwelling of the Redeemer in the redeemed.

iv. The Redeemer's person regarded as the ground of the efficacy and of the Divine acceptance of the atoning work.

Christ is the true mediator between God and man in that He shares the nature of both; He is "that mean between both which is both"; and the catholic doctrine of the atonement can only be understood, and indeed can only justify itself to our conscience and reason, by being studied in close connection with the other cardinal truth of Christianity.

Thus if Christ is *God*, we are at once relieved of some moral difficulties which are urged against the doctrine of the atonement on the basis of humanitarian views of Christ's person. Christ being very God, it is impossible to imagine any severance of will or purpose between the Father and the Son. The same zeal for holiness, the same resentment against sin burns in the heart of both Father and Son; the tender mercy of the Father, not less than the compassion of the Son, shines forth in the sacrifice on Calvary.²

"No; one in essence, one in majesty,
 Father and Son must one in counsel be;
 Not readier this to judge, or that to bless;
 In each all love, in each all holiness.
 The Father's pitying care the cross ordained;
 His own high law of right the Son sustained."³

Further, the Deity of the Son is a sufficient pledge of the validity and the efficacy of the atoning work. ✓

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 45; cp. S. Jo. vi. 51-57.

² Cp. Aug. *de Trin.* xiii. 15; and see Isai. lxiii. 5, "My fury, it upheld Me."

³ W. Bright, *Hymns and Verses*, poem on "The Atonement."

"What owes its being to God," it has been justly said, "must be well-pleasing to Him";¹ while the "infinite worth of the Son of God" is a guarantee of the infinite efficacy of His work. His Divine person imparts immeasurable grace and power to the actions and sufferings of His humanity. For "our nature is His own; He carried it with Him through life to death, He made it bear and do that which was utterly beyond its own native strength. His eternal person gave infinite merit to its acts and its sufferings."² And indeed the various effects ascribed to His death by New Testament writers are only such as we should expect, He being what the Church believes Him to be: the removal of guilt, the conquest of death, the overthrow of Satan, the reconciliation of man to God, the opening of heaven to all believers.

On the other hand, if Christ is *very man*, in the truth of our nature, His sacrifice necessarily wears the character of a representative act. It is the head of the human race who is sinless, who is perfectly well-pleasing to God, who makes a supreme act of reparation and satisfaction to the Divine holiness. He suffers *for many*, not only as a substitute who, from pure love to man, takes his burden upon himself, pays his debt, and suffers in his stead; but also as representative, offering the sacrifice which man was too sin-stained to present, discharging the obligations which we were too weak to fulfil. Thus Christ was our substitute, not through some arbitrary arrangement by which the innocent was compelled to suffer for the guilty, but in virtue of His representative character as the head and flower of our race, in whom humanity is "summed up," and in whom consequently man not only makes an

¹ Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 486.

² Liddon, *Univ. Sermon.* ser. 1, serm. ix. "The Divine Victim." Cp. Aug. *de Trin.* iv. 19 (a great passage).

act of acceptable submission to the Father's righteousness, but is exalted to the very throne of God.¹

v. The effects of the atonement.²

Holy Scripture and the Fathers describe, under different aspects and in different modes of speech, the full effects of Christ's atoning work; and there has sometimes been danger of overpressing one particular phrase or metaphor, to the neglect of others. We find the death of Christ generally described in Scripture under the following aspects: as a means of procuring man's forgiveness; a satisfaction; a ransom; a propitiation; a vicarious death; a reconciliation.

(a) The atoning sacrifice of Christ is said to have procured our forgiveness. *Without shedding of blood there is no remission*, and that which the shedding of blood symbolises—acceptance of penalty, submission to the Divine will concerning sin—must of necessity precede forgiveness; the Divine law of righteousness must be satisfied before sinful man can be accepted with God. Christ accordingly, on behalf of man, representatively offers the submission by which alone man can find acceptance.

(b) The sacrifice of Christ is also a satisfaction for sin, an act of reparation offered to the Divine holiness. This is the point of view which is chiefly distinctive of Anselm; a debt of homage and obedience is owing on man's part to God, and sin means withholding or withdrawing from God that which is His due (*ablatus honor*). The work of Christ is restoration to God of His due; the fulfilment of His just claim (*τὸ εὐλογον*) on man; the payment of man's debt; the act of reparation for the wrong done by the creature to the Creator. Christ, in a word, takes upon Himself the whole of man's obligations in order by the

¹ See *Ath. Orat. c. Arian.* i. 41-45.

² See generally Aquinas, *Summa*, p. iii. qu. 49.

merit of His lifelong obedience to completely discharge them.

(c) Christ's sacrifice of Himself is also a ransom¹—a costly price by which redemption is achieved, *i.e.* the deliverance of humanity from slavery to sin and Satan and from the eternal punishment of sin. The words *λύτρον* and *ἀπολύτρωσις* are largely coloured by Old Testament associations. "The idea," says Bishop Westcott, "of a ransom received by the power from which the captive is delivered is practically lost in *λυτροῦσθαι*." The word, in fact, seems to imply two things: exertion of a mighty force and acquisition at a great cost.² Christ's death is in both respects a ransom: in the work of redemption we see the triumphant and irresistible display of Divine power;³ the result of redemption is only achieved at a mighty cost—we were *bought with a price*, redeemed with *the precious blood of Christ*.⁴

(d) The word propitiation (*ἱλασμός*)⁵ does not originally imply, as we are accustomed perhaps to suppose, the act of appeasing one who is angry; the Greek word expresses the alteration of circumstances or conditions which have produced the alienation. God is unchanging; and when we ascribe to Him the affection of "anger," we express in human fashion the fact of His necessary resentment against sin.⁶ God cannot welcome the impenitent sinner; He cannot treat sin as something other than it is. "Propitiation," in the New Testament sense, means an act which, so to speak, neutralises or "covers" the sin of him who is "in Christ"; who by sincere repentance

¹ S. Mt. xx. 28; cp. 1 Tim. ii. 6.

² *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, p. 296. Cf. Chrys. *ad Rom.* iii. 24.

³ Cp. Eph. i. 19 f.

⁴ 1 Cor. vi. 20; 1 Pet. i. 19.

⁵ 1 Jo. ii. 2, iv. 10.

⁶ Aug. *de Trin.* v. 17: "Sic etiam cum iratus malis dicitur et placidus bonis, illi mutantur, non ipse; sicut lux infirmis oculis aspera, firmis lenis est, ipsorum scilicet mutatione, non sua."

renews his union with the Redeemer, and "in Him" finds acceptance.¹

(e) The death of Christ is also "vicarious," in the sense that He suffered not only as our representative, but in our stead. He suffered something which we were too weak² to endure, yet which had to be endured if atonement was to be achieved. It is at this point that we touch the element of supreme mystery in the atoning work of Christ. We do not know either the precise nature of His sufferings or the exact degree in which His submission to them has exempted us from the penalties of guilt. But in any case the substitution of Christ for the guilty race depended upon, and corresponded to, the actual relation in which He stood to men as the result of His Incarnation. His representative character enabled Him to be the natural substitute for sinners, so that *He suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that He might bring us to God*.³

(f) Once more, the effect of our Lord's death was a reconciliation between God and man;⁴ an "at-one-ment" (*καταλλαγή*), putting an end to the state of alienation or enmity which resulted from human sin. "In vain it is objected that the Scripture saith our Saviour *reconciled men to God*, but nowhere teacheth that *He reconciled God to man*; for in the language of the Scripture, to reconcile a man to God is, in our vulgar language, to reconcile God to man—that is, to cause Him, who before was angry and offended with him, to be gracious and propitious to him. . . . In the like manner we are said to be reconciled unto God when God is reconciled, appeased, and become gracious and favourable unto us ;

¹ See Westcott, *Epistles of S. John*, p. 83 f.; Trench, *Synonyms of the N.T.* p. 293 f.

² Rom. v. 6.

³ 1 Pet. iii. 18, ii. 24.

⁴ Rom. v. 10; 2 Cor. v. 18; Col. i. 20.

and Christ is said to reconcile us unto God, when He hath moved and obtained of God to be reconciled unto us, when He hath appeased Him and restored us unto His favour. Thus *when we were enemies we were reconciled to God*—that is, notwithstanding He was offended with us for our sins, we were restored under His favour *by the death of His Son* (Rom. v. 10).¹ In short, the word “reconciliation,” like “propitiation,” is a description, in the terms of a human analogy, of the objective change in the relation between God and sinful man which was brought about by our Lord’s death. It has already been pointed out that the anger of God is our mode of conceiving and describing that necessary resentment with which the God of holiness must regard moral evil. Sin must inevitably be banished from the Divine presence.

Such, then, are the terms in which Scripture usually describes the effect of the Son’s atoning work. No doubt many other aspects of His sacrifice are recognised in the New Testament. Some of them are comprised in the following summary of Bernard in his treatise on the errors of Abelard: *Non mors sed voluntas placuit sponte morientis, et illa morte expungentis mortem, operantis salutem, restituentis innocentiam, triumphantis principatus et potestates, spoliantis inferos, ditantis superos, pacificantis quæ in cælo sunt et quæ in terra, omnia instaurantis.*²

✓ Christ’s sacrifice is of universal validity. He died for all, but men do not always actually appropriate the virtue of the passion, which becomes effectual for those only who by an act of faith identify themselves with the submission made on their behalf by Christ, and who are by baptism

¹ Pearson’s *Exposition of the Creed*, art. x. Pearson is arguing against the Socinian statement that in Scripture we are said to be reconciled to God, but God is not said to be reconciled to us. Cp. a passage in Aug. *de Trin.* xiii. 21, and a note in Sanday and Headlam on *Romans*, p. 129.

² *de error. Abael.* viii. 21.

really incorporated into Him, becoming thereby living members of the second Adam. The righteousness of Jesus Christ, and the virtue of His death, are really imparted to Christians in the sacrament of the new birth (Rom. vi.). They are accounted righteous, as being actual living members of a righteous person.¹

vi. The nature of Christ's sufferings.

It may be regarded as an axiom that Jesus Christ suffered, because He willed to suffer, all that a holy being could suffer on our behalf. "If the hypostatic union communicated to His sacred humanity a strength infinite in the Giver, it was only that He might suffer in proportion. . . . He suffered everything that it was possible for a human nature united to the Divine to suffer."² There is therefore reason to suppose that He could suffer the mental agony of a true and perfect contrition for the sins of men; He could sorrow for them as laid upon Himself, with a capacity of "appropriative penitence" beyond our power to realise. "He felt the heinousness of sin as being one with God; and He felt the awfulness of the curse resting upon sin as being one with each individual sinner."³

Further, Christ could endure in a real sense the penalties of sin; not indeed that we can allow, with Calvin and others, that He suffered the torments of the lost *intensively* if not *extensively*. For there is necessarily a

¹ Aquin. *Summa*, iii. 49. 1 resp.: "Sicut naturale corpus est unum ex membrorum diversitate consistens, ita tota ecclesia quæ est mysticum corpus Christi, computatur quasi una persona cum suo capite, quod est Christus." *Ibid.* 49. 3 ad 3: "Satisfactio Christi habet effectum in nobis inquantum incorporamur ei, ut membra suo capiti."

² Grou, *Manual*, etc. [Eng. tr.], p. 375.

³ R. M. Benson, *Ep. to the Romans*, p. 216. Cp. Newman, *Discourses on various occasions*, serm. on "The mental sufferings of our Lord in His passion." Bruce, *Humil. of Christ*, p. 317 f., seems too critical of this view. In Macleod Campbell, *The Atonement*, it perhaps assumes disproportionate importance; cp. Bruce, p. 351.

limit to what a sinless soul can suffer, and the atoning value of His sufferings depends, not on their quantitative or qualitative relation to the sins of men, but on the infinite dignity of the sufferer, on the perfection of His obedience and self-humiliation, and on the depth and intensity of His love. Nevertheless, Christ could indeed *taste of death*; ¹ nay, only the sinless one could taste it in its full bitterness, as vividly apprehending that which is the sting of death—the wrath of God.² The horror of death which marked the true Israelite (*e.g.* in Ps. xxii.) would be His in the fullest degree; and the dereliction would be heart-breaking to a sinless soul. It may therefore be allowed that Christ endured all the *signs*, but not the *affection* of Divine displeasure; but in any case it is vain to speculate as to the precise measure of those *ἄγνωστα πάθη* which He alone, in virtue of His holiness and love, was capable of enduring for our redemption.³

vii. The descent into hell.⁴

The following points are of special importance:—

1. Neither the soul nor the body of the Redeemer was for a moment parted from His Divine person.⁵ “The humanity of the Son of God was neither wholly in the sepulchre, nor wholly in Hades; but in the

¹ Heb. ii. 9.

² Cp. Delitzsch on *Hebrews*, *in loc.*; Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, c. vi. § 19; Aug. *de Trin.* iv. 6.

³ It must suffice to refer to the treatment of this subject by Aquinas, *Summa*, iii. 46. artt. 5, 6, 7, 8. Cp. Bruce, *Humil. of Christ*, p. 338.

⁴ On the history of this article, see Pearson. It first appears in the creed of Aquileia (*circ.* 400), but is generally found in the earlier Fathers. Cp. Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 69; H. Browne on *Thirty-Nine Articles*, art. 3.

⁵ See (*e.g.*) “Ath.” c. *Apoll.* ii. 14, 15; *Ep. ad Epict.* v.; Greg. Nyss. *Antirr.* xvii. etc.; Aquinas, *Summa*, iii. 50. 2 and 3; also Pearson, *On the Creed*, art. v. note 76 (quoting Fulgentius, *ad Thrasim.* iii. 34, as above).

sepulchre Christ lay dead as touching His true flesh, as touching His soul He descended to Hades; and as touching the same soul He returned from Hades to the flesh which He had left in the sepulchre. But as touching His Deity, which is not subject to limitations of space, nor comprehensible within bounds, *totus fuit in sepulchro cum carne, totus in Inferno cum anima; ac per hoc plenus fuit ubique Christus; quia non est Deus ab humanitate quam susceperat separatus, qui et in anima sua fuit, ut solutis Inferni doloribus ab Inferno victrix rediret, et in carne sua fuit, ut celeri resurrectione corrumpi non posset.*"

2. "Hades" is apparently a general name embracing two states: a blessed but not perfect condition or sphere called *Paradise*;¹ and a suffering but not perfectly miserable sphere assigned to the wicked, and generally called *Hades*. The mysterious work of the Redeemer seems to have been the visitation of either sphere. With the soul of the penitent malefactor at His side, He entered Paradise;² and He also visited that place or state where "some at least were confined who had died an apparently impenitent death by the visitation of God."³ Beyond this it is only possible to speak with the strictest reserve; and it is difficult to endorse the confident language of Cornelius à Lapide: *Certum est Christum cum latrone . . . descendisse ad limbum patrum; ibique eis visionem suæ divinitatis impertisse, itaque eos beasse; quare tunc Christus eorum sortes mutavit; fecit*

¹ Cp. Trench, *Studies in the Gospels*, p. 318, note 3.

² S. Lk. xxiii. 43. Ath. *Expos. fid.* 1, maintains that Christ, with the soul of the robber, *re-entered* the very Paradise whence Adam was expelled for his sin. See generally Aquinas, *Summa*, iii. 52, esp. artt. 2 and 5.

³ Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, p. 212. See 1 Pet. iii. 18, iv. 6. We should notice the prominence given to the history of Noah in our Lord's teaching, which seems to have deeply impressed S. Peter (S. Mt. xxiv. 37 f.; S. Lk. xvii. 26 f.).

enim ut limbus esset paradisos, ut inferi essent superi, ut infernus esset cælum. ~ Ubi enim est Christus, ibi est paradisos; ubi est visio Dei et beatitudo, ibi et cælum. ~

3. The article is important as proving the verity and completeness of Christ's manhood; the descent into Hades shows that He had a human soul as well as a human body. It was accordingly customary among the Fathers who opposed the error of Apollinaris to lay special stress on the doctrine of Christ's descent into hell.¹

viii. The high-priesthood of the Redeemer.²

The Epistle to the Hebrews, of which Christ's priesthood is the central theme, treats the Incarnation, and the conditions of Christ's human life, as the essential preparation for His high-priestly function and ministry. The main purport of the Epistle is to show that Christ fulfils the functions of a double high-priesthood—the Aaronic and the Melchizedekian.

1. Christ embodies the Aaronic or Levitic type of priesthood. He brings the offering of a spotless victim—Himself. Into this offering enters as a permanent element the "obedience" of His human life. The whole discipline of earthly trial and service was preparatory to a final, culminating act of high-priestly ministry—the self-oblation on the Cross. Christ was *obedient unto death*.³ Next, He enters once for all within the veil as the Levitic high-priests had done *year by year continually*. Every condition of acceptable atonement having been fulfilled,⁴ Christ passes into heaven itself *through His own blood*, and is *manifested in the presence of God for us*.⁵ The death

¹ Cp. Pearson, *l.c.*

² See an outline for study in Westcott, *Ep. to the Hebrews*, p. 70 ff. Cp. Aquinas, *Summa*, iii. 22.

³ Phil. ii. 8; Heb. vii. 27, viii. 3, ix. 14, 26, x. 10–12.

⁴ S. Jo. xix. 30.

⁵ Heb. iv. 14, vi. 20, viii. 12, 16, ix. 12, 24.

of Christ must not be considered apart from His triumph. Only when the whole typical transaction of the Day of Atonement is fulfilled; only, that is, when our Lord has died, risen, and ascended, is the atoning work complete.¹

2. Christ is also a priest *after the order of Melchizedek*: a priest enthroned, representing man to God and God to man. He who has made atonement (Heb. i. 3), and has cleansed the sphere of human worship (ix. 23), has taken His seat upon the throne and so entered upon the possession of that which by His obedience He has merited. His priesthood is universal and lifted above the limitations of nationality or time. Henceforth He applies to mankind the effects of His atoning work; He gathers the fruits of a victory already achieved; and "through the fulfilment of His work for His Church He moves towards the fulfilment of His work for the world."²

The Epistle in various passages indicates the nature and scope of Christ's present work as high-priest.

(a) *Intercession*. Christ intercedes for us by His *presence*: "His perpetual presentation of Himself before the Father is that which constitutes His intercession."³ It is not specially His passion which He is said to plead. Just as the ancient high priest stood without utterance before the ark in the Holy of Holies on the day of Atonement, so it suffices that Jesus is *manifested in the presence of God for us*.⁴ He presents humanity to the Father, consummated in accordance with the truth of

¹ Obs. the doctrinal importance of the resurrection and ascension. The resurrection was the seal of Divine acceptance impressed upon the Son's earthly work (cp. Rom. iv. 25); the ascension, or entry into the Divine presence, completed the work, and imparted to it an eternal validity. Cp. Milligan, *The Resurrection of our Lord*, pp. 137-142; Delitzsch on *Hebrews*, vol. ii. p. 82; Sanday and Headlam on *Romans*, p. 116.

² Westcott, *Ep. to the Hebrews*, p. 230.

³ Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 493.

⁴ Heb. ix. 24: ἐμφανισθῆναι τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ θεοῦ. See Westcott, *ad loc.*

the Divine purpose. It is His very presence which pleads; in Him humanity is enabled to bear the light of the Divine countenance unveiled.

(b) *The grace of access.* Through Jesus Christ the prayers and praises of the faithful are presented, and find acceptance, before God;¹ through Him, and *in His blood*,—compassed as it were and clothed with the merit or virtue of His life and sacrificial death,—Christians have their access to the holy place; they are brought near, as priests and kings, to God; as children they approach the Father; as suppliants they *come boldly to the throne of grace*.² Thus in union with Jesus Christ, the faithful enjoy perpetually that which under the old covenant was the privilege of one individual only, on one day in the year.

(c) *Sustenance.* The reference to Melchizedek implies that Christ fulfils a ministry similar to that which was mysteriously exercised by that ancient *priest of the most high God*. He solemnly blesses in the power of the Divine name, and He brings forth bread and wine to be the heavenly food of His people.³

(d) *Purification.* In Heb. ix. 13, 14, a contrast is drawn between the external purificatory rites of Judaism,—the purgation with blood on the Day of Atonement, and the removal of ceremonial defilement by means of the ashes of an heifer,⁴—and the inward effectual operation of the blood of Christ. The Mosaic rites availed to renew the covenant fellowship between God and His people which might have been interrupted by sin; they removed the accumulated defilement arising from daily action and intercourse, or from contact with death. But

¹ Heb. xiii. 15.

² Heb. iv. 16, vii. 25, etc. Cp. Rom. v. 2; Eph. ii. 18, iii. 12.

³ See Aquinas, *Summa*, iii. 22. 6 ad 2.

⁴ Lev. xvi. 18 f.; Num. xix. 17 f.

their effect was outward and transitory; they hallowed, but could not purge, the worshipper. Their effect might be described in the word *ἁγιασμός*, which implies merely the renewal of stated covenant conditions, the reconsecration of what had been desecrated or profaned. But the effect of Christ's blood is a true and inward purgation of the character and conscience from moral and spiritual defilement;¹ His blood is a real means of cleansing (*καθαρισμός*), of actual deliverance from the stain of guilt and from the power of sin. It is not merely the means of atonement as the symbol of man's submission to the penalties of sin, but also the source of healing and renewed strength. The communication of the blood of Christ, whether in the gift of absolution, or in the grace of holy communion, is in fact the communication of a Divine life annihilating the stains and reinforcing the frailty of nature.

NOTE.—The question has been asked, Why God did not restore man by a mere *fiat*? why was a redemptive act necessary?

The following outline of answers that have been given may be suggestive:—

1. Athanasius in the *de Incarnatione* holds that though a *fiat* of Divine omnipotence might have called things non-existent into existence, yet when things *actually existent* were perishing and wasting away, a *fiat* would be insufficient. "Christ came to heal things existent (*τὰ ὄντα*); and He became man to that end, and used the body as a human instrument."² In the *Orations*, however, he suggests a deeper line of thought. The restoration of man by a mere *fiat* would have been non-moral; it would have been unworthy of a God in whom

¹ Heb. ix. 14; cp. 1 S. Jo. i. 7 (Westcott, add. note).

² *de Incarn.* xlv. See above, p. 27.

mere force is subject and secondary to goodness. "We ought to consider," he says, "what is really profitable for mankind, and not in all matters to calculate what is *possible* for God to achieve. . . . For what He doeth is also expedient for men, and could not with seemliness be otherwise done."¹ In other words, the question is not, why could not God do so and so? but, what is most worthy of one who is perfect love?

2. John of Damascus and others held that the enemy of man would have had a just ground of complaint if he had been crushed by force.² This idea that in His dealings with Satan God necessarily adopted the method of perfect justice, is very common in the Fathers. The same noble idea is present in Augustine, namely, that the mere exercise of power is less worthy of God than goodness and justice.

3. Anselm points out that if any other method of redemption had been adopted, man would have had no part in the conquest. Here he follows Irenæus, who teaches that the very nature which had sinned must become victorious over sin; or as Anselm expresses it, the nature which owed the debt to God must pay it.³ Only one who is very God *can* discharge the debt; man alone *ought* to discharge it.

4. Bernard deprecates the question,⁴ but gives his own answer, which is characteristic. Man, he says, in consequence of the Incarnation, is more likely to be perpetually *mindful* of God's goodness. Living as they do, in a *land of forgetfulness*, men might have become ungrateful and forgetful of their benefactor, but for redemption. So in one of his sermons, he says: "Some one may say,

¹ *Orat. c. Arian.* ii. 68.

² *de orth. fid.* iii. 18; cp. Aug. *de Trin.* xiii. 13, and see Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 134.

³ *Cur Deus Homo?* i. 22, ii. 7.

⁴ *Ep. 190, de error. Abael.* viii. 19, 20.

‘God was not able to restore His work without all this difficulty’; nay, He was able, but He preferred to do it at the cost of suffering to Himself, rather than needlessly occasion the odious fault of ingratitude in man.”¹ Aquinas, in discussing the fitness of the Incarnation, suggests somewhat similar considerations. The Incarnation was a great means of instruction; man learned from it his duty to his Maker, and the dignity of his own nature; his hope was aroused, his pride subdued, his deliverance from sin effected.² Both Bernard and Aquinas seem to recognise the element of truth in Abelard’s subjective view of the atonement as a Divine incentive to love.

5. The consideration has been justly urged in modern times that no restoration of man is worthy of God that does not fully respect man’s freedom as a moral being. Annihilation of the sinner would be a mere confession of failure, so to speak, on God’s part; and any compulsory restoration, which should override man’s will and deal with him as a broken machine or instrument, would be only another form of annihilation; for freedom is an essential element in human nature, and man’s restoration is not worth while achieving unless he is freely won to submission and obedience.³

III. It remains to consider another momentous depart-

¹ *in Cant.* xi. 7.

² *Summa*, iii. 1. 2.

³ Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 466. The same idea is suggested by Iren. v. 1. 1: “Quoniam injuste dominabatur nobis apostasia et quum natura essemus Dei omnipotentis, alienavit nos contra naturam, suos proprios faciens discipulos; potens in omnibus Dei Verbum et non deficiens in sua justitia, juste etiam adversus ipsam conversus est apostasiam, ea quæ sunt sua redimens ab ea; non cum vi, quemadmodum illa initio dominabatur nostri, ea quæ non erant sua insatiabiliter rapiens; sed *secundum suadelam*, quemadmodum decebat Deum, suadentem (et non vim inferentem) accipere quæ vellet, etc.” The point here is that the *method of persuasion* alone is worthy of God, though Irenæus regards the *suadela* as employed towards Satan rather than man.

ment of the Redeemer's work : the re-creation of human nature through grace.

In the early days of Christianity, when the impression produced by the forlorn and helpless condition of humanity was profound and widespread, when human corruption seemed to have arrived at its zenith¹ and the world to be verging towards entire ruin and decay, Christian apologists eagerly welcomed that aspect of the Incarnation under which it was proclaimed as the renewal of all things, the gift of a new life to perishing humanity. Sin was contemplated less perhaps in its moral aspect as a radical defect of human nature, than as the source of corruption and decay to creation at large. ✓ The unspeakable joy of the early Christian Church was its sense of a Divine power at work in the world, really making all things new. ✓ The vivid experience of individual souls, combined with the consciousness of disturbance and upheaval in the pagan society surrounding them, led Christian thinkers to dwell particularly on the work of redemption as one of re-creation. Nor were they slow to apprehend the wisdom and fitness of the Incarnation as a movement of Divine love, whereby the great Creator Himself undertook the work of re-creation. Athanasius, for instance, repeatedly insists that only the Creator can renew fallen humanity; only the Creator can penetrate to the very roots of the nature which has become subject to corruption and sin; accordingly the Word of God, by whom all things were originally brought into being, comes to the assistance of His perishing creature; and by taking flesh becomes the restorer of humanity and the head of the new creation.² By an act of condescension correspond-

¹ "Omne in præcipiti vitium stetit" (Juvenal, *Sat.* i. 149).

² Ἀρχὴ τῆς καινῆς κτίσεως (*Orat. c. Arian.* ii. 70, etc.). Cp. Just. M. *Dial. c. Tryph.* 138 : ὁ γὰρ Χριστὸς . . . ἀρχὴ πάντων ἄλλου γένους γέγονεν τοῦ ἀναγεννηθέντος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δι' ὕδατος καὶ πίστεως καὶ ξύλου.

ing to that whereby He originally called the universe into existence, the Word deigned to become the first-begotten of creation and to lift it into the state of adoption.¹ His characteristic work was the renewal of the first creation, and its sustentation in the renewed state.

Now it is the doctrine of the New Testament that this work of renewal is accomplished by the ascended Christ, acting through the medium of His glorified humanity. "The human nature of Christ is raised by the Spirit of God into the resurrection might. Spiritualised,² quickened with new capacities of life, but not *dehumanised*, the God-accepted, God-united humanity is lifted to the Divine glory, to be thence, as the second Adam, through the ministry of the Spirit, the source of regenerating, re-creating life to His body, the Church."³ *The last Adam became a life-giving Spirit* is the pregnant statement of S. Paul;⁴ in its glorified state Christ's manhood becomes the medium whereby the fulness of the Divine life is communicated to man; by the resurrection and ascension it acquires an inexhaustible power of self-communication to man. And so, as Leo tersely expresses it, Christ *cœpit esse divinitate præsentior qui factus est humanitate longinquior*.⁵

To this aspect of Christ's operation on humanity corresponds the familiar patristic doctrine of man's "deification." ✓ Human nature is "deified" through the real indwelling of Christ's presence in His members. He has ordained and instituted *media* through which He vouchsafes to enter into them and to inhabit them

¹ *Orat. c. Arian.* ii. 64: συγκαταβάς τοῦ Λόγου, υἱοποιεῖται καὶ αὐτῇ ἡ κτίσις δι' αὐτοῦ. See the chapters which follow.

² Aquinas, *Summa*, iii. 54. 3.

³ Art. in *Ch. Quart. Review*, no. 32, p. 292. So Milligan, *The Resurrection of our Lord*, p. 167 f.

⁴ 1 Cor. xv. 45. Cp. Iren. iii. esp. 18. 1, 7, 21. 10, 22. 3.

⁵ *Serm. de res. Dom.* ii.

personally. The Word dwells, as S. John teaches, *in us*; the graces and excellences of His manhood overflow into the members of His body; *of His fulness have all we received, and grace for grace.*¹ ✓

The agent in this mystical process of re-creation is the Holy Spirit "accomplishing the presence" of the ascended Lord. In the presence of the indwelling Spirit, who proceeds forth from Christ's exalted manhood, the Lord Himself is present. "By reason of the grace of the Spirit given unto us, both we are in Him and He in us; and since the Spirit is God's, through His indwelling in us, we, possessing the Spirit, are reasonably accounted to be in God; and so God actually is in us. . . . By our participation in the Spirit we are united to the Deity."² ✓ The Spirit is, in fact, the true *vicar of Christ*;³ it is His work to manifest Christ, and the things of Christ, to men; His to convey to individual souls the enriching energies of Christ's manhood.⁴ He who "as power is immanent in nature, as spirit is immanent in man."⁵ ✓

✓ In accordance with the principle involved in the Divine Incarnation, the mode of the Spirit's operation

¹ S. Jo. i. 16. Cp. esp. Ath. *Orat. c. Arian.* i. 39, 43, ii. 47, iii. 34, 39. In iii. 33 he uses the striking expression λογωθεισης τῆς σαρκός; in i. 52 he speaks of Christ as χορηγὸς ἀρετῆς; cp. i. 43.

² Ath. *Orat.* iii. 24 (very explicit); cp. i. 46, ii. 14. So Iren. iii. 17. 1, speaks of the Holy Spirit in men as "voluntatem Patris operans in ipsis et renovans eos a vetustate in novitatem."

³ Tert. *de præser.* xxviii. Iren. iii. 17. 3, says that to the Spirit Christ commended man who had fallen among thieves: cp. iii. 24. 1. Hugh of S. Victor (*de Sacr.* ii. 2) says with great beauty: "Primum Filius venit ut homines liberarentur; postea Spiritus Sanctus venit ut homines beatificarentur. Primum ille a malo liberavit; postea hic ad bona revocavit. Ille abstulit quod sustinebamus; hic reddidit quod perdideramus."

⁴ On the relation of the Holy Spirit to Christ's manhood, see a thoughtful and striking chapter (iv.) in Milligan, *The Ascension and Heavenly Priesthood of our Lord.*

⁵ Fairbairn, *Christ in Mod. Theol.* p. 488.

is sacramental ; the Incarnation was itself the supreme illustration of the sacramental method, *i.e.* the conveyance of spiritual and Divine gifts through visible and material channels. Matter was for ever consecrated to be the veil and vehicle of spirit ; and it is important to bear in mind the mysterious closeness of connection between the work of the Holy Ghost and the sacraments ordained by Christ.¹ They convey an actual communication of the life of the risen Christ to the soul ; and being moral instruments of grace, their saving operation necessarily depends on the moral condition of the recipient. But the point to be insisted upon here is the perpetual co-operation between the Son and Holy Spirit in the work of man's salvation ; so that while the grace of the sacraments flows from the passion of Christ, their actual operation in the soul depends upon the presence of the Holy Spirit, whose office it is to accomplish the saving union of man's nature with the human nature of the Son. The Spirit is, in a word, the agent through whom the exalted humanity of the Divine Son is applied to our sinful nature for its healing and restoration.² ✓

The three aspects of our Lord's work have thus been briefly exhibited in their connection. ✓ He who through the obedience of His life became outwardly our example, and who by the sacrifice of the cross removed the barrier which sin had raised between God and His creatures, becomes through the agency of the Holy Spirit the source of a new life, re-creating men after His own image. ✓ "For it was not only that Christ exhibited the natural qualities of manhood in their most perfect state, but that He conferred upon it a

¹ Aug. *de Trin.* iii. 10 (of the Eucharist): "Non sanctificatur ut sit tam magnum sacramentum, nisi operante invisibiliter Spiritu Dei."

² Cp. Wilberforce, *The Incarnation*, chap. x.

power which was above nature. . . . The union of mankind with Christ is not a mere imitation—the following a good model—the fixing our thoughts upon One who has shown in the clearest manner how God may be served and men benefited; it is an actual and a real union, whereby all renewed men are joined to the second, as they were by nature to the first, Adam. . . . Our salvation therefore does not depend merely on our own efforts, on the self-dependent exertions of men to cure their inherent evils, but on the external influence of that head of our race who mercifully conforms His brethren to His own likeness.”¹

A few words may be added touching the consummation of the Redeemer's work. The goal of human history is described symbolically in Scripture as a kingdom of perfected human beings, penetrated and possessed by the life and Spirit of God. “The Word became flesh,” says Athanasius, “in order that He might make man capable of receiving Deity.”² He who dwelt *with* men aims at dwelling *in* them; only so can be accomplished that entire self-communication of God to His creatures which belongs to the essence of the chief Good,³ and which alone can satisfy man's upward aspirations. For it belongs to the true idea of human nature not to be independent of God, but to be a temple for the Divine nature; to be penetrated and possessed by Deity.⁴ This is the goal towards which our nature strives; it is the condition also of individual perfection. “The Son of God was made son of man,” says Irenæus, “that He might accustom man to receive God, and might accustom

¹ Wilberforce, *op. cit.* pp. 199–202.

² Ath. *Orat. c. Arian.* ii. 59: ἵνα τὸν ἀνθρώπον δεκτικὸν θεότητος ποιήσῃ.

³ Aquinas, *Summa*, iii. qu. 1, art. 1.

⁴ Cp. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, § 137.

God to dwell in man." And again, "He became man in order that man, embracing the Spirit of God, might pass over into the glory of the Father."¹ ✓ "In the time of restitution," says Nazianzen,² "we shall be wholly godlike"; ὅλοι θεοειδεῖς, ὅλου θεοῦ χωρητικοὶ καὶ μόνου τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ τελείωσις πρὸς ἣν σπεύδομεν.

But this consummation is destined to come about through judgment, and the office of judgment is committed to the Son, in virtue of the relationship in which He stands to our race; in virtue also of His being Himself *the Truth*: *Judicium . . . ad hominem qui est veritate imbutus pertinet, secundum quod est unum quodammodo cum ipsa veritate, quasi quædam lex et quædam justitia animata.*³

Meanwhile as King Christ sits enthroned *at the right hand of the Majesty on high*, watching and guiding the fortunes of His Church, bearing all things onward in their course towards the appointed end, and extending His dominion by a gradual victory over all that defies or resists His sway. And while He waits in calm expectancy till *His foes be made His footstool*, to His servants He is the ever-living source of *grace to help in time of need.*⁴ Thus the New Testament combines with the revelation of Christ's majesty the assurance of His tenderness. "Our Priest is King and our King is Priest. The Son of God is also Jesus the Son of man."⁵

¹ Iren. iii. 20. 2, iv. 20. 5.

² Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxx. 6. Cp. Milligan, *The Resurrection of our Lord*, pp. 189-195.

³ Aquinas, *Summa*, iii. 59. 2 ad 1. Cp. S. Jo. v. 27.

⁴ See Heb. i. 3, x. 13, iv. 16.

⁵ Westcott, *Christus consummator*, pp. 43, 44.

CONCLUSION

WE approached the study of the great doctrine which has occupied our attention in the foregoing pages under the guidance of S. John. In the prologue to his Gospel he describes in general outline the nature, the significance, and the permanent issues of the Divine Incarnation. Our closing reflections may appropriately take the form of a short expansion of another statement of the same inspired writer,—a statement which some would attribute to the Redeemer Himself, but which appears more probably to be a comment of the evangelist on the discourse of our Lord with Nicodemus: *God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life.*¹

Speaking generally, that which has secured the hold of S. John's Gospel on the thought and affection of Christendom, is pre-eminently its simplicity. Attention has been so often and so persistently directed to its difficulties,—its profound theology, or its use of abstract modes of expression, that we have in some degree lost sight of that which is not less remarkable—its power of appealing to the simple and unlettered, of presenting Divine truth in a manner level with their capacity, of using imagery the purport of which is plain to ordinary spiritual insight. Certainly in the utterance just quoted, we find the simplest summary of essential truth

¹ S. Jo. iii. 16.

that is contained in the New Testament. Here are combined the simplicity of age and the simplicity of knowledge. When life is far advanced, the realities of the unseen world become clear in proportion to their nearness; the primal facts of life stand out in their true proportions; things that have interrupted or distorted the earliest visions of truth fade and vanish. "To me," the poet makes S. John say,

"To me that story, ay, that Life and Death
Of which I wrote 'it was'—to me, it is;
Is here and now; I apprehend nought else.
Love, wrong, and pain, what see I else around?"

Hence in S. John's writings we find the language of calm assertion taking the place of reasonings, of balanced statements; advancing moral insight finds a new directness of utterance. Accordingly Aristotle bids us pay heed to the unproved statements of the old, because through age they have the eye of experience. Where facts are familiar from long and intense contemplation of them, they admit of being described simply. The mind which apprehends them is content to say, as S. John so often does in his Epistle, "We know." *We know that we are of God. We know that the Son of God is come.* And the simplicity which belongs to age belongs also to knowledge. We cannot be said to know a truth until we can give it expression in terms of the widest and simplest relationships. S. John speaks simply, not only because spiritual truth is most adequately conveyed to others under familiar imagery, but also because he knows profoundly what he teaches.

God loved the world. Here is, in the first place, the general point of view from which the mystery of redemption is to be approached and estimated.

The idea of "the world" which meets us in S. John's writings is in many respects peculiar to himself. The

phrase has a moral and also a physical application. It implies that the dwelling-place of man is the scene of conflict between Divine and human will. All that is averted from God, all that ignores Him, all that bids Him defiance—that is “the world” as a moral conception. The habitable globe, marred, darkened, depraved by the power of human will alienated from God—that is “the world” as a physical fact: in other words, “the present order viewed in its alienation from God.” It is this world of which S. John tells us that *God loved the world*.

It has been said that love is gifted with an insight which is ordinarily mistaken for blindness. He who loves discerns in the object of his affection something which is concealed from the gaze of others. He sees what his beloved might be; he sees the ideal nobleness, purity, or power which adverse circumstances repress, or superficial faults of character obscure. So we may venture to think it is with the Divine love for the world. God beholds the world, not as it is in itself, but as it is in Him who is *the beginning of the creation of God*; He looks upon it, and it is only not abhorred because He regards it not merely in its deformity, its ruin, its alienation from Himself, but as it is in idea, and as it may hereafter be in fact. The world is transfigured in the light of the Divine countenance. God sees it as it will be: *a new heaven and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness*. The transfiguring principle is already at work. *The true light already shineth*, and whatever is made manifest thereby is light. *Old things are passed away; they are become new*. Just as the individual soul, incorporated into Christ, clothed with Christ, radiant with the light of Christ, becomes a worthy object of Divine acceptance, so in some sense the world viewed in its totality is accepted in Christ, and can become the object of Divine love.

There is a striking passage in *John Inglesant* which describes the emotions excited in a cultivated observer by a constant and continuous observance of mankind—their ways, their follies, their pursuits, their pathetic strivings and failures, their picturesqueness as they group themselves in the play of social life, as they pass one by one from the stage on which they have acted their part. The observer would have them be always what they are to-day; the moral interest insensibly gives way before the æsthetic. He is content to watch them, and to amuse his fancy in the process. "This study of human life, this love of human existence, is unconnected with any desire for the improvement either of the individual or of the race. It is man as he is, not man as he might be, or as he should be, which is a delightful subject of contemplation to this tolerant philosophy which human frailty finds so attractive. Man's failings, his self-inflicted miseries, his humours, the effect of his very crimes and vices, if not even those vices themselves, form a chief part in the changing drama upon which the student's eyes are so eagerly set, and without these it would lose its interest and attraction." This human delight in the world—this "pleased acquiescence in life as it is"—stands in broad contrast to the love which penetrates beneath the appearance of things to their essence and inner reality. That which exercises so subtle and mysterious a fascination upon the human heart is only the passing fashion, the outward surface of the world. The hidden forces at work are too fragmentary, too obscure in their action, too dispersed in their range, for a human intellect steadily to keep in view their tendency and effects. But the love of God is a transforming power actually at work in the world. Through slow and age-long processes it works towards that which was eternally present to

the Divine thought: *according to His good pleasure which He hath purposed in Himself: that in the dispensation of the fulness of times, He might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth, even in Him.* In Christ the world again becomes to Divine eyes a rational order, a moral cosmos. S. John's starting-point then is love's view of the world. And we may observe that all action upon character, on a large or small scale, is successful in so far as it is inspired by a similar hopefulness. Christian hopefulness springs partly from a sober contemplation of the original Divine purpose for that which appears to be ruined, or corrupted, or crushed; partly from the assurance of the unfailing, unwearied love which works behind and in all sincere human endeavours.

But next, *God gave His Son.* Here in one word we have a description of the method of Divine love, its essential mode of operation—sacrifice. To an infinite and perfect being sacrifice must consist in self-limitation. In creation, Divine love limits itself. It calls into existence free, self-conscious beings, with a view to a free communication to them of itself. And so far the Divine Creator foregoes part of His prerogative. For the creature which is free in the moral sense of the word is capable of resisting and thwarting the Creator's will. In creating free intelligent beings—beings who are capable of going wrong—it would seem that God must needs allow evil a place in His world. But as Plato taught, and as Athanasius loves to repeat, there can be no envy in the Divine nature. Self-communication is of its essence. Love therefore creates. But, as we have seen,¹ creation is only the first stage in a continuous process of Divine self-communication. In the Incarnation of God there is obviously, and to a degree quite

¹ See p. 285.

beyond our measurement, a self-limitation of love. And finally, the completest, the most final limitation must consist in indwelling. For this is the goal of the Divine process: *I will walk in them, and dwell in them.* God *with* man is preparing for a further and final stage, God *in* man. The end of man is to be penetrated, indwelt by God.

Love then manifests itself in sacrifice. Jesus Christ presents Himself to mankind as that *gift of God*, in which was included all that men could need. His coming is the pledge of God's willingness to sacrifice Himself. And on this mystery of sacrifice in God, reverence will content itself with one inevitable reflection, namely, the impossibility of determining *a priori* its limits, or the nature of its effects. This reflection seems to exclude, for instance, the objection urged somewhat crudely a few years ago. The doctrine of evolution, it was urged, has made it difficult to take literally God's sacrifice of His own Son for the advantage of a race located on a third-rate planet, and so "has dealt a deathblow at the assumptions of human self-conceit." It is easy, and also true, to rejoin that the relative ideas of an object's importance that prevail among men are no clue to the possible estimate formed by eternal love. Until men have experienced the power, or patiently watched the methods of love, they have no standard whereby to measure the probabilities, or forecast the direction of Divine intervention. For character is that which can display itself in a little field as in a great. What gives us a clear conception of a royal person's character, for example, is not necessarily or only the capacity for handling with skill and width of grasp large affairs of State,—dealing, for instance, with a conquered nation, or a rebellious faction. We learn the truth of character better perhaps when we hear of a king stooping to relieve the wretchedness of a single family, or of a

queen reading beside the sickbed of a cottager or comforting a newly-made widow. In the same way the peculiar lustre of the love of God is revealed in the very fact that while "magnitude does not overpower Him, minuteness cannot escape Him." To us men the loss of one sheep out of a hundred might appear a loss of insignificant importance. To the Divine compassion the single lost one may seem a worthy object of diligent and toilsome search.

"The sense

Sees greatness only in the *sensuous* greatness:
Science in that sees little: Faith sees naught:
The small, the vast, are tricks of earthly vision.
To God, that omnipresent All-in-each,
Nothing is small, is far.
If earth be small, likelier it seems that love,
Compassionate most and condescending most
To sorrow's nadir depths, should choose that earth
For love's chief triumph, missioning thence her gift
Even to the utmost zenith."

Again, the mystery of sacrifice as an essential element in God's nature and methods of action may guard us from hasty assertions in regard to the limits of that profound fact which we call the *kenosis*. To forego capacities of action or knowledge may be a difficult process to conceive or express in intellectual terms. But our power of expressing or intellectually conceiving the fact is no measure of what may be a perfectly natural mode of working to Divine love.¹ We may well deprecate, for example, curious or over-minute discussion as to the exact conditions and limits of our blessed Lord's knowledge. This is eminently a mystery which is intelligible only to love. *He that loveth not knoweth not God*; and many Christians must feel their tongues tied by the sense that at the best they do but *desire* to

¹ See above, p. 288.

love. The history of Christian doctrine supplies us with but too many instances of the errors into which thought has been led by simply insisting on logical inference and ceasing to be ethical and spiritual; and perhaps Christian character has suffered even more deeply from this tendency than Christian philosophy. The safeguard against premature dogmatism is to reflect steadily on the degree of profound and lifelong communion with the source of all love, which lies behind the quiet words of the apostle of love, *He gave His Son*.

But, as we have said, there is a point in self-sacrifice and self-limitation even beyond that act of condescension by which God made Himself visible to His helpless and sinful creatures. It was an *unspeakable gift* that we should be *taught of God* what was the true ideal of manhood, in the loveliness of a perfect human life. It was an even greater gift that love should approve its character, should vindicate its glory, by submitting to the penalties of outraged moral law. But there was a gift beyond—the gift of Divine life. *The bread of God is He which cometh down from heaven, and giveth life unto the world*. It is this mystery of the interpenetration of the creature by the Creator which was the goal of saintly expectation, the crowning point of prophetic visions, and the true consummation and completion of the Incarnation. Thus mystical writers point to the prominence of the number twelve in the apocalyptic vision of the Church. Twelve, the blending of the Divine number *three* with the number of creation *four*, is a symbol of the indwelling of God in His creatures. And so the city of God has twelve gates and twelve foundations, and twelve times twelve thousand forms the Church of the redeemed.¹ The number symbolically represents a community indwelt by God. *He that sitteth on the throne*

¹ Rev. xxi. 10 f.

shall dwell among them. The tabernacle of God is with men, and He will dwell among them and they shall be His people, and God Himself shall be with them and be their God. Such then is the purpose, such the goal of Divine love. God's gift of His Son not only means the mission of one who could effect the reconciliation of God and man—the removal of that barrier which on any theory is raised between God and His creatures by the self-assertion of human will. The gift is that of an inward life, a renovating power, the grace of an indwelling presence. And it is just at this point, where the thought of atonement leads on to that of indwelling as its complement and consummation, that current religious thought not unfrequently recoils, and says as it said of old, “This is a hard saying, who can hear it?” Imagination is oppressed by the immensity of the Divine gift, the depth of Divine condescension. The methods of love—its impulse towards a complete and permanent union with its object—are to many minds strange, unfamiliar, and almost unwelcome. That God should come so close to us as to veil His presence beneath visible, tangible symbols, seems to some unworthy of the infinite Creator. They do not realise that in rejecting or depreciating the mystery of sacraments, they are setting arbitrary limits to the self-abasement of Divine love. They ignore the illuminating power of that Spirit which, S. Paul says, we have received for this express purpose—*that we may know the things that are freely given to us of God.* Our Lord Himself speaks of *the gift of God*¹ as if it were the highest object of human thought and knowledge: *the gift of God*, surpassing all that men ask or think: the gift of the indwelling Christ visiting us in His sacraments of grace, in His ministry, in His Church, in all the operations of the Spirit; the gift of Him who *of God became unto*

¹ S. Jo. iv. 10.

us wisdom and righteousness and sanctification and redemption.

And at this point we may somewhat extend the thought of Divine self-limitation, in order to consider how fruitful and important are the results of reasoning from the analogy of the Incarnation in other great departments of theological inquiry. We have seen that the Incarnation is, in its essence, the communication of a Divine gift to mankind under the veil of a tangible and visible human form;¹ it implies the permanent consecration of matter as the appropriate veil and vehicle of spirit. It hallows what is earthly and material to sacramental uses. "The wisdom of the early Church," says a living writer,² "becomes apparent in the tenacity with which, when philosophy meant idealism, and the secrets of matter were all unexplored, she clung to the reality of the human nature of her Lord. . . . For the leaven of the Incarnation leavened the whole lump. And in taking flesh upon Him and transfiguring it by dying, the Word came into new contact, not only with the few in Palestine whom He breathed upon and sighed over, and healed by the trailing of His garment and the imposition of His hand, but with the human body everywhere, and its modes of material affection,—sanctifying water to the mystical washing away of sin, consecrating bread and wine to holier purposes of sustenance, hallowing symbolic and ceremonial teaching, deepening the parables of nature and the significance of art." The whole sacramental system of the catholic Church, viewed as an organised kingdom of *media*, divinely intended to bring human souls into vital union with God, finds its sanction and explanation in the Incarnation of the Son of God.

¹ 1 S. Jo. i. 1.

² J. R. Illingworth, *University and Cathedral Sermons*, p. 203. This point has been already noticed above, p. 332.

He Himself is, in Hooker's phrase, "that mean between both [God and man] which *is* both"; in the Church the principle of mediation is extended, in wise adaptation to the complex needs of human nature; visible human persons, things, and ordinances become the channels of the Divine goodness; and so the principle, already clearly marked in the Old Testament dispensation, finds a new and more complete expression,—“the principle that when man is brought near to God it is with the entirety of his manhood; that God is to be glorified alike in the body and in the spirit, and that His mercy really is over all His works.”¹ The Incarnation is in fact the crowning example, or rather the sufficient justification, of the Divine use of *media*. God reveals Himself in it as willing to take things common, and to make them instruments of Divine power; He gives to great spiritual energies and gifts *a body as it hath pleased Him*.

So, again, the analogy of the Incarnation may be extended to the question of the nature and limits of inspiration. What does the fact of the Incarnation *a priori* suggest as to the probable character of Scripture? We shall antecedently expect to find in the records of revelation that twofold character which marks the revelation of God in human form. Scripture will wear a twofold aspect. It will not surprise us if on one side it appears “perfectly human.”² We shall remember that in the incarnate Christ there was very much that was simple, plain, ordinary. It has been pointed out by Bishop Milman³ that the great trial for our Lord's contemporaries—the trial under which the average Jewish faith actually broke down—was the simplicity and the ordinariness of His outward appearance. *Is not*

¹ Dean Paget in *Lux Mundi*, p. 414.

² Robertson Smith, *The O.T. in the Jewish Church*, p. 18.

³ *The Love of the Atonement*, cc. vii. and viii.

*this, men asked, the carpenter's son, the brother of James and Joses and Juda and Simon? and are not his sisters here with us? And they were offended at Him.*¹ Now similarly Scripture is found to have a literary history, exceptional indeed, but not to all appearance entirely mysterious or inexplicable. In proportion as our literary and critical knowledge becomes enlarged, we come to feel that in its letter, in its outward aspect, Scripture appears, so to speak, more and more completely human. It displays to a large extent traces of human workmanship analogous to those which we find in other literature. It seems in considerable portions to embody a collection of fragmentary materials gathered together, none can say with certainty how, when, or by whom; and so far it appears to be parallel in construction to other great products of national genius. There is always danger however, lest this ordinariness of external aspect should make men practically blind to the higher claims and proper use of Scripture. Our Lord did not at first sight bear any mark or quality to distinguish Him from others, except His transcendent holiness, and the tone of moral authority with which He taught. Something of the same kind attracts our attention in Scripture. Here, also, under a humble exterior is concealed a special presence of God; here, as in the Incarnation, is the self-unveiling of a Divine Spirit, the operation of Divine power, the manifestation and the appeal of Divine love. These are great realities of the spiritual world, which remind us that the true function of Scripture transcends the range of critical investigation. The appeal of spirit is to spirit; the appeal of power to the sense of dependence and moral need; the appeal of love to the faculties of heart and will. And inasmuch as Holy Scripture bears the very title, *Word of God*, which it ascribes to

¹ S. Mk. vi. 3.

the Divine Son, no supposed thoroughness of scientific knowledge can justify the shallow conclusion that the Bible, as a complete product, is evacuated of mystery. Inspiration, like the fact of the Incarnation, implies the unsearchable operation, the continuous control, and the overruling guidance of the Holy Spirit of God; and where He deigns to act or move, there is and must be an element of unfathomable mystery.¹

In such instances as these we are justified in using the analogy of the Incarnation to throw light on other verities of Christian belief, and to illustrate their essential coherence with the general body of truth to which they belong. We may now return to the passage of S. John in order to notice one more point of His teaching. He proceeds to declare the ulterior purpose of God's love in giving His Son, namely, *that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life.*

Here we are reminded of that mystery which, as was once said by Dr. Newman, might well make us laugh with amazement and wonder—the mystery of God's personal care for individual souls.² Love not only has comprehensive and far-reaching purposes; it not only deals with the natural order on a large scale; it seeks the perfection of details; it sees the relation of part—even the least part—to the well-being of the whole; it gathers up fragments that nothing may be lost; it puts each single portion of the whole to its appropriate use. And it is important to remember that it was apparently a leading purpose of the Incarnation to bring home to us the value of the single soul—of the personal life—in God's sight. A considerable part of our Lord's ministry was devoted to personal interviews. He spends a day

¹ S. Jo. iii. 8.

² See Newman, *Paroch. Sermon*, vol. iii. no. 9; Church, *Pascal and other Sermons*, no. xix.

with two inquirers ; He devotes a night to Nicodemus ; He concentrates Himself on the spiritual needs of the Samaritan woman ; He watches Nathaniel under the fig-tree ; He loves Mary, and Martha, and Lazarus ; He commends the devotion of the woman that was a sinner ; He points to the example of the poor widow casting her mites into the treasury ; He notices and rewards the zeal of Zacchæus ; His ear is open, His response immediate, to the prayer of the dying thief. Mary Magdalene is blessed with the vision of the risen One, and named by her name : *Jesus saith unto her, Mary.* And this discriminating tenderness and care seems to be reflected in the system of the Church. For in the first place, the Church adapts her discipline to individual cases. Personal dealing is a necessary part of her method. She recognises and delights in the diversity of the souls under her care. It is her aim to develop and train individuality ; and she provides remedies for each spiritual disorder, guidance for every type of character, every variety of temperament ; she educates personality without repressing or stiffening or crushing it. The Christian Church is no hothouse, but a garden of God, where the trees are of His planting, and each must be tended according to its need and peculiar capacity. The Church is the home of individuality, where each may feel himself cared for, and none may be unregarded or forgotten ; *and whether one member suffer all the members suffer with it, or one be honoured, all the members rejoice with it.* And secondly, the Church aims at keeping each soul in conscious relation to God. The means of grace provided by Divine bounty are not obstacles between the soul and God, but His own appointed *media* of union and reconciliation. The personal communion of the soul with God, the right jealousy of personal access to the Father of spirits in Jesus Christ—these privileges are secured

and guaranteed by life in God's Church. Thus then in the pastoral system of the Church we see the action of love reflected and embodied; men are called one by one, one by one taken into the arms of God, one by one absolved, one by one fed with the Bread of eternal life, one by one warned, chastened, guided with wise care, and with far-seeing providence. For love has its purposes, its hopes, for the unregarded units of the crowd. It makes its appeal, it offers its gifts in ways and on occasions that we know not of; it has its own times of discipline, its own ways of winning or leading human souls. To each it may whisper in the moment of its conscious loneliness, *I will not leave thee until I have done that which I have spoken to thee of*. Each may say with S. Paul, *He loved me, and gave Himself for me*.

The love of God for the world, the self-sacrifice of love, the discriminating care of love—these are the three mysteries which S. John describes with such simplicity.

The intellectual apprehension of a great doctrine like that of the Incarnation has its fascination for the mind, but it needs to be supplemented by the insight which only love can give. For one thing which we seem to learn from the study of Christian doctrine is the danger of prejudice, *i.e.* a fixed preconception as to the way in which God will act. We have an instance of prejudice overcome in Nathaniel. He asked, *Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?* and the answer which he needed, and which Philip gave him was, *Come and see*. Nathaniel comes into the presence of Jesus, and there he learns more perfectly to understand the range and methods of the Divine providence. He found that Jesus already knew him; knew his character, his antecedents, his capacities; and actual contact with Jesus dispelled his prejudice. The want of openness of mind has its obvious perils

in regard to all kinds of new knowledge, but especially in the study of religious truth. It cannot be safely forgotten by those who study theology as a science; who are familiar with its history and terminology. Such persons do well occasionally to translate theological truths, as S. John does in this passage, into the language of simple relationships and familiar experiences. To do so guards a student from hardness, from unreality, from crude dogmatism, from want of sympathy. *God loved the world*; and we are to measure the self-revelation and self-abasement of love, not by any mere standard of intellectual completeness, nor by the measuring line of average human character or of reason isolated from character. We have to ask ourselves—and it is not everyone who can safely attempt to answer the question—what is probable, what is consistent, what is worthy of that which is called love? If love be that which attempts the seemingly impossible, which is ever breaking down insurmountable barriers, which is ever giving to colder natures food for wonderment and even for ridicule, which is persistently and almost perversely hopeful, which has no fears of being misunderstood, no arbitrary limit in condescension; which transfigures everything it touches, which clings and forsakes not, making all things possible, and all things perfect,—it is clear that there is a force at work in the world which defies the kind of measurements by which religion is often tried and rejected as wanting; a force the action and method of which will only be intelligible to that which is akin to itself.

Students of theology do well to face the private and personal bearing of what they read or learn from other men. "We may overlook and cloud the fact of the Incarnation with subordinate doctrines, with the theories and traditions of men, with a disproportionate mass of guesses on what it is not given us to know, of

subtleties and reasonings in the sphere of human philosophy; we may recoil from it and put it from us, as something which oppresses our imagination and confounds our reason; but we may be sure that on the place which we really give it in our mind and heart depends the whole character of our Christianity, depends what the gospel of Christ means *to us*.”¹

*Si quis se existimat scire aliquid, nondum cognovit quemadmodum oporteat eum scire. Si quis autem diligit Deum, hic cognitus est ab eo.*²

¹ Church, *Pascal and other Sermons*, p. 182.

² 1 Cor. viii. 2, 3.

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